Showing papers in "Comparative Civilizations Review in 2012"

Modernization or Westernization: The Muslim World vs. the Rest

Abstract: The 20th century has been a time of rapid transformation, a continuation of a process begun in the West with the Scientific Revolution, Industrial Revolution, Religious Revolution, and Political Revolution. Other once-powerful empires, such as China, India, Ottoman Turkey, and Safavid Persia, had fallen into decline, while the West burgeoned. By the dawn of the 20th century, the states in decline all became aware of their condition and the danger it posed to them. All have experimented with various aspects of modernization: modernizing monarchies, dictatorships, Marxism, and Fascism. Some have modernized without democracy - such as China and Singapore. The majority of Muslim states, however, have not succeeded even in economic development, which their Asian counterparts have. At this time, without the cushion of an oil economy, these Muslim societies appear headed for dysfunctional, if not failed states. The direst of these is Yemen, which is not only chaotic and dysfunctional but is also facing a population explosion accompanied by severe lack of water. In this paper, I propose to explore the avenues selected by modernizing countries and explore why some have been successful while other choices have failed to bring these societies into the world system. Westernization (the world system) cannot happen without modernization preceding it. Defining the Terms Modernization has been a global process that we can observe in most of the major cities of the world, regardless of culture. Samuel Huntington says: "Modernization involves industrialization, urbanization, increasing levels of literacy, education, wealth, and social mobilization, and more complex and diversified occupational structures. These common elements may be present, even though the institutions that created them are not. Modernization can be borrowed or bought." But to create and sustain it, one must look to Westernization, "which created the tremendous expansion of scientific and engineering knowledge beginning in the eighteenth century that made it possible for humans to control and shape their environment in totally unprecedented ways." [Huntington, p. 68] Most Muslim-majority countries have automobiles, skyscrapers, television, airlines, and young people dressed in blue jeans, bopping to the latest hip-hop or other commercial Western music. But while listening to Western pop music on their earphones, they may also be listening to a fiery Jihadi sermon that will persuade them to volunteer as a suicide bomber. They are modern, but not Western. Furthermore, what one sees in the big cities may not be what we would find in the countryside or in the millions of villages in what we still call "the lesser developed world." They are neither modern nor Western. A perfect example of this situation, of course, is Afghanistan, a model of unending misery. Kabul and Herat are seemingly modern cities, but the rest of Afghanistan is trapped in the very feudal dark ages. Westernization is an entire complex of practices and values that have shaped the West over the 2,500 years from ancient Athens to today. These practices cannot be replicated overnight. Modernization may be seen as a civilization that emerged because of Westernization; however, a country may be modernized without being Westernized. Toby E. Huff notes that the Scientific Revolution did not take root in any of the other great civilizations of the 17th century (Ottoman, Moghul, Persian, or Chinese). This revolution was exclusively the product of our Classical legacy, Roman law, Latin language, and Christianity (church law and a system of contracts). [Huff, p. 3] Huntington adds the importance of rule of law, law that also constrains the exercise of arbitrary power of rulers. Social pluralism is also the product of Europe's particular geography, which has always provided for rival power centers, unlike the great empires of Asia. Representative bodies (parliaments), individualism and a certain restlessness and curiosity distinguishes the descendants of the Indo-European peoples, [see Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel; Ricardo Duchesne The Uniqueness of Western Civilization; and the work of a geographer, Barry Cunliffe, Europe Between the Oceans, 9000 BC-AD WOO. …

What is the Difference Between Culture and Civilization?: Two Hundred Fifty Years of Confusion

Abstract: The distinction between culture and civilization is not well embedded in the English language but has remained relatively meaningful in both other European and non-European languages. Edward B. Tylor designed an idea of civilization that covers both culture and civilization. Similar attempts had been made in late 18th Century Germany. Though it is sometimes stated that Tylor's relativist concept of culture harks back to Herder, the latter's cultural relativism differs from Tylor's civilizational relativism. Tylor's holistic definition of civilization-culture has created an amount of confusion that can still be felt today. European totalitarianism is often called "civilization" because many people would work in the service of an expansionist tendency of colonizing groups. On the other hand, European racism, such as that which occurred in 20th Century Germany, profited from the creation of a totally mystical culture that included a pseudo-biological notion in the concept of culture (Master Race). This component had not been present in the Enlightenment or in Herder's Counter-Enlightenment discourses. Civilization-based racism thrived not only in the colonies but also in the United States, where Beard's purist and radically culture-less idea of civilization could create a suitable background. In Nazi Germany, anti-Jewish racism was based on a naturalized idea of culture; in European colonies and in the United States, anti-black racism was based on the idea that Black people are unable to attain civilization by nature. Introduction The distinction between culture and civilization is not well embedded in the English language, but has remained relatively meaningful in other European and in nonEuropean languages which adopted these concepts from French and German scholars. In the English-speaking world, a century-old confusing play of name switching and revisions has made the distinction between culture and civilization difficult. The fogginess of the distinction has been reinforced when powerful streams of Englishspeaking anthropologists suggested that both concepts are identical. "Culture" (from Latin cultura) is the older term and corresponds to the Latin form also in its content; the term civilization (from Latin civis) was coined later, in 18th Century France and later also in England. However, German scholars preferred culture, with its complex of meanings. One can draw a more or less distinctive line between civilization and culture by stating that the former refers more to material, technical, economic, and social facts while the latter refers to spiritual, intellectual and artistic phenomena. The German usage of Zivilisation has always alluded to a utilitarian, outer aspect of human existence subordinated to Kultur, which was perceived as the "real" essence of humans, society, and their achievements. Unfortunately, things are not always that simple because there are cases where the two notions are not clearly distinguished. For example, both culture and civilization can be applied for analyses of religions. Another example is one of the most famous critiques of civilization, Freud's Unbehagen in der Kultur, which uses the word culture, although Freud clearly means civilization. Consequently, the book has been translated into English and into French as Civilization and its Discontents. E. B. Tylor In the English speaking world, the idea of civilization has developed autonomously, without reference to the term culture. This is because of the particularity of British anthropological approaches (strongly influenced by "Victorian evolutionists" and Edward B. Tylor), which would find no useful applications for the German-French distinction. Tylor's notion of civilization covers both culture and civilization. It adds to the confusion that Tylor, although defining civilization as more than culture, nonetheless used both terms interchangeably. Tylor abandoned the distinction between culture and civilization because the angle from which he was looking at culture made this distinction unnecessary. …

