Showing papers in "American Philosophical Quarterly in 1997"

On some vices of virtue ethics

Abstract: Tt is common knowledge by now that recent phil -^ osophical and theological writing about ethics reveals a marked revival of interest in the virtues. But what exactly are the distinctive features of a so-called virtue ethics? Does it have a special con? tribution to make to our understanding of moral experience? Is there a price to be paid for its dif? ferent perspective, and if so, is the price worth paying? Contemporary textbook typologies of ethics still tend to divide the terrain of normative ethical theory into the teleological and deontological. Both types of theory, despite their well-defined differences, have a common focus on acts as opposed to qualities of agents. The fundamental question that both types of theory are designed to answer is: What ought I to do? What is the correct analysis and resolution of morally problematic situations? A second feature shared by teleological and deontological theories is conceptual reductionism. Both types of theory start with a primary irreducible element and then proceed to introduce secondary derivative concepts which are defined in terms of their relations to the beginning element. Modern ideologists (the majority of whom are utilitarians) begin with a concept of the good?here defined with reference to states of affairs rather than persons. After this criterion of the good is established, the remaining ethical categories are defined in terms of this starting point. Thus, according to the classic maxim, one ought always to promote the greatest good for the greatest number. Duty, in other words, is defined in terms of the element of ends?one ought always to maximize utility. The concepts of virtue and rights are also treated as derivative categories of secondary importance, definable in terms of utility. For the classic utilitarian, a right is upheld "so long as it is upon the whole advan? tageous to the society that it should be maintained," while virtue is construed as a "tendency to give a net increase to the aggregate quantity of happiness in all its shapes taken together."1 For the deontologist, on the other hand, the con? cept of duty is the irreducible starting point, and any attempt to define this root notion of being mor? ally bound to do something in terms of the good to be achieved is rejected from the start. The deon? tologist is committed to the notion that certain acts are simply inherently right. Here the notion of the good is only a derivative category, definable in terms of the right. The good that we are to promote is right action for its own sake?duty for duty's sake. Similarly, the virtues tend to be defined in terms of pro-attitudes towards one's duties. Virtue is important, but only because it helps us do our duty. But what about virtue ethics? What are the hallmarks of this approach to normative ethics? One problem confronting anyone who sets out to analyze the new virtue ethics in any detail is that we presently lack fully developed examples of it in the contemporary literature. Most of the work done in this genre has a negative rather than positive thrust?its primary aim is more to criticize the trad? itions and research programs to which it is opposed rather than to state positively and precisely what its own alternative is. A second hindrance is that the literature often has a somewhat misty antiqua? rian air. It is frequently said, for instance, that the Greeks advocated a virtue ethics, though what pre? cisely it is that they were advocating is not always spelled out. In describing contemporary virtue ethics, it is therefore necessary, in my opinion, to do some detective work concerning its conceptual shape, making inferences based on the unfortu? nately small number of remarks that are available. For purposes of illustration, I propose to briefly examine and expand on some key remarks made by two contemporary philosophers?Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot?whose names have

The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification

Abstract: Etude du caractere penetrant, de la psychologie, du statut epistemique et de la place du temoignage dans la cognition humaine. Eclairant les fondements individuels et sociaux de la croyance, la notion de temoignage permet d'offrir une approche comprehensive de la distinction entre les processus operationnels de la connaissance et de la justification. Soulignant l'indispensabilite epistemique du temoignage, l'A. demontre son importance primordiale dans l'acquisition des concepts et l'apprentissage du langage

Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology

Abstract: Etude du developpement recent de plusieurs versions de l'epistemologie de la vertu, depuis le renouveau des etudes sur la fonction explicative de la vertu intellectuelle dans l'epistemologie d'Aristote. Distinguant le fiabilisme de la vertu (A. Plantinga, E. Sosa, A. Goldman) du responsabilisme de la vertu (L. Code, J. Montmarquet, J. Greco, C. Hookway, H. Kornblith et L. Zagzebski), l'A. souligne un rapprochement entre l'ethique et l'epistemologie du point de vue d'une conception aretique-theorique de la justification

