Showing papers by "Thomas Schmid published in 2012"

Differences in Phosphorylated Histone H2AX Foci Formation and Removal of Cells Exposed to Low and High Linear Energy Transfer Radiation.

Abstract: The use of particle ion beams in cancer radiotherapy has a long history. Today, beams of protons or heavy ions, predominantly carbon ions, can be accelerated to precisely calculated energies which can be accurately targeted to tumors. This particle therapy works by damaging the DNA of tissue cells, ultimately causing their death. Among the different types of DNA lesions, the formation of DNA double strand breaks is considered to be the most relevant of deleterious damages of ionizing radiation in cells. It is well-known that the extremely large localized energy deposition can lead to complex types of DNA double strand breaks. These effects can lead to cell death, mutations, genomic instability, or carcinogenesis. Complex double strand breaks can increase the probability of mis-rejoining by NHEJ. As a consequence differences in the repair kinetics following high and low LET irradiation qualities are attributed mainly to quantitative differences in their contributions of the fast and slow repair component. In general, there is a higher contribution of the slow component of DNA double strand repair after exposure to high LET radiation, which is thought to reflect the increased amount of complex DNA double strand breaks. These can be accurately measured by the γ-H2AX assay, because the number of phosphorylated H2AX foci correlates well with the number of double strand breaks induced by low or / and high LET radiation.

Corporate Governance and Payout Policy: Do Founding Families Have a Special 'Taste for Dividends'?

Abstract: This paper analyzes how the predominant example of a controlling shareholder, i.e., the firms’ founders and their families, influence payout policy. Using a panel dataset of 660 listed firms in the 1995 to 2006 period from Germany, we find that family firms exhibit a higher propensity and level for dividend payouts. Further tests indicate that this result is driven (i) by family ownership, not management and (ii) restricted to later-generation family firms. These findings are consistent with the view that the desire of families for a steady income stream without losing control shapes payout decisions in family firms.

The Value of Financial Flexibility and Payout Policy

Abstract: We propose a novel empirical measure for a firm’s value of financial flexibility and examine its impact on payout decisions. Studying listed firms from 23 countries over the 1998-2008 period, we find convincing evidence that the value of financial flexibility is an important determinant of payout policy. Specifically, firms with a high value of financial flexibility tend to limit or even avoid payouts. If such firms decide to disgorge cash, they prefer share repurchases to dividends. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that financial flexibility considerations determine the pecking order of payouts. JEL classification: G32, G35

Control Considerations, Creditor Monitoring, and the Capital Structure of Family Firms

Abstract: In this paper, I analyze the motives moving founders and their families to influence the capital structure decision. For this, I complement detailed corporate governance information for Germany with data from other countries. The results for the German bank-based financial system contradict prior findings for other institutional environments. According to these results, family firms in Germany rely less heavily on debt than non-family firms. Less surprisingly, the opposite holds true for the international dataset. Different empirical tests indicate that this puzzling result can be explained by control considerations. Founders and their families use the capital structure to optimize their control over the firm. However, whether family firms rely more or less on debt depends on the level of creditor monitoring in an institutional environment. These findings emphasize that control considerations of major shareholders are important – although often overlooked – determinants of the capital structure.