This chapter presents an outline of a theory of intergroup conflict and some preliminary data relating to the theory. Much of the work on the social psychology of intergroup relations has focused on patterns of individual prejudices and discrimination and on the motivational sequences of interpersonal interaction. The intensity of explicit intergroup conflicts of interests is closely related in human cultures to the degree of opprobrium attached to the notion of "renegade" or "traitor." The basic and highly reliable finding is that the trivial, ad hoc intergroup categorization leads to in-group favoritism and discrimination against the out-group. Many orthodox definitions of "social groups" are unduly restrictive when applied to the context of intergroup relations. The equation of social competition and intergroup conflict rests on the assumptions concerning an "ideal type" of social stratification in which the salient dimensions of intergroup differentiation are those involving scarce resources.

The social identity theory of intergroup behavior

In this article the author reviews research evidence on the prevalence of mental disorders in lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals (LGBs) and shows, using meta-analyses, that LGBs have a higher prevalence of mental disorders than heterosexuals. The author offers a conceptual framework for understanding this excess in prevalence of disorder in terms of minority stress— explaining that stigma, prejudice, and discrimination create a hostile and stressful social environment that causes mental health problems. The model describes stress processes, including the experience of prejudice events, expectations of rejection, hiding and concealing, internalized homophobia, and ameliorative coping processes. This conceptual framework is the basis for the review of research evidence, suggestions for future research directions, and exploration of public policy implications. The study of mental health of lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) populations has been complicated by the debate on the classification of homosexuality as a mental disorder during the 1960s and early 1970s. That debate posited a gay-affirmative perspective, which sought to declassify homosexuality, against a conservative perspective, which sought to retain the classification of homosexuality as a mental disorder (Bayer, 1981). Although the debate on classification ended in 1973 with the removal of homosexuality from the second edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; American Psychiatric Association, 1973), its heritage has lasted. This heritage has tainted discussion on mental health of lesbians and gay men by associating— even equating— claims that LGB people have higher prevalences of mental disorders than heterosexual people with the historical antigay stance and the stigmatization of LGB persons (Bailey, 1999). However, a fresh look at the issues should make it clear that whether LGB populations have higher prevalences of mental disorders is unrelated to the classification of homosexuality as a mental disorder. A retrospective analysis would suggest that the attempt to find a scientific answer in that debate rested on flawed logic. The debated scientific question was, Is homosexuality a mental disorder? The operationalized research question that pervaded the debate was, Do homosexuals have high prevalences of mental disorders? But the research did not accurately operationalize the scientific question. The question of whether homosexuality should be considered a mental disorder is a question about classification. It can be answered by debating which behaviors, cognitions, or emotions should be considered indicators of a mental

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Prejudice, social stress, and mental health in lesbian, gay, and bisexual populations: conceptual issues and research evidence

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to give a state‐of‐the art overview of the Job Demands‐Resources (JD‐R) modelDesign/methodology/approach – The strengths and weaknesses of the demand‐control model and the effort‐reward imbalance model regarding their predictive value for employee well being are discussed. The paper then introduces the more flexible JD‐R model and discusses its basic premises.Findings – The paper provides an overview of the studies that have been conducted with the JD‐R model. It discusses evidence for each of the model's main propositions. The JD‐R model can be used as a tool for human resource management. A two‐stage approach can highlight the strengths and weaknesses of individuals, work groups, departments, and organizations at large.Originality/value – This paper challenges existing stress models, and focuses on both negative and positive indicators of employee well being. In addition, it outlines how the JD‐R model can be applied to a wide range of occupations, and be used to i...

The job demands-resources model : state of the art

Many prominent theorists have argued that accurate perceptions of the self, the world, and the future are essential for mental health. Yet considerable research evidence suggests that overly positive selfevaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism are characteristic of normal human thought. Moreover, these illusions appear to promote other criteria of mental health, including the ability to care about others, the ability to be happy or contented, and the ability to engage in productive and creative work. These strategies may succeed, in large part, because both the social world and cognitive-processing mechanisms impose niters on incoming information that distort it in a positive direction; negative information may be isolated and represented in as unthreatening a manner as possible. These positive illusions may be especially useful when an individual receives negative feedback or is otherwise threatened and may be especially adaptive under these circumstances. Decades of psychological wisdom have established contact with reality as a hallmark of mental health. In this view, the well-adjusted person is thought to engage in accurate reality testing, whereas the individual whose vision is clouded by illusion is regarded as vulnerable to, if not already a victim of, mental illness. Despite its plausibility, this viewpoint is increasingly difficult to maintain (cf. Lazarus, 1983). A substantial amount of research testifies to the prevalence of illusion in normal human cognition (see Fiske& Taylor, 1984;Greenwald, 1980; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Sackeim, 1983; Taylor, 1983). Moreover, these illusions often involve central aspects of the self and the environment and, therefore, cannot be dismissed as inconsequential. In this article, we review research suggesting that certain illusions may be adaptive for mental health and well-being. In particular, we examine evidence that a set of interrelated positive illusions—namely, unrealistically positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism—can serve a wide variety of cognitive, affective, and social functions. We also attempt to resolve the following para

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Illusion and well-being: a social psychological perspective on mental health

Social behavior is ordinarily treated as being under conscious (if not always thoughtful) control. However, considerable evidence now supports the view that social behavior often operates in an implicit or unconscious fashion. The identifying feature of implicit cognition is that past experience influences judgment in a fashion not introspectively known by the actor. The present conclusion--that attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes have important implicit modes of operation--extends both the construct validity and predictive usefulness of these major theoretical constructs of social psychology. Methodologically, this review calls for increased use of indirect measures--which are imperative in studies of implicit cognition. The theorized ordinariness of implicit stereotyping is consistent with recent findings of discrimination by people who explicitly disavow prejudice. The finding that implicit cognitive effects are often reduced by focusing judges' attention on their judgment task provides a basis for evaluating applications (such as affirmative action) aimed at reducing such unintended discrimination.

/pdf/implicit-social-cognition-attitudes-self-esteem-and-2j32pp6h9o.pdf

Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes.

Psychology of intergroup relations

Chapter 1 Thinking About American Politics Chapter 2 Political Culture Chapter 3 The Constitution Chapter 4 Federalism Chapter 5 Civil Liberties and Civil Rights Chapter 6 Public Opinion and the Media Chapter 7 Political Participation, Voting, and Elections Chapter 8 Political Parties Chapter 9 Interest Groups Chapter 10 Congress Chapter 11 The Presidency Chapter 12 The Federal Court System Chapter 13 The Bureaucracy Chapter 14 Domestic and Foreign Policy

Equity : theory and research

The Social psychology of intergroup relations

This study investigated subjects' cognitive, affective, and physiological reactions to equity and inequity. Results confirmed two hypotheses derived from equity theory: (a) Subjects were more content (and less distressed) when they were equitably rewarded than when they were either underrewarded or overrewarded (Hypothesis 1). Further, overrewarded subjects were more content than were underrcwardcd subjects (Hypothesis 2). Hypothesis 3 predicted that when persons are led to expect inequity, they will be less distressed when an injustice is actually encountered than they would be had they been unprepared for the inequity. This hypothesis was also supported. This last finding was explained in terms of the notion of cognitive set, as developed by Austin.

William G. Austin

Papers

Psychology of intergroup relations

Equity : theory and research

The Social psychology of intergroup relations

Reactions to confirmations and disconfirmations of expectancies of equity and inequity

Internal standards revisited: Effects of social comparisons and expectancies on judgments of fairness and satisfaction