Showing papers by "T. Parthasarathy published in 1990"
TL;DR: Weakly completely mixed bimatrix games are defined to be games with a completely mixed Nash component as mentioned in this paper, which turns out to consist of only one point, which is isolated.
8 citations
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TL;DR: Weakly completely mixed bimatrix games are defined to be games with a completely mixed Nash component as mentioned in this paper, which turns out to consist of only one point, which is isolated.
Abstract: Weakly completely mixed bimatrix games are defined to be games with a completely mixed Nash component. For these games this component turns out to consist of only one point, which is isolated. Special classes of these games are completely mixed matrix and bimatrix games, the first introduced by Kaplansky, the latter by Raghavan. We give a characterization of these games, which can be used for completely mixed matrix games also. Given a completely mixed strategy pair, we are able to construct a (weakly) completely mixed bimatrix game having this pair as an equilibrium. We derive interesting results for the case where the payoff matrices have a nonnegative and irreducible inverse.
7 citations
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5 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that discounted general-sum stochastic games with two players, two states, and one player controlling the rewards have the ordered field property and that the value is rational.
Abstract: It is shown that discounted general-sum stochastic games with two players, two states, and one player controlling the rewards have the ordered field property. For the zero-sum case, this result implies that, when starting with rational data, also the value is rational and that the extreme optimal stationary strategies are composed of rational components.
2 citations