Moral responsibility and leeway for action

Abstract: Soulevant la question de la responsabilite morale d'un agent envers l'action qu'il a realisee, d'une part, et celle de la volonte libre comme condition necessaire a la responsabilite morale, d'autre part, l'A. emet l'hypothese du champ d'action, c'est-a-dire la possibilite pour l'agent d'agir autrement qu'il ne l'a fait, communement admise par les defenseurs de compatibilisme et les defenseurs de l'incompatibilisme. L'A. repond a l'objection du principe des possibilites alternatives opposee par H. Frankfurt et J. M. Fischer

Recent work on the basing relation

Abstract: Etudes des publications recentes (1980-1995) sur le probleme de la relation de base qui permet d'etablir la distinction entre la croyance justifiee et la croyance justifiable, d'une part, et la distinction entre la coryance basique et la croyance non-basique, d'autre part, dans le contexte du debat sur l'internalisme et l'externalisme. L'A. examine les theories causales (P. Moser), les theories doxatiques (R. Audi) et les theories de la pseudo-surdetermination (M. Swain), ainsi que leurs principales objections

Why Do We Value Knowledge

Abstract: At would seem that an account of why we value knowledge is a desideratum of any so-called 'theory of knowledge'. In the first two sections of this paper, I argue that a dominant approach to knowledge, which I call "epistemic instrumentalism," cannot account for the value we place on knowl? edge. At the very least such accounts will have to be supplemented. In the remainder of the paper I defend two complementary explanations for the value of knowledge. One explains why we value other people's knowledge, while the other explains why we value our own knowledge. Both of these explanations are based, however, on prop? erties of knowledge which are neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. The value of knowledge, I suggest, derives from contingent properties of knowledge. I conclude that not only epistemic instru mentalism, but furthermore the entire necessary and sufficient conditions ap? proach to knowledge, will not be able to offer us an adequate explanation of the value we place on knowledge.

Ascriptions of responsibility

Abstract: Distinguant deux modes d'explication de l'attribution de la responsabilite, l'un developpant une analyse des attitudes reactives, l'autre exigeant le fait de repondre des intentions du comportement, l'A. montre que le premiere n'est pas satisfaisant, mais qu'il permet: 1) de rendre compte de la dynamique emotionnelle en jeu dans les questions de rsponsabilite, 2) d'engager une reflexion sur les conditions de l'action responsable

Recent work on virtue epistemology

Abstract: Etude du developpement recent de plusieurs versions de l'epistemologie de la vertu, depuis le renouveau des etudes sur la fonction explicative de la vertu intellectuelle dans l'epistemologie d'Aristote. Distinguant le fiabilisme de la vertu (A. Plantinga, E. Sosa, A. Goldman) du responsabilisme de la vertu (L. Code, J. Montmarquet, J. Greco, C. Hookway, H. Kornblith et L. Zagzebski), l'A. souligne un rapprochement entre l'ethique et l'epistemologie du point de vue d'une conception aretique-theorique de la justification

A plea for accuses

Abstract: Ever since J. L. Austin's famous "plea for excuses," if not before, the standard account of the distinction between a justification and an excuse has been this: one has a justification for what one has done just in case one did not do wrong in doing it; one has an excuse, just in case one lacks a justification (that is, one did do wrong), but is nonetheless not to be blamed for what one did.1 There is an excuse, then, if there is reason or grounds for not imputing blameworthiness despite the presence of wrongdoing. There is an analogue to this concept of an excuse that has strangely escaped the notice of all but a few.

