Deposits of clastic carbonate-dominated (calciclastic) sedimentary slope systems in the rock record have been identified mostly as linearly-consistent carbonate apron deposits, even though most ancient clastic carbonate slope deposits fit the submarine fan systems better. Calciclastic submarine fans are consequently rarely described and are poorly understood. Subsequently, very little is known especially in mud-dominated calciclastic submarine fan systems. Presented in this study are a sedimentological core and petrographic characterisation of samples from eleven boreholes from the Lower Carboniferous of Bowland Basin (Northwest England) that reveals a >250 m thick calciturbidite complex deposited in a calciclastic submarine fan setting. Seven facies are recognised from core and thin section characterisation and are grouped into three carbonate turbidite sequences. They include: 1) Calciturbidites, comprising mostly of highto low-density, wavy-laminated bioclast-rich facies; 2) low-density densite mudstones which are characterised by planar laminated and unlaminated muddominated facies; and 3) Calcidebrites which are muddy or hyper-concentrated debrisflow deposits occurring as poorly-sorted, chaotic, mud-supported floatstones. These

Phd by thesis

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

An Introduction to MultiAgent Systems.

From the Publisher:
An agent is an entity with domain knowledge, goals and actions. Multi-agent systems are a set of agents which
interact in a common environment. Multi-agent systems deal with the construction of complex systems involving multiple agents and their coordination. A multi-agent system (MAS) is a distributed computing system with
autonomous interacting intelligent agents that coordinate their actions so as to achieve its goal(s) jointly or competitively.

Introduction to Multiagent Systems

Ontologies tend to be found everywhere. They are viewed as the silver bullet for many applications, such as database integration, peer-to-peer systems, e-commerce, semantic web services, or social networks. However, in open or evolving systems, such as the semantic web, different parties would, in general, adopt different ontologies. Thus, merely using ontologies, like using XML, does not reduce heterogeneity: it just raises heterogeneity problems to a higher level. Euzenat and Shvaikos book is devoted to ontology matching as a solution to the semantic heterogeneity problem faced by computer systems. Ontology matching aims at finding correspondences between semantically related entities of different ontologies. These correspondences may stand for equivalence as well as other relations, such as consequence, subsumption, or disjointness, between ontology entities. Many different matching solutions have been proposed so far from various viewpoints, e.g., databases, information systems, and artificial intelligence. The second edition of Ontology Matching has been thoroughly revised and updated to reflect the most recent advances in this quickly developing area, which resulted in more than 150 pages of new content. In particular, the book includes a new chapter dedicated to the methodology for performing ontology matching. It also covers emerging topics, such as data interlinking, ontology partitioning and pruning, context-based matching, matcher tuning, alignment debugging, and user involvement in matching, to mention a few. More than 100 state-of-the-art matching systems and frameworks were reviewed. With Ontology Matching, researchers and practitioners will find a reference book that presents currently available work in a uniform framework. In particular, the work and the techniques presented in this book can be equally applied to database schema matching, catalog integration, XML schema matching and other related problems. The objectives of the book include presenting (i) the state of the art and (ii) the latest research results in ontology matching by providing a systematic and detailed account of matching techniques and matching systems from theoretical, practical and application perspectives.

Ontology Matching

We introduce ATLES - a variant of ATL with explicit names for strategies in the object language. ATLES makes it possible to refer to the same strategy in different occurrences of path quantifiers, and, as a consequence, it possible to express in ATLES some properties that cannot be expressed even in ATL*. We present a complete axiomatic system for ATLES. Moreover, we show that satisfiability problem for ATLES is no more complex than for ATL: it is ExpTime-complete. We identify two variants of the model-checking problem for ATLES and investigate their computational complexity. Finally, we show how ATLES can be used to reason about extensive games.

/pdf/alternating-time-temporal-logic-with-explicit-strategies-4qv6xjxi2s.pdf

Alternating-time temporal logic with explicit strategies

In this paper we give an overview of work we have done to provide a framework in which many aspects of rational agency are integrated. The various attitudes of a rational agent, viz. the informational as well as the motivational ones, are modelled in the framework by means of a variety of modal operators that are interpreted by means of possible worlds, as usual in modal logic. A main point here is that we incorporate all these modal operators into one model, so that in principle the various modal operators can be mixed to describe an agent’s complex attitudes.

/pdf/an-integrated-modal-approach-to-rational-agents-38p53bo12m.pdf

An Integrated Modal Approach to Rational Agents

We review the state of the art in knowledge representation formalisms for multi-agent systems. We divide work in this area into two categories. In the first category are approaches that attempt to represent the cognitive state of rational agents, and to characterize logically how such a state leads a rational agent to act. We begin by motivating this approach. We then describe four of the best-known such logical frameworks, and discuss the possible roles that such logics can play in helping us to engineer artificial agents. In the second category are approaches based on representing the strategic structure of a multi-agent environment, and in particular, the powers that agents have, either individually or in coalitions. Here, we describe Coalition Logic, Alternatingtime Temporal Logic (ATL), and epistemic extensions.

Multi-Agent Systems

We investigate the computational complexity of reasoning about multi-agent systems using the cooperation logic ATL of Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman. It is known that satisfiability checking is EXPTIME-complete for "full" ATL, and PSPACE-complete (in the general case) for the fragment of ATL corresponding to Pauly's Coalition Logic. In contrast, the model checking problems for ATL and Coalition Logic can both be solved in time polynomial in the size of the formula and the size of model against which the formula is to be checked. However, these latter results assume an extensive representation of models, in which all states of a model are explicitly enumerated. Such representations are not feasible in practice. In this paper we investigate the complexity of the ATL and Coalition Logic model checking problems for a more "reasonable" model representation known as SRML ("Simple Reactive Modules Language"), a simplified version of the actual model representation languages used for model checkers such as SMV and MOCHA. While it is unsurprising that, when measured against such representations, the model checking problems for ATL and Coalition Logic have a higher complexity than when measured against explicit state representations, we show that in fact the ATL and Coalition Logic model checking problems for SRML models have the same complexity as the corresponding satisfiability problems. That is, model checking ATL formulae against SRML models is EXPTIME-complete, and model checking Coalition Logic formulae against SRML models is PSPACE-complete. We conclude by investigating some technical issues around these results, and discussing their implications.

/pdf/on-the-complexity-of-practical-atl-model-checking-egmv9wrnq1.pdf

On the complexity of practical ATL model checking

We introduce emph{Normative Temporal Logic} (acro{ntl}), a logic for
reasoning about normative systems. acro{ntl} is a generalisation of
the well-known branching-time temporal logic acro{ctl}, in which the
path quantifiers $Apath$ (``on all pathsldots'') and $Epath$ (``on
some pathldots'') are replaced by the indexed deontic operators
$O{
s}$ and $P{
s}$, where for example $O{
s}phi$ means
``$phi$ is obligatory in the context of normative system $
s$''.
After defining the logic, we give a sound and complete axiomatisation,
and discuss the logic's relationship to standard deontic logics. We
present a symbolic representation language for models and normative
systems, and identify four different model checking problems,
corresponding to whether or not a model is represented symbolically or
explicitly, and whether or not we are given an interpretation for the
normative systems named in formulae to be checked. We show that the
complexity of model checking varies from acro{p}-complete up to
acro{exptime}-hard for these variations.

https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/921/pdf/07122.AgotnesThomas.Paper.921.pdf/

Wiebe van der Hoek

Papers

Alternating-time temporal logic with explicit strategies

An Integrated Modal Approach to Rational Agents

Multi-Agent Systems

On the complexity of practical ATL model checking

On the Logic of Normative Systems