This paper provides a survey of European antitrust law enforcement since its foundation in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 up to and including 2004. We present a complete overview and statistical analysis of all 538 formal Commission decisions under Articles 81, 82, and 86 of the European Community Treaty. We report a range of summary statistics concerning report route, investigation duration, length of the decision, decision type, imposed fines, number of parties, sector classification, nationality, and Commissioner and Director General responsible. The statistics are linked to changes in legislation and administrative implementation, thereby providing an historical overview that summarizes the Commission’s work in the area of antitrust. One or more appeals were filed with respect to 161 of the 538 decisions. We estimate the determinants of the size of the imposed fine and probability of appeal when an infringement has been found.

European antitrust policy 1957–2004 : an analysis of commission decisions

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European antitrust policy 1957-2004: An analysis of Commission decisions

This Article examines whether the current penalties in the United States Sentencing Guidelines are set at the appropriate levels to deter illegal price fixing cartels optimally. The authors analyze two data sets to determine how high on average cartels raise prices. The first consists of every published scholarly economic study of the effects of cartels on prices in individual cases. The second consists of every final verdict in a U.S. antitrust case in which a neutral finder of fact reported collusive overcharges. They report average overcharges of 49% and 31% for the two data sets, and median overcharges of 25% and 22%. They also report separate results for domestic cartels, international cartels, more recent cartels, and bid‑rigging. The authors conclude that the current Sentencing Commission presumption that cartels overcharge on average by 10% is much too low, and that principles of optimal deterrence indicate that current levels of cartel penalties should be increased significantly. The Sentencing Commission should consider raising the presumption to 15% for domestic cartels and 25% for international cartels. Alternatively, if the policymakers decide this distinction is unwise, a 20% overall presumption would be appropriate. This is a conservative and modest proposal in light of this article's results.

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Cartel Overcharges and Optimal Cartel Fines

Refusals to Deal and Aftermarkets

List of figures Acknowledgements Table of legislation Table of equivalences List of abbreviations 1. Introduction 2. Horizontal constraints 3. Abuse of dominance 4. Licensing 5. Vertical restrictions 6. Joint ventures and alliances 7. Decisions addressed to Member States pursuant to Article 106 FEU Treaty 8. Mergers and acquisitions Annex: 1. Decisions related to procedural issues 2. Table of landmark decisions described in the book 3. Table of mergers blocked by the European Commission 4. Table of merger decisions described in the book in alphabetical order 5. Table of all European Commission decisions on antitrust in alphabetical order Bibliography Index.

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European Commission Decisions on Competition: Economic Perspectives on Landmark Antitrust and Merger Cases

Designed with the practitioner in mind, this reference work provides access to details of case law, legislation and practical information required by those dealing with competition law. This edition has been revised to include sections on coal and steel, industrial and intellectual property and financial services. The book is divided into a series of lists, tables and sections which can be used to locate information by various methods, according to the needs and preferences of the user. All sections have been amended to take into account developments in competition law in the EEC over the last year. The contents include listings of all Commission decisions, European Court and Court of First Instance judgements, merger decisions, fines imposed by the Commission and examples of basic texts used in practice, such as documents used in inspections, letters requesting information and comfort letters.

Xavier Lewis

Papers

EU Competition Law Handbook