Why it is better never to come into existence

Abstract: L'A. demontre la these selon laquelle le fait de venir au monde n'est pas un avantage, mais un prejudice, a partir de l'argument de l'evaluation asymetrique des peines et des plaisirs. Examinant les torts et les benefices qui privilegient l'existence sur la non-existence, l'A. affirme que si le fait d'avoir des enfants n'est pas immoral, au regard du mal qu'est l'existence, il n'est pourtant pas morallement desirable d'en avoir, parce que notre desir de procreation obeit a une illusion paternaliste

A new look at a the cosmological argument

Abstract: Reevaluation de l'argument cosmologique de l'existence de Dieu, fonde sur la notion de contingence, tel qu'il a ete developpe par Aristote, Maimonide et Saint Thomas d'Aquin, a la lumiere des differentes branches de la logique moderne: 1) la mereologie des faits (calcul des individuels), 2) la logique modale (principes de la causalite, de l'universalite et de l'existence separee), 3) la logique non monotone (theorie du raisonnement annulable)

Supervenience and co-location

Abstract: Etude du probleme de la constitution materielle dans le cadre de l'opposition entre la doctrine de la survenance microphysique et la possibilite de la co-localisation. Distinguant les proprietes qualitatives intrinseques et la structure microphysique d'un objet, l'A. montre que la discernabilite entre Socrate et la masse de tissu qui le constitue est maintenue des lors que les proprietes microphysiques, les proprietes mentales et les proprietes generiques qui les composent restent differentes

Is Presentness a Property

Abstract: Soulevant le paradoxe du devenir-present et du devenir existant chez J. McTaggart, l'A. etudie la question de la nature de la presentite chez les defenseurs de la theorie-A de l'ontologie tels que A. N. Prior et C. D. Broad. Examinant l'argument de l'inherence a l'infini du present developpe par Q. Smith, d'une part, et le probleme d'avoir la propriete de la presentite chez E. Sosa, d'autre part, l'A. defend la these de l'identite de la presentite et de l'existence, c'est-a-dire de l'existence temporelle comme demonstration de la propriete et non comme propriete elle-meme

Misdirection in the free will problem

Abstract: Designant le probleme du lien entre la volonte libre et la responsabilite morale comme la mauvaise direction prise par les philosophes compatibilistes, incompatibilistes ou libertaires, l'A. montre que la veritable question concerne la relation entre les etats psychologiques antecedents de l'action et le choix des personnes, d'une part, et ouvre la voie objectiviste et la voie subjectiviste a une reponse non-erronnee qui met fin aux conclusions pessimistes concernant l'action libre, d'autre part

Recent work on consciousness

Abstract: Apercu des principales theories sur la conscience et de la structure dialectique qui les entoure, dans le cadre des travaux recents qui ont ete realises depuis T. Nagel (1974) jusqu'a J. Levine (1997). Distinguant la subjectivite, le caractere qualitatif et le role causal de la conscience, l'A. montre que le probleme des qualias reste entier, meme si de grands progres ont ete faits dans le domaine du materialisme et de l'anti-materialisme, du dualisme et du mysterianisme, du representationnalisme et de l'eliminativisme, concernant les notions de concevabilite et de possibilite

Strength of motivation and being in control : Learning from Libet

Abstract: Etude de la force de la motivation et de la possibilite du controle de l'agent dans la production d'actions intentionnelles, a la lumiere des experiences physiologiques et de la conception de la conscience developpees par B. Libet. Examinant la distinction entre les notions de decision, volition, intention, desir et incitation, l'A. rejette l'interpretation des intentions en termes de potentiels de promptitude chez Libet, mais reconnait que ses travaux ont permis de mesurer le temps et les changements possibles qui se passent entre l'acquisition d'un desir proche et le debut de l'action motivee par ce desir

Persons and Bodies: How to Avoid the New Dualism

Abstract: L'A. admet la these du nouveau dualisme selon laquelle les personnes sont des objets materiels, mais defend l'idee d'une identitie numerique entre ces personnes et leur corps. Sans abandonner le caractere absolu de l'identite ni s'engager dans la voie d'une metaphysique revisionniste, l'A. oppose l'objection des deux penseurs, fondee sur le critere materialiste du cerveau, aux arguments dualistes en faveur d'une distinction entre la personne et le corps, ainsi qu'aux arguments en faveur d'une distinction entre l'organisme humain et l'organisme animal

