Showing papers in "Classical Philology in 1983"

The Context and Date of Priscus Fragment 6

Abstract: A PERENNIAL problem in analyzing ancient texts preserved only in fragments and excerpts is establishing their context and, especially important in the case of historical texts, their date. The many fragments of early Byzantine historians in particular have been extensively used by modern scholars, but there is much scope for more precise and rigorous analysis of them. In using Priscus of Panion, for example, as a source for the 440s we rely largely on the excerpts preserved in two compilations made for the tenth-century scholar-emperor, Constantine Porphyrogenitus. They deal with embassies from the Roman imperial court to various barbarian chiefs and officials (Excerpta de legationibus Romanorum) and embassies from barbarians to Romans (Excerpta de legationibus gentium). I Since the excerpts are confined to embassies and are torn from their context in the original history of Priscus, dating individual excerpts is primarily achieved by correlating the excerpts with other sources for the 440s, notably the annalistic chronicles (e.g., Marcellinus, Prosper, Chronicon Paschale, Theophanes).2 A useful check on this method is to analyze the Excerpts to see if they bear witness to a systematic and sequential process of extraction on the part of the Byzantine editor. Taking the fragments relating to the Hunnish wars in the 440s (i.e., 1-14), we find that fragments 1, 4, and 8 are successive extracts from Excerpta de legationibus Romanorum. Fragment 1 describes events in 435, fragment 4 events in 447, and fragment 8 recounts the embassy to Attila of Maximinus and Priscus in 449.3 They are therefore in order; and this is made clearer still by the next successive fragments of the Roman embassies: 13(449), 14(449), 18(452), 24(456), 25(456), 28(461), 29(462), 32(464), 33(465), 40(467). When we turn to the Excerpta de legationibus gentium we discover that the compiler here engaged in the same process: that is, he excerpted

Aristotle and Happiness after Death: Nicomachean Ethics 1. 10-11

Abstract: IN Nicomachean Ethics 1. 10-11 Aristotle discusses the meaning of Solon's advice that one look to the end before judging a person happy. The consideration of this issue leads him to discuss at some length the popular opinion that the dead are affected by the changing fortunes of living descendants and friends. Aristotle himself mentions how incongruous such an opinion is with his own account, which equates happiness with a certain activity (1100a13-14). Several times in the ensuing discussion he uses the common Greek word for the dead, ot KEK1WqKOTE19 (literally, \"the ones who have completed their labor\"), as if to accentuate this incongruity (1101a35, b6). Nevertheless, chapter 11 ends with the assurance that the good or bad fortune of friends does have some effect on (but cannot reverse) the happiness or unhappiness of the dead (1 101b59). Faced with this apparent inconsistency, interpreters of the Ethics have responded in a remarkably uniform way. Common to all accounts with which I am familiar is the view that Aristotle himself does not seriously entertain the possibility that the dead are happy or unhappy, despite the literal preoccupation with the topic in Nicomachean Ethics 1. 10-11. To some, Aristotle is actually in some disingenuous way reconciling the received opinions about the departed with his account of happiness. J. A. Stewart, for instance, says that Aristotle merely \"minimizes\" popular opinions because a forthright account of his own views would wound \"the tenderest feelings of mankind.\", According to R.-A. Gauthier, Aristotle is content to reveal inconsistencies in the received opinions on the dead and thus, with a \"condescending smile,\" to discredit them as a challenge to his analysis.2 To others, like J. Burnet and H. Rackham, the passage's actual concern is the question of our estimate of a dead person's life, although they find the text inconsistently attributing awareness to the dead at several places. Another response to the apparent inconsistency between happiness as virtuous activity of soul and the existence of the

Aristotle and the Happy Dead

Abstract: A LTHOUGH Nicomachean Ethics 1. 10-11 is not part of the textual core of Aristotle's ethics, it nevertheless ought not to be disregarded: these two chapters show Aristotle's attempt to relate his account of happiness to a popular Greek aphorism that forbids the attribution of happiness to anyone alive. Thus, as Kurt Pritzl argues in the preceding article, the passage is of interest for an understanding of Aristotle's methodology, an interest which has been obscured by much of the traditional commentary. While Pritzl has provided a helpful setting of the passage in its social context and a useful commentary on some points of interpretation, there inevitably remains more to be said. This reflection upon his article first reinforces his reading of one passage, but in the second part qualifies his general assessment of these chapters of the Nicomachean Ethics.

