“Multivalued Analysis” is the theory of set-valued maps (called multifonctions) and has important applications in many different areas. Multivalued analysis is a remarkable mixture of many different parts of mathematics such as point-set topology, measure theory and nonlinear functional analysis. It is also closely related to “Nonsmooth Analysis” (Chapter 5) and in fact one of the main motivations behind the development of the theory, was in order to provide necessary analytical tools for the study of problems in nonsmooth analysis. It is not a coincidence that the development of the two fields coincide chronologically and follow parallel paths. Today multivalued analysis is a mature mathematical field with its own methods, techniques and applications that range from social and economic sciences to biological sciences and engineering. There is no doubt that a modern treatise on “Nonlinear Functional Analysis” can not afford the luxury of ignoring multivalued analysis. The omission of the theory of multifunctions will drastically limit the possible applications.

SET-Valued Analysis

The Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem is an important model that has its roots in the economic sciences but is being fruitfully used in many different fields. In this survey paper we aim at discussing its main properties and solution algorithms, pointing out what could be useful topics for future research in the field.

Generalized Nash equilibrium problems

The Generalized Nash equilibrium problem is an important model that has its roots in the economic sciences but is being fruitfully used in many different fields. In this survey paper we aim at discussing its main properties and solution algorithms, pointing out what could be useful topics for future research in the field.

/pdf/generalized-nash-equilibrium-problems-4l29wa4kvt.pdf

Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems

The (re)distribution of collective gains and costs is a central question for individuals and organizations contemplating cooperation under uncertainty. The theory of cooperative interval games provides a new game theoretical angle and suitable tools for answering this question. This survey aims to briefly present the state-of-the-art in this young field of research, discusses how the model of cooperative interval games extends the cooperative game theory literature, and reviews its existing and potential applications in economic and operations research situations with interval data.

Cooperative interval games: a survey

Matrix game theory is concerned with how two players make decisions when they are faced with known exact payoffs. The aim of this paper is to develop a simple and an effective linear programming method for solving matrix games in which the payoffs are expressed with intervals. Because the payoffs of the matrix game are intervals, the value of the matrix game is an interval as well. Based on the definition of the value for matrix games, the value of the matrix game may be regarded as a function of values in the payoff intervals, which is proven to be non-decreasing. A pair of auxiliary linear programming models is formulated to obtain the upper bound and the lower bound of the value of the interval-valued matrix game by using the upper bounds and the lower bounds of the payoff intervals, respectively. By the duality theorem of linear programming, it is proven that two players have the identical interval-type value of the interval-valued matrix game. Also it is proven that the linear programming models and method proposed in this paper extend those of the classical matrix games. The linear programming method proposed in this paper is demonstrated with a real investment decision example and compared with other similar methods to show the validity, applicability and superiority.

/pdf/linear-programming-approach-to-solve-interval-valued-matrix-2g7jwnv0f3.pdf

Linear programming approach to solve interval-valued matrix games

Pseudocontinuous functions and existence of Nash equilibria

Fuzzy interval cooperative games

We introduce spaces of discontinuous games in which games having essential Nash equilibria are the generic case. In order to prove the existence of essential Nash equilibria in such spaces, we provide new results on the Ky Fan minimax inequality. In the setting of potential games, we show that games with essential Nash equilibria are the generic case when their potentials satisfy a condition called weak upper pseudocontinuity that is weaker than upper semicontinuity.

Essential equilibria of discontinuous games

We enlarge the class of sufficient conditions which guarantee, on the one hand, the sequential closedness of set-valued functions defined by minimum points and by social Nash equilibria and, on the other hand, the existence of solutions for MinSup problems, using new classes of functions, called sequentially lower pseudocontinuous and sequentially upper pseudocontinuous functions. Properties and characterizations of such classes are investigated.

Vincenzo Scalzo

Papers

Pseudocontinuous functions and existence of Nash equilibria

Fuzzy interval cooperative games

Essential equilibria of discontinuous games

Pseudocontinuity in Optimization and Nonzero-Sum Games

On the existence of maximal elements, fixed points and equilibria of generalized games in a fuzzy environment