V
Vassilis Zikas
Researcher at University of Edinburgh
Publications - 89
Citations - 1917
Vassilis Zikas is an academic researcher from University of Edinburgh. The author has contributed to research in topics: Cryptography & Secure multi-party computation. The author has an hindex of 20, co-authored 82 publications receiving 1418 citations. Previous affiliations of Vassilis Zikas include University of Maryland, College Park & University of California, Los Angeles.
Papers
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Ouroboros Genesis: Composable Proof-of-Stake Blockchains with Dynamic Availability
TL;DR: A novel Proof-of-Stake protocol, Ouroboros Genesis, that enables parties to safely join (or rejoin) the protocol execution using only the genesis block information, and proves the security of the construction against an adaptive adversary.
Book ChapterDOI
Bitcoin as a Transaction Ledger: A Composable Treatment
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a composition-based security proof for Bitcoin, which is based on the property-based approach of existing security proofs, and as such they do not support composition.
Book ChapterDOI
Universally composable synchronous computation
TL;DR: It is shown that the expected guarantees of synchronous computation can be achieved given functionalities exactly meant to model, respectively, bounded-delay networks and loosely synchronized clocks, and that previous similar models can all be expressed within this new framework.
Journal Article
Ouroboros Genesis: Composable Proof-of-Stake Blockchains with Dynamic Availability.
TL;DR: Ouroboros Genesis as discussed by the authors is a proof-of-stake (PoS) protocol that enables parties to safely join (or rejoin) the protocol execution using only the genesis block information.
Book ChapterDOI
Fair and Robust Multi-party Computation Using a Global Transaction Ledger
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a secure MPC protocol with compensation, which is based on the idea that when the protocol aborts in an unfair manner, after the adversary receives output then honest parties get compensated by the adversarially controlled parties.