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Deep and detailed research into the workings of corporate enables Professor Herman to throw considerable light on how the board of directors operates, how important outside directors are, how new members are selected, and how multiple directorships interlock the large corporations. Throughout the book the author contrasts the power of the managers with that of other interest groups - bankers, family - and he concludes that power lies with the managers. But this has not changed the basic objectives of the corporation - the pursuit of growth and profits - nor has it enhanced social responsibility. After thorough investigation Edward Herman concludes that government regulation has done surprisingly little to reduce the autonomy of the corporation. Just as the influence of bankers and investors has been resisted, so has the effect of regulation. Improved communications and controls, geographic dispersion, and the enhanced adaptability and mobility of the large corporation have all played a part in maintaining corporate power and managerial control. Corporate Control, Corporate Power will be essential reading for executives, policy makers, regulators, and all those concerned to make the corporation more responsible and accountable.

Corporate Control, Corporate Power.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of corporate governance proxies by ownership structure on the likelihood of firms’ financial distress for a sample of 146 Pakistani public-limited companies listed at the Karachi Stock Exchange over the period of 2003-2012.,The dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator and panel logistic regression (PLR) are used to determine the impact of corporate governance on the financial distress. The ownership structure is used as a determinant of corporate governance, while the Altman Z-score is utilized as an indicator of financial distress, as it measures financial distress inversely. The smaller the values of the Z-score, the higher will be the risk of financial distress.,The authors find insignificant impact of ownership structure on firms’ likelihood of financial distress based on the dynamic GMM method. However, the PLR results indicate that foreign shareholdings have a significant negative association with firms’ likelihood of financial distress, in the case of Pakistan. An evidence of a negative and insignificant relationship between institutional ownership and financial distress was observed, which indicates the passive role of institutional investors in Pakistan. The results also reveal a positive and significant relationship between insider’s ownership and likelihood of financial distress. This finding is consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis which predicts that insiders are more aligned with their self-interest than outside shareholders’ interest when their shareholding increases in the business. Furthermore, the results also reveal insignificant association between government shareholdings and the probability of financial distress. The reason could be the social welfare objective of the government entities rather than profit maximization.,The findings of this study provide more insight to corporate managers and investors about the association between the quality of corporate governance and the degree of financial distress, with respect to Pakistani firms. Furthermore, this study contributes to the existing literature by adding new evidence from developing countries like Pakistan which are helpful for regulatory bodies and policymakers in the formulation of long-term corporate governance strategies to manage the financial distress. It is well established that strengthening the quality of corporate governance practices enhances the efficiency of capital markets and reduces the probability of financial distress.,The study extends the body of existing literature on corporate governance and the likelihood of financial distress with reference to Pakistan. The results suggest that policymakers may pay special attention to the quality of corporate governance, specifically ownership structure, while predicting corporate financial distress.

The effects of ownership structure on likelihood of financial distress: an empirical evidence

Principal-principal conflicts and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China

Ownership concentration and ownership identity are important corporate governance mechanisms. This paper seeks to understand how ownership concentration and identity affect firm performance...

Ownership Concentration, Identity and Firm Performance: Evidence from China’s Listed Firms

Drawing on Asian contexts of principal–principal (PP) conflicts, for example, influence from controlling families and low dividends, this study examines whether external audit is an effective disciplining agent in a firm’s tax avoidance, compared with foreign-ownership contexts. An analysis of 450 Korean firms indicates that the regulatory role of the ‘Big-4’ audit firms is negatively moderated by the controlling family, consequently increasing tax avoidance. In contrast, foreign ownership decreases tax avoidance, unaffected by the controlling family. It is therefore suggested that to control PP conflicts in Asian contexts, more attention should be paid to a firm’s ownership structure.

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057%2Fabm.2014.11.pdf

Agent or structure for principal–principal conflicts? Audit firms versus foreign ownership in the Asian context

Korean firms, often represented by a business group or chaebol, have adopted and increased outside directors owing to the government’s initiative for corporate governance reform. However, their mon...

Yunsung Koh

Papers

Agent or structure for principal–principal conflicts? Audit firms versus foreign ownership in the Asian context

Remains on the board: outside directors’ behaviour and their survival chance in Korean firms