In Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, henceforth AJR, (2001), we advanced the hypothesis that the mortality rates faced by Europeans in different parts of the world after 1500 affected their willingness to establish settlements and choice of colonization strategy. Places that were relatively healthy (for Europeans) were—when they fell under European control—more likely to receive better economic and political institutions. In contrast, places where European settlers were less likely to go were more likely to have “extractive” institutions imposed. We also posited that this early pattern of institutions has persisted over time and influences the extent and nature of institutions in the modern world. On this basis, we proposed using estimates of potential European settler mortality as an instrument for institutional variation in former European colonies today. Data on settlers themselves are unfortunately patchy—particularly because not many went to places they believed, with good reason, to be most unhealthy. We therefore followed the lead of Curtin (1989 and 1998) who compiled data on the death rates faced by European soldiers in various overseas postings. 1 Curtin’s data were based on pathbreaking data collection and statistical work initiated by the British military in the mid-nineteenth century. These data became part of the foundation of both contemporary thinking about public health (for soldiers and for civilians) and the life insurance industry (as actuaries and executives considered the

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The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation

http://feem-web.it/ess/ess07/files/bulte6_ln.pdf

Political foundations of the resource curse

This article uses the different mortality rates of European colonialists to estimate the effect of institutions on economic performance. Europeans adopted very different colonization policies in different colonies. In places where mortality rates were high they did not settle, but set up extractive institutions that exist to the present day. By exploring the different mortality rates faced by soldiers, bishops and sailors in the colonies in the 17th, 18th and 19th Centuries, we were able to estimate the long-term effect of colonial institutions on per capita income.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/nber_w7771.pdf?abstractid=235727&mirid=1

What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule - the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule - the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008.

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The Politics of Authoritarian Rule

1. Introduction: institutions and ethnic politics Part I. Accounting for the Ethnic Cleavage Structure: 2. Accounting for Zambia's ethnic cleavage structure I: the emergence of tribal identities in colonial Northern Rhodesia 3. Accounting for Zambia's ethnic cleavage structure II: the emergence of language identities in colonial Northern Rhodesia Part II. Accounting for Ethnic Coalition-Building Choices: 4. Ethnicity and ethnic politics in post-independence Zambia 5. Explaining changing patterns of ethnic politics Part III. Testing the Model: 6. Competing explanations 7. Ethnic campaigning: testing the observable implications of the model for elite behavior 8. Ethnic voting: testing the observable implications of the model for mass behavior Part IV. Beyond Zambia: 9. Regime change and ethnic politics in Africa 10. Beyond regime change, beyond Africa Appendix A. Native authorities and tribal identifications Appendix B. Survey and focus group methodologies Appendix C. Tribal affiliations of parliamentary candidates Appendix D. Tribal demographies of electoral constituencies.

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Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa

The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State

Zaire, apparently strong and stable under President Mobutu in the early 1970s, was bankrupt and discredited by the end of that decade, beset by hyperinflation and mass corruption, the populace forced into abject poverty. Why and how, in a new African state strategically located in Central Africa and rich in mineral resources, did this happen? How did the Zairian state become a parasitic predator upon its own people?In this broadly researched study, Crawford Young and Thomas Edwin Turner examine the political history of Mobutu s Zaire, looking at critical structures and patterns of societal flux, inequality, and cleavage, in particular the urban-rural nexus, the problematic of class formation, and the fluid patterns of cultural pluralism.The authors begin with a succinct history of the origins of the Zairian state (formerly the Belgian Congo), examining in particular the problems, inherited from its colonial heritage, that led to the first few tumultuous years of independence. They then turn to the critical aspects of transformation of civil society, including the relationships between urban and rural factions, class formation, and the rapidly shifting nature of ethnicity as a sociopolitical factor. They offer a comprehensive overview of the major political trends, tracing the regime through its successive phases of power seizure, consolidation, growing personalization, crisis, and decline. Finally, Young and Turner assess the state s actual performance in several policy areas: economy, international relations, and its package of Zairianization and radicalization measures.Young and Turner s thorough research, informed analysis, and straightforward style will do much to illuminate the political workings of a major African state long considered an enigma by most Western observers."

Thomas Turner

Papers

The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State

The rise and decline of the Zairian state

The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire

The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State

Le Zaïre dans tous ses Etats