Showing papers in "Asian Survey in 1990"

The Concept of Chinese Neo-Authoritarianism: An Exploration and Democratic Critique

Abstract: Academic debate in China about political development and modernization was dormant from December 1986, when the government took a "clear-cut stand against bourgeois liberalization,"' until the middle of 1988, when discussion in academic circles began to stir once again. A new vigor and enthusiasm appeared within China's scholarly community that manifested itself through renewed discussion and analysis of Chinese politics and modernization. Two important and competitive schools of thought emerged from this new thaw: democracy and neo-authoritarianism. The former maintains that democracy is the essential prerequisite to Chinese modernization; the latter argues that modernization is possible only through authoritarian rule. Debates between these two schools of thought were at first centered in Beijing, but as the year progressed they spread to Shanghai, Nanjing, and other mainland cities. These discussions so aroused the interest of important party officials that

Women's Status in South Korea: Tradition and Change

Abstract: The Republic of Korea (ROK) has experienced very rapid industrial growth and economic modernization since the end of the Korean War. Although the society's material change has been substantial, behavioral adjustments to the economic developments have occurred slowly and have sometimes been justified by tradition. Thus, inequities in women's opportunities are maintained through an elaborate system of role relationships that are rooted in and rationalized by Confucian customs; they are socially mandated and often legally condoned. However, despite the cultural limits on behavioral change, a women's rights movement has developed in the ROK over the past several years, and it is addressing issues of equity and worker exploitation-two universal concerns of modernized societies. The interaction of tradition with the calls for change issued by this women's rights movement is the focus of this study.

Religious Movements in Contemporary Thailand: Buddhist Struggles for Modern Relevance

Abstract: The Bangkok Post, the largest English-language newspaper in Thailand, published a small article on March 11, 1988, that stirred up much controversy. It reported that a member of Parliament from Ubon Rachathani, the largest province in the Northeast, would propose that the government set up a "Buddhist Bank" and require all temples (some 30,000 in the country) to be shareholders. According to this MP, temples nationwide have more than six billion baht (US$240 million) deposited in commercial banks. He also said that each temple in Bangkok has at least 200 million baht in bank deposits. This is not to mention the Dhammakaya Temple, which is the most elaborate temple complex ever established in Thailand with assets of about 800 million baht (about US$32 million). 1 At about the same time, another Buddhist group, Santi Asoke, published a book entitled Buddhist Economics, which calls for a return to a simple way of life and strongly criticizes both Thai monks and the laity for indulging in secular wealth.2 A third Buddhist group, headed by the Venerable Buddhadasa, does not even have a temple (in the traditional form of an elaborate building) in its "Garden of Liberation" in Surat

Islamic Revivalism in ASEAN States: Political Implications

Abstract: The Muslim World completes its 1,400 years (after Hijrah) of evolution in a manner quite revolutionary in character, with the emergence of the phenomenon of "Islamic resurgence." This phenomenon can be explained and rationalized through theological, historical, and political perspectives. However, unlike the earlier post-World War II period when Muslim nationalist sentiments were fortified by Islamic reformist movements, the contemporary revitalization came about as a consequence of the cumulative political developments experienced by Muslim countries in more recent times. Variously captioned as Islamic revivalism, resurgence, and fundamentalism, this rejuvenation of the Islamic ethos has been brought about, especially since the 1970s, by events and sociopolitical changes affecting the Muslim-dominated countries in the Gulf area in particular and the worldwide Muslim umma (community) in general. Notable among these were the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of a predominantly Muslim Afghanistan, the (anti-Saudi regime) shooting incident at the Masjidil Haram, the intensification of the Arab-Israel conflict, and the political and economic leverage that the Muslim nations in the Gulf exerted in international politics as a result of their newfound oil power.1 In addition to these international Islamic stirrings, the sources or causes of the phenomenon must necessarily have their local impetus. Despite it being a universal or global phenomenon, individual countries have experienced different levels of Islamic revival. Within ASEAN-the Associa-

The Burma Road from the Union of Burma to Myanmar

Abstract: Since September 18, 1989, the country known for many generations as Burma has been renamed twice, informally as the Union of Burma and formally as Myanmar, by the present military government of General Saw Maung.1 The name Union of Burma was originally and constitutionally given by the U Nu government in 1948 when Burma attained independence from British rule. It was retained until 1974 by the Revolutionary Council government of General Ne Win, at which time the country was officially christened the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. This essay will attempt to travel a historical Burma road from the Union of Burma to Myanmar. The main purpose of this journey is to analyze and evaluate the backward and forward linkages of Burmese polities in terms of the interrelationships between the traditional Burmese

