1. Introduction and Overview. 2. Detecting Influential Observations and Outliers. 3. Detecting and Assessing Collinearity. 4. Applications and Remedies. 5. Research Issues and Directions for Extensions. Bibliography. Author Index. Subject Index.

Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity

Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Edited by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave. Pp. viii, 282. £3·50, paperback £1. 1970. (Cambridge University Press.)

This article reports and analyzes an updated version of the widely-used Polity II dataset, consisting of annual indicators of institutional democracy and autocracy for 161 states spanning the years from 1946 through 1994. The validity of the Polity III indicators of regime type is supported by their strong correlations (.85 to .92) with seven conceptually and operationally different indicators of democracy developed by other researchers. Comparative analysis of global and regional trends in democracy shows the extent to which the Middle East and Africa lag behind other world regions in the transition to democracy. A series of challenges to the `third wave' of democratization are identified, with particular attention paid to the large numbers of institutionally unconsolidated, or `incoherent', polities that have recently emerged, mainly due to attempts by autocratic elites to contain domestic and international pressures to liberalize their regimes.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/425616.pdf

Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data

Since Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998), the standard method for modeling time dependence in binary data has been to incorporate time dummies or splined time in logistic regressions. Although we agree with the need for modeling time dependence, we demonstrate that time dummies can induce estimation problems due to separation. Splines do not suffer from these problems. However, the complexity of splines has led substantive researchers (1) to use knot values that may be inappropriate for their data and (2) to ignore any substantive discussion concerning temporal dependence. We propose a relatively simple alternative: including t, t 2 , and t 3 in the regression. This cubic polynomial approximation is trivial to implement—and, therefore, interpret—and it avoids problems such as quasi-complete separation. Monte Carlo analysis demonstrates that, for the types of hazards one often sees in substantive research, the polynomial approximation always outperforms time dummies and generally performs as well as splines or even more flexible autosmoothing procedures. Due to its simplicity, this method also accommodates nonproportional hazards in a straightforward way. We reanalyze Crowley and Skocpol (2001) using nonproportional hazards and find new empirical support for the historical-institutionalist perspective.

/pdf/back-to-the-future-modeling-time-dependence-in-binary-data-51zbd54rc2.pdf

Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data

Democratic states are in general about as conflict- and war-prone as nondemocracies, but democracies have rarely clashed with one another in violent conflict. We first show that democracy, as well as other factors, accounts for the relative lack of conflict. Then we examine two explanatory models. The normative model suggests that democracies do not fight each other because norms of compromise and cooperation prevent their conflicts of interest from escalating into violent clashes. The structural model asserts that complex political mobilization processes impose institutional constraints on the leaders of two democracies confronting each other to make violent conflict unfeasible. Using different data sets of international conflict and a multiplicity of indicators, we find that (1) democracy, in and of itself, has a consistent and robust negative effect on the likelihood of conflict or escalation in a dyad; (2) both the normative and structural models are supported by the data; and (3) support for the normative model is more robust and consistent.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0003055400271414

Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946-1986

The research reported here develops an explanation for the often-noted absence of international war between democratic states. This explanation is derived from a theoretical rationale centered on universal democratic norms for reconciling competing values and interests. I argue that democratic states locked in disputes are better equipped than others with the means for diffusing conflict situations at an early stage before they have an opportunity to escalate to military violence. Not only is this explanatory logic consistent with the published findings on democracy and war, but it also entails the novel empirical proposition that disputes between democracies are more amenable than are other disputes to peaceful settlements, the hypothesis I examine here. Analyses of contemporary interstate disputes reveal that even when potentially confounding factors are controlled, democratic opponents are significantly more likely to reach peaceful settlements than other types of disputants.

Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict.

The research reported here extends investigation of the democracy-war hypothesis by focusing on the norms of dispute resolution integral to the democratic process. If we extend these norms to the international arena, then it becomes reasonable to expect democratic states to adopt compromise solutions to international problems. One implication of this logic is that democracies are likely to be more amenable than others to efforts of third parties to resolve or ameliorate interstate disputes. This hypothesis is examined in the present study. A sample of strictly interstate disputes acquired from the Alker-Sherman disaggregated conflict set provide the basis for this inquiry. Democracy is assessed for each disputant party with the composite index from the Polity II data collection. In order to control for extraneous effects on the probability of management, the author develops a baseline model consisting of prior management activity, the costs of conflict, and the power of the disputants. Because the depende...

Democracy and the Management of International Conflict

This study examines ways that political processes influence the provision of basic human needs once the effects of aggregate national wealth are removed. Three general explanatory approaches are examined. These are based on the size or strength of the national government, the achievement ofdemocratic processes, and the ideological orientation ofruling elites along a left-right dimension. These three approaches are analyzed by regressing an index of physical well-being, the PQLI, on measures drawn from each perspective for a sample of 1 16 contemporary nations. The findings indicate that political attributes do indeed have an impact on the provision of basic needs even when controlling for aggregate social wealth. Democratic processes are related to positive welfare outcomes irrespective of state strength and ideological norms. For regimes with a roughly centrist ideology, state strength appears to make little noticeable difference one way or another; for those on the left, state strength promotes welfare performance; for those on the right, state strength is found to inhibit the provision of basic needs. How do political processes affect the welfare of individuals? This question in countless variants has motivated students of political economy at least since the advent of the modern nation-state. In its simplest form, the empirical question becomes "What kind of state achieves the highest level of welfare for its citizens?" Although it may seem that there are as many answers as possible dimensions of states, most analyses have centered on one (or more) of three general explanatory approaches. The first focuses on the size or strength of the state apparatus as the essential ingredient in translating productive potential into welfare outcomes. Successful welfare performance hinges on the capability of the state, because the state is considered the one social institution concerned with the material needs of the population as a whole. A second model highlights procedural aspects of the political system rather than the budgetary strength of the state by linking successful welfare outcomes to the relatively even distribution of political power brought about by political democracy. The third approach is distinguished from the other two by its emphasis on the ideological orientation (usually on a left-right continuum) of ruling elites. This model posits welfare

Politics, the State, and Basic Human Needs: A Cross-National Study*

Although agents employ a wide range of conflict management techniques in practice, scholars have evaluated only a few of these. A more complete empirical analysis of the spectrum of third-party procedures used to manage international crises reveals that two techniques in particular are most effective: mediation efforts and third-party activities to open or maintain lines of communication. The endpoints of preventing escalation and promoting peaceful settlement take into account the notion of conflict as a dynamic evolutionary process, consisting of several phases, which in turn affect the outcome of third-party management. Crisis management methods that have proved successful in a bipolar world may be similarly successful in the post-cold war environment, an issue future work must address.

Third-party techniques for preventing conflict escalation and promoting peaceful settlement

The early 1940s marked a period in which the consensus norms of the Supreme Court experienced a radical and apparently permanent change. The consistent pattern of relatively high cohesion characteristic of the Court's earlier years gave way to surging rates of concurring and dissenting opinions. The present research is an examination of the factors possibly contributing to the justices' sharply increasing tendency to express their individual views rather than to defer to the opinion of the Court. Using both historical and quantitative methods, the authors evaluate the impact of the Court's discretionary jurisdiction, changing caseload, associate justice characteristics, and judicial leadership. The evidence presented points to the conclusion that in combination with other factors the leadership style introduced by Harlan Fiske Stone in 1941 had a dramatic effect on the consensus norms of the Court.

William J. Dixon

Papers

Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict.

Democracy and the Management of International Conflict

Politics, the State, and Basic Human Needs: A Cross-National Study*

Third-party techniques for preventing conflict escalation and promoting peaceful settlement

On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court