It is proposed that motivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes—that is, strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs. The motivation to be accurate enhances use of those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate, whereas the motivation to arrive at particular conclusions enhances use of those that are considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion. There is considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions. These ideas can account for a wide variety of research concerned with motivated reasoning. The notion that goals or motives affect reasoning has a long and controversial history in social psychology. The propositions that motives may affect perceptions (Erdelyi, 1974), attitudes (Festinger, 1957), and attributions (Heider, 1958) have been put forth by some psychologists and challenged by others. Although early researchers and theorists took it for granted that motivation may cause people to make self-serving attributions and permit them to believe what they want to believe because they want to believe it, this view, and the research used to uphold it, came under concentrated criticism in the 1970s. The major and most damaging criticism of the motivational view was that all research purported to demonstrate motivated reasoning could be reinterpreted in entirely cognitive, nonmotivational terms (Miller & Ross, 1975; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Thus people could draw self-serving conclusions not because they wanted to but because these conclusions seemed more plausible, given their prior beliefs and expectancies. Because both cognitive and motivational accounts could be generated for any empirical study, some theorists argued that the hot versus cold cognition controversy could not be solved, at least in the attribution paradigm (Ross & Fletcher, 1985; Tetlock & Levi, 1982). One reason for the persistence of this controversy lies in the failure of researchers to explore the mechanisms underlying motivated reasoning. Recently, several authors have attempted to rectify this neglect (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Kunda, 1987; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986). All these authors share a view of motivation as having its effects through cognitive processes: People rely on cognitive processes and representations to arrive at their desired conclusions, but motivation plays a role in determining which of these will be used on a given occasion.

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The case for motivated reasoning.

Past research has generated mixed support among social scientists for the utility of social norms in accounting for human behavior. We argue that norms do have a substantial impact on human action; however, the impact can only be properly recognized when researchers (a) separate 2 types of norms that at times act antagonistically in a situation—injunctive norms (what most others approve or disapprove) and descriptive norms (what most others do)—and (b) focus Ss' attention principally on the type of norm being studied. In 5 natural settings, focusing Ss on either the descriptive norms or the injunctive norms regarding littering caused the Ss* littering decisions to change only in accord with the dictates of the then more salient type of norm.

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A focus theory of normative conduct: Recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places.

Research on people's confidence in their general knowledge has to date produced two fairly stable effects, many inconsistent results, and no comprehensive theory. We propose such a comprehensive framework, the theory of probabilistic mental models (PMM theory). The theory (a) explains both the overconfidence effect (mean confidence is higher than percentage of answers correct) and the hard-easy effect (overconfidence increases with item difficulty) reported in the literature and (b) predicts conditions under which both effects appear, disappear, or invert. In addition, (c) it predicts a new phenomenon, the confidence-frequency effect, a systematic difference between a judgment of confidence in a single event (i.e., that any given answer is correct) and a judgment of the frequency of correct answers in the long run. Two experiments are reported that support PMM theory by confirming these predictions, and several apparent anomalies reported in the literature are explained and integrated into the present framework. Do people think they know more than they really do? In the last 15 years, cognitive psychologists have amassed a large and apparently damning body of experimental evidence on overconfidence in knowledge, evidence that is in turn part of an even larger and more damning literature on so-called cognitive biases. The cognitive bias research claims that people are naturally prone to making mistakes in reasoning and memory, including the mistake of overestimating their knowledge. In this article, we propose a new theoretical model for confidence in knowledge based on the more charitable assumption that people are good judges of the reliability of their knowledge, provided that the knowledge is representatively sampled from a specified reference class. We claim that this model both predicts new experimental results (that we have tested) and explains a wide range of extant experimental findings on confidence, including some perplexing inconsistencies.

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Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence.

High- and low-task-importance Ss read a strong or weak unambiguous message or an ambiguous message that was attributed to a high- or low-credibility source. Under low task importance, heuristic processing of the credibility cue was the sole determinant of Ss' attitudes, regardless of argument ambiguity or strength. When task importance was high and message content was unambiguous, systematic processing alone determined attitudes when this content contradicted the validity of the credibility heuristic; when message content did not contradict this heuristic, systematic and heuristic processing determined attitudes independently. Finally, when task importance was high and message content was ambiguous, heuristic and systematic processing again both influenced attitudes. Yet, source credibility affected persuasion partly through its impact on the valence of systematic processing, confirming that heuristic processing can bias systematic processing when evidence is ambiguous. Implications for persuasion and other social judgment phenomena are discussed.

Heuristic processing can bias systematic processing : effects of source credibility, argument ambiguity, and task importance on attitude judgment

Most so-called "errors" in probabilistic reasoning are in fact not violations of probability theory. Examples of such "errors" include overconfi dence bias, conjunction fallacy, and base-rate neglect. Research- ers have relied on a very narrow normative view, and have ignored conceptual distinctions—for example, single case versus relative frequency—fundamental to probability theory. By recognizing and using these distinctions, however, we can make apparently stable "errors" disappear, reappear, or even invert. I suggest what a reformed understanding of judgments under uncertainty might look like.

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Zvi Ginossar

Papers

Problem solving in judgment under uncertainty.

On the use of statistical and nonstatistical knowledge: A problem solving approach