Drawing on data from a mid-sized city in eastern China, this article examines the interactions among the courts, the Party, and other administrative agencies. It finds that the courts, caught between the unruly administrative agencies and legal rhetoric, seek support from the Party to enhance their authority. They then devise tactics such as putting the chief official of agencies on the stand, issuing judicial suggestions, and innovatively applying the laws. Many of these tactics prove effective, as agencies adjust their behaviors accordingly. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that the courts are only a passive actor in local politics, the development indicates that the role of the courts is by no means negligible in translating the national laws into local practice. By exploring the dynamics of court-government relations in the context of administrative litigation, this article argues that local politics is a crucial factor in determining the trajectory of China’s judicialization of administrative governance and rule of law more generally.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2026304_code367705.pdf?abstractid=2026304&mirid=1

Judicial Innovation and Local Politics: Judicialization of Administrative Governance in East China

Judicial institutions, local protection and market segmentation: Evidence from the establishment of interprovincial circuit tribunals in China

Judicial Institution, Local Protection and Market Segmentation: Evidence from the Establishment of Interprovincial Circuit Tribunals in China

Conventional studies show that political connections have significant distributional effects. Yet, the means by which political connections affect the distribution of economic resources has not been fully investigated. This paper examines the role of political connections in the allocation of government procurements in China by combining quantitative and qualitative evidence. For quantitative analysis, we focus on a specific type of political connections, namely revolving-door recruitment. A unique dataset between 2016 and 2020 based on the contract-level transaction records of government procurements and the resumes of listed firms' board members and executives is established. The results suggest that firms establishing political connections by recruiting former government officials acquire more government procurements in the connected jurisdictions. Complementing with qualitative analysis from two publicly reported judicial cases, we show that political connections exploiting the loopholes in procurement institutions, including manipulating procurement methods, setting up restrictive requirements, and intervening in the process of expert evaluation, drives the allocation of government procurements. The results demonstrate that political connections exploit the loopholes in the context of weak institutions to benefit companies. 

How political connections exploit loopholes in procurement institutions for government contracts: Evidence from China

This chapter introduces the background and purpose of this book, describes the main content of each chapter, and highlights the significance and contributions of this book. 

Zhuang Liu

Papers

Authoritarian transparency: China's missing cases in court disclosure