Security has become the primary concern in many telecommunications industries today as risks can have high consequences. Especially, as the core and enable technologies will be associated with 5G network, the confidential information will move at all layers in future wireless systems. Several incidents revealed that the hazard encountered by an infected wireless network, not only affects the security and privacy concerns, but also impedes the complex dynamics of the communications ecosystem. Consequently, the complexity and strength of security attacks have increased in the recent past making the detection or prevention of sabotage a global challenge. From the security and privacy perspectives, this paper presents a comprehensive detail on the core and enabling technologies, which are used to build the 5G security model; network softwarization security, PHY (Physical) layer security and 5G privacy concerns, among others. Additionally, the paper includes discussion on security monitoring and management of 5G networks. This paper also evaluates the related security measures and standards of core 5G technologies by resorting to different standardization bodies and provide a brief overview of 5G standardization security forces. Furthermore, the key projects of international significance, in line with the security concerns of 5G and beyond are also presented. Finally, a future directions and open challenges section has included to encourage future research.

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A Survey on Security and Privacy of 5G Technologies: Potential Solutions, Recent Advancements, and Future Directions

The development of the fifth generation (5G) wireless networks is gaining momentum to connect almost all aspects of life through the network with much higher speed, very low latency and ubiquitous connectivity. Due to its crucial role in our lives, the network must secure its users, components, and services. The security threat landscape of 5G has grown enormously due to the unprecedented increase in types of services and in the number of devices. Therefore, security solutions if not developed yet must be envisioned already to cope with diverse threats on various services, novel technologies, and increased user information accessible by the network. This paper outlines the 5G network threat landscape, the security vulnerabilities in the new technological concepts that will be adopted by 5G, and provides either solutions to those threats or future directions to cope with those security challenges. We also provide a brief outline of the post-5G cellular technologies and their security vulnerabilities which is referred to as future generations (XG) in this paper. In brief, this paper highlights the present and future security challenges in wireless networks, mainly in 5G, and future directions to secure wireless networks beyond 5G.

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Security for 5G and Beyond

A survey on software defined networking with multiple controllers

Software-defined networking (SDN) is a novel network paradigm that enables flexible management for networks. As the network size increases, the single centralized controller cannot meet the increasing demand for flow processing. Thus, the promising solution for SDN with large-scale networks is the multi-controller. In this paper, we present a compressive survey for multi-controller research in SDN. First, we introduce the overview of multi-controller, including the origin of multi-controller and its challenges. Then, we classify multi-controller research into four aspects (scalability, consistency, reliability, and load balancing) depending on the process of implementing the multi-controller. Finally, we propose some relevant research issues to deal with in the future and conclude the multi-controller research.

Multi-controller Based Software-Defined Networking: A Survey

https://cyberleninka.org/article/n/150341.pdf

New Security Architecture for IoT Network

Distributed SDN controller system

Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a promising step towards the future network. But, it still has some issue regarding the security. One of the security issues is the augmented impact of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. In this paper, we create an application on the top of Beacon controller to mitigate the DoS attacks in the OpenFlow networks. The attacks include IP/MAC Spoofing and Bulky/Garbage Message. We launch the DoS attacks towards the network and analyze the performance of the application. All of these attacks, Beacon, and OpenFlow are implemented in the network simulation environment Mininet. At the end of this paper, we also discuss about another strategy and supplementary method to mitigate the DoS attacks.

Mitigating Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in OpenFlow networks

Many researchers challenge the possibility of using blockchain and smart contracts to disrupt the Internet of Things (IoT) architecture because of their security and decentralization guarantees However, the state-of-the-art blockchain architecture is not scalable enough to satisfy the requirements of massive data traffics in the IoT environment The main reason for this issue is one needs to choose the consensus trade-off between either coping with a high throughput or a high number of nodes Consequently, this issue prevents the applicability of blockchain for IoT use cases In this paper, we propose a scalable two-tiered hierarchical blockchain architecture for IoT The first tier is a Core Engine, which is based on a Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) consensus to cope with a high throughput, that supervises the underlying subordinate engines (sub-engines) as its second tier This second tier comprises of the Payment, Compute, and Storage Engine, respectively We can deploy multiple instances of these sub-engines as many as we need and as local as possible near to the IoT domains, where IoT devices reside, to cope with a high number of nodes Furthermore, to further extend the scalability of the proposed architecture, we also provide additional scalability features on the Core Engine such as request aggregation, request prioritization, as well as sub-engine parallelism We implement all of our engines and expose them to IoT applications through the Engine APIs With these APIs, developers can build and run IoT applications in our architecture Our evaluation results show that our proposed features on the Core Engine can indeed enhance the overall performance of our architecture Moreover, based on our proof-of-concept IoT car rental application, we also show that the interoperability between sub-engines through the Core Engine is possible, even when the particular sub-engine is under sub-engine parallelism

/pdf/hierarchical-multi-blockchain-architecture-for-scalable-hb8t5igne9.pdf

Hierarchical Multi-Blockchain Architecture for Scalable Internet of Things Environment

In distributed software-defined network (SDN), the east/west-bound protocol describes the communication between the SDN controllers. The security of the east/west-bound protocol ensures that no malicious controllers are eavesdropping on or even driving the network. Southbound protocol defines the communication between the control plane and the data plane. It is also the only SDN communication channel with an agreed protocol, OpenFlow. OpenFlow suggests securing the southbound communication with Transport Layer Security (TLS). However, most current SDN projects do not implement the security segment in both the east/west-bound and southbound communications. Only a few exceptions such as OpenDayLight and HP VAN SDN implement TLS in the southbound communication. In this paper, we propose securing the distributed SDN communication with a multi-domain capable Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) protocol, particularly for the southbound and east/west-bound communication.

Securing distributed SDN with IBC

In software-defined network (SDN), the southbound protocol defines the communication between the control plane and the data plane. The agreed protocol, OpenFlow, suggests securing the southbound communication with Transport Layer Security (TLS). However, most current SDN projects do not implement the security segment, with only a few exceptions such as OpenDayLight, HP VAN SDN, and ONOS implementing TLS in the southbound communication. From the telecommunication providers’ perspective, one of the major SDN consumers besides data centers, the data plane becomes much more complicated with the addition of wireless data plane as it involves numerous wireless technologies. Therefore, the complicated resource management along with the security of such a data plane can hinder the migration to SDN. In this paper, we propose securing the distributed SDN communication with a multidomain capable Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) protocol, particularly for the southbound and wireless data plane communication. We also analyze the TLS-secured Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) message exchanges to find out the possible bandwidth saved with IBC.

/pdf/securing-sdn-southbound-and-data-plane-communication-with-1227xe5c59.pdf

Yustus Eko Oktian

Papers

Distributed SDN controller system

Mitigating Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in OpenFlow networks

Hierarchical Multi-Blockchain Architecture for Scalable Internet of Things Environment

Securing distributed SDN with IBC

Securing SDN Southbound and Data Plane Communication with IBC