Where does morality come from? Why are moral judgments often so similar across cultures, yet sometimes so variable? Is morality one thing, or many? Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) was created to answer these questions. In this chapter, we describe the origins, assumptions, and current conceptualization of the theory and detail the empirical findings that MFT has made possible, both within social psychology and beyond. Looking toward the future, we embrace several critiques of the theory and specify five criteria for determining what should be considered a foundation of human morality. Finally, we suggest a variety of future directions for MFT and moral psychology.

Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism

Dual-process theories of moral judgment suggest that responses to moral dilemmas are guided by two moral principles: the principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action (e.g., harming others is wrong regardless of its consequences); the principle of utilitarianism implies that the morality of an action is determined by its consequences (e.g., harming others is acceptable if it increases the well-being of a greater number of people). Despite the proposed independence of the moral inclinations reflecting these principles, previous work has relied on operationalizations in which stronger inclinations of one kind imply weaker inclinations of the other kind. The current research applied Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation procedure to independently quantify the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations within individuals. Study 1 confirmed the usefulness of process dissociation for capturing individual differences in deontological and utilitarian inclinations, revealing positive correlations of both inclinations to moral identity. Moreover, deontological inclinations were uniquely related to empathic concern, perspective-taking, and religiosity, whereas utilitarian inclinations were uniquely related to need for cognition. Study 2 demonstrated that cognitive load selectively reduced utilitarian inclinations, with deontological inclinations being unaffected. In Study 3, a manipulation designed to enhance empathy increased deontological inclinations, with utilitarian inclinations being unaffected. These findings provide evidence for the independent contributions of deontological and utilitarian inclinations to moral judgments, resolving many theoretical ambiguities implied by previous research.

Deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral decision making: a process dissociation approach

Ethical decision-making (EDM) descriptive theoretical models often conflict with each other and typically lack comprehensiveness. To address this deficiency, a revised EDM model is proposed that consolidates and attempts to bridge together the varying and sometimes directly conflicting propositions and perspectives that have been advanced. To do so, the paper is organized as follows. First, a review of the various theoretical models of EDM is provided. These models can generally be divided into (a) rationalist-based (i.e., reason); and (b) non-rationalist-based (i.e., intuition and emotion). Second, the proposed model, called ‘Integrated Ethical Decision Making,’ is introduced in order to fill the gaps and bridge the current divide in EDM theory. The individual and situational factors as well as the process of the proposed model are then described. Third, the academic and managerial implications of the proposed model are discussed. Finally, the limitations of the proposed model are presented.

Ethical Decision-Making Theory: An Integrated Approach

The role of emotion in moral judgment is currently a topic of much debate in moral psychology One specific claim made by many researchers is that irrelevant feelings of disgust can amplify the sev

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Does Incidental Disgust Amplify Moral Judgment? A Meta-Analytic Review of Experimental Evidence.

Recently, intuitionist theories have been effective in capturing the academic discourse about morality. Intuitionist theories, like rationalist theories, offer important but only partial understanding of moral functioning. Both can be fallacious and succumb to truthiness: the attachment to one's opinions because they "feel right," potentially leading to harmful action or inaction. Both intuition and reasoning are involved in deliberation and expertise. Both are malleable from environmental and educational influence, making questions of normativity-which intuitions and reasoning skills to foster-of utmost importance. Good intuition and reasoning inform mature moral functioning, which needs to include capacities that promote sustainable human well-being. Individual capacities for habituated empathic concern and moral metacognition-moral locus of control, moral self-regulation, and moral self-reflection-comprise mature moral functioning, which also requires collective capacities for moral dialogue and moral institutions. These capacities underlie moral innovation and are necessary for solving the complex challenges humanity faces.

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Moral Complexity: The Fatal Attraction of Truthiness and the Importance of Mature Moral Functioning

Jon Haidt's (2001) proposal for a moral intutionist theory of morality is criticized on psychological and philosophical grounds, including (a) the apparent reduction of social influence to one kind...

Haidt's Moral Intuitionist Theory: A Psychological and Philosophical Critique:

L'A. souleve le probleme de la justification d'une action ou politique paternaliste par la marque potentielle de gratitude exprimee par ses beneficiaires. Le paternalisme semble en effet justifie si le sujet de l'intervention bienveillante eprouve le besoin d'exprimer sa reconnaissance. Mais l'assentiment du sujet a l'action paternaliste consiste au renoncement a ses droits a la non non-intervention. En ce sens, la paternalisme apparait comme un acte de violence envers les droits de l'individu a l'autonomie et a la liberte

Paternalism: does gratitude make it okay?

Reasoning and Moral Decision-Making: A Critique of the Social Intuitionist Model.

Discussion concerning the meaning and analysis of “punishment” has centered, in large measure, on claims for a logical connection between “punishment” and “guilt.” However, more and more in the literature focus has shifted from guilt as the defining feature of “punishment” to guilt as only one of many constitutive conditions satisfaction of which is necessary for standard cases with allowance made for other correct, though secondary, uses of the term.

Tziporah Kasachkoff

Papers

Haidt's Moral Intuitionist Theory: A Psychological and Philosophical Critique:

Paternalism: does gratitude make it okay?

Reasoning and Moral Decision-Making: A Critique of the Social Intuitionist Model.

The Criteria of Punishment: Some Neglected Considerations

Hegel’s Retributivist Position on Punishment