The House of Wisdom: How the Arabs Transformed Western Civilization

Abstract: Lyons, Jonathan. The House of Wisdom: How the Arabs Transformed Western Civilization. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009. Reviewed by Connie Lamb This is a fascinating book which covers a vast amount of subjects over a long historical time and wide geographic space. Written almost like a novel, it intertwines the stories of rulers, religious leaders, great Arab philosopher-scientists and Jewish, Christian and Persian scholars who lived in the Islamic Empire. It is a lively discussion of how a few Westerners traveled to Islamic countries in the 11 and 12 centuries; there they discovered a wealth of scientific writings which they recognized to be of great value. While Europe had languished in ignorance, superstition, and Christian religious restrictions during the Middle Ages, the Arab world witnessed a dynamic flowering of scholars, libraries, and scientific advances in mathematics, astronomy, geography, navigation, medicine, philosophy and agriculture. The Arabs had obtained much of their learning from knowledge left by the Greeks, Romans, and Persians, which was discovered as the Islamic empire spread through Iraq and Central Asia. The Arabs translated and synthesized this material and used it to further advance scientific understanding. Arabic replaced Greek as the universal language of scientific inquiry. Arab knowledge passed into Europe by way of the Crusader kingdoms, Sicily, and Spain and helped prepare the groundwork for the Renaissance and greater scientific advances in the Western world. Much of the transmission was accomplished by scholars such as Adelard of Bath, Michael Scot and Stephen of Pisa who found and translated significant Arabic language scientific texts and translated them into Latin. The author, Jonathan Lyons, served as a foreign correspondent, mostly in the Muslim world, for the Reuters News Agency for more than twenty years. His posts included Moscow, Tehran, Turkey, and Jakarta. He left this work to pursue a doctorate in sociology at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia and has since become an author and professor, teaching at Monash University, George Mason University, and at the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University. His first book, Answering Only to God: Faith and Freedom in 21s' Century Iran, co-authored with Geneive Abdo, was published in 2003 and his latest is Islam through Western Eyes: From the Crusades to the War on Terrorism. His website explains that he has spent much of his life exploring the shifting boundaries between East and West, first in the Cold War and then on the cusp between the Islamic and Western worlds. Over time he has come to see the relationships between these seemingly polar fields as a problem not of geography or politics, "but of thought, ideas, and knowledge - that is, as essential problems of epistemology." This idea is reflected in his book. The House of Wisdom is a well-researched and extensively documented book with 24 pages of endnotes. In addition, the front matter includes a clarifying note to readers, a chronological list of significant events from 622-1687 AD, and a list of leading figures discussed in the book. A few colored illustrations from Arab sources about the various sciences discussed in the book add visual understanding. The title of the book comes from the House of Wisdom, a royal library and academy built in the mid 700s AD in Baghdad by the Abbasid Caliph, al-Mansur, and which, in a sense, represents all the learning and culture that transpired during the Arab renaissance of scientific development. "Over time, the House of Wisdom came to comprise a translation bureau, a library and book repository, and an academy of scholars and intellectuals from across the empire" (p. 63). For many years, it provided, under the patronage of ruling caliphs, the working space, administrative support, and financial assistance needed by the scholars. The book is organized loosely chronologically but also by topic. …

How Islam Created the Modern World

Abstract: These accomplishments were so numerous and original that they realised an unprecedented stage of civilisation and occupied a high rank in human creation. Being unique and at the front of inventivity, they gained the admiration of other peoples who were aware of the existence of these treasures. Hence a dynamic process of transmission was set up between the Muslim and the Latin worlds all over the Mediterranean coasts.

How Civilizations Die (and Why Islam Is Dying Too)

Abstract: David P Goldman, How Civilizations Die (And Why Islam is Dying Too) Regnery 2011 Reviewed by Laina Farhat-Holzman Summary: "Population decline is the elephant in the world's living room" If population declines continue in the developed world, there will be an inverted pyramid of the elderly on top being supported by too few young people, the opposite of most of world history "For the first time in history, the birth rate of the whole developed world is well below replacement, a significant part of it has passed the demographic point of no return" (p x) What has not been noticed is a very precipitous crash of population in the lesser developed world, the most significant of which is the crash of Muslim population - the opposite of what we have assumed The author notes: " Islamic Society is even more fragile As Muslim fertility shrinks at a rate demographers have never seen before, it is converging on Europe's catastrophically low fertility as if in time-lapse photography Iranian women in their twenties who grew up with five or six siblings will bear only one or two children during their lifetimes Turkey and Algeria are just behind Iran on the way down, and most of the other Muslim countries are catching up quickly By the middle of this century, the belt of Muslim countries from Morocco to Iran will become as gray as depopulating Europe The Islamic world will have the same proportion of dependent elderly as the industrial counties - but one-tenth the productivity A time bomb that cannot be defused is ticking in the Muslim world" (p x) Radical Islamists already are driven by despair that their culture has been ruined The demographic bomb will frighten them even more What happens to society when people's very existence is under threat? We have no idea how people will behave under existential threat, and social scientists have not cast much light on this issue as yet Goldman takes this speculation to the extreme, anticipating irrational responses from the Muslim states who think they have no future He asks: why do individuals, groups, and nations act irrationally, often at the risk of self-destruction? The question, of course, is what is rational? It seems irrational to us when people set themselves on fire to make a political protest (Buddhist monks in Vietnam) or enlist and send their young to become suicide bombers Americans could not understand why the Japanese in World War II made human explosives of their pilots and sailors - suicide dive-bombers, human torpedoes strapped with explosives sent to swim out to American ships It was so apparent that they were losing the war that such extreme actions seemed highly irrational The same can be said for the seeming Muslim "death cult" that has enlisted (and often deceived) youngsters to be suicide bombers How many young can they afford to lose in a hopeless and delusional struggle? Despair does strange things Canada has noted that the overall suicide rate among their Native American communities is twice that of the rest of Canada, and the rate among the Inuit is still higher There is also an epidemic of suicides and alcoholism among the ancient Amazon tribes, who were until recently isolated Demographers have identified several different factors responsible for population decline overall: urbanization, literacy and education, and modernization of traditional societies, enforcing changes in the treatment of women and children Female literacy is the most powerful predictor of population decline among the world's countries My feminist antennae go up when I hear that female literacy is a powerful predictor of population decline Literate females are perfectly capable of having two or three children at replacement levels (as they do in the United States) But when such women choose to have no more than one (or none), they have plenty of reasons for this other than the frivolity of materialism …