The Politics of Pollution Control in Indonesia

Abstract: Pollution is a rather recent issue on the political agenda in Indonesia. Concern with some aspects of pollution is known from earlier periods, but its focus tended to be either aesthetic or rather narrowly focused on public health, specifically on protecting the population from infectious diseases by means of public hygiene. Concern with pollution as a distinct phenomenon is a product of the 1970s and after, when Indonesia began to industrialize. It is worth looking at new issues of this kind because they highlight features of the political system in a way that older and more prominent issues do not. Raising a topic such as the correct place of Islam or the possible desirability of federalism for Indonesia, also raises at the same time a horde of malevolent historical ghosts. A new issue, on the other hand, gives social and political forces a chance to realign in novel ways that may foreshadow deeper structural changes. Pollution, I think, is one such issue.

Public Political Consciousness in China: An Empirical Profile

Abstract: Historically, the Chinese people have had a tradition of political apathy and ignorance, which James Townsend characterized as a "popular isolation from politics."l However, the communist government made tremendous efforts to mobilize people's "class consciousness" during the 1950s to 1970s, and some outside observers have been amazed by the "participation explosion" (Townsend's term) among the Chinese population, especially the widespread participation in the Cultural Revolution. After entering the post-Mao era, however, the Chinese seemed to regress to the apolitical tradition. The current status of Chinese political mentality has drawn a great deal of attention among Chinese scholars and decision makers. Basically, the literature encompasses two competing perspectives: a mass theory maintaining that Chinese are still apathetic, apolitical, or politically immature, and a public theory arguing that people's indifference to politics is the first step of departure from the unconscious mood. The sharp contrast between the two perspectives was manifested at a recent debate in Beijing over socalled "neo-authoritarianism," a theory advocated by some political science advisers to former party leader Zhao Ziyang. Relying on the "mass" theory assumption, this school proposed a more authoritarian government to ensure the course of modernization in China. Many others, backed by the "public" theory arguments, strongly opposed this approach, holding that the success of modernization depends on more freedom and democ-

Managing Interests in the Japanese Bureaucracy: Informality and Discretion

Abstract: The study of Japanese bureaucracy presents a distinct class of concerns. The substance of bureaucratic informality and discretion is anything but administrative and is quite far removed, even by most practical standards, from the Weberian ideal of neutral competence, and the processes of informality and discretion are a good deal more than flexible practices that complement and flesh out formal rules and procedures. They are organizational strategies crucial to the functions and performance of bureaucracy and government in Japan. These informalities are powerful enough to bound the scope and content of political leadership by determining what gets into the Diet, how issues look once they get there, and how they are dealt with. They can also provide ministries with the means to accomplish through discretion what they cannot attain through normal parliamentary processes. This can allow ministries to resurrect legislative failures as administrative successes, and can consign parliamentary authority to the role of validating ministerial actions already taken. An important case in this regard involves the Ministry of Construction and its creation of Japan Teleway.1

Public Attitude toward Laissez Faire in Hong Kong

Abstract: Extolling the doctrine of laissez faire, the Hong Kong government opts for a minimal and noninterventionist economic role and operates an administrative apparatus that lacks the capacity for economic intervention. The ideology of laissez faire is enthusiastically propagated by the government and the business sector and appears connected in the public mind with the economic miracle. On the surface at least, it seems that laissez faire as an economic creed is widely embraced by Hong Kong Chinese. However, it will be argued here that there is a significant disparity between the official and the popular conceptions of the economic role of government. This becomes apparent when the public's views on the concrete functions of government are solicited; for example, the public desires more government intervention in welfare areas even if it would slow down economic growth. Popular understanding of the economic role of government is closely related to the Chinese conception of state, society, and the individual. Despite the disparity in understanding, popular demands for changes in the economic role of the government are moderate due to a number of factors that alleviate the conflicts stemming from the disparity. However, recent changes in Hong Kong will increasingly subject the government to political demands for a more interventionist economic role on its part, and the doctrine of laissez faire will become even more irrelevant,

Indonesia-China Relations: A Recent Breakthrough

Abstract: On the evening of February 23, 1989, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen met Indonesian Minister of State for State Secretariat Moerdiono in the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo for an hour of discussion on the question of Sino-Indonesian normalization. Afterwards, in an adjoining room, Qian Qichen met with President Suharto for another 25 minutes. Both sides agreed to normalize diplomatic ties that had been frozen for 22 years, and Qian and Moerdiono jointly announced the decision during a press conference that followed the meetings. This essay discusses Sino-Indonesian relations, the problems that hindered normal relations, the factors contributing to the decision for normalization, and Indonesian domestic reactions. Future problems will also be considered briefly.