Euripides and Socrates

Abstract: JN PLATO'S Protagoras Socrates argues that no one can choose what he believes to be worse. He thinks this is a controversial claim, because most people will reject it; they think someone can know that one course of action is better than another, but still be overcome by emotion, pleasure, pain, passion, or fear, so that he chooses to do what he knows to be worse (Prt. 353B1-C2). The \"Socratic Paradox\" defended by Socrates here is a central claim in Socratic ethics. It denies the possibility of incontinence. An agent acts incontinently if and only if:

The External Evidence for the Division of Propertius, Book 2

Abstract: hominum risu cavillatus. The diplomatic situation then prevailing in the two Arab kingdoms lent itself to the intentionally barbed question: Would the Senate which refused the toga to one mini-monarch allow another the pretension of wearing it? There is as yet no evidence that Abgar II was refused this honor, but the known outline of his reign does not exclude such a possibility.22 The variant readings or emendations noted above are much less satisfactory or convincing precisely because they do not address themselves to the multiple factors involved. We believe that the solution proposed above satisfies every consideration. The word to be restored must compare and contrast geographically, historically, and politically with Commagenum in the same sentence. Such a word must accommodate itself to a passage composed for delivery with intentional rhetorical flourishes. This same word must demonstrate that it would have been instantly comprehensible to Cicero's Senate colleagues. It must also plausibly demonstrate that it lends itself easily to errors of manuscript transmission. Lastly, it must satisfy the joking ambiance which pervades all portions of the letter to which it relates. Our examination of this crux benefits especially from a review of the historical and geographical background of Cicero's letter, important aspects overlooked by other commentators. We therefore submit that there is a solid basis, textual and contextual, for believing that the emendation we propose is preferable to anything so far suggested in the discussion of this notorious crux.

The Athenian Courts for Homicide

Abstract: JN the time of Aristotle and Demosthenes the Athenians had five courts to judge cases of 46vo's, a term which is conveniently translated as "homicide," although the competence of the five courts was wider and approximated to the modern notion of "injuries to life and limb." The first of the five courts was the Council of the Areopagus, and in this court the members of that Council were the judges. The second, third, and fourth courts met in the Palladion, the Delphinion, and at Phreatto. The judges in these three courts were called the ephetai. Their identity is enigmatic; the question is not crucial for the present inquiry and will be relegated to an appendix. The fifth court met in the Prytaneion; the judges were the king-archon and the four tribal kings. Two views are widely held about these five courts. I First, it is said that the whole system of five courts came into being at an early date, reaching its final form in the legislation of Draco in 621/620; it is said that the system was preserved without serious change for at least three centuries. Second, it is said that the Areopagus was the oldest of the courts dealing with homicide and that the three ephetic courts were created subsequently, although not later than 621. Accordingly, it is conjectured that the ephetai were a commission drawn from among the Areopagites, and that each of the three ephetic courts received its sphere of competence by something like delegation from that Council, which thus gave up parts of its originally comprehensive competence. These views arise from accepting as historical in outline Athenian traditions about Draco and about the legendary origins of the Areopagus. Those traditions will receive incidental attention below. The present paper will scrutinize the distribution of competence between the Areopagus and the ephetic courts. It will claim to find anomalies which demand a historical explanation, and on this basis it will challenge the two views indicated above. It will argue from institutional survivals, that is, from the distri-

Semantics, Syntax, and Phonological Organization in Greek: Aspects of the Theory of Metrical Bridges

