How have Japanese companies become world leaders in the automotive and electronics industries, among others? What is the secret of their success? Two leading Japanese business experts, Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi, are the first to tie the success of Japanese companies to their ability to create new knowledge and use it to produce successful products and technologies. In The Knowledge-Creating Company, Nonaka and Takeuchi provide an inside look at how Japanese companies go about creating this new knowledge organizationally. The authors point out that there are two types of knowledge: explicit knowledge, contained in manuals and procedures, and tacit knowledge, learned only by experience, and communicated only indirectly, through metaphor and analogy. U.S. managers focus on explicit knowledge. The Japanese, on the other hand, focus on tacit knowledge. And this, the authors argue, is the key to their success--the Japanese have learned how to transform tacit into explicit knowledge. To explain how this is done--and illuminate Japanese business practices as they do so--the authors range from Greek philosophy to Zen Buddhism, from classical economists to modern management gurus, illustrating the theory of organizational knowledge creation with case studies drawn from such firms as Honda, Canon, Matsushita, NEC, Nissan, 3M, GE, and even the U.S. Marines. For instance, using Matsushita's development of the Home Bakery (the world's first fully automated bread-baking machine for home use), they show how tacit knowledge can be converted to explicit knowledge: when the designers couldn't perfect the dough kneading mechanism, a software programmer apprenticed herself withthe master baker at Osaka International Hotel, gained a tacit understanding of kneading, and then conveyed this information to the engineers. In addition, the authors show that, to create knowledge, the best management style is neither top-down nor bottom-up, but rather what they call "middle-up-down," in which the middle managers form a bridge between the ideals of top management and the chaotic realities of the frontline. As we make the turn into the 21st century, a new society is emerging. Peter Drucker calls it the "knowledge society," one that is drastically different from the "industrial society," and one in which acquiring and applying knowledge will become key competitive factors. Nonaka and Takeuchi go a step further, arguing that creating knowledge will become the key to sustaining a competitive advantage in the future. Because the competitive environment and customer preferences changes constantly, knowledge perishes quickly. With The Knowledge-Creating Company, managers have at their fingertips years of insight from Japanese firms that reveal how to create knowledge continuously, and how to exploit it to make successful new products, services, and systems.

The knowledge-creating company

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The New Economics for Industry, Government, Education

JUST CULTURE: BALANCING SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY Sidney Dekker, PhD Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007, 153 pp., $29.95 Dr. Sidney Dekker's book, Just Culture, is a thought-provoking account of the dilemma our society faces when we attempt to balance human safety with human error. Practitioners such as physicians, nurses, air traffic controllers, and aircraft pilots, who are skilled in making life-and-death decisions, are the focus of this book. Using real-life stories the author depicts eloquently for the reader the facts and consequences of criminalization of accidents, mistakes, and errors. Dr. Dekker starts by examining society's reasons for wanting a "just culture." What makes us believe that some occurrences are acts of God as opposed to human management of risk? A just culture is very difficult to define, as justice is one of those essentially contested categories. We will never agree with each other about what justice means, or what is just versus what is unjust. Essentially contested means that the very essence, the very nature of the concept is infinitely negotiable. But that does not mean that we cannot agree, or make some progress on, some very practical problems related to defining what we could call a "just culture" (p. x). In this book, the author explores the importance, risks, and benefits of reporting and disclosing human errors. "In 2006, Julie, a nurse from Wisconsin, was charged with 'criminal neglect of a patient causing bodily harm' in the medication death of a 16-year old girl during labor. Instead of giving the intended penicillin intravenously, Julie accidentally administered a bag of epidural analgesia. Julie lost her job, faced action on her nursing license and the threat of six years in jail as well as a $25,000 fine" (p. 21). The author challenges the reader with intriguing and interesting questions: "Are all mistakes equal?" "Who is responsible to decide when an accident becomes a crime?" "Who in society gets to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior?" "Who decides what constitutes the truth?" Dr. Dekker points out that, following publicity about cases like Julie's and other professionals who stood trial on criminal charges, the number of reported serious errors dropped. The author continues: "Unfortunately, when the legal system gets involved, things seem to get neither more just, nor safer" (p. 91). Furthermore, he states: "The idea that a charged or convicted practitioner will serve as an example to scare others into behaving more prudently is probably misguided; instead, practitioners will become more careful only in not disclosing what they have done" (p. 96). The author's recounting of his experiences with practitioners who were what might be termed culpable gives another dimension to his book. Other examples are the story of Mara, a nurse who administered a baby 10 times the amount of medication the baby needed, and the pilot who in one of his flights was low on fuel and was forced to make an unauthorized landing, thereby risking the lives of the crew members and the passengers. …

Just Culture: Balancing Safety and Accountability

This study analyzes explicit pieces of advice for effective social media crisis communication given by researchers in various sub-disciplines of strategic communication. The themes are identified b ...

