Showing papers by "Tadashi Sekiguchi published in 2008"
TL;DR: It is shown that the folk theorem holds for any finite stage game that satisfies the standard full dimensionality condition and for any level of observation costs, and tacit collusion can attain efficient outcomes in general repeated games with private monitoring if perfect private monitoring is merely feasible, however costly it may be.
40 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a simple model of repeated partnerships with noisy outcomes is studied, where two partners first choose a sharing rule, under which they start their repeated interaction, and characterize the sharing rule which supports the most efficient equilibrium, and show that it suffices to consider two particular sharing rules.
Abstract: We study a simple model of repeated partnerships with noisy outcomes. Two partners first choose a sharing rule, under which they start their repeated interaction. We characterize the sharing rule which supports the most efficient equilibrium, and show that it suffices to consider two particular sharing rules. One is an asymmetric sharing rule, which induces only a more productive partner to work. It is optimal for impatient or less productive partners. The other treats them more evenly, and prevails for more productive partnerships with patient partners. Those results indicate that the role of a more productive partner crucially depends on technological parameters and patience. If the partners become more productive or more patient, the productive partner ceases to be a residual claimant and sacrifices his own share, in order to foster teamwork.
2 citations