Showing papers in "Australasian Journal of Philosophy in 1972"
TL;DR: In this paper, psychophysical and theoretical identifications are discussed in the context of ontology and ontology-based ontologies in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 50, No. 3, pp 249-258.
Abstract: (1972). Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 249-258.
792 citations
TL;DR: In this article, what is eliminative materialism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 50, No 2, No. 2, pp 149-159, 1970.
Abstract: (1972). What is eliminative materialism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 149-159.
66 citations
TL;DR: The world is everything that is the case as mentioned in this paper, and the world is not the case, it is the way it should be, and the case is not always the case.
Abstract: (1972). The world is everything that is the case. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 1-13.
49 citations
Journal Article•
36 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the implications of causal propagation outside the null cone were investigated and the authors concluded that causal propagation in the outside the cone does not necessarily imply the existence of a null cone.
Abstract: (1972). Implications of causal propagation outside the null cone. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 222-237.
19 citations
18 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a demon has seized two highly rational act-utilitarians and put them in separate rooms, and in each room there are two buttons, a red one and a green one.
Abstract: A demon has seized two highly rational act-utilitarians---call them 'You ' and T a n d put them in separate rooms. In each room there are two buttons, a red one and a green one. The demon has arranged that by both pushing our red buttons or by both pushing our green buttons we bring about the Good; but by pushing one red button and one green button (or by pushing both buttons or neither button in one of the rooms) we bring about the Bad. The demon has made sure that we both know all the facts I have listed so far, that we both know that we both know them, and so on. You manage to send me a message, and the message is ' I pushed red'. But, strange to say, that does not help. Fol I reason as follows. 'You are a highly rational utilitalian. You act in whatever way you think will have the best consequences, with no regard to any other consideration. This goes for sending messages: you send whatever message you think will have the best consequences, caring not at all about truthfulness for its own sake. So I have not the slightest reason to believe your message unless I have reason to believe that you think that truthfulness will have the best consequences. In this case, you must know that truthfulness has the best consequences only if I have some reason to believe you and to act accordingly. If not, there is nothing to choose between the expected consequences of truth and untruth, so you have no reason whatever to choose truth rather than untruth. I have not the slightest reason to believe you unless I have leason to believe that you think that I have reason to believe you. But I know that you--knowledgeable and rational creature that you are--will not think that I have reason to believe you unless I really do have. Do I? 1 cannot show that ! have reason to believe you without f irst assuming what is to be shown: that I have reason to believe you. So I cannot, without committing the fallacy ofpet i t io principii, show that I have reason to believe you. TherefoIe I do not. Your message gives me not the slightest reason to believe that you pushed red, and not the slightest reason to push red myself.' Arguing thus, I push at random. By chance I push green. Such is the disutility of utilitarianism, according to D. H. Hodgson. 2 We might better say: such is the disutility of expecting utilitarianism, and it is not sufficiently compensated by the efforts to maximize utility that fulfil the
10 citations
10 citations
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5 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, identity and spatio-temporal continuity are discussed in the context of ontology and ontology in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol 50, No 2, pp 184-189
Abstract: (1972) Identity and spatio-temporal continuity Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol 50, No 2, pp 184-189
TL;DR: Quine on Natural Kinds as discussed by the authors is a seminal work in the field of natural kind theory and philosophy, and it has been used extensively in many works. But this paper is different.
Abstract: (1972). Quine on Natural Kinds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 263-270.
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TL;DR: The authors define the notion of incorrigibility and define a set of rules for defining incorrigible behaviour, which are then used to define the concept of immorality in philosophy.
Abstract: (1972). On defining incorrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 279-282.