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Showing papers by "Thomas Poell published in 1999"


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, a close analysis of the Amsterdam political elite is presented, focusing on the interaction between various groups of politicians, the popular revolutionary clubs, and foreign regimes, and the specific impact of this "democratic paradox" on the political modernization process was very much determined by the type of coalition that was constructed.
Abstract: The Democratic Paradox aims to cast a new light on the Dutch Revolution (1780-1813) specifically, and political modernisation in general. The current perspectives on the Dutch Revolution mostly focus on the socio-economic, financial, and cultural backgrounds of this revolution. In contrast, this book concentrates on the revolutionary process itself. Through a close analysis of the Amsterdam political elite, it dissects the interaction between various groups of politicians, the popular revolutionary clubs, and foreign regimes. The book demonstrates that the late eighteenth-century political modernization process was characterized by a paradox. Democratic ideals were, on the one hand, very effective instruments to mobilize large groups of revolutionaries for the reform of the Old Regime political system. On the other hand, the same democratic ideals, as well as the democratic procedures which were established in the course of the revolution, formed an obstacle for political reform. Democratic ideals and procedures allowed various groups to resist the elimination of their political, economic, social, and religious privileges. The specific impact of this “democratic paradox” on the political modernization process was very much determined by the type of coalition that was constructed. The Patriot coalition of the 1780s clearly confirmed the democratic paradox. Precisely the collaboration between the various revolutionary groups made it impossible to pursue a liberalization of the political and economic system. As the Patriots had been organized on the basis of the corporate identities of regent and burgher, the cooperation between the revolutionaries reinforced, rather than undermined the local corporate system. Consequently, only a limited, corporate form of democratisation could be pursued. In the years between 1795 and 1798, a very different coalition was constructed, which did challenge the local corporate state structure. This coalition, which included various groups of unitary-minded politicians, the French regime, and popular revolutionary clubs and assemblies, made it possible to temporarily circumvent the democratic paradox by overruling obstructing representative institutions, and eliminating political opponents. Although a unitary democratic constitution could, as a result, be established in the Spring of 1798, the coalition making efforts did not solve the democratic paradox. In fact, after the constitution had been created, the revolutionary coalition quickly disintegrated precisely because its participants disagreed on how to deal with the democratic paradox. Some unitary-minded politicians wanted to continue in the same authoritarian fashion as before, while others aimed to restore the democratic procedures. The breakdown of the unitary democratic alliance eventually led to a reversal in the modernisation of the Dutch state. The above observations indicate that democratisation and centralisation were not always mutually reinforcing processes, but often contradictory. However, the elimination of democratic procedures, and the abandonment of democratic ideals after 1800, did not really facilitate the centralisation process either. Without a national democratic ideal, it proved to be much more difficult to obtain the cooperation of local political groups. Consequently, when the centralisation process was revived in the years after 1805, it met with strong local resistance and very little collaboration.

17 citations