计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

The 2008 crash has left all the established economic doctrines - equilibrium models, real business cycles, disequilibria models - in disarray. Part of the problem is due to Smith’s "veil of ignorance": individuals unknowingly pursue society’s interest and, as a result, have no clue as to the macroeconomic effects of their actions: witness the Keynes and Leontief multipliers, the concept of value added, fiat money, Engel’s law and technical progress, to name but a few of the macrofoundations of microeconomics. A good viewpoint to take bearings anew lies in comparing the post-Great Depression institutions with those emerging from Thatcher and Reagan’s economic policies: deregulation, exogenous vs. endoge- nous money, shadow banking vs. Volcker’s Rule. Very simply, the banks, whose lending determined deposits after Roosevelt, and were a public service became private enterprises whose deposits determine lending. These underlay the great moderation preceding 2006, and the subsequent crash.

The Economic Institutions of Capitalism

https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/4511387.pdf

The origins of order. Self-organization and selection in evolution

This article introduces the Special Issue of Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice on the topic of Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO). In addition to overviewing the preparation and structure of the S...

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/j_1540-6520_2011_00482_x_wml.pdf?abstractid=1934108&mirid=1&type=2

Entrepreneurial Orientation Theory and Research: Reflections on a Needed Construct:

Markets and Hierarchies

Dominant logic is the manner in which firms conceptualize and make critical resource-allocation decisions, and over time develop mental maps, business models, and processes that become organizational recipes This study compares and contrasts the dominant logic of Polish entrepreneurial firms We find evidence that a dominant logic characterized by external orientation, proactiveness, and simplicity of routines significantly influences the performance of entrepreneurial firms in this emerging economy These dominant logic characteristics of high performers serve as a key intangible resource in transition economies that are characterized by the absence of strong institutions and resource constraints Future research in this critical domain should include how dominant logic needs in transition economies evolve over time as the institutional environment matures and market mechanisms become more solidified

Dominant Logic and Entrepreneurial Firms' Performance in a Transition Economy

Dominant logic is the manner in which firms conceptualize and make critical resource-allocation decisions, and over time develop mental maps, business models, and processes that become organizational recipes. This study compares and contrasts the dominant logic of Polish entrepreneurial firms. We find evidence that a dominant logic characterized by external orientation, proactiveness, and simplicity of routines significantly influences the performance of entrepreneurial firms in this emerging economy. These dominant logic characteristics of high performers serve as a key intangible resource in transition economies that are characterized by the absence of strong institutions and resource constraints. Future research in this critical domain should include how dominant logic needs in transition economies evolve over time as the institutional environment matures and market mechanisms become more solidified.

Dominant logic and entrepreneurial firms' performance in a transition economy

This paper explores conflicting implications of firm-specific human capital (FSHC) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a productivity effect that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting agency effect: FSHC may facilitate more sophisticated “gaming” of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points lower for high-FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high-FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits.

Firm-Specific Human Capital, Organizational Incentives, and Agency Costs: Evidence from Retail Banking

This paper explores conflicting implications of firm-specific human capital (FSHC) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a productivity effect that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting agency effect: FSHC may facilitate more-sophisticated �gaming� of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points lower for high-FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high-FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits.

Firm‐specific human capital, organizational incentives, and agency costs: Evidence from retail banking

In this paper, we study the individual and organizational learning mechanisms leading to the evolution of the division of value between economic actors under a given contractual arrangement. Focusing on the division of value between a firm and its employees, we theorize that following a change in the organizational incentive structure, employees learn, over time and with experience, how to be more productive under the implied objectives of the incentive regime, as well as how to game or exploit it. Results, based on outlet-level data from a Polish commercial bank over a 13-month period, show that the bank outlets' value creation (sales revenue from primary loans) and value appropriation (the sum of outlet employees' monthly bonus) both increased, at a decreasing rate, over time as outlet employees gained experience under the new incentive regime. In parallel, the bank's share (the percentage of value created by outlets retained by the bank) increased at first, then, after reaching a plateau, decreased continuously, indicating that the ability of the incentive regime to induce the intended results evolved, giving rise to an incentive lifecycle. In exploring the underlying micromechanisms, we found strong quantitative and qualitative evidence for the presence and relative paces of productive and adverse learning in bank outlets, as well as for the role of prior experience. This is the first empirical study to show that individual and organizational learning processes can influence the evolution of the division of value between economic actors.

Tomasz Obloj

Papers

Dominant Logic and Entrepreneurial Firms' Performance in a Transition Economy

Dominant logic and entrepreneurial firms' performance in a transition economy

Firm-Specific Human Capital, Organizational Incentives, and Agency Costs: Evidence from Retail Banking

Firm‐specific human capital, organizational incentives, and agency costs: Evidence from retail banking

Incentive Life-cycles: Learning and the Division of Value in Firms