Zhengyu Yin

TL;DR: It is shown that the Nash equilibria in security games are interchangeable, thus alleviating the equilibrium selection problem and proposed an extensive-form game model that makes the defender's uncertainty about the attacker's ability to observe explicit.

TL;DR: This paper presents TRUSTS, an application for scheduling randomized patrols for fare inspection in transit systems, an efficient algorithm for computing such patrol strategies and presents experimental results using real-world ridership data from the Los Angeles Metro Rail system.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on the complex games that are directly inspired by real-world security applications, and provide four contributions in the context of a general class of security games.

TL;DR: TRUSTS as discussed by the authors models the problem of computing patrol strategies as a leader-follower Stackelberg game, where the objective is to deter fare evasion and hence maximize revenue.

TL;DR: This work presents a general Bayesian Stackelberg game model for security patrolling in dynamic uncertain domains, in which the uncertainty in the execution of patrols is represented using Markov Decision Processes and shows that patrol schedules generated using this approach outperform schedules generated with a previous algorithm that does not consider execution uncertainty.