Abstract: P oERHAPS the most challenging and most debated problems in the study of Greek meter are those posed by the bridges. Bridges are locations and environments in the line at which word boundary is excluded or restricted. Not all types of word boundary are equally constrained at bridges: while boundaries between lexical words such as nouns, adjectives, and verbs are rare and often textually suspect, there is ample evidence for boundaries associated with short nonlexical forms, such as articles, conjunctions, negatives, modals, interrogatives, and pronouns, as well as prepositions, numerals, and certain adverbs (the term "appositive" is widely used to refer to these forms), for example, rfg#ovtukop&'g (Eur. Supp. 732), Kai#68vo-lvXl (IT 694), p thus, in his recent handbook, D. Korzeniewski writes: ". . . wiegt der Verstoss nicht schwer."'' Other metrists distinguish appositive boundary from full word boundary by classifying the former with the nonviolations: "the 'bridge' is not violated [by an appositive boundary]," writes P. Maas.' This latter (binary) classification implies that, so far as the bridge is concerned, the meter is indifferent to the distinction between appositive boundary and no boundary. These two approaches seem to be quite incompatible and mutually contradictory. On the basis of a detailed and systematic analysis of largely neglected gradients of diachronic and stylistic variability, we shall propose a new theory of the bridge designed to resolve the apparent contradiction within the framework of a more comprehensive understanding both of the phonological processing of syntactic structures in the Greek language and of the issues raised by the bridge in the metatheory of Greek meter.

Callimachus and the Ars amatoria

Abstract: T HE literary playfulness of Ovid's Ars amatoria ranges widely in its comic imitations of Greek and Roman authors. Students of the poem have frequently discussed its numerous parodies of passages or motifs from Hesiod, Lucretius, and Virgil's Georgics, to which one may add the many echoes of nondidactic works such as the Aeneid and Eclogues, Catullan lyric and Propertian love elegy.' Ovid apparently knows no bounds in his self-ironic attempt to relate his poem to the great works of his predecessors. One such masterwork whose reminiscences in the Ars have not been fully understood is the Aitia of Callimachus, a poem well known to Ovid and his Augustan colleagues as both the classic aetiological poem and a major model for poetry written in the neotericHellenistic tradition. The Aitia was a unique didactic elegy2 in which Callimachus set forth in a series of narratives the origins or aitia of various local customs. Sometimes the scholar-poet addresses these to the reader in his own person; often he pictures himself receiving antiquarian information from interlocutors from the Muses in an extended dialogue in the first two books, elsewhere from Delian Apollo3 and an acquaintance at a banquet in Alexandria (frag. 178). The literary prologue to the work, as is well known, had a monumental impact on Augustan programmatic poetry, including that of Ovid, most conspicuous perhaps in the Roman imitations of Lycian Apollo's epiphany to Callimachus (frag. 1. 21-28) and of the poet's consecration by the Muses on Helicon before they began to dispense aitia, a scene that Callimachus himself had imitated from Hesiod.4 On the elegists the entire work was influential in a number of ways, not the least of which was its inspiration of some Roman aetiological poems.

A Note on Arrian's Anabasis 5. 13. 1

Abstract: According to Arrian 5. 13. 1, Alexander crossed the Hydaspes river in a triaconter. With him in this triaconter (6ga aTCO) were the Bodyguards Ptolemy, Perdiccas, and Lysimachus, Seleucus (probably at this time commander of the hypaspists1), and \"half of the hypaspists. \" The rest of the hypaspists were conveyed across the river by other triaconters. In all probability, the hypaspists were 3,000 in number.2 Alexander, therefore, had 1,500 hypaspists with him in his triaconter, if we accept Arrian's account at its face value; the other 1,500 required more than one triaconter (&XXat TpLaKOPT6poL) for their conveyance. A triaconter, as its name indicates, was propelled by thirty oars, fifteen to each side. Alexander's triaconters had been cut up into three sections each at the Indus, loaded onto yoked teams, conveyed to the Hydaspes, and there reassembled (Arr. 5. 8. 5). From 6. 5. 2 we learn that they were 8&KpOTOL; that is, they had their oars arranged in two banks.3 Triaconters were not large ships, being mainly used in the classical period for such duties as reconnaissance and the conveying of messages (cf. Hdt. 8. 21) and for piratical activities (cf. Thuc. 4. 9) because of their lightness and speed. L. Casson estimates that Alexander's double-banked triaconters would have been about 45 feet or 15 meters long as compared with approximately 75 feet or 25 meters for the single-banked triaconter.4 The width of these triaconters can only be guessed; but, even if one works on the ratio of 4:1 given by Starr for merchant-vessels,5 as compared with 7:1 for warships, we have a maximum width for a 8&KpOTOS of only about 11 feet or 3.5 meters. Indeed, the fact that Alexander's triaconters could be broken into only three sections and hauled by carts and teams of draught animals, probably bullocks, is an indication of their small size. It is obvious that the number of men that could be fitted into such a vessel, in addition to its normal crew, would vary according to whether the vessel was fully decked, half-decked, or deckless. But it is equally obvious that it would be physically impossible to cram 1,500 men into a container with an absolute maximum decked surface area of approximately 50 square meters. Alexander could not possibly have had half the hypaspists with him on board his triaconter, even for the shortest of short dashes across the river (which happened to be running in a swollen state). It is interesting to note that at Arrian 6. 2. 2, when the flotilla is about to begin its descent of the Hydaspes on its journey to the Indus and the sea, Alexander embarks with him 9miT T&q va&q all the hypaspists, the archers, the Agrianians, and \"the agema of the cavalry.\" This last certainly refers to the Royal Squadron, about 300 in number.6 The hypaspists were about 3,000 in number;

