Cognitive Linguistics 

About: Cognitive Linguistics is an academic journal published by De Gruyter Mouton. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Cognitive linguistics & Verb. It has an ISSN identifier of 0936-5907. Over the lifetime, 617 publications have been published receiving 25639 citations. The journal is also known as: Cognitive linguistics (Print).

The Invariance Hypothesis: is abstract reason based on image-schemas?

Abstract: I view cognitive linguistics äs defined by the commitment to characterize the füll ränge of linguistic generalizations while being faithful to empirical discoveries about the nature of the mind/brain. The Invariance Hypothesis is a proposed general principle intended to characterize a broad ränge or regularities in both our conceptual and linguistic Systems. Given that all metaphorical mappings are partial, the Invariance Hypothesis claims that the portion of the source domain structure that is mapped preserves cognitive topology (though, of course, not all the cognitive topology ofthe source domain need be mapped). Since the cognitive topology of Image-Schemas determines their inference patterns, the Invariance Hypothesis claims that imagistic reasoning patterns are mapped onto abstract reasoning patterns via metaphorical mappings. It entails that at least some (and perhaps all) abstract reasoning is a metaphorical version of image-based reasoning. The data covered by the Invariance Hypothesis includes the metaphorical understanding of time, states, events, actions, purposes, means, causes, modalities, linear scales, and categories. Because the source domains of these metaphorical concepts are structured by image-schemas, the Invariance Hypothesis suggests that reasoning involving these concepts is fundamentally image-based. This includes the subject matter of Boolean, scalar, modal, temporal, and causal reasoning. These cases cover such a large ränge of abstract reasoning that the question naturally arises äs to whether all abstract human reasoning is a metaphorical version of imagistic reasoning. I see this äs a major question for future research in cognitive linguistics. 1. What is cognitive linguistics? I generally prefer not to engage in methodological discussions and would rather just get on with my work. But I feel that the Formation of a new Cognitive Linguistics 1-1 (1990), 39-74 0936-5907/90/0001-0039 $2.00 © Walter de Gruyter

Understanding figurative and literal language: The graded salience hypothesis

Abstract: In this study I lest the prevalent Claims among contemporary psycholinguists that understanding metaphor does not involve a special process, and that it is essentially identical to understanding literal language. Particularly, I examine the claims that figurative language does not involve processing the surface literal meaning (e.g., Gibbs 1984), and that its comprehension is not processing-intensive, because it does not involve a trigger (e.g., Keysar 1989). A critique, review and reinterpretation ofa number of contemporary researches on literal and figurative language reveal that figurative and literal language use are governed by a general principle of salience: Salient meanings (e.g., conventional frequent, familiär, enhanced by prior context) are processed first. Thus, for example, when the most salient meaning is intended (äs in, e.g., the figurative meaning of conventional Idioms), it is accessed directly, without having toprocess the less salient (literal) meaning first (Gibbs 1980). However, when a less rather than a more salient meaning is intended (e.g., the metaphoric meaning ofnovel metaphors, the literal meaning of conventional Idioms, or a novel Interpretation ofa highly conventional literal expression) comprehension seems to involve a sequential process, upon which the more salient meaning is processed initially, before the intended meaning is derived (Blasko and Connine 1993; Gerrig 1989; Gibbs 1980; Gregory and Mergler 1990). Parallel processing is induced when more than one meaning is salient. For instance, conventional metaphors whose metaphoric and literal meanings are equally salient, are processed initially both literally and metaphorically (Blasko and Connine 1993). The directl sequential process debate, then, can be reconciled: Different linguistic expressions ( salient-less salient) may tap different (direct/parallel/sequential) processes.

Metonymy: Developing a cognitive linguistic view

Abstract: In the traditionell view, metonymy is a matter of words (language); the metonymic process involves a transfer of the meaning of words which have reference; metonymy is a "stand~for" relationship between names; it is a relationship between two entities, where the nature of the relationship is generally assumed to be one of "contiguity" or "proximity". By contrast, we argue for a comprehensive and integrated cognitivist view which involves the following: (1) identifying the ontological realms in which metonymy can occur; (2) specifying the types of conceptual relationships that obtain between elements in a metonymic relationship; (3) establishing those cognitive and communicative principles that select the most "natural" vehicle-to-target routes; (4) discovering the conditions under which "non-default routes" can be selected.

Reference-point constructions

Abstract: Bö i h image-schematic abilities and conceptual ar ehe type s are essen tial t o the chciracierization of linguistic structures. Especially signißcant in this regard (and so ubiquitous in our everyday experience t hat we are largely oblivious t o it) is our capacity t o invoke t he conception of one entity äs a cognitive reference point for purposes of establishing mental contact with another. This image-schematic ability is proposed äs the abstract basis for possessives and affords a revelatory account of a broad ränge of possessive constructions. Other manifestations of this reference-point ability include topic and topic-like constructions, pronoun-antecedent relationships, metonymy, and the discrepancy typically encountered between t hose entities t hat ßgure rnost directly in a relationship and the explicitly coded relational participants. It is suggested that a wide array of linguistic and psychological phenomena might all be interpreted äs reflecting a fundamental aspect of cognitive processing. As one of its organizing principles, cognitive linguistics asserts the nonautonomy of linguistic structure. It Claims, in particular, that fundamental cognitive abilities and experientially derived cognitive models have direct and pervasive linguistic manifestations, and, conversely, that language structure furnishes important clues concerning basic mental phenomena. In recent years, cognitive linguists have in fact found strong linguistic evidence for positing a number of constructs whose general psychological significance is quite apparent. Examples include the notion of force dynamics (Talmy 1988); that of image Schemas (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987); of subjective vs. objective construal (Langacker 1985, 1990b); and of correspondences across cognitive domains (äs in metaphor) or mental spaces (Fauconnier 1985). My objective here is to explore the linguistic ramifications of another such construct: that of a cognitive reference Cognitive Linguistics 4-1 (1993), 1-38 0936-5907/93/0004-0001 $2.00 © Walter de Gruyter

The role of domains in the interpretation of metaphors and metonymies

Abstract: Metaphor and metonymy do not occur in Isolation; they are triggered in utterances in particular linguistic (and extralinguistic) contexts. They pose an interesting problem from the point of view of semantic composition in (hat ihe metaphorical or metonymic Interpretation of the parts (the individual words) appears to be determined by the Interpretation of the whole construction in which they are found. Much of this is determined by the domain in which the words are ίο be interpreted. Domainsplay a central role in the definition of a metaphor s a mapping of conceptual structure from one domain to another. Domains also play a significant (though not defining) role in most metaphors and some related lexical ambiguities, s the highlighting of particular domains in a domain matrix. The processes of domain mapping and domain highlighting are governed by the requirement that a dependent predication (in the sense of Langacker 1987) and all ofthe autonomous predications it is dependent on must be interpreted in a single domain; this is \"the conceptual unity of domain \\ This is only one ofseveral \"conceptual unities\" imposed by a whole construction on its component parts.