Lost Civilisations of the Stone Age

Abstract: Richard Rudgley, Lost Civilisations of the Stone Age Arrow Books Ltd, 1999 Having just finished reading this book, I found in the morning newspaper an article about an amazing find in the Ethiopian desert - several hippo bones with indications that the bones had been smashed by a human tool - by homo erectus, our first ancient ancestors Of course, the anthropological community is up in arms with fierce debate over the interpretation of the discoverers Lost Civilisations of the Stone Age was written a decade ago by this British cultural anthropologist with a distinguished trail of scholarship He won the British Museum Prometheus Award for his book The Alchemy of Culture: Intoxicants in Society (British Museum Press, 1993) He also wrote Wildest Dreams: An Anthology of Drug Related Literature (Little Brown, 1999) and Secrets of the Stone Age (Century, 2000, which has become a TV series (History Channel, I believe) But this book, Lost Civilisations, must be creating even more furor among his more conservative colleagues, but for us as outsiders to the discipline, it is enlightening to learn how contentious ideas can be among specialists Rudgley makes the point that "despite the fact that prehistory makes up more than 95 percent of our time on this planet, history, the remaining 5 percent makes up at least 95 percent of most accounts of the human story" He believes that the prehistory of humankind is no mere prelude to history; rather it is history itself Anthropologists themselves have had a bad record in this regard, according to Rudgley The famous early anthropologists (1863 London) had some unsavory skeletons in their closets - and may not have behaved any better than notoriously disrespectful colonialists Richard Burton, for example, used anthropology to sensationally discuss sexual issues not possible in proper British society (and his proper British wife burned his papers when he died) Others were involved in criminal grave robbing, selling body parts, and one even fashioned a gavel in the form of an African head How different is this from the making of lampshades from human skin (under the Nazis), he asks? Rudgley attacks the whole notion of history blooming 5,000 years ago out of a cloud of dust, without antecedents He also takes on the notion that modern man has evolved and invented astonishing institutions from that point forward And he questions the notion that all of these innovations made life better for us all "That the average Stone Age individual may have enjoyed greater freedom than the serf (or even the average citizen of a modern democratic state) is simply ignored in this version of the human story, in which we ascend to ever greater heights and only look back in order to congratulate ourselves on how far we have come" He examines the most basic sign of any society's success - the health of its members Anthropologists have found that our hunter/gatherer ancestors had far better health than their agricultural successors Agriculture was not an improvement for the mass of peasants throughout history - although it certainly helped to make populations explode and those elites at the top flourished with better health This is one area in which progress was a mixed blessing Many historians still regard ancient Egypt as some sort of miracle, arising out of primeval darkness The more ideological among them believe that there had to be some "outside" influence (the space alien theories) because these people couldn't possibly have invented it But newer anthropologists (such as Rudgley) see that Egypt's great culture emerged out of impressive indigenous prehistoric cultures - including elaborate tombs, religious motifs, and religious themes Writing has always been considered the hallmark of civilization - beginning with the Egyptian hieroglyphics and the Mesopotamian writing (which seem to be independent of each other) …

Local Civilization and Political Decency: Equilibrium and the Position of the Sultanate in Java

Abstract: Good men will not consent to govern for cash or honors. They do not want to be called mercenary for exacting a cash payment for the work of government, or thieves for making money on the side; and they will not work for honors, for they are not ambitious. ' Democracy is a widely accepted and prevalent political system in the world today. It is evidently based on the election of leaders according to the will of the majority. Accordingly, a government composed of either directly or indirectly chosen representatives of the people would be regarded as democratic and politically decent. The idea of democracy was the subject of debate in the city-states in ancient Greece, such as Athens, and influenced the course of both the French and American revolutions. In the 18th century, various thinkers in the West further developed the idea of democracy, and their ideas contributed to the establishment of nation states. In the modern era, democracy has come to enshrine one of the ideals of Western civilization. The contemporary scholar, Francis Fukuyama, is one of many who advocate liberal democracy. At the end of the 20 century, he stated: The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism ..... What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.3 Fukuyama might be right as democratic ideas in the West have admittedly played an important role in liberating humans and have contributed to the development of a freer world.4 Apart from this Western-oriented political system, however, it is still possible to identify traditional alternatives in governance which do not rely on any electoral system in the appointment of top political leaders. The Indonesian island of Java has been known for its distinctive civilization. While its civilizational influence might be domestic and geographically limited, this local civilization seems to offer a unique alternative characterized by a different relationship between the ruler and his subjects. At the end of 2010, Yogyakarta in Central Java, which has preserved the very essence of Javanese civilization with its deep-rooted philosophy and has been ruled by a sultan, was thrown into political turmoil. Yogyakarta' s traditional governance is that the sultan is automatically appointed as the governor of the specially designated province of Yogyakarta, or Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (DIY). Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, popularly known as SBY, recently expressed the view that a gubernatorial nomination in Yogyakarta was incompatible with the idea of democracy and that there should be a direct election for the governorship. The people in Yogyakarta angrily expressed their strong opposition to the view of this two-time popularly-elected president. On 13 December 2010, when the provincial council decided to support the current system of having the sultan as governor, tens of thousands people took to the streets to show their disagreement with the country's president.5 Some of the banners read: "SBY is the origin of disasters in Yogyakarta," blaming the president for the earthquakes and volcanic eruptions which the province has experienced recently. Regardless of age, ethnicity, or gender, people expressed their support for the sultan and showed their heartfelt attachment to him on that day.6 One survey conducted by newspapers indicates that 93.3% of people in Yogyakarta were in favor of their traditional automatic appointment of the sultan as governor.7 Interviews conducted by the author on the streets of Yogyakarta also confirmed the support shown by an overwhelming majority of people for the status quo} What does this local phenomenon mean? …

