世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

In the West are the 'haves', while much of the rest of the world are the 'have-nots'. The extent of inequality today is unprecedented. Drawing on an extraordinary range of contemporary and historical examples, Why Nations Fail looks at the root of the problems facing some nations. Economists and scientists have offered useful insights into the reasons for certain aspects of poverty, such as Jeffrey Sachs (it's geography and the weather), and Jared Diamond (it's technology and species). But most theories ignore the incentives and institutions that populations need to invest and prosper: they need to know that if they work hard, they can make money and actually keep it - and the key to ensuring these incentives is sound institutions. Incentives and institutions are what separate the have and have-nots. Based on fifteen years of research, and stepping boldly into the territory of Ian Morris's Why the West Rules - For Now, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson blend economics, politics, history and current affairs to provide a new, persuasive way of understanding wealth and poverty. And, perhaps most importantly, they provide a pragmatic basis for the hope that those mired in poverty can be placed on the path to prosperity.

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Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty

This study surveys the literature examining the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) We review the history of privatization, the theoretical and empirical evidence on the relative performance of state owned and privately owned firms, the types of privatization, if and by how much privatization has improved the performance of former SOEs in non-transition and transition countries, how investors in privatizations have fared, and the impact of privatization on the development of capital markets and corporate governance. In most settings privatization "works" in that the firms become more efficient, more profitable, and financially healthier, and reward investors.

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From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization

Service-dominant logic continues its evolution, facilitated by an active community of scholars throughout the world. Along its evolutionary path, there has been increased recognition of the need for a crisper and more precise delineation of the foundational premises and specification of the axioms of S-D logic. It also has become apparent that a limitation of the current foundational premises/axioms is the absence of a clearly articulated specification of the mechanisms of (often massive-scale) coordination and cooperation involved in the cocreation of value through markets and, more broadly, in society. This is especially important because markets are even more about cooperation than about the competition that is more frequently discussed. To alleviate this limitation and facilitate a better understanding of cooperation (and coordination), an eleventh foundational premise (fifth axiom) is introduced, focusing on the role of institutions and institutional arrangements in systems of value cocreation: service ecosystems. Literature on institutions across multiple social disciplines, including marketing, is briefly reviewed and offered as further support for this fifth axiom.

Institutions and axioms: an extension and update of service-dominant logic

China's economic reforms have resulted in spectacular growth and poverty reduction. However, China's institutions look ill-suited to achieve such a result, and they indeed suffer from serious shortcomings. To solve the "China puzzle," this paper analyzes China's institution—a regionally decentralized authoritarian system. The central government has control over personnel, whereas subnational governments run the bulk of the economy; and they initiate, negotiate, implement, divert, and resist reforms, policies, rules, and laws. China's reform trajectories have been shaped by regional decentralization. Spectacular performance on the one hand and grave problems on the other hand are all determined by this governance structure. ( JEL O17, O18, O43, P21, P25, P26)

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The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development

China began its gradual economic reform in the late 1970s; Russia initiated radical reform in the early 1990s. During the course of reform, China has enjoyed rapid growth while Russia has contracted. This paper argues that one reason for this difference is that Chinese local governments enjoy more clearly defined rights of taxation than their counterparts in Russia. When rights of taxation are sharply defined, a local government has the exclusive right to tax enterprises located within its territory. These rights become fuzzier as the number of independent tax agencies increases. A model is constructed in which these differences in property rights generate a forecast consistent with the observation that the effective tax rate facing an enterprise tends to be higher in Russia while local tax collections and the local provision of public goods and infrastructure tend to be stronger in China.

Decentralizing in Transition Economies: A Tragedy of the Commons?

China began its gradual economic reform in the late 1970s; Russia initiated radical reform in the early 1990s. During the course of reform, China has enjoyed rapid growth while Russia has contracted. This paper argues that an important explanation for the striking performance difference in China and Russia is that, during the course of reform, Chinese local governments have gained much more clearly defined tax rights than their counterparts in Russia. When tax rights are sharply defined, a local government has the exclusive right to tax enterprises located within its territory. These rights become fuzzier as the number of agencies which independently tax enterprises increases. The implications of these differences in government tax rights are analyzed using a model of a local economy which predicts that: 1) investment is higher when tax rights are more clearly defined- 2) local tax collections and local provision of public goods and infrastructure are higher when tax rights are more sharply defined; 3) the effective tax rate for investors increases as tax rights become fuzzier; 4) tax evasion is higher when tax rights are fuzzier. It is argued that these four points capture important differences in the performance of local Chinese and Russian economies. The model also predicts that capital mobility tends to encourage local and regional governments to limit cross-border capital flows. This prediction is consistent with local and regional government policies observed in both China and Russia.

Stock dividend and analyst optimistic bias in earnings forecast

SUBJECT AREAS: valuation, investment analysis, portfolio management, country analysis, emerging markets, development economics. This collection of two CD-ROMs presents interviews with leading scholars and practitioners on the subject of valuing assets in emerging markets. Featured interviews include, Michael A. Duffy, Ph.D., CFA, Managing Director, Emerging Markets Management, Vihang Errunza, Bank of Montreal Chair in Finance and Baking, Faculty of Management, McGill University, Marc Faber, Ph.D., Managing Director, Marc Faber Limited, Kristin J. Forbes, Mitsubishi Associate Professor of International Management, Sloan School of Management, and former deputy assistant secretary for the US Department of the Treasury , Campbell R. Harvey, J. Paul Sticht Professor of International Business, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, George R. Hoguet, CFA, Head, Active Emerging Markets, Global Active Equity, State Street Global Advisors, Mark Mobius, Ph.D., Managing Director, Templeton Asset Management, Mehran Nakjavani, Executive Director and Co-Head of Emerging Markets, UBS Global Asset Management, Marc Zenner, Ph.D., CFA, Salomon Smith Barney/Citigroup). The CDs also contain pdf files of papers and presentations given at the conference, "Valuation in Emerging Markets," at the Batten Institute of the Darden Graduate Business School, University of Virginia, on May 28-30, 2002. The downloadable document gives a detailed outline of the interviews and papers contained on the CD-ROM. These CD-ROMs serve at least three objectives: - Provide a learning resource on valuation in emerging markets usable in educational settings such as BBA, MBA, and doctoral courses. - Support executive and professional training for self-learners and distance learners. - Rapidly disseminate state-of-the-art ideas to scholarly researchers and professionals focusing on valuation and emerging markets. The Batten Institute will hold an annual conference on investing in emerging markets. The next conference will be held in Charlottesville, Virginia from the evening of May 28 to noon, May 30, 2003. The focus of this next conference will be corporate governance and organization as they affect the pricing of equities in emerging markets. Michael Jensen will be the keynote speaker at this next conference. Program information and registration details may be found at the Batten Institute website.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID354260_code021123100.pdf?abstractid=354260&rulid=229180&mirid=1

Wei Li

Papers

Decentralizing in Transition Economies: A Tragedy of the Commons?

Decentralizing in Transition Economies: A Tragedy of the Commons?

Stock dividend and analyst optimistic bias in earnings forecast

'Valuation in Emerging Markets' CDROM Edition

Provincial and Local Governments in China