Showing papers in "Accounting review: A quarterly journal of the American Accounting Association in 1997"

Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital

Abstract: The effect of disclosure level on the cost of equity capital is a matter of considerable interest and importance to the financial reporting community However, the association between disclosure level and cost of equity capital is not well established and has been difficult to quantify In this paper I examine the association between disclosure level and the cost of equity capital by regressing firm-specific estimates of cost of equity capital on market beta, firm size and a self-constructed measure of disclosure level My measure of disclosure level is based on the amount of voluntary disclosure provided in the 1990 annual reports of a sample of 122 manufacturing firms For firms that attract a low analyst following, the results indicate that greater disclosure is associated with a lower cost of equity capital The magnitude of the effect is such that a one-unit difference in the disclosure measure is associated with a difference of approximately twenty-eight basis points in the cost of equity capital, after controlling for market beta and firm size For firms with a high analyst following, however, I find no evidence of an association between my measure of disclosure level and cost of equity capital perhaps because the disclosure measure is limited to the annual report and accordingly may not provide a powerful proxy for overall disclosure level when analysts play a significant role in the communication process

Litigation risk and auditor resignations

Abstract: Litigation against auditors has increased dramatically in recent years. Auditors can offset litigation risk in a number of ways, including improved audit quality and planning, increases in audit fees and increases in the issuance of modified opinions. Auditors can also adjust their client portfolios by becoming more selective in their choice of new clients and by withdrawing from high-risk engagements. We test the hypothesis that litigation risk motivates auditor resignations by comparing resignation companies with two groups of client companies that dismissed their auditors: one matched with the resignation companies on industry and year, and the other matched on year alone. We find resignation companies differ from dismissal companies along dimensions that capture the probability of litigation: financial distress, variance of abnormal returns, auditor independence, tenure and a modified (particularly going-concern) opinion. We also construct a litigation proxy based on a prior litigation-prediction model and find that the proxy is positively associated with the probability that the auditor will resign rather than be dismissed from the engagement. Our analysis is consistent with concerns expressed by the accounting profession that litigation pressures lead to the withdrawal of audit services for a segment of the market.

Legal regimes, audit quality and investment

Abstract: This paper presents an analytical model that explores the impact of auditors' legal liability on audit quality and investment. The model is particularly concerned with the impact of damage measures on investments. The threat of liability payments creates an incentive for the auditor to work hard; however, the potential liability payments can also provide an "insurance" for investors in the event the state of nature is bad. Indeed, if damages are measured based on actual investments, investors can increase the liability payments by over-investing. Thus, the potential transfer of wealth from auditors to investors can lead to an overinvestment in risky assets, relative to a socially optimal level, even with a high-quality audit. A socially optimal level of investment can be induced by removing the association between actual investments and liability payments. In my model, a legal regime that can induce the socially optimal level of investment, while still motivating the auditors to exert the socially optimal effort level, consists of a strict liability rule with a damage measure that is independent of the actual investment.