In the scenario of highly mobile communication of Internet of Vehicles (IoV), identity authentication between vehicles not only needs to ensure security, but also needs to consider the problem of delay. The designed authentication scheme should meet the requirements of ultra-reliable and low latency in future B5G or 6G. We innovatively used the concept of network slicing to divide the interior of the vehicle into multiple compartments, and carried out PBFT consensus of blockchain among these compartments. Meanwhile, we introduce the channel estimation method to evaluate the relationship between the success rate of authentication and the time delay, which provides a reference for the deployment of PBFT consensus in IoV communication in the future.

Ultra Reliable and Low Latency Authentication Scheme for Internet of Vehicles Based on Blockchain

With the improvement of people's awareness of environmental protection, electric vehicles (EVs) are becoming more and more popular, and the issue of vehicle to grid (V2G) energy trading is also put on the agenda. To protect the security and privacy of EVs when they trade energy with the grid, many scholars have introduced the emerging blockchain technology. However, there are few studies on the blockchain consensus algorithm for the EVs charging scenario, while the consensus is exactly the core technology in blockchain for reaching agreement in distributed systems, which to some extent determines the efficiency of V2G. Therefore, aiming at the above scenario, this paper proposes two low-complexity consensus algorithms, namely (PBFT-enabled RAFT) PRAFT and (RAFT-enable PBFT) RPBFT, which are combined the typical blockchain consensus PBFT and RAFT, and can be respectively applied to two EVs charging scenarios. In our V2G model, charging piles (CPs) and charging stations (CSs) will participate in the blockchain consensus as nodes. Through theoretical analysis and simulation, and compared with other methods, these two consensus algorithms have high scalability, low communication complexity, low storage overhead, high throughput, and low latency. Meanwhile they can also avoid the risk of Byzantine leader in RAFT. Finally, we demonstrate the two consensus algorithms in a real charging scenario, which show their transaction latency and energy consumption can well adapt to the EVs charging scenario in V2G networks. 

PRAFT and RPBFT: A class of blockchain consensus algorithm and their applications in electric vehicles charging scenarios for V2G networks

Blockchain sharding technology randomly divides all nodes in the blockchain system into multiple shardings. This design aims to solve the scalable problem when there are too many access nodes in the blockchain network, by significantly reducing the complexity of reaching consensus and improving the throughput and efficiency of transactions in the blockchain system. However, if too many malicious nodes are allocated or the number of nodes is not enough, it may bring security risks to sharding. This paper analyzes the sharding security of blockchain systems with PBFT consensus under non-cross sharding transaction and cross sharding transaction. Simulation results show that both the number of nodes in a sharding and the number of malicious nodes affect the sharding security. In the case of cross-sharding, we can increase the number of cross-sharding validation nodes to improve the success rate of consensus.

Security Analysis of Sharding in Blockchain with PBFT Consensus

The GEO-Mobile Radio Interface-1 (GMR-1) is a satellite communication standard used in Thuraya, a United Arab Emirates-based regional mobile satellite service provider. The specification of the encryption algorithm used in GMR-1 was not disclosed until it was uncovered by Driessen <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">et al.</i> in 2012 through reverse engineering. Given that A5-GMR-1, a stream cipher used in GMR-1, is primarily based on A5/2, Driessen <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">et al.</i> presented a ciphertext-only attack from the attacks on A5/2. Their ciphertext-only attack recovers the session key from multiple sets of 24 ciphertexts in an average of 32.1 min and requires 400 GB of pre-computed data. This study enhances Driessen <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">et al.</i> ’s ciphertext-only attack on A5-GMR-1 in all aspects of time, memory, and data. Our contributions are fourfold. First, we optimize the inefficient part of the previous attack. As a result, our ciphertext-only attack recovers the session key from multiple sets of 13 ciphertexts in less than 1 second and requires 400 MB of pre-computed data. Second, we propose novel memory-saving techniques. These techniques reduce the memory complexity to 216 ~ 289 MB without increasing the time and data complexity. Third, we present several time-memory-data tradeoff techniques. Using these techniques, we can present an attack that meets the desired conditions, such as memory minimization or data minimization. Furthermore, while the complexity of the previous attack is presented vaguely as “multiple sets” of 24 ciphertexts, these techniques allow us to accurately calculate the time, memory, and data complexity of the attack. Finally, we demonstrate that A5-GMR-1 can be attacked without frame numbers. To find out the frame number of each ciphertext, it is necessary to analyze and synchronize multiple channels. We present a plaintext recovery attack that does not require these processes. 

/pdf/improved-ciphertext-only-attack-on-gmr-1-bgn3qkg0.pdf

Improved Ciphertext-Only Attack on GMR-1

Electronic devices are connected now more than ever with the prevalence of the Internet of Things. The ever-increasing communication between these lightweight devices presses for the need to embed a cryptographic mechanism to ensure the confidentiality and authentication of data. Lightweight cryptography nicely supports the need for encryption mechanisms on IoT devices with limited memory, storage, and computing capability. This paper focuses on breaking the hardware implementation of GIFT-COFB, one of NIST's Lightweight Cryptography finalists. The 2-round partial unrolled design of GIFT-COFB is shown to be the most energy-efficient among all other <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$r$</tex> -round partial unrolling and fully unrolled settings [1]. In this paper, we propose a chosen-plaintext attack to retrieve the master key <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$K$</tex> effectively and demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed attack on the 2-round partial unrolled GIFT-COFB. Our efficient attack can derive the secret key by exploiting the nonlinearity of the Sboxes with a worst-case complexity of <tex xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">$O(2^{4})$</tex> . 

Chosen-Plaintext Attack on Energy-Efficient Hardware Implementation of GIFT-COFB

Lightweight block cipher PRESENT is an algorithm with SPN structure. Due to its excellent hardware performance and simple round function design, it can be well applied to Internet of things terminals with limited computing resources. As an improved cipher of PRESENT, GIFT is similar in structure to PRESENT and has been widely concerned by academia and industry. This article studies the P permutation law of PRESENT and GIFT, and presents a general differential fault attack(DFA) method with their differential characteristics. For PRESENT, this article chooses to inject a nibble fault before the 30th and 31st rounds of S-box operation. A total of 32 nibble fault ciphertexts are needed to recover the original key. The computational complexity and data complexity are 210.94 and 28, respectively. For GIFT, this article chooses to inject a nibble fault before the 25th, 26th, 27th and 28th rounds of S-box operation. A total of 64 nibble fault ciphertexts are needed to recover the original key. The computational complexity and data complexity are 211.91 and 29, respectively. Compared with other public cryptoanalysis results of PRESENT and GIFT, this general attack method has great advantages. In this article, the DFA of GIFT is experimentally verified and the effectiveness is proved. These experiments have been done on a personal computer and run in a very reasonable time(around 500ms).

/pdf/general-differential-fault-attack-on-present-and-gift-cipher-3pkwrc8tnd.pdf

Xinyue Ming

Papers

General Differential Fault Attack on PRESENT and GIFT Cipher With Nibble