Foundations of perceptual knowledge

Abstract: Soulevant la question de la possibilite de la connaissance perceptive et de la nature de l'experience sensible, l'A. defend la these de l'autorite epistemique de la perception et decrit les principales caracteristiques du contenu de l'experience perceptive. Rejetant les positions fiabiliste et internaliste, ainsi que le fondationnalisme classique, l'A. developpe une nouvelle approche (cartesienne) de la connaissance perceptive, fondee sur le rapport perspectiviste du sujet connaissant aux choses qui l'entourent, d'une part, et sur l'idee d'un contenu spatial egocentrique de la percpetion, d'autre part

Two problems with knowing the future

Abstract: Knowledge is a good thing. But might it be one of those good things of which one can have too much? Perhaps so, if the knowledge in question is foreknowledge. Two concerns over excess foreknowledge have attracted particular attention in the literature. One is that holding a belief about how the future will turn out thereby excludes that portion of the future from being an object of the believer’s own agency. The idea is that agency is a matter of intentional action, and such action — including activities, like deliberating and deciding, which are oriented toward the formation of intentions — is stultified by an antecedent belief about what one will do. If this is indeed the case, and impotence is an unacceptable price to pay for prescience, it is evidently possible for someone to have more knowledge than is good for him.1 The other concern regarding foreknowledge is that there are circumstances in which it is incompatible with libertarian freedom. The circumstances in question are those in which the knower is infallible. The problem is that infallible knowledge rules out even the possibility of someone acting differently than he is known to act, while infallible foreknowledge rules out this possibility in advance. The latter, however, negates a crucial requirement of the libertarian conception of freedom; so if it is better that the universe contain at least some (libertarian) freedom than that it contain an infallible knower who knows absolutely everything even before it happens, there are conditions under which someone might have more knowledge than it is good for anyone to have.2

Natural-kind terms and the status of folk psychology

Abstract: Rejetant l'identification de la psychologie populaire avec la theorie de la theorie d'une part, et la protoscience, d'autre part, reconnue par Churland, Devitt et Sterelny, l'A. etudie la semantique des termes de categorie naturelle et montre que les termes des etats mentaux ne fonctionnent pas comme ceux-ci. Defendant la these negative selon laquelle nos pratiques communes d'attribution des croyances ne constituent pas une theorie protoscientifique du comportement humain, l'A. rouvre deux questions fondamentales dans le debat sur la philosophie de l'esprit: 1) celle de la realite des etats mentaux, 2) celle de la nature de l'explication de l'action

Utilitarianism for sinners

Abstract: Mesurant la pertinence de la theorie de l'utilitarisme classique fonde sur le critere bien/mal, l'A. propose une theorie des differents degres de la mauvaise action qui permet d'evaluer les differents degres du blâme (blamworthiness). Examinant la question de la valeur et de la difficulte relatives de l'action envisagee du point de vue de ses alternatives (doubles et multiples), l'A. montre que la theorie des degres du prejudice permet de mieux comprendre les jugements normatifs qui sont au fondement de la justice retributive

Level Connections in Epistemology

Abstract: Soulevant la question d'un critere pour le passage d'une philosophie a priori de type cartesien a une philosophie a posteriori fondee sur des principes faillibles, l'A. montre que la position de W. Alston, ouvrant la voie a une meta-epistemologie a posteriori, ne rend pas compte de la justification des affirmations empiriques. Bien plus que le rejet de la these KK, la conception des confusions de niveaus developpee par Alston a pour consequence de rendre impossible toute meta-connaissance et toute connaissance du premier ordre

Self-interest, autonomy, and the presuppositions of decision theory

Abstract: Distinguant deux formulations de l'hypothese de la deliberation selon l'interet personnel et de l'hypothese de l'autonomie, l'une concernant le choix des fins, l'autre concernant la prudence, l'A. montre que la theorie de la decision ne repose sur aucune de celles-ci, et que sa structure ne presuppose rien des procedures decisionnelles de l'individu rationnel. Examinant les presupposes de la presomption et de la jutification qui fondent la theorie de la preference et la theorie du choix, l'A. montre que la notion de justice est premiere par rapport a la notion de prudence