New Orleans Connection: The Feibleman-Toynbee Interface

Abstract: Introduction This essay shows how facets of James K. Feibleman's (1904-1987) reciprocal relationship with Arnold J. Toynbee (1889-1975) may have influenced each thinker in their overlapping fields, respectively of philosophy and history. Toynbee remains a giant among world historians, and thanks to his able biographer and fellow world historian, William H. McNeill, his life and career are well known. By contrast, the American, Feibleman, despite a mammoth bibliography, remains relatively unknown outside of the states of America's south and west. Toynbee's history made a major impact on Feibleman's philosophy of culture, and there is ample evidence that Feibleman, either individually or collectively with other critics, made Toynbee reconsider his coverage of philosophy and science. In the final volume of Toynbee's mammoth A Study of History, entitled "Reconsiderations", Feibleman is cited over twenty-five times. Background Given the first encounter between these two, the probability of any ensuing relationship seemed highly unlikely. When they first corresponded in 1939, Arnold J. Toynbee was already a distinguished historian, but he had not achieved the reputation which would follow full publication of his classic work. By contrast in 1934, when our story begins, his early reader and future critic James K. Feibleman was a virtually unknown Southern writer. He was the scion of a New Orleans, German- Jewish immigrant family that sold their dry goods emporium, "Feibleman's House of Values" on Canal Street to Sears and Roebuck for two and a half million dollars just before the Great Depression struck in 1929. After graduating from Horace Mann preparatory school in New York City in 1924 and spending an abbreviated year at the University of Virginia plagued by illness, Feibleman's formal education was over. He then worked for his father for five years selling shirts. Now he had an almost Aladdin-like opportunity to do whatever he wished, and he opened an office in downtown New Orleans with the modest name plate: "James Feibleman: Poet," sure to keep solicitors away.1 He had first begun his writing career as a youthful poet contributing poetry to a local little magazine, The Double Dealer. His interests progressed to philosophy. Unable to find an American publisher for his first book, he sought out one in London during a vacation in Europe. Upon returning to America with a contract signed with Allen and Unwin to publish Science and the Spirit of Man (1933), he received a letter from his cowriter Julius Friend, a fellow New Orleans business man and holder of a B.A. from Yale. Their American book agent had released them from any legal commitment and Friend condescendingly wrote, Personally, Science and the Spirit of Man intrigues me as much as a bowl of black-eyed peas, but these Allen and Unwin bimbos seem determined to write the title - apparently with one eye on the religious caterpillars and another on the popular scientific audience, the "Fun with Chemistry" - the homemade telescope boys.2 This first book was a curious lament about the threat to traditional values posed by the juggernaut of business, science and technology in the 1920s. Their sense of malaise did not last long. There was little in that first youthful book that previewed what was to come. Subsequently, tracing back the historical origins of modern business to technology, the new writers finally arrived at the original fount in Greek science and philosophy. They were also particularly influenced by the writings of the American philosopher and physical scientist, Charles Sanders Peirce. Under this influence, Feibleman became a lifelong advocate of science, and a philosopher who hoped others might increasingly employ more science in their philosophical writings. Peirce saw scientific truths as asymptotic and never quite beyond doubt. To guard against absolutist claims, Peirce elevated the watch-dog principle of uncertainty in science, which he termed fallibilism3, to a philosophical principle. …

Two Concepts of "Civilization"

Abstract: Civilization Has Two Definitions. The word "civilization" has two basic meanings rather than one. There has been much discussion recently about civilizational conflicts and fusion. But to talk about such fusions, we must keep in mind that the word "civilization" has two basic meanings: first, civilization cultural type or a way of life, and second, civilization as a historicocultural entity or a congeries of peoples sharing and practicing that particular set of values or way of life. The differences between the two concepts are not self-evident. Yet this is so because they are often enmeshed. Their relationship is not "either/or" because there is no clear demarcation line between them. If we talk about different cultural types or ways of life, civilization in this sense means the basic values and related cultural practices, historical memories, and the geographic configurations people share with one another. Yet this kind of unity doesn't necessarily mean political unity or a shared political stance and commitment. For instance, although historically Muslims and Westerners had certain aspects of their religions and cultures in common, politically the Islamic world and the West have always been divided and generally hostile. And both civilizations have suffered from internal warfare, as well. Today, the European countries that comprise the European Union are trying to constitute a unified entity, striving toward a super-sovereign state, a United States of Europe, very much like America or China. But this is a massive job and predictably will take generations to accomplish. In 2007 and 2008, the draft of a European constitution was vetoed in referenda in Holland and France, referenda attempting to affirm a common constitution. Even though the European Union is expected to emerge eventually as something like a super-sovereign state, there is still a long way to go before the European states can finally attain the goal of political unification and become a sort of "United States of Europe." Civilization in the sense of cultural type is defined by a common mode of thinking or system of beliefs. Usually it includes not only a particular set of beliefs but also various cultural practices, despite populations speaking various languages or dialects. In most cases, civilization in this sense also shares a common geographic space, with Islam, perhaps, as an exception (as it is scattered over huge expanses of land on two continents). This lack of geographic continuity may be one factor in Islam's failure to modernize, along with the other cultural factors discussed in "Modernization or Westernization: the Muslim World vs. the Rest," authored by Laina Farhat-Holzman in this issue. There are many East and West African countries that have adopted Islam in one way or another. There are North African countries that are mainly Islamic. There are some Islamic countries in Southeast Asia, too. There are many ethnic groups who believe in Islam in China. So it seems that Islam is a very much a scattered religious, social, and political phenomenon that does not have very clear boundaries. It has to be noted, too, that civilization in the sense of cultural type is a long-term dynamic structure. It is a particular spatio-temporal continuum that has existed for thousands of years. Diffusion of Cultures Almost without exception, civilization in the sense of cultural type or way of life can be separated from that of a particular historico-cultural entity or aggregate of peoples who share a common way of life and a common geographic locus. Because these two aspects of it can be discussed separately, the values of a particular congeries of peoples called "a civilization" can diffuse among other peoples in the world. Chinese civilization, for example, was centered on "Zhong yuan" or Northern China. Soon it spread to other parts of China. After the Qin unified China, it even expanded to Vietnam, Korea, and Japan. …

The Myths and Realities of the Clash of Western and Chinese Civilizations in the 21st Century

