Showing papers in "Asian Survey in 1973"

Politics and the Film in Tamilnadu: The Stars and the DMK

Abstract: The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), the ruling party of Tamilnadu State in India, has split in climax to persistent rumors of intraparty discord and impending schism. M. G. Ramachandran, DMK party treasurer and popular Tamil film star, was stripped of his party offices and suspended from membership in the party to which he had so long brought support from his devoted fans. The crisis culminated a long feud between M.G.R. and Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi. In the early months of 1972, as Karunanidhi, in demands for regional autonomy, began to tout himself as the "Mujib of Tamilnadu," M.G.R. protested Karunanidhi's "dictatorial methods" and called for a boycott of the party's General Council in protest against one man rule. His criticism of Karunanidhi and the party leadership mounted with his demand for a party probe into rampant corruption. M.G.R. called for a disclosure of all assets of ministers, legislators, and party officials-and assets of their close relatives. Party careerists were alarmed: M.G.R.'s public utterances violated party discipline and, in discrediting party and Government, created confusion in the public mind. A memorandum, submitted by 26 members of the DMK Central Executive, called for disciplinary action against M.G.R. His suspension, sustained by the General Council, soon followed. M.G.R. appealed to party members to remain loyal to the ideals of C. N. Annadurai, founder of the DMK and Chief Minister until his death in 1969. To continue his policies, M.G.R. announced the formation of a rival party, the Anna DMK, to challenge the legitimacy of Karunanidhi's leadership. M.G.R. "fan clubs," long adjuncts of the DMK, now became branches of the new party. Many regular DMK branches throughout Tamilnadu also switched allegiance to M.G.R. The star's fans paraded in the streets. In Madurai, they pulled down DMK flags and stoned Government buses; in Vellore, they brought off a total hartal; in Madras, rickshaw men went on strike in protest against the party's suspension of their idol and protector.

Bangladesh in 1972: Nation Building in a New State

Abstract: One of the traumatic events of 1971 was the disintegration of Pakistan and the emergence of the new nation state, Bangladesh. The birth of Bangladesh was in many ways a unique phenomenon, for Bangladesh was the first country to emerge out of a successful national liberation movement waged against "internal colonialism" in the new states.' While the bloody birth of Bangladesh created widespread sympathies for the new nation, it also led to doubts about its viability and stability. A poor, over-crowded land, its economy ruined by a nine-month-long Pakistani military occupation and a national liberation war, Bangladesh was looked upon by many as an "international basket case."2 Surrounded on three sides by India, which played a decisive role in its birth, Bangladesh appeared destined to be a client state of India. These fears about Bangladesh's economy and sovereign existence seemed justified given the absence of any well-organized administrative-political structure in the new state. With its charismatic leader Sheikh Muj ibur Rahman in prison in Pakistan, the Awami League regime's ability to hold the new nation together and create a national political community out of various warring factions was doubted by many. It was widely believed that chaos and bloodbath would follow the liberation of Bangladesh.3 In the first year following liberation, many of these early predictions proved to be wrong. In 1972 the economy of Bangladesh slowly recovered from the previous year's disruption, and a famine, which was almost universally feared, was avoided. The anticipated bloodbath did not materialize in

Constitutionalism and the Supreme Court in a Changing Philippine Polity

Abstract: On September 22, 1972, martial law was proclaimed in the Philippines. Among the immediate steps taken by the government were the general shutdown of the mass media, the temporary closing of all schools and universities, the banning of the possession or sale of private firearms, the placing of certain public utilities under government control, the mass arrest of persons regarded to be engaged in anti-government activities, and the imposition of a 12:00 midnight to 4:00 a.m. curfew. In a speech delivered on nation-wide radio and television one day after martial law was proclaimed, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos said: "The proclamation of martial law is not a military takeover. I, as your duly-elected President of the Republic, use this power implemented by military authorities to protect the Republic of the Philippines and our democracy."' He went on to state that "the judiciary shall continue to function in accordance with its present organization and personnel," subject to certain limitations. Four months later, addressing the Consultative Council at Malacanang after he announced the ratification of the new Constitution, the President pledged that the government would be based on constitutionality and reiterated that he had declared martial law legitimately on the basis of the old Constitution. "I have not grabbed power," the President said at a news conference. He described the new government as one of "constitutional authoritarianism," and added that the broad powers he wields are subject to "checks and balance" by the country's Supreme Court.2 These and similar statements by high Philippine officials collectively paint the image which the government wishes to portray to observers at home and abroad, which is that despite the realities of martial law, constitutional procedures have not been abrogated and that the judiciary is alive and well. It therefore becomes worthwhile to inquire into current constitutional developments in the Philippines and, within a limited context, assess the nature of the interaction between the President and the Supreme Court under martial law conditions.

