V
Venkataraman Bhaskar
Researcher at University of Texas at Austin
Publications - 84
Citations - 2425
Venkataraman Bhaskar is an academic researcher from University of Texas at Austin. The author has contributed to research in topics: Repeated game & Stochastic game. The author has an hindex of 27, co-authored 84 publications receiving 2265 citations. Previous affiliations of Venkataraman Bhaskar include University of Texas System & University of Essex.
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Minimum Wages in a Symmetric Model of Monopsonistic Competition
Venkataraman Bhaskar,Ted To +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the employment effect of a minimum wage on employment in a symmetric model of monopsonistic competition, where each employer competes equally with every other employer, was investigated.
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Rational adversaries? evidence from randomized trials in the game of cricket
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the treatment effects of a coin-tossing game and found significant evidence of inconsistency, with teams often agreeing on who is to bat first.
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Is beauty only skin-deep? Disentangling the beauty premium on a game show
TL;DR: This article analyzed behavior on a TV game show where players’ monetary payoffs depend upon an array of factors, including ability in answering questions, perceived cooperativeness and the willingness of other players to choose them.
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Insidious discrimination? Disentangling the beauty premium on a game show
TL;DR: This article analyzed behavior on a TV game show where players' monetary payoffs depend upon an array of factors, including ability in answering questions, perceived cooperativeness and the willingness of other players to choose them.
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Dynamic Moral Hazard, Learning and Belief Manipulation
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study dynamic moral hazard, with symmetric ex ante uncertainty and learning, and show that such a misalignment is always profitable for the agent, and must be dissuaded by providing more high-powered incentives.