Abstract: The Globalization and Comparative Approach Key Words: Western Civilization, Chinese Civilization, USA, EU, China, civilization clash, wealth bifurcation, Death Triangle of Civilization, globalization, globalization waves, economic crisis, grand strategy, outsourcing, wise civilization, civilization future. Introduction1 The main purpose of this investigation is to evaluate a question: is there a clash between the Western and Chinese civilizations, and what is the myth and reality of this clash? The spectacular economic development of the Chinese and the concurrent decline of Western civilization provoke many predictions of the near-future world order. So far it seems that the West cooperates with China quite well, since through outsourcing of Western manufacturing, China can employ its large labor force and the Western financial elite benefit tremendously in business, due to cheap labor. However, the question is how long can that kind of cooperation last? It triggered the financial crisis of 2008-2011, due to the shrinking middle class in the West, and furthermore, increasing numbers of employed Chinese workers can buy more and will need to consume more strategic resources which are available in limited volumes on the earth. Will the current cooperation be replaced by a clash for resources? That kind of question will be investigated in this paper. Also the wisdom-oriented abilities of both civilizations will be evaluated to see which one has better chances to survive a shortage of strategic resources. The methodology of this investigation is based on the interdisciplinary big-picture view of the world scene, driven by a global economy and civilization, with an attempt to compare both civilizations according to key criteria. A set of conclusions will be provided at the end of this paper, with practical and social implications for eventual implementation. The Impact of Globalization on Western and Chinese Civilizations in the 21st Century The development of the modern world began after the fall of Byzantium (1453) and the discovery of America (1492), that is, at the end of the 15th century. In each century since, usually one country has dominated the world. In the 16th century Portugal dominated, in the 17th century Spain was the hegemon, and in the 18th century Great Britain was the leader. At the beginning of the 19th century, the hegemon was France, which was later replaced by Great Britain. In the 20th century Great Britain, Germany, the United States, and to a certain degree Russia competed for the main role in world politics. In the 21st century the U.S. 's domination is fading, and many predict it will be replaced by China. In the last 500 years, different targets and issues were at stake in world politics. For example, Portugal, Spain, and Great Britain were conquering new territories, with good results. Once the world became richer in the 19th century due to the gains of the Industrial Revolution, at stake were clashing ideologies. The English Revolution (168889) built the foundation for the parliamentary system, the American Revolution (17751783) provided the concept of modern democracy, and the French Revolution (17891 799) created citizenship in France. The Industrial Revolution (1760-1850-1960) contributed the factory system and industrially manufactured products, financed by capital. It led to accelerated wealth creation and rising inequality among society's members. To solve rising dissatisfaction and poverty, differing ideologies regarding the further development of civilization were at stake. None of those ideologies - capitalism, socialism, and later communism and Nazism - could solve societal problems. Eventually these ideologies led to the Bolshevik Revolution (1917), Spanish Revolution (1936), World War ?, the Cold War (1945-1991), and to the very successful Scientific-Technological Revolution (1945-) and Information Revolution (1980-). …

Spengler's Philosophy and Its Implication that Europe has "Lost Its Way"

Abstract: During the First World War, a German historian produced a book that caused quite a stir among intellectuals around the world. By collating events in different (usually noncontemporary) cultures and civilizations, Spengler maintained that it should be possible to fill in gaps in history, ' and indeed to set out possibilities for the future, although admittedly only in terms of very broad generalizations. It was an extremely ambitious undertaking, but after the Second World War, his ideas became unfashionable (mainly for political reasons). Nevertheless, Spengler's book is a work of monumental scholarship, discussing in depth such diverse topics as mathematics, music, architecture, painting, theology and money, with brief but still erudite excursions into other subjects including law, chemistry, linguistics, space-time relativity, and literature, integrating them all into a single coherent philosophy. Eight or more "Higher Organisms" Most people find it extremely difficult to accept Spengler's basic thesis, namely that cultures and civilizations are living organisms in their own right, 2 as are plants, animals, and humans, although of a much higher rank. Each culture has its own distinctive soul, which expresses itself in artistic, scientific, political, economic and religious forms, he says. Spengler identifies eight higher organisms. Three of them, Babylonian, Ancient Egyptian, and Classical (Graeco-Roman), perished long ago, with their landscapes subsequently being overlain by later cultures. 3 (If he were writing today, he might well include in his list the recently-discovered pre-Hindu Indus Valley Civilization). Three others, the Indian, Chinese and Arab-Persian, attained "old age" many centuries ago. We could also describe these as "petrified" although in a few respects, they have never been wholly extinguished. A seventh culture matured in Mexico and Guatemala, only to suffer a sudden and violent death at the hands of Spanish invaders (although it could be said that a few glowing embers still remain). Peru might also qualify for inclusion in Spengler's list. Our Western Civilization has not yet completed its life-cycle, although it has already reached late adulthood (hence the title of the book - The Decline of the West). Spengler suggests that another High Culture has started to manifest itself in Russia. 4 However, because it was born comparatively recently, this culture is handicapped through trying to absorb alien ideas from the much older Western organism; Spengler calls this phenomenon a. pseudomorphosis. Another example of a pseudomorphosis was his Magian Culture, which grew up in the shadow of various older civilizations (in particular the Classical), causing it to become distorted and fragmented into Arabian, Zoroastrian, Byzantine, Hebrew, Coptic, Armenian and other components. 5 Only with the rise of Islam did this culture manage to break free from the pseudomorphosis and discover its true soul. One phenomenon that might be easier to explain in terms of a higher organic entity is an increase in male birth-rate to replenish losses incurred in a major war. Admittedly, those instances could simply be accidents of statistics, 6 but this example does at least help to illustrate the concept and role of a higher organism with its own will and consciousness. Like individual people, cultural organisms differ in character, ability, and aptitude. Thus, calculus and the theory of mathematical functions, soaring Gothic cathedrals and a music based on fugai composition all express characteristically Western passions, which include a love for vast wide-open spaces as well as an intense interest in the distant past and concern for the far future. 7 In a contrasting manner, geometry, statistics and sculpture were all creative expressions of a mind obsessed with the corporeal and with here-now - that which produced the Ancient Greek Culture. 8 Similarly, algebra, alchemy and arabesque were all manifestations of another unique culture-personality, as also were acupuncture, Taoism and Chinese art. …