The Paradox of Japan's Groupism: Threat to Future Competitiveness?

Abstract: Japan's unsurpassed international competitive strength owes much to the group-oriented value system of Japanese society. The high productivity of Japanese workers, their hard work and cooperative attitude; the harmonious relationships between management and labor and between government and business; the long time horizon of Japanese managers, their marketing strategy with a focus on market share, product quality, and innovation-all of these strengths have been attributed to Japanese society's emphasis on the group and its "others-oriented motivation" system. The voluminous studies that have been published in recent years on the subjects of Japanese management and marketing systems seldom fail to stress that the Japanese ability to work as a group is at the heart of Japan's competitive strength. Paradoxically, this very groupism may contain a seed for a long-term demise of Japan's competitive prowess. I will examine herein the nature of Japanese groupism with an emphasis on its negative aspects, and relate them to the series of economic frictions that Japan has recently encountered with the outside world. Specifically, I will discuss three sources of frictions: (1) the closed nature of the Japanese market; (2) the difficulty of taking really effective measures for reducing the frictions; and (3) the emerging problem of Japanese firms' inability to integrate foreign managerial employees into their corporate hierarchies. I will conclude the article by speculating on the prospect for radical changes in Japan's value orientation, which are needed if the frictions are to be resolved.

Benazir Bhutto and the Future of Women in Pakistan

Abstract: By a slim margin, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was successful in the November 1988 elections, more than 11 years after its founder, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, had been overthrown by General Zia ulHaq in a military coup d'etat Those ensuing years had witnessed much social confusion and antagonism within the country, much of it focused on the place of women in society The lifting of martial law on December 31, 1985, did little to alleviate the existing scenario, as repressive laws continued to be passed right up to the end of Zia's tenure State policy under Zia ul-Haq was pursued in a rather complicated ideological framework His stance contradicted popular culture in which most people are "personally" very religious but not "publicly" religious An untoward outcome was that by relying on an Islamic-based policy, the state fomented factionalism; by legislating what is Islamic and what is not, Islam itself could no longer provide unity as it was now defined to exclude previously included groups Shi'a-Sunni disputes, ethnic disturbances in Karachi between Pathans and muhajirs (migrants from India), increased animosity toward Ahmediyyas, and the revival of Punjab-Sind tensions can be traced to Pakistan having lost the ability to use Islam as a common moral vocabulary Most importantly, the state had attempted to dictate a specific ideal image of women that was largely antithetical to that existing in popular sentiment and in everyday life Following the August 1988 plane crash in which Zia ul-Haq and a number of other high-ranking generals died, many people considered that the era of women's suppression in Pakistan had come to a close Benazir Bhutto had led her party to victory, and had been invited by President

Political Change in South Korea: The Challenge of the Conservative Alliance

Abstract: A revolutionary change has been made in South Korean politics under the Sixth Republic. On January 22, 1990, President Roh Tae Woo and the two opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Jong Pil, jointly announced the creation of a new governing party, the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), thus leaving the largest opposition party, led by Kim Dae Jung, in isolation. The precarious "one-Roh, threeKim" four-party system, which had lasted for almost two years, was suddenly abandoned, and a new asymmetric three-party system in the form of a "oone-Roh, two-Kim" grand alliance versus "one Kim" (and "one Lee") has emerged. ' Given the traditional pattern of hostile zero-sum confrontation between the government and the opposition, the new political experiment signifies drastic chemical as well as physical changes in South Korea's body politic. The impact of the surprise merger is indeed far-reaching. Domestically, the pace of the "democratization" process is now dominated by the new ruling party with its nearly three-quarters parliamentary majority. InterKorean relations are more regulated by the new conservative alliance in the South under less influence from the opposition. Externally, South Korea's relations with the U.S. are becoming more subtle as the political base of Seoul's bargaining position has been strengthened commensurately. On the other hand, its relations with Japan are becoming more pragmatic as the two governments are now under comparable political structures. In addition, the Nordpolitik of South Korea is being accelerated because of reduced concern about the negative domestic political feedback.

Cambodia in 1989: Still Talking but no Settlement

Abstract: On September 27, 1989, Hanoi announced it had withdrawn its remaining 26,300 troops from Cambodia, the withdrawal ceremony attended by a small group of observers from the socialist bloc, some Thai members of parliament, and journalists. It occurred in the manner of the other milestones in this peace process-JIM I and II and the International Conference in Paris-with high expectations and no denouement to the conflict. Looking at all fronts-internal, external, military, and diplomatic-it is tragically apparent at year's end that peace remains elusive in Cambodia. As evidence-including the long-drawn-out debate in the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) Politburo-began to point to consensus on the wisdom of Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia, a sense of urgency was added to the Indochina scene. The initial quarter of 1989 again saw a flurry of renewed possibilities as governments and individuals scrambled to secure a ride on what appeared at times to be a fast train to resolution of the war. Of great significance were the stepped up dialogues and cooperation between the People's Republic of Kampuchea (now renamed the State of Cambodia [SOC]) and Thailand, highlighted by the much publicized visit of Premier Hun Sen to Bangkok on January 25 that was followed by a series of economic concessions. Though largely symbolic, Hun Sen's visit, followed by others in subsequent months, generated much speculation over its implications, not only for Thai foreign policy but also for internal politics within the SOC. Though the impetus appeared to have been more of a domestic power play inside Thailand, the expressed independence of Thai Prime Minister Chatichai's policy line toward Indochina caused some consternation, especially among his ASEAN partners.

Indonesia in 1989: A Question of Openness

Abstract: Political Developments The year 1989 once again brought far more continuity than change to the political and governmental landscape of Indonesia. Now well into his fifth five-year term in office, President Soeharto has made it clear that the country's overall policy direction and leadership style will continue to be dominated by considerations of national stability and security, consensus-building, and the priority needs of national economic development. As it has since the start of the New Order 23 years ago, real decision-making power in Indonesia remains concentrated within a relatively small and highly centralized military and bureaucratic elite under the twin banners of the Indonesian Armed Forces and the government's ruling Golkar party. The pace of political development and liberalization in the country has thus remained, and is likely to remain much slower than in many of the other rapidly developing nations of East and Southeast Asia. This does not mean that all was stagnant during 1989. In May, on the eve of his departure from Jakarta following an extremely successful threeyear tour of duty, U.S. Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz touched off a major national debate in Indonesia by calling for greater "openness" in Indonesian political life to accompany the progress being made in economic liberalization. While this was certainly not a new argument in Indonesian political circles, it did serve to focus unprecedented critical attention on the need to develop more responsive political institutions in Indonesia and to encourage greater popular participation in the development process and the national policy dialogue.

Aspects of Beijing's Crisis Management: The Tiananmen Square Demonstration

Abstract: The Chinese student protest in April-June 1989 at Tiananmen Square in Beijing and elsewhere in China constituted a domestic crisis situation.1 The immediate effects and the Chinese leaders' perception of the protest clearly meet four essential elements of a crisis: a change in the domestic political environment, a threat to important national goals as defined by political leaders, the probability of violence being significantly increased, and leaders' perceived short time for response.2 The demonstration in April-June 1989 thus affords a good opportunity to study Chinese leaders' crisis management. Though minutes of highlevel meetings in Beijing during the crisis are not available, major phases of leaders' reactions to the demonstration are known. For example, we have reliable reports on the initial uncertainty of leaders as to the nature of the demonstration, the crucial role of the Beijing Communist Party Committee and government in starting the crisis decision-making process at the party center, first definition by leaders on the demonstration, the controversy over this definition, and the different stands of various leaders, especially that of Zhao Ziyang, toward the demonstration. These are sufficient for us to present a preliminary analysis of Beijing's crisis management.

The Democratic Movement in China in 1989: Dynamics and Failure

Abstract: The death of former Party Secretary Hu Yaobang on April 15, 1989, triggered the largest protest in Beijing since the founding of the People's Republic of China. From the beginning, the students hinted obliquely at indirect criticism of the current leadership, and in mourning Hu's passing they were actually mourning his political dismissal in 1987. Within a few days, many apolitical students, whether they were tuo pal (most concerned with preparing for the TOEFL [Test of English as a Foreign Language] in order to go abroad) or ma pal (preoccupied with playing majong), were mobilized. Shortly after the students began the hunger strike, almost all urban citizens became involved in the movement one way or another. Unofficial organizations were established in order to coordinate the activities of different circles of people anxious to join the protest, and after Li Peng declared martial law, Beijing residents spontaneously took to the streets to block roads and prevent the People's Liberation Army (PLA) from entering the city. In addition to being the longest and largest protest movement in modern Chinese history, it was also the best organized. In the face of the student protests, the CCP was divided. Zhao Ziyang, on his return from North Korea, favored a conciliatory approach toward the protesters. His personal staff, including Bao Tong and Yan Mingfu, head of the Department of the United Front of the Central Committee, tried to mediate between the government and the students at various stages, and some of his junior staff were sent to the universities to persuade

Pakistan in 1989: The Politics of Stalemate

Abstract: The year 1989 was one in which no one won and everyone seemed to lose-but not much. Continuing difficulties in all areaspolitical, economic, and social-tempered the national mood of renewal and increased confidence. Zia ul-Haq's sudden demise in the summer of 1988 had paved the way for civilian government, and the elections that November catapulted Benazir Bhutto into the prime minister's office. The euphoria, however, was short-lived. As the first woman to head the government of a Muslim nation, Bhutto brought youth and vitality to a role traditionally filled by members of the feudal oligarchy. Although she was the scion of a celebrated wadera family, she was more representative of Pakistan's urban, professional, and artistic intelligentsia. Her upbringing and education had emphasized modernity-her ideas and expressions forged only in the previous decade-and no Pakistani politician was more conversant in the Western idiom or in Western manners and tastes. Through all the recent turmoil, her presence has provided a refreshing respite from the tensions of the Zia era, and even the more traditional political forces have sensed the opportunity to pursue goals and prospects heretofore denied them. Although challenged by a formidable and outspoken opposition, even the more determined efforts to unseat Prime Minister Bhutto in 1989 did not succeed. In this year of trial, no Pakistani institution appeared more firmly in support of Bhutto's tenure than that represented by the armed forces. General Aslam Baig, who succeeded to the post of chief of the army staff on the deaths of Zia and the other senior generals, publicly and repeatedly declared his confidence in the civilian government. Whatever the motives of the Pakistani military, this determined action in support of Bhutto's administration nullified substantial threats from other circles. Thus, de-

A Free Press in South Korea: Temporary Phenomenon or Permanent Fixture?

Abstract: South Korea, which has a history of strongman rule under authoritarian regimes since its founding in 1948, is flush with the hope that democracy has at last arrived This sanguine mood stems from the democratic policies initiated by President Roh Tae Woo and from a number of recent political reforms aimed at breaking what has been called Korea's "cycle of authoritarian rule"' Roh, while chairman of the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) and a presidential candidate, ushered in an era of open politics with a package of democratic reforms in his June 29, 1987, declaration, issued at a time of worsening antigovernment demonstrations Among his proposed reforms was recognition of a free press with no governmental interference There is no question that a number of positive changes subsequently have taken place in South Korean press-government relations Some of these have involved structural changes in the media industry; others have been institutional, involving sociopolitical and legal systems affecting the Korean press As the International Press Institute (IPI) reported in late 1988, "visible and invisible restrictions imposed on the [Korean] press have been abolished in favor of a greater freedom of information and the right of the people to know has been guaranteed It is worth asking, however, whether these changes are firmly entrenched in the South Korean sociopolitical system and can withstand future political turmoil, should turmoil occur The brief historical survey of the South Korean

The Crisis of the Indian State: From Quiet Developmentalism to Noisy Democracy

Abstract: The liberal democratic state in India was founded in a moment of insurgent idealism, capping one of the longest and ideologically middle-of-the road national liberation movements in the Third World Theoretical interpretations of this state have often been wildly abstract because of the proclivity of interpreters to view it through the conceptual blinders of theories based on Third World political experiences or, occasionally, even on those abstracted from advanced capitalist societies The Indian state, however, is best comprehended on its own ground-its historical patterns and the strategy of political and economic development adopted following independence