Showing papers in "Australian Journal of International Affairs in 2003"

Hegemonic constraints: The implications of 11 September for American power

Abstract: At the heart of the post-11 September world lie several critical issues surrounding US power: its unprecedented primacy, the way in which it is exercised, and how it is perceived and received around the world. Even as US primacy and 'hard' power projection have been reinforced, the terrorist attacks and Washington's responses have adversely affected the vital 'soft' foundations of its power: the appeal of American values and culture; the perception that US hegemony is benign; and the apparent legitimacy of the exercise of American power. These trends will, in the longer term, constrain US hegemonic power by limiting the effectiveness of foreign and security policies. At the international level, Washington will experience increased friction and costs in dealing with its allies and other friendly states; and at the domestic level, the Bush and subsequent administrations will have to take into account rising domestic costs of 'blowback'.

Responding to state failure—the case of Australia and Solomon Islands

Abstract: (2003). Responding to state failure—the case of Australia and Solomon Islands. Australian Journal of International Affairs: Vol. 57, No. 3, pp. 485-498.

Asylum-seekers in Australia's international relations

Abstract: The paper is divided into five sections. In the first, I offer some observations on the nature of 'sovereignty', and on the place of 'border controls' within sovereignty discourse. In the second, I discuss what it means to be a 'middle power', and what 'soft power' resources a middle power may need to use. In the third, I argue that crude populism has shaped recent responses to asylum-seekers, with scant regard to some of the wider consequences for Australia's reputation, but suggest that part of the blame lies with past failures of the foreign policy establishment to recognise genuine concerns entertained at mass level about the morality of Australian alignments and affiliations. In the fourth, I outline the key elements of Australia's recent policies towards asylum-seekers, and argue that they entail costs in terms both of Australia's reputation, and the nature of the Australian polity. In the fifth, I suggest some new directions to pursue.

Transformation or stagnation? Rethinking Australia's defence

Abstract: State on state conflicts are being replaced by hybrid wars and asymmetric conflicts in which there is no clear cut distinction between soldiers and civilians and between organised violence, terror, crime and war. Given the enormous changes in Australia's security environment, it is time to rethink our defence strategy which has four major failings. It is based on a misplaced geographical determinism that ignores the diverse and globalised nature of modern conflict. It has shaped the Australian Defence Force for the wrong wars. It gives insufficient weight to the transnational threats that confront us. And it fails to recognise that modern defence forces must win the peace as well as the war. Australia needs a strategy for the future not the past and a transformed defence force structured for the very different security challenges of the 21 st century.

A leap into the past—in the name of the ‘national interest’

Abstract: (2003). A leap into the past—in the name of the ‘national interest’. Australian Journal of International Affairs: Vol. 57, No. 3, pp. 431-453.

Terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction: How serious is the threat?

Abstract: This article examines the extent to which terrorist use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons poses a tangible threat to international security. In the literature on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) some analysts have tended to exaggerate the scope of the threat and assumed that large-scale terrorist acts involving WMD are only 'a matter of time'. In short, there is a tendency among observers to converge on analogous assessments at the higher end of the threat spectrum. In this article I argue that although WMD terrorism remains a real prospect, the ease with which such attacks can be carried out has been exaggerated; acquiring WMD capabilities for delivery against targets is a lot more problematic for terrorists than is generally acknowledged in the literature. However, this is not to say that the possibility of such attacks can (or should) be ruled out. The rise of a 'new' brand of terrorism that operates across transnational networks and whose operations aim to inflict mass casual...

Free Trade Agreements in the era of globalisation--new instruments to advance new interests--the case of Australia

Abstract: (2003). Free Trade Agreements in the era of globalisation--new instruments to advance new interests--the case of Australia. Australian Journal of International Affairs: Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 165-186.