Hegel and the Western Spirit

Abstract: This paper argues that Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit ([1806] 1977) should be read as an invaluable work on the distinctive restlessness of Western culture - so long as we view this book as an account of the developmental experience of the Western spirit rather than of the human spirit as such. The basic truth contained in Hegel's Phenomenology is that the West is the only civilization in which "freedom" and "reason" have progressed over the course of history. The distinctiveness of the Western spirit is that it cannot be comprehended as a substance, a state of being, as in other civilizations, but should be apprehended as an "activity". The rational-liberal culture of the West can be known only by knowing it as an experience that developed in time. Like Weber, Hegel detected an inner necessity (a "dialectical" logic) in the philosophical development of the West. The difference is that Hegel traced this logic to the nature of human reason per se to become actually what it was potentially from the beginning. From the first flowerings of philosophy in ancient Greece, Hegel portrayed this rational spirit as if it were in a state of dissatisfaction and alienation, ceaselessly pressing ahead, trying to understand, overcome, and sublimate every nonconceptualized unknown it encountered. He believed that reason started to display this restless disposition - its true nature - when it came to "discover" itself as a faculty in its own right in ancient times. For it was then that reason for the first time apprehended its capacity for self-reflection, to think for-itself, in terms of its own volitional abilities, ceasing to accept passively the existence of norms, gods, and natural things as if they were "things-in-themselves" beyond its own reflective judgments. Unlike Weber, Hegel did not restrict the experience of Western reason to the rationalizing activities of formal and theoretical reason; he was less preoccupied with the way reason had subjected social life to quantification, precision, and standardization. What drew Hegel's attention was the seemingly restless desire of Western reason to become fully conscious of itself as free activity. It was this desire to be the source of its own assumptions and principles that drove Western reason forward until it brought into existence a culture wherein individuals enjoyed freedom of inquiry, tolerance of diverse views, and meritocratic advancement. According to Hegel, individuals become what they are potentially - rationally self-conscious agents - when they recognized themselves as free in their institutions and laws. The Phenomenology is a work that seeks to capture, in a comprehensive manner, the developmental experience of the idea of freedom in its intrinsic association with the developmental experience of reason. It does so by viewing every single major Western outlook - for example, Roman stoicism, skepticism, Catholic scholasticism, Cartesian rationalism, British empiricism, German idealism, and romanticism - not as isolated or timeless viewpoints but as evolving "moments" in the effort of human reason to become what it is intrinsically: the free author of its own concepts, values, and practices. The Phenomenology thus exhibits the ways in which diverse but interrelated outlooks held sway and conviction for some time only to be seen as limited in their inability to provide answers consistent with the demands of beings that are becoming more aware of themselves as the free creators of their own beliefs, laws, and institutions. The Phenomenology is thus an account of the entire dialectic of theses, anti-theses, and syntheses effected throughout history until Hegel's own time. Hegel believed that humanity had reached in his own time (in the post-French Revolution era of Europe) a point of true and full satisfaction asfar as the conceptualization of the human capacity for free reflection was concerned. This is why Hegel wrote that Spirit "appears in time just so long as" humans have not achieved a proper self-understanding of themselves as free rational beings; Spirit would continue to evolve in time. …

America's Love Affair With Markets: Is America an Outlier? Health Reform

Abstract: Although I am not a social scientist, it seems to me that in the twentieth century, what with fascism and communism, the idea of an "advanced Western democracy" became more sharply focused. Here in the U.S., we think of America as the prototype and natural leader, especially after World War ?. Yet, in contrast to other developed Western economies, there is still no universal health insurance coverage here; moreover, the most strenuous efforts to arrange it continue to result in plans quite different from those in the rest of the West. At some point, the failure to develop universal national health insurance, despite per capita health care costs far in excess of other OECD countries, has to raise the question, is there something fundamentally different about the U.S.? Do we believe in the free market as a means to an end, or an end in itself? Does capitalism resonate more deeply here? Are we not a paradigm, but an outlier? This is a question for us all to ponder. In this article, I shall supply some background. Health Insurance Systems in the Rest of the Developed World Today, in other OECD countries, all citizens have health insurance. In general, this insurance is comprehensive - it covers virtually all necessary health care expenses, although in some cases, for an additional voluntary payment one can access additional doctors, facilities, and perhaps some elective services. If there are co-pays, they are not onerous. Payments are from tax revenue, except in a few countries like Switzerland and the Netherlands, where citizens are required to pay premiums. Even there, however, premiums are regulated, those who can't afford the premiums are subsidized, and the basic benefit package is specified. Sick people cannot be charged more. Insurance intermediaries who process the claims are generally non-profit, or profits are limited. Although in these countries the insurance cost is socialized, usually the health care providers - doctors, hospitals - remain private. (Britain is the big exception; its health care professionals work for the public National Health System.) Nevertheless, costs are tightly controlled, if not by the government directly, then by negotiations between the providers, the government and the insurance intermediaries. Western governments also negotiate the prices of drugs with pharmaceutical manufacturers. Health Insurance in the U.S. By contrast, in the U.S., apart from public health systems such as Medicare, Medicaid, the Veterans' Administration and the active duty military health care system (Tricare), there is currently no regulation of the cost of health insurance or the cost of health care. Private insurers, now mostly for-profit (although Blue Cross Blue Shield and other insurers structured along the same lines started out in the 1950' s as non-profits) set premium prices at whatever level they wish, and structure complex benefit packages to attract the most desirable customers. Insurers can hike prices for customers with pre-existing conditions or other undesirable attributes, or deny them insurance altogether. Insurers can require co-pays and set high deductibles: indeed, so-called "high deductible" or catastrophic policies, with low premiums but deductibles of up to $1 1,000 per family per year, are the fastest growing category of insurance policies in the US today - no doubt because they are the cheapest. Many companies and individuals cannot afford better. If you get sick during the year, insurance companies can raise your premium for the following year, or drop your coverage altogether. For many years now, many health insurance premiums in the U.S. have been going up faster than inflation, often much faster, and faster than health costs. Moreover, in America, insurers sort customers into different markets, based on customers' health and bargaining power. Employers with large, well-paid workforces, where beneficiaries are likely to be healthy, can negotiate decent plans - indeed insurers compete for this business, pushing benefits up and premiums down. …

