Sung-Ming Yen

TL;DR: This paper describes a DFA attack on the AES key schedule that efficiently finds the key of AES-128 with feasible computation and less than thirty pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts.

TL;DR: A new side-channel vulnerability of cryptosystems implementation based on BRIP or square-multiply-always algorithm is pointed out by exploiting specially chosen input message of order two and further extension of the proposed attack is possible to develop more powerful attacks.

TL;DR: This article considers the problem of how to prevent the fast RSA signature and decryption computation with residue number system speedup from a hardware fault cryptanalysis in a highly reliable and efficient approach and proposes a new concept of fault infective CRT computation and fault infectives CRT recombination.

TL;DR: In this research, immunity of the Montgomery ladder against the doubling attack is investigated and a remark is given to the problem of whether the upward (right-to-left) regular exponentiation algorithm is necessary against the original doubling attack and the proposed relative doubling attack.

TL;DR: This work considers the integration of block cipher cryptanalysis techniques into a particular type of side-channel attack, the differential fault attack (DFA), and applies the DFA on the AES key schedule or on intermediate states within the AES and exploits distinguishers based on Square attacks and impossible differential cryptanalysis to cover the remaining rounds.