https://www.sfu.ca/~wainwrig/Econ400/jensen-meckling.pdf

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

How behavior and institutions are affected by social relations is one of the classic questions of social theory. This paper concerns the extent to which economic action is embedded in structures of social relations, in modern industrial society. Although the usual neoclasical accounts provide an "undersocialized" or atomized-actor explanation of such action, reformist economists who attempt to bring social structure back in do so in the "oversocialized" way criticized by Dennis Wrong. Under-and oversocialized accounts are paradoxically similar in their neglect of ongoing structures of social relations, and a sophisticated account of economic action must consider its embeddedness in such structures. The argument in illustrated by a critique of Oliver Williamson's "markets and hierarchies" research program.

Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness

?The stakeholder theory has been advanced and justified in the management literature on the basis of its descriptive accuracy, instrumental power, and normative validity. These three aspects of the theory, although interrelated, are quite distinct; they involve different types of evidence and argument and have different implications. In this article, we examine these three aspects of the theory and critique and integrate important contributions to the literature related to each. We conclude that the three aspects of stakeholder theory are mutually supportive and that the normative base of the theory-which includes the modern theory of property rights-is fundamental. If the unity of the corporate body is real, then there is reality and not simply legal fiction in the proposition that the managers of the unit are fiduciaries for it and not merely for its individual members, that they are . . . trustees for an institution [with multiple constituents] rather than attorneys for the stockholders.

http://www.faculty.wwu.edu/dunnc3/rprnts.stakeholdertheoryofcorporation.pdf

The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications

Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization

Oliver E. Williamson University of California, Berkeley This paper combines institutional economics with aspects of contract law and organization theory to identify and explicate the key differences that distinguish three generic forms of economic organization-market, hybrid, and hierarchy. The analysis shows that the three generic forms are distinguished by different coordinating and control mechanisms and by different abilities to adapt to disturbances. Also, each generic form is supported and defined by a distinctive type of contract law. The costeffective choice of organization form is shown to vary systematically with the attributes of transactions. The paper unifies two hitherto disjunct areas of institutional economics-the institutional environment and the institutions of governance-by treating the institutional environment as a locus of parameters, changes in which parameters bring about shifts in the comparative costs of governance. Changes in property rights, contract law, reputation effects, and uncertainty are investigated.'

/pdf/comparative-economic-organization-the-analysis-of-discrete-2pqve3tqkn.pdf

Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives

AS CRITICISM of the traditional theory of production and exchange has mounted in the postwar period, increasing attention has been given to new analytical approaches that seek either to supplant classical marginalism or to extend its scope. In the latter category is the important body of literature that has grown up around the notion of property rights structures. The contributions here are quite diverse in style and content but are characterized by a common emphasis on certain basic ideas concerning the interconnectedness of ownership rights, incentives, and economic behavior. The purpose of the present paper is to summarize the essential features of this line of research, examine some of its important areas of application, and discuss the promise the approach holds for improved understanding of economic problems.

Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature

This authoritative collection presents the most important published articles on the cultural, legal, philosophical and economic dimensions of property rights. It shows how the economics of property rights has enriched our ability to understand as well as to predict a wide range of real world events.

The economics of property rights.

This book argues that the capacity of a country to develop, and the levels of economic and social development achieved, depend more on the institutional parameters within which the development policies are implemented than on the policies themselves. It contends that forces of globalisation influence individual countries' economic and social institutions.

/pdf/the-effects-of-the-interaction-of-formal-and-informal-41kq394ly7.pdf

Svetozar Pejovich

Papers

Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature

The economics of property rights.

The Effects of the Interaction of Formal and Informal Institutions on Social Stability and Economic Development

The Effects of the Interaction of Formal and Informal Institutions on Social Stability and Economic Development

Property rights and the behavior of the firm in a socialist state: The example of Yugoslavia