The Decline of Elective Local Government in Malaysia

Abstract: In West Malaysia' there are some 48 maj or local governments At one time each of these governments, with the sole exception of that in the national capital, Kuala Lumpur, was controlled by a local elective council By the end of 1972, in a piecemeal process which began in 1965, twenty of these councils had been abolished and their functions assumed by state-appointed officials This article examines the decline of the elective councils in Malaysia and assesses several hypotheses and conclusions which have been presented relevant to urban politics and race relations in Malaysia In this context Malaysia is significant both because it is (excluding Brunei and Singapore) the most urbanized country in Southeast Asia and because racial factors are especially evident within Malaysian society West Malaysia has a population of almost nine million, of which 17% live within the official boundaries of cities containing 75,000 or more persons, and 29% live within the official boundaries of towns containing 10,000 or more persons The ten mostpopulous urban areas (each of which includes more than 40,000 persons) contain 21% of the West Malaysian population Malaysia contains proportionately the largest Chinese minority in Southeast Asia and is the only country in the region in which a national minority forms the urban maj ority The 1970 West Malaysian racial composition was 53 % Malay, 35 % Chinese, 11% Indian, and 2% others Within the ten most-populous urban areas the racial composition was 29% Malay, 57% Chinese, 13% Indian and 2% Fathers 2

Origins of Nativism: The Emergence of Shiv Sena in Bombay

Abstract: n multi-ethnic societies, migrations often kindle nativist sentiment.1 This sentiment, for the most part, remains inarticulate. When, on occasion, it becomes politicized, it finds expression in demonstrations, riots, nativist associations, and nativist political parties. Nativism, in these several manifestations, arises most commonly in urban areas. As industrial and commercial centers, cities often attract migrants in large numbers from distant and culturally diverse regions of the country. The heterogeneous populations which then eventuate form the seedbed of nativist politics.

The Meo Hill Tribe Problem in North Thailand

Abstract: In 1960 disturbing rumors began to drift out of the hills of northern Thailand indicating that the Communists had made initial steps toward the infiltration of the hill tribes population which makes its home in the tortuous, jungle-clad mountain terrain of the region. A small minority of 250,000 among nearly 35 million Thai, the hill tribes had long been a source of possible dissidence and hence a latent threat to Thai security. With their unique way of life and customs, the hill tribes had successfully resisted assimilation and retained their proud independence, coexisting with their lowland neighbors. The infiltration of Communist agents into the tribes, particularly the Meo, thrust the problem squarely in the face of the Thai government and began the chain of events which has led to the hill tribes making certain areas of the north their private domain. Of the numerous distinct hill tribes, the one with which this article will be concerned is the Meo, for they are the principal vehicle of the Communist attack upon north Thailand security. The problems posed by the Meo can be divided into several broad categories: (1) destruction of forests and water. sheds by the "slash and burn" style of agriculture utilized by the tribe; (2) opium cultivation; (3) the need for integration within the Thai nation; and (4) the danger they pose to Thai security. Of crucial importance to an understanding of the Meo problem as it exists in northern Thailand is the recognition of the interconnection between these four factors. Any move in one area will affect the others, thus making the entire scenario fraught with risk for the Thai government. Only the utmost skill and ability will enable the Thai to solve successfully the puzzle for the benefit of all concerned. There are some 50,000 Meo (or Miao) in Thailand, located primarily in Nan, Chiangmai, and Chiangrai Provinces. They occupy the most remote and mountainous regions of all the hill tribes, are the most migratory, and live between altitudes of 2,600 and 6,500 feet above sea level, preferring 3,200 to 5,000 feet. The village is the basic political unit and is headed by a chief who has usually had his position recognized officially by the Thai government following his election by his fellow tribesmen. Society is patrilineal, a typical household consisting of man, wife, children, and married sons to