A Confucian Case for Economic Freedom

Abstract: Introduction The current economic and geopolitical rise of China and its East Asian neighbors is a crucial watershed moment in world history, representing an eastward shift of power and influence with little precedent in modern history. Unlike the various Western powers that have risen and fallen in prominence over the last several centuries, the nations of East Asia are steeped in independent and heavily Confucian traditions that remain distinct from the philosophical, political, and economic heritage that has framed the development of Europe and its cultural offspring. What remains to be seen is how effectively these rising nations will integrate the practices and institutions of marketdriven and industrialized economics with the deeply rooted and remarkably resilient sets of values that continue to shape the lives and attitudes of the vast population of the region - a process that has already begun, but which is far from complete. Rooting the political, legal, and economic reforms necessary to sustain growth, prosperity, and friendly trading relations in the ideas and language of existing regional norms is likely to provide a smoother and more sustainable method of guiding this transition than attempting to impose Western values and institutions from the top down. With special attention given to foundational Confucian texts, this paper responds to the challenges at hand by demonstrating that the basic principles of economic freedom underlying the 21st Century economy find support within the core values that already characterize the Confucian worldview. Specifically, there is a strong case for the key principles of freedom of exchange, basic property rights, and the mutually binding nature of contractual obligations through the lens of the Confucian emphasis on the necessities of benevolent governance, human dignity and self-cultivation, and the reciprocal nature of human relationships. By developing a proper understanding of the relationship between these principles, we can facilitate more effective and meaningful discussions about education and policy formulation both within East Asia and with respect to bilateral political, cultural, and economic interaction between East Asian nations and those of Europe and the Western Hemisphere. "He, who by revising the old knows the new, is fit to be a teacher. " Analects 2.11(1) China's Rise Western scholars, leaders, and citizens are gradually beginning to recognize one of the reasons why the economic and geopolitical rise of China and the other East Asian nations within its historical sphere of influence is a crucial watershed moment in world history. For the first time since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, the global flow of power and interaction is adjusting to restore proportional influence to a part of the world that presents a cohesive cultural and philosophical alternative to the ideas, values, and institutions of the West. In both conscious and subconscious ways, the paradigms of East Asia remain deeply rooted in a Confucian cultural context, and this 2500-year-old backdrop has consistently resisted any and all attempts to erase it or to replace it, instead proving itself to be both resilient and amenable to further development and adaptation to changing circumstances. In a 21st Century economy that relies on division of labor, market based trade, and the ability of the individual to independently acquire and utilize economic resources, it is absolutely essential that we successfully integrate the ideas and institutions of economic freedom with the cultural context in which well over one billion human beings - in some of the world's most powerful and productive nations - live and work every day. This is not an impossible challenge. It is certainly true that current ideas and values regarding economic and political theory, and individual rights and liberty, have developed in a particular Western historical context. …

Classicide in Communist China

Abstract: Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China has known only one form of government: the authoritarian communism of Mao Zedong. Although China has undergone 30 years of major social and economic transitions, from a political standpoint, the fundamental system of dictatorship established by Mao Zedong has not changed. Why? Because China's leaders are deeply afraid of falling from power and allowing real freedom, democracy, and human rights to flourish. The Party of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao is the party of Mao Zedong. We cannot just forget the crimes committed against humanity over the course of its 60-year history. The world rightfully remembers the tragedy of the Holocaust where around 20 million were killed. But many in the West do not realize that genocide has taken place on an even greater scale in the People's Republic of China. Under Mao's reign, it is estimated that 65 million people died of unnatural causes- many of whom were killed because of their class background. "Genocide," as defined by the United Nations, "involves acts committed with the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group." The methods of genocide are not limited to killing, but also include mental harm and restrictions on people's rights and freedoms. The brutal and widespread "classicide" committed by the Chinese government was indeed genocide. What is classicide? In order to consolidate his power, Mao Zedong implemented a nation-wide ideology to undermine those who previously held power. According to the Chinese Communist Party's revolutionary theory, society is composed of different classes of people who can be divided into two major groups: the exploiting class and the exploited. The Communist Party sought to exterminate the "exploiting classes," so it launched a political campaign to determine the political and social status of individuals. According to each individual's possession of land, capital, property, and income (as well as the situation of their family members), everyone in the country was designated as a member of the landlord class, the rich peasant class, the middle peasant class, or the poor worker and peasant classes. The poor classes were praised for their humble way of life and work ethic, and so they willingly supported the Communist Party. Meanwhile, the landowners, the wealthy, the intellectual elite, and the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government were demonized and persecuted as "black classes". Not only was their property seized, but they were sent to do the most difficult and dangerous manual labor in the countryside. Some of these people were beaten to death during various political movements, and many were sent into the Laogai - China's forced labor prison system. The Communist Party proclaimed that class struggle was necessary for promoting social development, and said that the violence which ensued was necessary to establish a proletarian socialist state. According to research, in 1949 there were around 10 to 15 million members of the landlord and rich peasant classes nationwide. By the end of the 1970s, when the Cultural Revolution had ended, only 10 to 15 percent of them remained alive. As for myself, I made some comments in a student political meeting at my university: I criticized the Soviet suppression in Budapest in 1956. I also disagreed with those Communist Party members who treated the common people as second-class citizens. Because of these remarks, I was labeled a "Bourgeois-Counterrevolutionary-Rightist". In 1960, I was sentenced to life in the Laogai. At the time, I could not believe this injustice, but afterwards I realized that there were other reasons I had become a target. My father was a banker who was already considered a counter-revolutionary due to his capitalist ways and contact with people overseas. The children of "rightists" were often deemed to be "historical counter-revolutionaries", and so they also suffered a similar fate. …

