Showing papers by "Thomas Piketty published in 2000"
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a non-technical survey of existing empirical work about intergenerational mobility and persistent inequality among dynasties and discuss total economic inequality both in wealth and in earnings.
Abstract: Publisher Summary This chapter reviews the existing theories of persistent inequality across generations. The chapter discusses total economic inequality both in wealth and in earnings and focuses on the intergenerational mobility dimension of total inequality. The chapter presents a nonexhaustive, nontechnical survey of existing empirical work about intergenerational mobility and persistent inequality among dynasties. The question of intergenerational mobility has always been one of the most controversial issues indeed, both in actual political conflicts and in academic writings by social scientists, and conflicting theories in this area have very often been motivated by conflicting qualitative perceptions of the extent of mobility (and conversely).
291 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a model where voters trade-off two different motives when deciding how to vote: they care about current decision-making (they are "strategic"), but they also care about communicating their views about their most-preferred candidate so as to influence future elections, by influencing other voters' opinion and/or party positioning.
Abstract: This paper develops a model where voters trade-off two different motives when deciding how to vote: they care about current decision-making (they are "strategic"), but they also care about communicating their views about their most-preferred candidate so as to influence future elections, by influencing other voters' opinion and/or party positioning. In effect, voters in this model are intermediate between "strategic" and "sincere" voters of conventional models in elections with more than 2 candidates. This allows us to better investigate the relative efficiency of various electoral systems: our main conclusion is that since voting is used as a communication device electoral systems should be designed to facilitate efficient communication, e.g. by opting for 2-round systems rather than 1-round systems.
172 citations
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166 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a model where voters trade-off two different motives when deciding how to vote: they care about current decision-making (they are "strategic") but they also care about communicating their views about their most-preferred candidate so as to influence future elections, by influencing other voters' opinion and/or party positioning.
Abstract: This paper develops a model where voters trade-off two different motives when deciding how to vote: they care about current decision-making (they are 'strategic'), but they also care about communicating their views about their most-preferred candidate so as to influence future elections, by influencing other voters' opinion and/or party positioning. In effect, voters in this model are intermediate between 'strategic' and 'sincere' voters of conventional models in elections with more than 2 candidates. This allows us to better investigate the relative efficiency of various electoral systems: our main conclusion is that since voting is used as a communication device electoral systems should be designed to facilitate efficient communication, e.g. by opting for 2-round systems rather than 1-round systems.
11 citations