Eclipse of "Reddy-Raj"? The Attempted Restructuring of the Congress Party Leadership in Andhra Pradesh

Abstract: R ecent regional conflict in Andhra Pradesh, which may lead to a break up of the first linguistic state in India, has its roots in a number of factors. One of them is the attempt by the Congress Party at the center to restructure the state leadership, particularly to break the political power of the dominant agricultural castes and to establish a direct contact with politicians at the grass roots without the link of strong factional leaders. This attempt has failed. It contributed to a crisis leading to the imposition of President's RIle in January 1973. A phenomenon that could be observed in a number of Indian states after independence is the rise to political power of the dominant agricultural castes: the Jats in Punjab, the Marathas in Maharashtra, the Lingayats and Vokkaliga in Mysore, to name only a few. Andhra Pradesh provided one of the most striking examples of this development: members of the landowning castes of the Reddis, Kammas and Velmas dominate at all political levels. Their political success can be traced to several causes: 1. The land reforms in the early fifties, particularly the Jagir abolition in the erstwhile Hyderabad State, broke the power of the traditional elite, especially the Muslim feudal aristocracy associated with the rule of the Nizam. 2. The prestige of the urban, predominantly Brahmin elite has been undermined by strong anti-Brahmin sentiments. 3. The pressures of modern life deprived the urban educated middle class of means and leisure for political activity. 4. The introduction of democratic politics opened up opportunities for the rural upper middle class of medium landowners, and they were quick to realize the importance of political office for the maintenance and enlargement of their prestige and economic interest. The joint-family system provides these politicians with a material base. The dominance of the landowning castes is most marked in Panchayati Raj, where they constitute up to 80% of the elected representatives.' At the

Patrons, Clients and Ethnicity: The Case of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia

Abstract: ven in pre-eminently "ethnic" states, such as Malaysia, the concept of ethnicity, by itself, is of limited value as a key to understanding the political dynamics of a country at all levels. It may sometimes be difficult to define what ethnic units are, so recent have been the formation of blocs of individuals of appreciable size which have any ethnic group solidarity. Even if such units have been identified, ethnic considerations do not help much to explain conflict within a group. Moreover, we need an explanation, not only of what produces solidarity inside groups, but also how groups interact, as they do to some extent, across ethnic barriers. To understand this is especially important in Malaysia where the ruling party, at the federal level and also in the states of Sarawak and Sabah, is an "Alliance" party, which has the explicit aim of bridging gaps by a structure which is "ethnic" at the grass roots but "supra-ethnic" at the top.

Voter Turnout and the Meaning of Elections in South Korea

Abstract: A x rapid succession of events in South Korea is recent months has confounded many outside observers of the Korean political scene.' Why was martial law declared on October 19, 1972? Why constitutional amendments? What are the prospects in the North-South negotiations for unification of the country? Since the division of Korea in 1945 and the resultant Korean War, both sides have been uncompromising in their hostility. In his address to the nation on October 27, 1972 announcing "the draft amendments to the Constitution," South Korea's President Park Chung-hee stated: "Today the Extraordinary State Council has deliberated and adopted the draft amendments to the Constitution with firm determination to bring about national stability, prosperity and unification which all of our people are so ardently desiring, and we take this occasion to announce them to the people." "At this moment," President Park continued, "I sincerely pray that Korean democracy, which best suits our situation, will take root promptly in this land and contribute to the establishment of a proper constitutional order... .2 President Park's statement is ambivalent to say the least. He mentions "Korean democracy." He emphasizes national stability and prosperity. He underlines the theme of unification as the desire of all the Korean people. His very action of imposing martial law and bringing about constitutional amendments, however, amounts to the emasculation of the earlier constitution which he himself helped formulate and by which he was elected president of the Third Republic in 1963. Whether the result is economic prosperity or chaos, political stability or instability, and unification or no unification, President Park-under the new constitutional framework-could make himself a lifetime president accountable to a non-partisan National Conference for Unification. Korea's democratic experiment is on trial. As a matter of fact, one could argue that

The Middle Class Family Model in Taiwan: Woman's Place is in the Home

Abstract: The People's Republic of China takes justifiable pride in the changes that have effected the status of women, both within the family setting and in the larger world of schooling, work, social activity and political engagement. Though by no means complacent that equality between the sexes has been fully achieved, the PRC's example demonstrates how rapidly and far-reachingly change can occur when backed by government sanction.

