Survey Paper: A survey on the communication architectures in smart grid

Power System Oscillations.- Linear Control in Power Systems.- Test System Model.- Power System Stabilizers.- Multiple-Model Adaptive Control Approach.- Simultaneous Stabilization.- Mixed-Sensitivity Approach Using Linear Matrix Inequalities.- Normalized ?? Loop-Shaping Using Linear Matrix Inequalities.- ?? Control For Time-Delayed Systems.

Robust Control in Power Systems

Vulnerability assessment is a requirement of NERC's cybersecurity standards for electric power systems. The purpose is to study the impact of a cyber attack on supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. Compliance of the requirement to meet the standard has become increasingly challenging as the system becomes more dispersed in wide areas. Interdependencies between computer communication system and the physical infrastructure also become more complex as information technologies are further integrated into devices and networks. This paper proposes a vulnerability assessment framework to systematically evaluate the vulnerabilities of SCADA systems at three levels: system, scenarios, and access points. The proposed method is based on cyber systems embedded with the firewall and password models, the primary mode of protection in the power industry today. The impact of a potential electronic intrusion is evaluated by its potential loss of load in the power system. This capability is enabled by integration of a logic-based simulation method and a module for the power flow computation. The IEEE 30-bus system is used to evaluate the impact of attacks launched from outside or from within the substation networks. Countermeasures are identified for improvement of the cybersecurity.

Vulnerability Assessment of Cybersecurity for SCADA Systems

http://www.neetrac.gatech.edu/publications/Electric%20System%20Automation.pdf

A survey on communication networks for electric system automation

Disruption of electric power operations can be catastrophic on national security and the economy. Due to the complexity of widely dispersed assets and the interdependences among computer, communication, and power infrastructures, the requirement to meet security and quality compliance on operations is a challenging issue. In recent years, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) established a cybersecurity standard that requires utilities' compliance on cybersecurity of control systems. This standard identifies several cyber-related vulnerabilities that exist in control systems and recommends several remedial actions (e.g., best practices). In this paper, a comprehensive survey on cybersecurity of critical infrastructures is reported. A supervisory control and data acquisition security framework with the following four major components is proposed: (1) real-time monitoring; (2) anomaly detection; (3) impact analysis; and (4) mitigation strategies. In addition, an attack-tree-based methodology for impact analysis is developed. The attack-tree formulation based on power system control networks is used to evaluate system-, scenario -, and leaf-level vulnerabilities by identifying the system's adversary objectives. The leaf vulnerability is fundamental to the methodology that involves port auditing or password strength evaluation. The measure of vulnerabilities in the power system control framework is determined based on existing cybersecurity conditions, and then, the vulnerability indices are evaluated.

/pdf/cybersecurity-for-critical-infrastructures-attack-and-b43elyfw9t.pdf

Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructures: Attack and Defense Modeling

Analysis of 162 disturbances from 1979 to 1995 reported by the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) indicates the importance of information systems under the regulated and competitive environment. This paper points out the major deficiencies in current communication and information systems and proposes a new power system information architecture aimed at correcting these deficiencies. The proposed architecture includes automation and control systems at all levels, from substation control system to independent system operator (ISO) operating center, taking into account the requirements of real-time data, security, availability, scalability, and appropriate Quality of Service (QoS). It uses multiple communication channels employing a wide variety of technologies to transmit real-time operating data and control signals. The real-time operating and control system is modeled with various redundancy configurations; the reliabilities of different configurations are studied and compared for practical values of component failure rates and repair rates.

Zhaoxia Xie

Papers

An information architecture for future power systems and its reliability analysis