/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

The Study of Man. By Michael Polanyi. Price, $1.75. Pp. 102. University of Chicago Press, 5750 Ellis Ave., Chicago 37, 1959. One subtitle to Polanyi's challenging and fascinating book might be The Evolution and Natural History of Error , for Polanyi is at pains to expunge what he believes to be the false notion contained in the contemporary view of science which treats it as an object and basically impersonal discipline. According to Polanyi not only is this a radical and important error, but it is harmful to the objectives of science itself. Another subtitle could be Farewell to Detachment , for in place of cold objectivity he develops the idea that science is necessarily intensely personal. It is a human endeavor and human point of view which cannot be divorced from nor uprooted out of the human matrix from which it arises and in which it works. For a good while

Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

Organizations face institutional complexity whenever they confront incompatible prescriptions from multiple institutional logics. Our interest is in how plural institutional logics, refracted through field-level structures and processes, are experienced within organizations and how organizations respond to such complexity. We draw on a variety of cognate literatures to discuss the field-level structural characteristics and organizational attributes that shape institutional complexity. We then explore the repertoire of strategies and structures that organizations deploy to cope with multiple, competing demands. The analytical framework developed herein is presented to guide future scholarship in the systematic analysis of institutional complexity. We conclude by suggesting avenues for future research.

Institutional Complexity and Organizational Responses

Industry self-regulation—the voluntary association of firms to control their collective action—has been proposed as a complement to government regulation. Proponents argue that the establishment of...

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1556362.pdf

Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program

We develop an economic model of greenwash, in which a firm strategically discloses environmental information and a non-governmental organization (NGO) may audit and penalize the firm for failing to fully disclose its environmental impacts. We identify conditions under which NGO punishment of greenwash backfires, inducing the firm to become less rather than more forthcoming about its environmental performance. We show that complementarities with NGO auditing may justify public policies encouraging firms to adopt environmental management systems. Mandatory disclosure rules offer the potential for better performance than NGO auditing, but the necessary penalties may be so large as to be politically unpalatable. If so, a mix of mandatory disclosure rules, NGO auditing and environmental management systems may be needed to induce full environmental disclosure.

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Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure Under Threat of Audit

We develop an economic model of “greenwash,” in which a firm strategically disclosesenvironmentalinformationandanactivistmayauditandpenalizethe firmfordisclosingpositivebutnotnegativeaspectsofitsenvironmentalprofile. We fully characterize the model’s equilibria, and derive a variety of predictions about disclosure behavior. We rationalize conflicting results in the empirical literature, finding a nonmonotonic relationship between a firm’s expected environmental performance and its environmental disclosures. Greater activist pressure deters greenwash, but induces some firms to disclose less about their environmental performance. Environmental management systems discourage firms with poor expected environmental performance from greenwashing, which may justify public policies encouraging firms to adopt them.

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Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure under Threat of Audit ∗

We extend the economic theory of regulation to allow for strategic self-regulation that preempts political action. When political ‘‘entry’’ is costly for consumers, firms can deter it through voluntary restraints. Unlike standard entry models, deterrence is achieved by overinvesting to raise the rival’s welfare in the event of entry. Empirical evidence on releases of toxic chemicals shows that an increased threat of regulation (as proxied by increased membership in conservation groups) indeed induces firms to reduce toxic releases. We establish conditions under which self-regulation, if it occurs, is a Pareto improvement once costs of influencing policy are included. While some of the environmental changes now emerging in corporate America are genuine and welcome, a good many are superficial, some are downright diversionary, and a few are being specifically designed to preempt more stringent public policies from emerging. [Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the Earth] 1

/pdf/self-regulation-and-social-welfare-the-political-economy-of-4cdswkc3sb.pdf

Self‐Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism*

Corporate claims about environmental performance have increased rapidly in recent years, as has the incidence of greenwash, that is, communication that misleads people into forming overly positive ...

The Means and End of Greenwash

buildings that are Gold-certified by the US Green Building Council. Dell Computer allows customers to buy carbon offsets when they purchase a new computer. Nike plans to be carbon neutral by 2011. The US Climate Action Partnership—whichincludes Alcoa, BP, and GE—even lobbies for government regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. Despite creeping concerns that some of these actions may be mere “greenwash,” for the most part they are welcomed by employees, consumers, investors, regulators, and the public. After all, it seems intuitive that voluntary actions that internalize environmental externalities are socially responsible. But to what extent can voluntary action substitute for government mandates? Might the two be complements instead of substitutes? Is it appropriate for the private sector, instead of government, to determine which environmental issues deserve prioritytreatment?Isitsociallydesirableformanagerstotakecostlyenvironmentalinitiatives at the expense of shareholders? Such questions tend to elicit strong reactions. Fortunately, these questions are attracting increasing attention from economists, who are in the process of building the theories needed to address them objectively. This article, which is part of a three-article symposium on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the environment, discusses the frontiers of theoretical economicsresearchonenvironmentalcorporatesocialresponsibility. 1 ItcomplementsthearticlesbyReinhardt,Stavins,andVietor(2008),whichprovidesanoverviewofthekeyissuesin environmentalCSR,andthearticlebyPortney(2008),whichoffersanempiricalperspective. One of the perplexing things about the notion of CSR is that it means different things to different people. In this article, we define environmental CSR as environmentally friendly

/pdf/corporate-social-responsibility-and-the-environment-a-4sp3xwfb7r.pdf

Thomas P. Lyon

Papers

Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure Under Threat of Audit

Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure under Threat of Audit ∗

Self‐Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism*

The Means and End of Greenwash

Corporate Social Responsibility and the Environment: A Theoretical Perspective