Distinguishing four sources of power in human societies – ideological, economic, military and political – The Sources of Social Power traces their interrelations throughout human history In this first volume, Michael Mann examines interrelations between these elements from neolithic times, through ancient Near Eastern civilizations, the classical Mediterranean age and medieval Europe, up to just before the Industrial Revolution in England It offers explanations of the emergence of the state and social stratification; of city-states, militaristic empires and the persistent interaction between them; of the world salvation religions; and of the particular dynamism of medieval and early modern Europe It ends by generalizing about the nature of overall social development, the varying forms of social cohesion and the role of classes and class struggle in history First published in 1986, this new edition of Volume 1 includes a new preface by the author examining the impact and legacy of the work

The sources of social power

“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?” Alice asked the Cheshire Cat. “That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,” said the Cat. “I don't much care where...” said Alice. “Then it doesn't matter which way you go,” said the Cat. (Carroll, 1983: 72)

Toward A Unified Conception Of Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory

Inclusion and democracy.

The Law of Peoples John Rawls Harvard 1999 John Rawls, the great political philosopher, has turned his reflections to questions of international justice, much as his philosophical ancestor Kant did toward the end of his career. Indeed, Kant's conception of a "pacific federation" of states in Perpetual Peace is Rawls's acknowledged model for the "realistic utopia" sketched in The Law of Peoples, which expands upon his 1993 essay by the same title (without, however, revising its basic argument). Despite differing philosophical constraints and geopolitical conditions, both Kant and Rawls aim to develop an ideal normative framework for international law that accommodates a measure of realism and rejects the idea of a world-state. Unfortunately, in its uncritical acceptance of so-called "decent hierarchical societies" even at the level of ideal theory, the normative claim of Rawls's Law of Peoples is undermined. This philosophical appeasement, meant to secure perpetual peace in our time through a moderately demanding Law of Peoples that liberal and "decent" hierarchical societies alike can endorse, departs fundamentally from Kant's cosmopolitanism. For Kant, the "First Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace-as opposed to a temporary interruption of hostilities-is that each member state of the foedus pacif cum must have a republican form of government, which is partly founded upon "the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens)." By contrast, Rawls weakens his ideal of international justice to buy the assent of hierarchical societies, which by definition lack equality among citizens, at the price of sacrificing a theoretical basis for justifying reforms of the practices and institutions of these hierarchical societies above a minimal level of decency. Rawls's complex argument begins by extending the original position, in which principles of justice for the basic structure of society are chosen under epistemic constraints that ensure fairness, from a single liberal society to what he calls the Society of Liberal Peoples. In a second step, though still within ideal theory, he argues that the substantive principles comprising the Law of Peoples are also acceptable to decent hierarchical societies, which possess decent consultation hierarchies and common good conceptions of justice. Despite being inegalitarian, decent hierarchical societies do respect basic human rights, allow some dissent, and at least consult with representatives of groups whose members are denied full citizenship rights. …

The Law of Peoples

Conclusions and Recommendations, are particularly interesting in view of the controversies aroused by the Warnock Report. Many of the recommendations contained here are similar to Warnock's (for example, concerning the legitimacy of AID children, the need for a licensing authority to supervise the work ofAID and IVF centres, etc), but others are at odds with the corresponding Warnock recommendations. In general, the authors place higher value on the family as an institution than did the Warnock Committee and display a much livelier awareness of the possible social dangers of the new techniques. One weakness of the book is that since its authors are approaching these topics from the standpoint of social scientists, their recommendations for legislative action which surely must be based on properly ethical considerations, not merely sociological ones seem devoid of any satisfactory rational support. For example, they concede that experimentation on human embryos is an objectionable practice, since 'the material acting as the subject of the experimentation is a human being at the beginning of its individual development' (p 178); but the practical recommendation which they make concerning this practice is disappointingly feeble:

https://jme.bmj.com/content/medethics/12/3/165.full.pdf

Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy

International Relations in Political Thought: AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO

1. Ethical traditions in international affairs Terry Nardin 2. The tradition of international law Murray Forsyth 3. The declaratory tradition in modern international law Dorothy V. Jones 4. Classical realism Steven Forde 5. Twentieth century realism Jack Donnelly 6. Natural law and international ethics Joseph Boyle 7. Kant's global rationalism Thomas Donaldson 8. Utilitarianism and international ethics Anthony Ellis 9. The contractarian tradition and international ethics David R. Mapel 10. Liberalism and international reform Michael Joseph Smith 11. Marxism and international ethics Chris Brown 12. The idea of rights in international ethics R. J. Vincent 13. Biblical argument in international ethics Michael G. Cartwright 14. Convergence and divergence in international ethics David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin.

Traditions of International Ethics

PrefaceMy aim in this book is to consider the ideas of law, morality,nand society as they pertain to the relations of states. Thesenideas are central and not, as many hold, peripheral to thenstudy of international relations. I want to defend the viewnthat the practices of international law and international moralitynconstitute the indispensable foundation of all durable internationaln association. To the extent that the relations of statesnachieve a significant degree of permanence, rising above thenlevel of mere episodes in the separate histories of isolatednpolitical communities, they must be understood as taking placenon the basis of common, authoritative practices and rules.nAnd this, I shall argue, means that they must be understoodnas occurring within a world of legal and moral ideas.Two topics often treated by theorists of international relationsnare also considered here. One is whether legal and moralnorder can exist at all in an international system lacking centralizedninstitutions for making and applying law and characterizednby deep cultural and ideological differences. The othernis the tension between what might be labeled qstate-centricqnand qcosmopolitanq conceptions of international society, law,nand morality -- an old topic recently revived in controversiesnover human rights and international distributive justice. Butnmy main concern is with an argument that has not been adequatelynconsidered in connection with international relations,nand this is that morality and law are best understoodnas authoritative practices constraining the pursuit of differentnpurposes rather than as instruments for the joint pursuit ofnshared purposes. International morality and international lawnare authoritative practices that have evolved in the course ofnrelations among separate political communities, practices bynwhich international conduct is to be guided and judged. It isnin terms of these practices that those who have different values,ninterests, and beliefs, and who may be engaged in thenpursuit of different and sometimes incompatible purposes, canncoexist with one another. It seems to me that the distinctionnbetween what I have chosen to identify as the qpracticalq andnqpurposiveq conceptions of international society is at least asnilluminating and important as any of the more familiar distinctionsnthat have occupied the attention of theorists of internationalnrelations. This book is largely an exploration ofnthat distinction and its implications.The main distinction is developed in the introductory chapter.nPart One is concerned with the idea of international society,nand in particular with the gradual emergence of thenidea of the society of states as a kind of practical association.nIt considers how the view that international law is an institutionnspecific to the society of states developed from an earliernunderstanding of the law of nations as a branch of naturalnlaw, and explores the historical fortunes of the practical conceptionnof international law in the unfolding of nineteenth andntwentieth-century international politics. Part Two containsnan analysis of the authoritative common practices andnrules of international society, where these are understood asncomprising a system of positive law. And Part Three examinesnthese practices and rules in their moral aspect, that is, as anset of ideas handed down within an independent moral traditionnor traditions. I also attempt to trace some of the implicationsnof the practice/purpose distinction for the topics ofninternational justice, human rights, and the just war. Thenquestion whether the view of international law and internationalnmorality I defend has any relevance to an ideologicallynand culturally diverse world is considered in the concludingnchapter.n n

Law, Morality, and the Relations of States

The Description for this book, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States, will be forthcoming.

Terry Nardin

Papers

International Relations in Political Thought: AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO

Traditions of International Ethics

Law, Morality, and the Relations of States

Law, Morality, and the Relations of States

The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals.