New York State Unified Court System

About: New York State Unified Court System is a government organization based out in New York, New York, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Therapeutic jurisprudence & Criminal law. The organization has 6 authors who have published 10 publications receiving 253 citations.

Intrusion and misuse detection in large-scale systems

Abstract: Attacks and misuses of computer systems are major concerns in today's network-based world. With the growing concern with regard to cyberterrorism there is a need for new tools and techniques to monitor networks and systems for intrusions and misuse. The goal must be to identify an attack before an organization incurs damage, loses information (theft or otherwise), or has its integrity impugned. With today's network-based economic resources, a successful attack will negatively impact consumer confidence and decrease consumers' willingness to make electronic purchases. The authors present information visualization techniques based on a glyph metaphor for visually representing textual log information.

Self-presentation processes in job analysis: a field experiment investigating inflation in abilities, tasks, and competencies.

Abstract: Although job analysis is a widely used organizational data collection technique, little research has investigated the extent to which job analysis information is affected by self-presentation processes. This study represents the first direct test of the propositions offered by F. P. Morgeson and M. A. Campion (1997) concerning self-presentation in job analysis measurement. Using an experimental design, the authors examined job incumbent response differences across ability, task, and competency statements. Results indicated that ability statements were more subject to inflation than were task statements across all rating scales. Greater endorsement of nonessential ability statements was responsible for the differences. This produced higher endorsement of ability items but lower mean ratings. Finally, frequency and importance ratings of global competency statements were generally higher than decomposed ability and task scales, but required-at-entry judgments demonstrated the opposite relationship. Job analysis data is perhaps the most widely gathered type of organizational information for developing human resource (HR) management systems. It forms the foundation upon which many important HR management systems are built (Butler & Harvey, 1988), including selection systems, training programs, performance management programs, and compensation systems. The seemingly straightforward character of collecting information about jobs has led many to assume that job analysis methods result in reliable, valid, and unbiased information. It has recently been suggested, however, that job analysis information may be subject to numerous social and cognitive sources of inaccuracy (Morgeson & Campion, 1997). Such inaccuracies can negatively affect the HR systems that rely on job analysis. This study examined how selfpresentation processes can serve to inflate job analysis responding and represents the first direct test of the propositions outlined by

“Friend to the Martyr, a Friend to the Woman of Shame”: Thinking About The Law, Shame and Humiliation

Abstract: This paper considers the intersection between law, humiliation and shame, and how the law has the capacity to allow for, to encourage, or (in some cases) to remediate humiliation, or humiliating or shaming behavior. The need for new attention to be paid to this question has increased exponentially as we begin to also take more seriously international human rights mandates, especially – although certainly not exclusively – in the context of the recently-ratified United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, a Convention that calls for “respect for inherent dignity,” and characterizes "discrimination against any person on the basis of disability [as] a violation of the inherent dignity and worth of the human person..." Humiliation and shaming, we believe, contravene basic fundamental human rights and raise important constitutional questions implicating the due process and equal protection clauses. Humiliation and shaming practices include “scarlet letter”-like criminal sanctions, police stop-and-frisk practices, the treatment of persons with mental disabilities in the justice system, and the use of sex offender registries. Humiliation and shame are detrimental in the ways that lead to recidivism, inhibit rehabilitation, discourage treatment, and injure victims. They also directly contravene the guiding principles of therapeutic jurisprudence, especially in the context of its relationship to the importance of dignity in the law, and potentially violate international human rights law principles as well.In this paper, we will explore how humiliation and shaming are bad for all participants in the legal system, and bad for the law itself. We will urge that humiliating and shaming techniques be banned, and that, this ban will enhance dignity for the entire legal system and society as a whole. First, we consider the meaning of shame and humiliation. Then, we briefly discuss principles of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) and its relationship to the significance of dignity, and then consider recent developments in international human rights law, both of which are valuable interpretive tools in this conversation. Next, we consider how the United States Supreme Court has considered these concepts in recent cases. Following this, we consider several relevant areas of law and policy from the perspective of how overt shaming is employed: scarlet letter punishments, use of the police power, treatment of institutionalized persons with mental disabilities and elders, and sex offender registry law. We then, using a TJ filter and drawing on international human rights law principles, examine why these shaming tactics are contrary to bedrock principles of the legal system: the mandates to honor dignity, to minimize recidivism, and to enhance rehabilitation.

Who's Pretending to Care for Him? How the Endless Jail-to-Hospital-to-Street-Repeat Cycle Deprives Persons with Mental Disabilities the Right to Continuity of Care

Abstract: There is a well-documented “shuttle process” by which individuals committed to psychiatric institutions (having been charged with minor “nuisance”-type criminal offenses) are often stabilized, returned to jail to await trial, and then returned to the hospital following relapse. This shuttling or cycling is bad for many reasons, not least of which is the way that it deprives the cohort of individuals at risk from any meaningful continuity of care. Continuity of care is crucial in order to reduce the rate of incarceration and institutionalization for persons with mental illness. Without this continuity, it is far less likely that any therapeutic intervention will have any long-lasting ameliorative effect. In this paper, we will argue that the current system – in addition to being utterly counter-productive (and in many ways, destructive) – also violates the constitutional right to treatment, and the statutory right to non-discrimination as provided in domestic (the Americans with Disabilities Act) and international (the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities) human rights law. This also violates every precept of therapeutic jurisprudence; in this context, we argue that it is necessary for lawyers to integrate these teachings – focusing on the prerequisites of “voice, validation and voluntariness” – in their representation of this population in the hopes that the current system can be ameliorated. In conclusion, we will offer some solutions as to how continuity of care can be improved through mental health courts, programs that support diversion away from incarceration to treatment at an early process in a criminal proceeding, proper mental health screening, expanded access to mental health treatment and better re-entry services, and training for all persons interacting with someone with mental illness.

Said I, but You Have No Choice: Why a Lawyer Must Ethically Honor a Client's Decision about Mental Health Treatment Even If It is Not What S/He Would Have Chosen

Abstract: This paper addresses a remarkably under-considered topic: the ethical standards for lawyers representing persons with mental disabilities. Although there is an extensive body of literature endorsing “zealous advocacy” as the standard for the criminal defense lawyer in “ordinary” cases, there is virtually no literature (or case law) on this question in this context. Our thesis is simple. We reject the model of “paternalism/best interests” that is regularly substituted for a traditional legal advocacy position, and a substitution that is rarely questioned. We believe this presumption flies in the face of statutory law, constitutional law, and international human rights law, and must be rejected. It also is contrary to the principles of the school of therapeutic jurisprudence with which we both firmly align ourselves. Moreover, this presumption is also contrary to all the valid and reliable empirical evidence that has been available for decades. When it comes to mental disability law, the law is clear: if there is an issue as to the client’s capacity to engage in autonomous decision-making, then the lawyer must aid the client in supported decision-making, rather than impose substituted decision-making. In our analysis, we also discuss how sanism, pretexuality, heuristic thinking, and false “ordinary common sense” contaminate the practice of mental disability law, and look at the implications of criminal law, elder law, juvenile law, caselaw implementing the Americans with Disabilities Act, and international human rights law (especially, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities), and how the ethical obligations in these types of cases are no different than in mental disability law. And we discuss the multi-textured meanings of “competency” and “capacity” and how they affect the resolution of these issues, especially in the context of forced medication, psychiatric advance directives, and sexual autonomy.We conclude that client autonomy must be in the forefront of any client-attorney relationship, and an attorney must thus always follow their clients wishes except for in very limited cases (where there is a pre-existing finding of civil incompetency), that, if an attorney feels that a client is unable to make a decision completely on her own, the attorney should seek out others who might assist in supported decision-making; an attorney should never substitute her own judgment for “what is best”. We underscore that persons with mental disabilities have the same civil rights as all other persons; the existence of a question as to competency does not do mean that a person is stripped of all their decision-making power, or that the person’s expressed needs/desires are not valid.We acknowledge that pressure to ignore the client’s wishes will likely be the greatest in cases that involve the exact controversies (cases involving such civil rights as the right to refuse medication or the right to sexual autonomy) that create the most dissonance and are likely of the greatest importance to the client. Finally, we urge lawyers to take seriously international human rights law that mandates such supported decision-making, and to embrace the principles and tenets of therapeutic jurisprudence as a means of best ensuring the dignity of their clients and of maximizing the likelihood that voice, validation and voluntariness will be enhanced.