The second North Korean nuclear crisis

Abstract: In 2002 the inclusion of North Korea by the Bush administration within the 'axis of evil' portended a break from the Clinton policy of engagement. Despite the apparent inconsistencies of this categorisation, North Korea's undoubted possession of some weapons of mass destruction capability seemed to make it a possible target for US containment if not preemption. However, Pyongyang's chief motive in such weapons development might actually be to guarantee regime survival. The revelation that North Korea had been developing a covert uranium enrichment program led US policymakers in the Bush administration to contemplate a policy of quarantine and containment. The wider policy community is divided on the question of whether Pyongyang was seeking a new bargain with the US, or whether this program was intended to produce a deterrent from possible US attack. These alternatives prescribe, respectively, a new negotiating approach or a strategy designed to dissuade. But the actual policy choice hinges on the outcome...

Australia's self-image as a regional and international security actor: some implications of the Iraq war

Abstract: (2003). Australia's self-image as a regional and international security actor: some implications of the Iraq war. Australian Journal of International Affairs: Vol. 57, No. 3, pp. 455-471.

Drawing a line in the Taiwan Strait: 'strategic ambiguity' and its discontents

Abstract: The Bush administration's continuing emphasis on US military deterrence of the PRC on behalf of Taiwan threatens to undermine the posture of 'strategic ambiguity' that the United States has proclaimed since 1979. This article argues for the retention of 'strategic ambiguity' and traces the origins of revisionist sentiment towards this effective conflict avoidance mechanism to reactions within the US foreign policy community to the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis. Case studies of this crisis and its predecessors in 1954-55 and 1958 demonstrate that US military deterrence was not a decisive factor in their resolution. US and PRC initiatives and responses in the 1950s crises introduced the essential elements of 'strategic ambiguity' into the triangular relationship between themselves and Taiwan. In particular, they established a precedent for the United States and the PRC in circumscribing the issue of Taiwan so as to achieve a political accommodation.

Perspectives on Australian foreign policy, 2002

Abstract: (2003). Perspectives on Australian foreign policy, 2002. Australian Journal of International Affairs: Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 37-54.

The China factor in US alliances in East Asia and the Asia Pacific 1

Abstract: Any discussion of the United States' alliances in East Asia and the Pacific should include an understanding of the role that China plays in regional security in general, and the influence of such a role on the alliance system in particular. The 'China factor' in the contemporary US alliance system can be understood by asking the following questions: (1) what are China's perceptions of and concerns regarding the US alliance system as a whole and regarding specific bilateral military alliances of the US?s (2) where does China figure in the American post-Cold War worldview, and what role does the United States itself see its alliances playing in relation to China?s (3) to what extent are the current bilateral alliances of the US directed against China, in the view of US alliess and (4) how might the reshaping of the international security environ ment following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States affect China's perceptions and attitudes towards future alliance developm...

Will the Chickenhawks come home to roost? Iraq, US preponderance and its implications for Australia

Abstract: It began, generally, in the way the US promised it would, with (a scaled down) ‘Operation Shock and Awe’ unleashing hundreds of bombs and missiles upon the peoples and places of Iraq. A strategy, for all its fabled precision, designed to terrify and pulverise people and things. Some, those guilty of torture and systematic Ba’ath party intimidation, probably deserved to be terrified, maybe even pulverised. Most, however, are guilty of nothing more than being born in the wrong place and time. Eighty years after the British literally drew lines in the sand and proclaimed the new Iraq, complete with imported Hashemite monarch. A quarter of a century after the thuggish reign of Saddam began. A decade after the US, having withdrawn its support for the instigator of a bloody war with Iran, sought to punish him for again following his instincts in attacking Kuwait. In the lead-up to the attacks of March 2003, there was widespread concern about the fate of the innocents in Iraq, as both victims of Saddam’s regime and of a post-11 September US strategy which seemed, inexplicably, to have shifted focus from Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda to the much less immediate threat posed by Iraq, and its alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD). One of the few governments not to have expressed these reservations was that headed by John Howard in Australia, which supported the proposition that Iraq’s WMDs did indeed represent an immediate threat to US security and that of its western allies. That, moreover, the Islamic fanatic bin Laden and the secular miscreant Saddam were likely allies in the campaign against the global status quo. Support for US policy was thus proffered as part of a reiteration of a traditional mantra regarding the American Alliance, which reiterated the view that Australia’s national interests are best served when integrated with those of our ‘great and powerful friend’. A decision taken in the knowledge that, imperfect and occasionally infuriating as the Alliance might be (e.g. on issues of agricultural trade), it still provides a comforting security blanket at moments of heightened anxiety for (at least one of) its Antipodean signatories. But there is more to the Iraq decision than this, and indeed to Australia’s enthusiastic commitment to the US-directed ‘war on terror’. In essence it is a decision underpinned by a series of assumptions about the (regional) present and (global) future, and about the nature of international relations per se in the early 21