Mythological Exempla in Ovid's Ars Amatoria

Abstract: NE of the most conspicuous features of Ovid's didactic style in the Ars Amatoria is the use of short mythological paradigms to reinforce his amatory precepts.' Although scholars have frequently mentioned this phenomenon,2 a detailed discussion of the real function of exempla in the poem has not as yet been undertaken:3 the present article attempts to fill this gap. To begin with, I will classify the various types of exemplum employed by Ovid, concentrating attention on their superficial purpose as a form of argumentation. Selected examples will then be discussed in order to determine whether the effect that they produce in their context is consistent with their ostensible function. Of the sixty-six brief allusions to myth in the Ars, four-fifths serve as examples to corroborate the poet's argument.4 In rhetorical terms, these may be classified as a variant of the 7rap&Sstyga (exemplum), though in both theory and oratorical practice the paradigm from history is naturally more frequent.5 Although ample precedent exists in Greek and Latin poetry for the corroborative use of myth,6 its prevalence in the Ars Amatoria is best viewed as an extension of a feature which was already common in the poetry of Propertius and had been taken over by Ovid in his Amores and Heroides. Apart from the numerous cases in these earlier elegies where myths take the form of a comparison between the poet's puella and the heroines of mythology, or between his own situation and that of a mythical character, exempla are frequently employed for purposes of argumentation.

Review Article: History and Rhetoric in Curtius Rufus

Abstract: Few classical authors present more problems than Q. Curtius Rufus. No information survives from antiquity about the Historiae Alexandri Magni and their author. Worse still, the first two books of the work are lost and with them all autobiographical details and statements of methodology that Curtius may have supplied. What remains is plagued by lacunae and riddled with deep-seated textual problems, which all too often baffle elucidation. On the other hand, Curtius is a major source for the history of Alexander the Great, often the fullest extant, and any historian of the reign must grapple repeatedly with him. Recent work on Curtius has not been illuminating, largely concentrating on the dating problem to the exclusion of more crucial issues, namely, the author's historical methods and rhetorical techniques: There has been no full-scale study of Curtius since S. Dosson's Etude sur Quinte Curce and E. Schwartz's standard Pauly article, both now nearly a century old; and the critical editions which have appeared since E. Hedicke's second edition of 1908 have not been of the first quality. The appearance of a major commentary on Books 3 and 4, the first serious commentary on Curtius ever attempted, is inevitably an event of prime importance for students of ancient history and Latin literature. J. E. Atkinson's work is extremely full, as is to be expected from the redaction of a doctoral thesis. It is well documented and equipped with excellent references, the full bibliography (pp. 4-17) allowing greater brevity and economy in the text proper; and eight appendixes enlarge on matter, mostly chronological and topographical, which was too bulky for incorporation in the notes. What emerges is a synthesis. A. digests and assesses all major and minor contributions by modern scholars, criticizing what is offered but rarely advancing the discussion himself. His notes are well informed and often very helpful: see, for instance, the discussion of Persian dress (pp. 128-29, 245-46). The very fullness, however, can be a drawback. A. is at pains to do justice to all views and counter all objections, an approach that stems from the thesis writer's desire for completeness. The user of the commentary, I suspect, would appreciate a more judicious selection of what is important and lasting and a clearer separation of major and minor issues. One aspect that I find disturbing and superfluous is the insertion of resumptive commentaries on composition and sources at the end of each major section. There is often unnecessary reduplication of the material in the individual notes and the result is often incoherent and disorganized. One could surely preface each section