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1553118X.2018.1510405

Lessons for Crisis Communication on Social Media: A Systematic Review of What Research Tells the Practice

1. Introduction: On Command The Nature of Command The Evolution of Command The Study of Command 2. The Stone Age of Command The Parameters of Strategy The Nonevolution of Staffs The Conduct of Battle Conclusions: Mars Shackled 3. The Revolution in Strategy \"The God of War\" Inside Imperial Headquarters 1806: The Campaign 1806: The Battle Conclusions: Mars Unshackled 4.

Command in War

Success and Failure Factors for KM : The Utilization of Knowledge in the Swedish Armed Forces

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Success and Failure Factors for KM: The Utilization of Knowledge in the Swedish Armed Forces

It is generally maintained that learning should be a part of the daily routines of many organizations; this is often referred to as lesson learned processes. The purpose of organizational learning is to foster improvements that seek to both reduce incidents and accidents and reduce their consequences when they nevertheless happen. Safety work is widespread among many organizations, e.g. aviation, hospitals, process industry, fire departments and several armed forces. A considerable part of safety work involves accident prevention, and aims to investigate why and how previous accidents and incidents happened, in order to learn how to avoid them, or minimize losses when they do occur. The collection of information after incidents represents one of the first steps in a lessons learned process, and the result is crucial for further work. Unfortunately, incident reports often tend to be unfocused (they represent a very wide area of issues) and, for that reason, cannot be clustered. They also frequently lack by analysts required information. The overall research objective in this thesis was to develop a report structure that enables the individuals who participated in or observed an incident to provide more information that is relevant about that incident. The first research question seeks to identify whether the Swedish Armed Forces face the kinds of problems that have been identified in earlier research on attempts to learn from accidents and incidents. The second and third research questions aim to ascertain whether the scope and quality of collected information in incident reports can be improved and if the number of incident reports can be increased. The results agree with earlier research and show that many of the problems that are common in other organizations (e.g. aviation, hospitals and the process industry) can also be observed and are a reality within the SwAF. In addition, the results showed that both scope and quality of collected information can be influenced. Group reporting using a consensus process neither had an appreciable effect on the quality of collected information, nor on the quantity of the reports. On the other hand, the new reporting form, which was based on interview and questionnaire methodology, and to some extent witness psychology, significantly improved the quality of the information collected after incidents. The new form proved to be superior, regardless of the character and context of the incidents. The information collected was also in accordance with what had actually happened and, finally, the form proved to be useful when various military “real world” incidents were reported. Finally, the results also provide new insights into the problems and possibilities associated with acquiring useful incident reports. The problem seems not only to be that people may be unwilling to report incidents that they have participated in or witnessed; it is also that they may be unable to do so. Consequently, it may not be sufficient to change the culture of the organization into a learning culture to receive by analysts required information. It is also necessary to help people report what they actually know by means of an improved report structure.

A New Incident Report Form Leads to Improved Foundation for the Lessons Learned Cycle

Sharing Knowledge : How to Highlight Proven Experience in the Swedish Armed Forces

A serious weakness in several organizations seems to be that numerous experiences are poorly reported. Unfortunately, there is little research conducted in the military field; on the contrary, there is an urgent need in several organizations to get a lessons learned process implemented. The aim of this paper is to compare group performances with individual performances and to determine whether groups will produce more mature experience-reports than individuals. The study was conducted within the Swedish Armed Forces; all participants were soldiers previously deployed on international missions. The results showed that groups produced somewhat better reports than individuals; however, individuals produced a higher quantity of reports per person than groups. It therefore appears to be pointless to report in groups, at least as was done in this study, since the extra effort it takes does not justify the small improvement.

Ulrica Pettersson

Papers

Success and Failure Factors for KM: The Utilization of Knowledge in the Swedish Armed Forces

A New Incident Report Form Leads to Improved Foundation for the Lessons Learned Cycle

Sharing Knowledge : How to Highlight Proven Experience in the Swedish Armed Forces

Experience-based knowledge from the Swedish Armed Forces: a comparison between groups and individuals