Power, rules and argument: new approaches to humanitarian intervention1

Abstract: Recently, there has been growing awareness that the debate between pluralist and solidarist approaches provides an unsatisfactory way of assessing the changing legitimacy of humanitarian intervention and the impact this has on international order (see Bellamy 2002, 2003a). The volumes considered here adopt four different ways of approaching the subject with a view to overcoming the impasse in the pluralist-solidarist debate. © 2003 Australian Institute of International Affairs

Australian-African relations 2002: Another look

Abstract: Various recent developments and events in Africa, including the involvement in 2002 of the Prime Minister of Australia in Commonwealth initiatives in relation to Zimbabwe, have made it timely to review the nature and extent of Australia's relations with African countries. This commentary describes current Australian policies on Africa, including trade relations and aid programs, against the background of the political and economic situation in Africa in the new millennium. In conclusion, the comment is made that Australia's dealings with African countries might have more significance to its own interests than is generally acknowledged. This is so particularly in respect of common standpoints on multilateral trade issues, and the future of the British Commonwealth.

Whither the San Francisco alliance system

Abstract: Fifty years on, the system of American-led alliances negotiated in San Francisco survives. The focal points of the treaty making process were: (1) signing the Japanese Peace Treaty and accompanying security arrangements to preclude Japan’s potential economic strength from falling into the Soviet orbit; and (2) ensuring that the United States enjoyed substantial forward bases on the North Asian littoral. In order to secure the Japanese Peace Treaty, reached in September 1951, additional defence pacts were signed by the United States with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) and with the Philippines. Both were necessary to secure their acquiescence in the peace agreement with Japan. In the subsequent three years, further treaties were signed with South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. The relative weight given by the United States to the role these agreements played in the central regional balance of power endures. Those in Northeast Asia (with Japan and South Korea) were—and remain—critical. Those in Southeast Asia served more diffuse purposes. Unlike NATO and the broader international economic and political/security arrangements put in place, like Bretton Woods and the United Nations, the US security treaties in the Asia/Pacific were very much reflections of American policy continuity. The latter represented the strategy of a new global hegemon and one of the two great victors of World War Two putting in place a compromise vision of transparent, stable regional security and economic relationships to underpin a new global order. The San Francisco system thus represented a combination of what had been continuing American Pacific engagement from the outset of the twentieth century. Far from the usual American isolationist sentiment directed towards enmeshment with Europe, America’s drive in the Pacific reflected its continuous efforts to secure military and economic advantage through appropriate Pacific regional arrangements. This had seen the United States engage both continental powers in Asia and Russia, old European Empires of which it did not approve, and its own imperia in the central and south west Pacific in what was a persistent effort to hedge its maritime power rival, Japan. The Washington Conference system constraining regional military capabilities was one facet of this American grand design. Rising political opinion in the United States that America should enjoy a ‘Pacific century’ had its genesis in the north’s victory over the confederacy in the Civil War (which made a minimally competitive incorporation of all contiguous territory to the US west coast possible) and the subsequent cross-party view that an American

America's Asian alliances in a changing world

Abstract: (2003). America's Asian alliances in a changing world. Australian Journal of International Affairs: Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 113-124.

Reassessing the ROK-US alliance: Transformation challenges and the consequences of South Korea's choices

Abstract: Changing political attitudes in South Korea, and the appearance of some divergence of view between Washington and Seoul on the nature of the threat posed by North Korea are impelling a re-examination of the US-South Korea alliance. At the same time, although still concerned with deterring an invasion from Pyongyang, the alliance must now also deal with the possible conse quences of a catastrophic collapse of the North Korean state. Changing threat perceptions, developments in military technology and doctrine associated with the 'revolution in military affairs', as well as the emergence of new issues such as terrorism, all require a redefinition of the alliance. While the changing geo-strategic environment and the wider regional role of the alliance will all be factors in the modifications made to the Washington-Seoul security relationship, the key to South Korea's future alliance choices will be the nature of the path taken to eventual Korean unification.

The misleading mystique of America's material power

Abstract: Little more than a decade after ‘declinists’ heralded America’s fall from hegemony a new mystique about American power permeates much academic and journalistic commentary. Article after article open by listing the principal indices of American might—the huge size and technological advantage of the US military, the scale and dynamism of the US economy, America’s lead in the communications and information revolutions, and the critical intersection between these faces of its material power. Reinforcing all of this is America’s ‘soft power’, the universality of its values and its extraordinary cultural magnetism. Searching for a suitable analogy, even the most sober of commentators have raised the spectre of the Roman Empire. In Kenneth Waltz’s words, ‘Never since Rome has one country so nearly dominated the world’ (2002: 350). That academic and journalistic commentators are drawn to such hubris is understandable and relatively innocuous. It is more worrying, however, that the mystique of America’s material power dominates the foreign policy consciousness of the Bush Administration. It is taken for granted that America’s unparalleled material resources can be translated into political influence unproblematically, that America’s cultural magnetism bolsters such influence, and the universality of American values gives Washington the right—even obligation—to embark on an ambitious, largely unilateral project of hegemonic renewal and global transformation. This article questions this view of American power. It does not deny the magnitude of America’s material advantage; it suggests that material power alone is insufficient to deliver sustained and effective political influence in the contemporary global order. American leadership, and the policies and strategies it engenders, will need to be deemed legitimate by the states and peoples of international society. Even then, the present international order is far less conducive to American hegemony than it was after the Second World War. These points are lost on the Bush Administration, and unless it goes on a steep learning curve there will be serious implications for America’s identity and interests and for the political fabric of global order.

Restructuring the US-South Korea alliance to deal with the second Korean nuclear crisis

Abstract: As the US-South Korea alliance faces the second Korean nuclear crisis, Seoul and Washington no longer share a common unifying threat perception of North Korea. This divide has allowed North Korea to advance its interests by playing a 'South Korea card' against the United States in the nuclear standoff. The divide is not a transient problem that can be ignored or addressed with ad hoc fixes but a secular phenomenon rooted in South Korea's growing wealth and deepening democracy. What is needed now is more distance in the alliance. The alliance must be restructured to reflect the reality that South Korea can defend itself against North Korea without the help of the United States. For both Seoul and Washington, the restructured alliance would produce a more complete and robust set of options to advance their respective North Korea policies.

Iraq, alliances and crisis management

Abstract: (2003). Iraq, alliances, and crisis management. Australian Journal of International Affairs: Vol. 57, No. 2, pp. 223-233.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Is there a way out?

Abstract: The blame for the inability to put an end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians must be shared by all parties. In Israel, Ehud Barak's attempts were courageous but he never established trust with the Palestinians. The policy of the Sharon government, based only on response to violence by force, also failed. Although he did not mastermind the Second Intifada, Arafat's attitude towards the Palestinian militant armed groups was always ambiguous and he lost any credit even among the Israeli peace camp. The Arab countries never gave more than a formal support to the Palestinians and abstained from arguing in favour of coexistence with the Israelis. The Americans, with Clinton, seriously tried their best but lacked some long-term perspective and, with George W. Bush, aligned themselves with the most radical Israeli position. Europe did support the Palestinian economy but was too divided to influence dramatically the negotiations and did not invest enough into peace-building among the peoples of th...

New routes to understanding Burma's democratic prospects

Abstract: Benjamin Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 2001. Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers (eds), Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) 2000. Yao Souchou (ed.), House of Glass: Culture, Modernity, and the State in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) 2001. Catarina Kinnvall and Kristina Jonsson (eds), Globalization and Democratization in Asia: The Construction of Identity (London: Routledge) 2002. Philip J. Eldridge, The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge) 2002. Robert H. Taylor (ed.), Burma: Political Economy Under Military Rule (London: C. Hurst and Co.) 2001.

Reviewing our Asian engagement

Abstract: Australian engagement with Asia seems to be getting more difficult. The Bali tragedy and developments occurring since that time underline the need to pause a moment, and take stock. But before assessing the problems ahead, and the resources we possess to deal with those problems, let me try to clear away three debates that seem to me to have been a waste of time. The first debate, or diversion, is the argument about whether Australia is an ‘Asian country’. To the extent to which the phrase signifies anything at all, it does not apply easily to this country. We have a significant Asian population here, but our dominant value system and institutions give Australia an unmistakable European stamp. To suggest we are an ‘Asian country’ provokes confusion and sometimes ridicule in Asian societies. It also threatens the sense of identity of important sectors of the Australian community. The fact is that the more we engage in our region—the more we interact in commerce, education, tourism and diplomacy—the more we tend to recognise the characteristics that distinguish us in the region. Engagement with Asia helps us to recognise the potency in Australian society of our Australian, liberal values. In many but not all situations these liberal values are also something that make Australia attractive in the region. The second diversion that it would be helpful to sweep away is the debate about whether the Asian region could be anything other than our priority in international relations. It will never be our only concern but, living where we do in this world, the Asian region has to be our special challenge and our special opportunity. Our relations with Asia define Australia in the wider world. Deep down, and despite differences in approach and strategy, most Australians will accept this fact. In the 1990s some commentators suggested that ‘Asia’ was taken seriously by only one side of Australian politics, and it is arguably the case that this claim has skewed public discussion about the ‘Asia’ issue ever since. The Labor contribution to our Asian engagement, in fact, is beyond question. But sensible public debate requires a broader narrative. When I was a boy a courageous Country Party leader was forging an historic agreement with the new Japan; it was in that period also that a Southeast Asian newspaper said of the Menzies Government—I repeat, the Menzies Government—that it had shown an unprecedented ‘consciousness of [Australia’s] geographic and strategic relationship with Asia’. Going back even further, to a time when most of the Asian region was under the power or influence of European colonialism, Australian leaders could nevertheless see what the future

Comment on the special issue (July 2002) Australian Foreign Policy: New Challenges and Changing Practices

Abstract: My first reaction, reading this from afar, was to welcome the journal’s devoting a special issue to a stocktaking exercise of this kind, and this was confirmed as I read the various articles, all highly informative and offering a wide range of expert judgments. However, I also felt a certain uneasiness, barely conscious, over the ‘message’ of the issue as a whole. This stubbornly refused to go away: on the contrary, it prompted me to return to reread the issue, either to banish the sense of unease or else to ascertain the reasons for it. In the event, the passage of a few months has reinforced my initial reaction and made it possible to formulate those reasons. Despite the merits of each individual article, the overall message comes across as relatively inward-looking and unresponsive to the concerns of the less fortunate 90 per cent or so of the world’s people. The issue has remarkably little to say on the dangers posed not so much by international terrorism as the character of the response to it. The perception that the world is becoming more dangerous, and that the way in which the ‘war on terrorism’ is being conducted is enhancing the dangers, may or may not be correct, but the failure even to mention this possibility suggests that something important is missing. Disregarding the nuances, the message is surprisingly sanguine. Australian foreign policy faces new and varied challenges, but by and large is on the right lines. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is responding creatively to expanding demands on its shrinking resources. Australia rightly remains committed to free trade and to market solutions—for example, in relation to environmental issues. It is right to resist all suggestions for new international regulations, as well as protectionism in all its guises. Although the priority it accords to ‘conventional’ territorial defence is contrary to the prevailing trends elsewhere, it is in accordance with Australia’s long-term security interests. (This thesis, however, unlike the others, is advanced only after searching analysis). The only discordant note is the treatment of asylum-seekers, which ‘has failed not only the people detained but also Australia itself as a nation’. The author of this last article, Don McMaster, quite rightly points to the need to ‘alleviate the root causes of people movement ... human misery, economic cost and political conflict’. However, this key issue is scarcely mentioned elsewhere. The exception, remarkably enough, is a statement by the Director of the CIA (quoted

Australia's economic growth prospects to 2010 and beyond

Abstract: (2003). Australia's economic growth prospects to 2010 and beyond. Australian Journal of International Affairs: Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 153-163.