In this paper, we present two differential fault analyses on PRESENT-80 which is a lightweight block cipher. The first attack is a basic attack which induces a fault on only one bit of intermediate states, and we can obtain the last subkey of the block cipher, given 48 faulty cipher texts on average. The second attack can retrieve the master key of the block cipher, given 18 faulty cipher texts on average. In the latter attack, we assume that we can induce faults on a single nibble of intermediate states. Given those faulty cipher texts, the computational complexity of attacks is negligible.

/pdf/new-differential-fault-analysis-on-present-32tjfldzpe.pdf

New differential fault analysis on PRESENT

Differential Fault Analysis is a powerful cryptanalytic tool to reveal secret keys of cryptographic algorithms. By corrupting the computation of an algorithm, an attacker gets additional information about the secret key. In 2012, several Differential Fault Analyses on the AES cipher were analyzed from an informationtheoretic perspective. This analysis exposed whether or not the leaked information was fully exploited. It revealed if an analysis was already optimal or if it could still be improved. We applied the same approach to all existing Differential Fault Analyses on the CLEFIA cipher. We show that only some of these attacks are already optimal. We improve those analyses which did not exploit all information. With one exception, all attacks against CLEFIA-128 reach the theoretical limit after our improvement. Our improvement of an attack against CLEFIA-192 and CLEFIA-256 reduces the number of fault injections to the lowest possible number reached to date.

/pdf/on-the-optimality-of-differential-fault-analyses-on-clefia-2u7xgo248f.pdf

On the Optimality of Differential Fault Analyses on CLEFIA.

In 2012, several Differential Fault Analyses on the AES cipher were analyzed from an information-theoretic perspective. This analysis exposed whether or not the leaked information was fully exploited. We apply the same approach to all existing Differential Fault Analyses on the CLEFIA cipher. We show that only some of these attacks are already optimal. We improve those analyses which did not exploit all information. With one exception, all attacks against CLEFIA-128 reach the theoretical limit after our improvement. Our improvement of an attack against CLEFIA-192 and CLEFIA-256 reduces the number of fault injections to the lowest possible number reached so far.

On the Optimality of Differential Fault Analyses on CLEFIA

Differential fault analysis of ARIA in multi-byte fault models

The new block cipher PRINTCIPHER was introduced in CHES 2010 as a lightweight block cipher for `integrated circuit' or IC-`printing' technology. The key of PRINTCIPHER consist of two sub-key components where the first sub-key is `XORed' to the state in each round, whereas the second sub-key is used to generate the key-dependent permutations. In this study, the authors describe a new differential fault analysis on the lightweight block cipher PRINTcipher. The authors present two different fault models for obtaining each sub-key. The first fault model is used to obtain the second sub-key, which induces a fault on the key-dependent permutation layer so, on average, key search space is reduced from 2 32 to 2 14 , given 36 faulty cipher texts. To obtain the first sub-key, the authors induce a fault on an intermediate results then they obtain, on average, 42 bits of the first sub-key with less than 24 faulty cipher texts. In total, on average, they reduce key search space of PRINTcipher from 2 80 to 2 20 , given 60 faulty cipher texts. They also simulated their attack on a 1.8 GHz Celeron PC.

Differential fault analysis on PRINTcipher

This paper examines the strength of CLEFIA against multiple bytes differential fault attack. Firstly, it presents the principle of CLEFIA algorithm and differential fault analysis; then, according to injecting faults into the r,r1,r-2 CLEFIA round three conditions, proposes three fault models and corresponding analysis methods; finally, all of the fault model and analysis methods above have been verified through software simulation. Experiment results demonstrate that: CLEFIA is vulnerable to differential fault attack due to its Feistel structure and S-box feature, 5-6,6-8,2 faults are needed to recover CLEFIA-128 based on the three fault models in this paper respectively, multiple byte faults model can greatly improve the attack practicality and even the attack efficiency, and the fault analysis methods in this paper can provide some fault analysis ideas on other block ciphers using S-box

/pdf/multiple-bytes-differential-fault-analysis-on-clefia-2rxj8utxu5.pdf

Xin-jie Zhao

Papers

Multiple Bytes Differential Fault Analysis on CLEFIA.