Since 2008, several OECD member countries had experienced a debt crisis, or at least were close to it. Three countries, Greece and Ireland in 2010, and Portugal in 2011, needed to receive help from the IMF through rescue packages. The debt ratio is expected to be above 60% of the GDP based on the projections for most of the OECD countries by 2015, (Rogoff, Reinhart, 2010), which means that the number of countries with the debt to GDP ratio of around 80 to 100 percent will increase.

The debt crisis occurs partially as consequences of errors in the economic policy. The government’s fiscal discipline institutions can help to maintain the government deficit and manage the public debt. 

The reason for the founding of these institutions is mainly to ensure the sustainability of the public debt, to create fiscal discipline, to maintain the budget deficit and to ensure the transparency of the budgetary process. In some EU countries, fiscal councils responsible for preserving fiscal discipline and compliance have existed for years. Ireland, Portugal and Slovakia have also launched initiatives to establish independent fiscal institutions.
The goal of the paper is to examine what the influence is of having approached the critical level of public debt, on changes to the fiscal rules in three countries of the European Union (Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom). The present study aims to compare the institutions that are responsible for fiscal budgetary discipline in the countries that are examined, with special regard to the degree of their independence, the duration of their existence, and areas of activity. The research results will be formulated regarding the lessons learned on the role of the EU fiscal policy institutions in crisis management.

http://www.eco.u-szeged.hu/english/research/scientific-publications/crisis-aftermath-conference-proceedings/bernadett-kovacs-gyongyi-csuka

The role of independent fiscal institutions in managing the European sovereign debt crisis: The case of the United Kingdom, Germany and Poland

Az Europai Unio megujulo gazdasagi kormanyzasi rendszerenek egyik meghatarozo pillere a diszkrecionalis gazdasagpolitikaval szemben megfogalmazott szabalyalapusag lesz. A minden korabbinal erősebb es velhetően hatekonyabb szabalyok bevezetesenek legelkotelezettebb hive Nemetorszag. Az elmult evtizedekben a folyo koltsegvetesi kiadasok hianybol tortenő finanszirozasanak tilalmat előiro aranyszabalyt inkabb kevesebb, mint tobb sikerrel alkalmazo Nemetorszag most arra vallalkozott, hogy nem csak sajat hataskorben vezeti be az un. adossagfeket, hanem kovetendő peldakent allitja azt a tobbi tagorszag ele is. Irasunkban az aranyszabaly, illetve az adossagfek előnyeit
es hatranyait vesszuk szamba a nemet tapasztalatok felhasznalasaval. / === / The need to strengthen rules-based fiscal policy has emerged as a widely shared
consensus amongst policy-makers in the recent economic and financial crisis. Germany has become the most devoted advocator of the new regime, where more innovative and effective fiscal rules are supposed to play an even bigger role than before. Germany supports such a move however not only in rhetoric but also in practice. It decided to abandon its several decade old golden rule and to adopt a more sophisticated one, the so-called debt-brake. This article provides a cost-benefit analysis of both the previous and the new fiscal rule.

Szilvia Váradi

Papers

Aranyszabály helyett adósságfék - a német példa = Debt-brake instead of the golden rule - the caseof Germany