International Security Studies (ISS) has changed and diversified in many ways since 1945. This book provides the first intellectual history of the development of the subject in that period. It explains how ISS evolved from an initial concern with the strategic consequences of superpower rivalry and nuclear weapons, to its current diversity in which environmental, economic, human and other securities sit alongside military security, and in which approaches ranging from traditional Realist analysis to Feminism and Post-colonialism are in play. It sets out the driving forces that shaped debates in ISS, shows what makes ISS a single conversation across its diversity, and gives an authoritative account of debates on all the main topics within ISS. This is an unparalleled survey of the literature and institutions of ISS that will be an invaluable guide for all students and scholars of ISS, whether traditionalist, ‘new agenda’ or critical. • The first book to tell the post-1945 story of International Security Studies and offer an integrated historical sociology of the whole field • Opens the door to a long-overdue conversation about what ISS is and where it should be going • Provides a detailed institutional account of ISS in terms of its journals, departments, think tanks and funding sources

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The Evolution of International Security Studies

`Human security' is a promising but still underdeveloped paradigmatic approach to understanding contemporary security politics. We argue that tension between those embracing the politics of development and those supporting the human security paradigm has intensified because the transnational dimensions embodied within the latter approach have been under-assessed. The idea of `threat' also needs to be identified with more precision for the human security concept to accrue analytical credibility. We focus on how transnational behaviour addresses the central human security problems of vulnerability and immediacy. Human security's utility for confronting crisis is also evaluated via the application of two case studies of humanitarian intervention: the 1994 multinational operation in Haiti and the 1999 intervention in East Timor. We conclude that, while general security politics includes both domestic and international issues, human security allows us to transcend sovereign prerogatives and to address emerging...

The utility of human security: Sovereignty and humanitarian intervention

This critical review of the new political science literature on the causes of nuclear weapons proliferation consists of seven parts. The first section briefly presents what we know about which states developed nuclear weapons and which states started but abandoned weapons development programs. I highlight the problems that result from uncertainty about the accuracy and completeness of the data. The second and third sections review the literature on the spread of the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons. We still lack robust knowledge about the relationship between the development of civilian nuclear power programs and nuclear weapons acquisition. The next two sections review the literature on the demand for nuclear weapons. Comparative case studies and statistical studies have improved our understanding of the diversity of motives for weapons development and restraints, but serious gaps in our knowledge remain. The sixth section outlines alternative theories about the potential impact of the nu...

https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052209-131042

The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

At one level, the question posed in the title of this contribution can be quickly dispensed with: war is violent and peace is, well, peaceful; in other words, peace is the antithesis of war. This is certainly the common-sense view, and it is one usually reinforced by the media. Journalists, after all, are interested in change: theirs is a world of news (what is new), of events, discontinuities and drama. What could be more dramatic than the change from one thing into its opposite? Historians, by contrast, are often interested in continuities, and it is this approach that informs this essay. What do war and peace have in common? Answering this question is particularly important if we hope to understand transitions: the transition from peace to war and the transition from war to peace. Perhaps we can also take a cue here from the natural sciences: how can one thing change into another - a bulb into a plant, a liquid into a gas - unless it has already begun to resemble it?

War and peace: what's the difference?

Building on the rationalist literature on sanctions, this article argues that economic and political sanctions are a successful tool of nonproliferation policy, but that selection effects have rendered this success largely hidden. Since the late 1970s—when the United States made the threat of sanctions credible through congressional legislation and began regularly employing sanctions against proliferating states—sanctions have been ineffective in halting ongoing nuclear weapons programs, but they have succeeded in deterring states from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place and have thus contributed to a decline in the rate of nuclear pursuit. The logic of the argument is simple: rational leaders assess the risk of sanctions before initiating a nuclear weapons program, which produces a selection effect whereby states highly vulnerable to sanctions are deterred from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place, so long as the threat is credible. Vulnerability is a function of a state's level of economic and security dependence on the United States—states with greater dependence have more to lose from US sanctions and are more likely to be sensitive to US-sponsored norms. The end result of this selection effect is that since the late 1970s, only insulated, inward-looking regimes have pursued nuclear weapons and become the target of imposed sanctions, thus rendering the observed success rate of nonproliferation sanctions low. I find support for the argument based on statistical analysis of a global sample of countries from 1950 to 2000, an original data set of US nonproliferation sanctions episodes, and qualitative analysis of the South Korean and Taiwanese nuclear weapons programs.

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The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions

This Adelphi Paper examines the motives behind Libya‘s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafi‘s rise to power in 1969 through to the end of 2003. It also assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed during this period, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance, subsequently relying on technological infusions from the A.Q. Khan network. 
Wyn Q. Bowen clearly analyzes the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the Gadhafi regime‘s calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage, both politically and economically, with the international community, particularly the United States. It explores the process of dismantling the nuclear programme and the question of whether Libya constitutes amodel for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink

In December 2003 Iran signed an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Authority. The signing followed 18 months of mounting international pressure on Iran to prove its benign motives following revelations about past failures to declare work on uranium enrichment and plutonium separation–the two routes to producing nuclear weapons-grade material. Although Iran has strenuously denied having a nuclear weapons programme, both the United States and the European Union have been highly suspicious. However, their responses to Iran have shown a divergence in how to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The way forward on Iran will be influenced significantly by the extent to which the American and European approaches can be reconciled or otherwise.

The Iranian nuclear challenge

The attacks against the US homeland in September 2001 demonstrate that terrorist groups possess both the motivations and capabilities to conduct devastating attacks on US territory, citizens and in...

Deterrence and asymmetry: non-state actors and mass casualty terrorism

The technical and political evidence that Iran is seeking to establish a ‘nuclear hedging’ capability has gradually increased over the past nine years. The regime in Tehran has continued to insist that its nuclear ambitions are purely civilian in nature and it has resisted the international community's dual-track policy, encompassing both negotiations and sanctions, to persuade Iran to be fully transparent about its nuclear activities and plans, and to suspend work related to uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. While the prospects for a negotiated solution currently appear slim, the regime does not yet appear to have decided whether, or when, to produce nuclear weapons and to break out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is essential, therefore, to maintain and if necessary to build up the pressure on Iran and to strengthen efforts to disrupt its procurement of technology and materials for its nuclear programme. It is also imperative for the international community to maintain negotiations and also consider alternative diplomatic approaches to enhance the prospects of keeping Iran focused purely on civil nuclear ambitions, while at the same time resolving questions related to the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme.

Iran's nuclear challenge: nine years and counting

The second Nuclear Security Summit on 26–27 March 2012 in Seoul provides an important opportunity to gauge international consensus on the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, and to evaluate progress in the development of multilateral cooperative efforts to prevent it. However, the ‘nuclear security’ agenda has long been complicated by the complexity of the issues it covers and diverging perceptions of the risks and threats in this area. Further complications involve the politics that have constrained the development of formal cooperative approaches and the patchwork nature of the existing multilateral policy architecture. While the Summit is unlikely to go very far in mitigating these complications, it will nonetheless provide impetus to multilateral efforts to strengthen the international regulative framework in this area and, in the process, to develop the norm of nuclear security. Beyond Seoul several priorities stand out. Nuclear safety and nuclear security need to be approached in a more balanced way by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and it must also be allowed to adopt a more joined-up, and less stove-piped, approach to nuclear governance across the safeguards, safety and security fields. Developing countries that are concerned by growing demands for strengthened nuclear security arrangements need greater reassurance from those proposing them that these will not undermine their rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue civil applications of nuclear energy. Greater progress also needs to be made in universalizing the key nuclear security conventions and their amendments, and attention should be given to how momentum and high-level political buy-in to the nuclear security agenda can be maintained in the future both as part of, and beyond, the Nuclear Security Summit process.

Wyn Q. Bowen

Papers

Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink

The Iranian nuclear challenge

Deterrence and asymmetry: non-state actors and mass casualty terrorism

Iran's nuclear challenge: nine years and counting

Multilateral cooperation and the prevention of nuclear terrorism: pragmatism over idealism