The Political Demography of Nepal

Abstract: Political demography is the study of the political effects of changes in the size, rate of growth, distribution and composition of a population.' Among the more familiar demographic differences between developed and less developed countries are that the latter have high fertility, mortality and morbidity rates, larger families, a young population and, therefore, a heavy dependency ratio, and fewer older people. Among the more typical social and political consequences of these differences are that less developed countries are often faced with a restive youth population, annual increments to the labor force which exceed employment opportunities, growing fragmentation of land holdings and increased pressure on the land, rising demands upon government for social services, and increases in per capita incomes well below increases in the gross national product. This article will analyze some of the long-term political consequences of rapid population growth in Nepal. The starting point for our inquiry is that though the demographic changes taking place within Nepal are, in the main, similar to those occurring in many other less developed countries, the political framework within which these changes are taking place is significantly different. It is necessary, therefore, to describe first the Nepal political system, and then examine some of the demographic changes and the impact these are having, or are likely to have, upon the political system.2

Indonesia 1972: The Solidification of Military Control

Abstract: Indonesia's "New Order," existent since the decimation of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) in 1966 and the consolidation of President Suharto's power, has been characterized by military-civilian alliances of varying compositions. Students, Muslim and Christian groups, civil servants, and intellectuals have all, at one time or another during this period, supported the paramount political role of ABRI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia). The alliance was initially predicated upon a commonly-held antipathy to 'the PKI; later it came to be based upon ABRI's monopoly of force and the estimation that no other force in society was capable of maintaining security and providing economic stability. ABRI's political preeminence was aided by its self-perceived role as guardian of national unityabove the squabble for petty political advantage, regional aggrandizement, and religious bickering. ABBRI's legitimacy was also buttressed by its image as a modernizing force, capable of bringing Indonesia back from the nadir of chaos and inflationary excess to the threshold of self-sustaining economic growth. This received expression in an "army-administrator-economist" managing elite, with the army serving as senior partner. By 1971 inflation had been brought under control, agricultural productivity continued to show significant improvement, and the confidence of foreign investors and aidgivers was apparent. Public policy was determined by the military-power holders of the New Order and their economist-advisors. It was essentially an elitist administrative configuration, entailing only a peripheral level of popular participation. The governing elite perceived 'the appropriate role of political participation to be that of passive approval or legitimation through controlled symbolic acts. The General Election of July 3, 1971, was intended to be just such an act of symbolic legitimation. A decisive victory was achieved by Sekber Golkar (Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups) -the government-sponsored "nonparty"-which received 62.8% of the votes cast. Golkar's ideological message emphasized modernizasi and pembangunan (development), while its candidates contrasted its pragmatism with what they termed the ideological bankruptcy of the political parties. The Golkar campaign was aided by a military and civilian bureaucratic effort from the national to the village level

Mass Line and "Mass Criticism" in China: An Analysis of the Fall of Liu Shao-Ch'i

Abstract: ]he Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) was a unique event, but understanding of this event and its meaning within the broader context of the Chinese political system may be enhanced if we use more general concepts of political action to abstract certain characteristics for special attention. The concepts mass line and criticism and self-criticism (also known as "inner-Party struggle") seem particularly appropriate for such an analysis for three reasons: They avoid the dangers of prematurely or uncritically applying Western concepts to political realities which are embedded in a different context of cultural meanings; they are central concepts in the vocabulary of Chinese Communist political action, and as such have been beneficiaries of both primary analyses by Chinese political thinkers and secondary analyses by Western social scientists; the explicit "methodology" of the GPCR is couched in the same language originally used to set forth the implications of these concepts, suggesting that their use as explanatory models corresponds with the subjective intentions of the Maoist sponsors of the GPCR. The GPCR may be understood as an attempt to unite criticism and selfcriticism with the mass line by opening inner-Party struggle to mass participation. This attempt, however, took place in a social context quite different from the one in which the mass line formula originated, and had entirely different consequences. This study of "mass criticism" begins with a brief summary of the changes which have taken place since original formulation of the mass line model during the Cheng-feng rectification movement at Yenan. This is followed by an empirical description, based on content analysis of the Chinese official and Red Guard press criticisms for a 34-month period (from January 1967 to October 1969) of the operation of the model in the new circumstances of the criticism campaign against Liu

Politics and Organized Labor in India

Abstract: ]7rade unions in India, although not formally committed to any political party, are steeped in party politics. The political involvement of trade unions is widely attributed to the partisan links of the leaders of organized labor. It is indeed argued that, but for these leaders, organized labor might be free from the domination of political parties, and a unified labor movement might emerge.' Implicit in these writings is the assumption that the rank and file members have no stake in party politics. One of the few explicit statements on the extent of rank and file interest in politics is that by Agarwal:

Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh

Abstract: whatever Peking and Islamabad may say,' it is wrong to assert that Soviet Russia had a hand in the dismemberment of Pakistan. Indeed, the weight of evidence suggests that Moscow sought to prevent the third IndiaPakistan War which led to Pakistan's breakup. From the very start the Soviet government had tried to bring home to the military junta in Islamabad the need for seeking a political solution to the complicated situation in East Pakistan, believing that this was the only way to keep Pakistan united, to maintain peace and to check the interference of Peking and Washington in a region close to the USSR.

The 1971 Coup in Thailand: Understanding Why the Legislature Fails

Abstract: O n June 21, 1968, a new Constitution for the Kingdom of Thailand was promulgated, ending ten years of absolute military rule. An elected legislature was established and political party activity was legalized. Three years and five months later, on November 17, 1971, the Government announced the failure of its "constitutional experiment;" martial law was declared, the legislature was closed, the parties were disbanded, and a military junta asserted complete control of the nation. In this discussion I do not intend to enter into the speculation concerning the possible international causes and implications of the November coup. Instead, I want to try to put these events into some perspective by assessing them in the context of the history of constitutional practices in Thailand. Such an analysis probably will not answer the question of why the coup occurred; rather, it will seek to explain why such an event could happen in Thailand and, by implication, in other nations similarly situated.

The Praja Socialist Party of India -- 1952-1972: A Final Assessment

Abstract: One of the least publicized results of the 1971 and 1972 Indian General Elections was the all but final demise of the Praja Socialist Party (PSP) and the crushing defeat administered to its remaining fragment, the Socialist Party of India (SP). When the PSP was formed in September 1952, it ranked as the major opposition party to the dominant Congress. Twenty years later when the results of the state assembly elections of 1972 had been finally counted, the PSP had become defunct for all practical purposes (see Tables l and 2).1

Regime Support among Taiwan High School Students

Abstract: 7 he series of international reverses suffered recently by the Government of the Republic of China raise once again the question of the fate and the outlook of the more than 15 million residents of Taiwan. Chou En-lai has told American newsmen that when that island "returns to the motherland," the "economic well-being of the people of Taiwan would improve since they would receive the same income, but without paying tax.... Far from exacting revenge on them, we will reward them."' The Peking Government has begun to invite members of the Taiwan independence movement to visit China and to seek to impress both Taiwanese and Mainlanders on Taiwan with the desirability of reunification.2 Adherents of the Taipei Government Iof course are convinced that the people of Taiwan support their present government, especially in view of the island's notable economic progress and the recent moves to bring a larger number of Taiwanese into high government positions. American supporters of an independent Taiwan, or of 'the Peking Government's position that Taiwan must be brought under the control of the People's Republic of China,

Effects of Institutional Change upon a Dependency Culture: The Commune Council 275 in Rural Thailand

Abstract: n developing nations limitations upon governmental finances hinder local economic development. To aid in bringing about rural development, governments have introduced various institutions designed to promote rural selfhelp. One such rural institution is the Commune Council 275 introduced in 1966 by the Thai government.' To succeed in promoting self-help this institution must reduce the effects of the traditional Thai dependency culture. In this paper, we shall discuss certain of the strengths and weaknesses of this council in the context of Thai political culture.2 Discussions about Thai political culture emphasize both the hierarchical centralized nature of authority relations and the dependence of the inferior upon the superior. The superior autonomously makes decisions which the inferior unquestioningly obeys. The inferior, though, hopes that these actions will have beneficial effects for himself. The ideal relationship is that of the benevolent superior and the respectful inferior. These patterns of superior-inferior relations have been described by psychologists, political scientists and anthropologists. Mosel, for example, explains the cultural support for hierarchy: