People in different cultures have strikingly different construals of the self, of others, and of the interdependence of the 2. These construals can influence, and in many cases determine, the very nature of individual experience, including cognition, emotion, and motivation. Many Asian cultures have distinct conceptions of individuality that insist on the fundamental relatedness of individuals to each other. The emphasis is on attending to others, fitting in, and harmonious interdependence with them. American culture neither assumes nor values such an overt connectedness among individuals. In contrast, individuals seek to maintain their independence from others by attending to the self and by discovering and expressing their unique inner attributes. As proposed herein, these construals are even more powerful than previously imagined. Theories of the self from both psychology and anthropology are integrated to define in detail the difference between a construal of the self as independent and a construal of the self as interdependent. Each of these divergent construals should have a set of specific consequences for cognition, emotion, and motivation; these consequences are proposed and relevant empirical literature is reviewed. Focusing on differences in self-construals enables apparently inconsistent empirical findings to be reconciled, and raises questions about what have been thought to be culture-free aspects of cognition, emotion, and motivation.

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Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation.

The capacity to exercise control over the nature and quality of one's life is the essence of humanness. Human agency is characterized by a number of core features that operate through phenomenal and functional consciousness. These include the temporal extension of agency through intentionality and forethought, self-regulation by self-reactive influence, and self-reflectiveness about one's capabilities, quality of functioning, and the meaning and purpose of one's life pursuits. Personal agency operates within a broad network of sociostructural influences. In these agentic transactions, people are producers as well as products of social systems. Social cognitive theory distinguishes among three modes of agency: direct personal agency, proxy agency that relies on others to act on one's behest to secure desired outcomes, and collective agency exercised through socially coordinative and interdependent effort. Growing transnational embeddedness and interdependence are placing a premium on collective efficacy to exercise control over personal destinies and national life.

/pdf/social-cognitive-theory-an-agentic-perspective-hguh0k9i9z.pdf

Social cognitive theory: An agentic perspective

There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitivemarkets butnot inbilateral bargainingsituations. Thereisalsostrong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained, although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selesh types dominate equilibrium behavior.

/pdf/a-theory-of-fairness-competition-and-cooperation-20ykvpovfq.pdf

A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation

There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if a fraction of the people exhibits inequality aversion the puzzles can be resolved.

/pdf/a-theory-of-fairness-competition-and-cooperation-445axsa22c.pdf

A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation

https://media.terry.uga.edu/socrates/publications/2013/05/Cropanzano__Mitchell_2005_SET_Review_JOM.pdf

Social Exchange Theory: An Interdisciplinary Review

A distinction is proposed betweentrust as a cognitive bias in the evaluation of incomplete information about the (potential) interaction partner andassurance as a perception of the incentive structure that leads the interaction partner to act cooperatively. It is hypothesized that trust in this sense helps people to move out of mutually committed relations where the partner's cooperation is assured. Although commitment formation is a rather standard solution to the problems caused by social uncertainty, commitment becomes a liability rather than an asset as opportunity costs increase. Facing increasing opportunity costs, trust provides a springboard in the attempt to break psychological inertia that has been mobilized to maintain committed relations. In conjunction with an assumption that networks of mutually committed relations play a more prominent role in Japanese society than in American society, this hypothesis has been applied to predict a set of cross-national differences between the United States and Japan in the levels of trust and related factors. The results of a cross-national questionnaire survey (with 1,136 Japanese and 501 American respondents) support most of the predictions, and indicate that, in comparison to Japanese respondents, American respondents are more trusting of other people in general, consider reputation more important, and consider themselves more honest and fair. In contrast, Japanese respondents see more utility in dealing with others through personal relations.

Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan

The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good

This paper presents a theoretical analysis of the structural determinants of power in exchange networks, along with research findings from laboratory experiments and a computer simulation of bargaining in network structures. Two theoretical traditions are dealt with: (1) point centrality in graph-theoretic representations of structure, as an approach to power distributions; and (2) powerdependence principles applied to exchange networks. Measures of centrality available in the literature have the advantage of being easily applied to large and complex networks. In contrast, powerdependence concepts were conceived for use in microsociology and are found to be cumbersome in the analysis of complex networks. But despite the relative difficulty of applying power-dependence theory to network structures, that approach generates hypotheses about power distributions which are confirmed at nearly every point in a laboratory experiment with five-person networks and at every point in a computer simulation of networks too large for laboratory study. In contrast, centrality measures applied to the type of networks studied fail to predict power distributions. Although centrality measures might predict power in some networks, their generality is limited. Toward resolution of the issues raised, this study offers two theoretical points: (1) a distinction between two different principles of "connection" in social networks suggests that current measures of centrality might predict power in one type of network but not in the other; and (2) it offers a first step toward a fusion of power-dependence theory and structural centrality in a way which might be general across networks of both types.

/pdf/the-distribution-of-power-in-exchange-networks-theory-and-1065h4e4vw.pdf

The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results

A theory of trust proposed by Yamagishi and Yamagishi provides the basis for the prediction that (1) social uncertainty promotes commitment formation between particular partners and (2) high trusters tend to form committed relations less frequently than would low trusters when facing social uncertainty. These predictions receive support in two experiments conducted in the United States and Japan. The findings provide empirical support for the theory of trust that emhasizes the role of general trust (trust in others in general) in emancipating people fromt the confines of safe, but closed relationships. The results also offer a theoretical explanation for what have been viewed in the past as cultural differences.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/210005

Uncertainty, trust, and commitment formation in the United States and Japan

In generalized exchange, the rewards that an actor receives usually are not directly contingent on the resources provided by that actor; therefore free riding can occur. The actor can receive benefit without contributing. Scholars interested in generalized exchange systems have often overlooked this inherent free-riding problem and thus have been overoptimistic in concluding that generalized exchange promotes mutual trust and solidarity among the participants. A more complete understanding of generalized exchange requires that the underlying social dilemma in such situations be appreciated fully. This paper represents our initial efforts to bridge two research traditions ― research on social exchange and research on social dilemmas

https://www.jstor.org/stable/info/2786661

Toshio Yamagishi

Papers

Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan

The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good

The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results

Uncertainty, trust, and commitment formation in the United States and Japan

Generalized Exchange and Social Dilemmas