What the West Doesn't Owe Islam

Abstract: Globalization has brought more and more peoples and societies around the world into contact with international standards of law, commerce, and communication. That process has also enabled a number of formerly underdeveloped societies to experience extraordinary patterns of economic growth, especially in the last third of the twentieth century. For some scholars the rise of Asian economies during this period has suggested an impending "Pacific Century" along with the thought that, after all, Asian societies such as China must have hidden cultural "resources" that enabled them to make the modernizing turn that apparently did not conform to Western models of the past.1 In part, as a reaction to these developments, North America and to some extent Europe experienced the flowering of multiculturalism, which includes the view that all peoples and societies are equal.2 Sometimes this point of view has been taken to mean that all peoples everywhere are the same. One scholar called this uniformitarianism, as it allows little room for alternative life choices and life ways: everyone is deemed to be identical in their habits and wishes.3 From either an anthropological or historical perspective, uniformitarianism is a highly unlikely claim, but it has been assimilated into the multicultural viewpoint. Furthermore, such a perspective has led still others to assume that if Europe was undergoing rapid economic development in the past, a scientific revolution, and an enlightenment, then other parts of the world must have been experiencing similar developments prior to the twentieth century. This is a myth, though prevailing sentiments do not approve of casting a critical eye on those (non-)developments from the seventeenth century onward in other parts of the world. To do so is said to be Eurocentric. But if Asian and South Asian development seems to be real in economic terms, the Islamic world - especially the Middle East - has not shown such a dashing path of development over the twentieth century, either economically or politically. Indeed, the rise of political Islam and its many jihadist offshoots reveals a civilization torn apart, with the spillover bringing serious acts of terrorism to Europe and America. Nevertheless, there are a few writers who manage to see elements of positive development in the history of the Muslim world that may have influenced Europe-inthe-making. If some of these writers do not see major Islamic influences on European culture, they at least claim "parallel" development. Traces and Parallels: An Islamic Legacy? For example, Maria Rosa Menocal finds evidence of poetic influences on "European subjectivity" and perhaps "images of self flowing from Arabic to medieval European troubadours.4 However, this debate has raged for centuries. Without examining the details about how this was said to have occurred, it is surely a stretch to imagine that medieval poetry - rhymed or not - contributed anything significant to the political, legal, and scientific foundations of Europe as a civilization. With all due respect to Petrarch and the many other scholars who sought the key to modern Europe in language and poetry, it seems unlikely that the hidden soul of Europe can be found in pre-modem poetry, with or without Arabic influences.5 A somewhat more plausible suggestion has been signaled by the title of George Saliba's Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance.6 This 2007 work concerns itself almost entirely with Islamic astronomy and the possibility that Arab astronomers, especially Ibn al-Shatir (d. 1375) and Nasir al-din al-Tusi (d. 1274), influenced, rather indirectly, Copernican astronomical models. Some commentators claim that the connection between Ibn al-Shatir' s models and those of Copernicus has been "proved," when in fact no one has shown that Copernicus had access to manuscripts written by al-Shatir, nor indeed those of al-Tusi, never mind that Copernicus did not read Arabic. …

John Rogerson, Chronicle of the Old Testament Kings: The Reign-by-Reign Record of the Rulers of Ancient Israel.

Abstract: John Rogerson, Chronicle of the Old Testament Kings: The Reign-by-Reign Record of the Rulers of Ancient Israel. London: Thames and Hudson, 1999. The Chronicle of the Old Testament Kings, written by John Rogerson, professor of biblical studies emeritus at the University of Sheffield, provides an accessible and engaging academic summary treatment of the major leaders found in the biblical text. The target audience is the general, interested reader. Biblical scholars would likely not turn to this as a source book for their own research. But for the arm-chair hobbyist it could be a valuable addition to one's collection. The book has been artfully designed. Over 260 illustrations and images (including images of ancient artifacts) are thoughtfully and strategically placed throughout the book to accompany the text and enhance the reading. The artwork depicting ancient leaders or biblical events is drawn from diverse artistic genres (Byzantine, Renaissance, Neo-Classical, etc.). In addition to illustrations and images, side bar call-outs provide focus and insight on topics of interest. Even though the title of the book highlights Old Testament kings, this book reviews many notable ancient Israelite leaders who do not fit the definition of an Old Testament king either because they were not a king or they lived after the time period of the Old Testament. Hence, in addition to Old Testament kings, the book discusses ancient Israelite ancestral leaders (such as the patriarchs, Moses, Joshua, and the Judges) as well as the rulers of Israel during the 2nd temple period (such as the Hasmoneans and Herod the Great). In the preface, Rogerson engages the reader with thought provoking questions. Do we really \"know\" the leaders of Israel? Are the stories about them in the Bible myths and legends? In the introduction, he presents some of the problems scholars encounter with the Bible. Is it reliable as history? How do we account for discrepancies in biblical chronology? Though outside archaeology and texts can help to corroborate details in the Bible, the general rule is that the further back we go in biblical history, the more guesswork that is involved. Hence, the dates and details assigned to the various kings and leaders of ancient Israel are provisional. After the preface and introduction the book divides the discussion of ancient Israelite leaders according to this outline: From the Ancestors to the Judges: 71450 - c. 1020 BC; The United Monarchy c. 1020-931 BC; The Divided Monarchy: Israel, 931722/1 BC; The Divided Monarchy: Judah c. 931-539 BC; and The Second Temple Period. This latter period is divided into the following sub-periods: Under the Persians 539 - 333 BC; Under the Ptolemies 333 - c. 200 BC; Under the Seleucids c. 200 - 166 BC; The Hasmonean Dynasty 166-37 BC, and The Roman Period 63 BC - AD 70). Rogerson devotes the substance of the book to reviewing each leader, presenting relevant chronological information, providing a summary of the leader's life, and including pertinent biblical citations. Using a version of the historical-critical approach, Rogerson also highlights intriguing questions from challenges or inconsistencies found within the Bible or triggered by competing extra-biblical evidence. He then offers reasoning for how to deal with these issues. Primarily his conclusions to these challenges express the general opinion of many biblical scholars. Though I recommend the book to any casual reader as an informative and educating experience, I have two general criticism of the book. First, the historicalcritical approach that some biblical scholars employ to provide scientific and objective interpretations for biblical data can lead to academically condoned speculative theories - this has become so commonplace that few acknowledge the speculative nature of such reasoning, even if this reasoning is sound and compelling. Second, modern feminist thought may have over-sensitized some scholars in their interpretative treatment of male and female characters, maximizing the \"negative\" features of the male characters and foregrounding the \"positive\" features of female characters. …

Mohammed & Charlemagne Revisited: The History of a Controversy

Abstract: Emmet Scott, Mohammed & Charlemagne Revisited: The History of a Controversy, New English Review Press, 2012. Reviewed by Laina Farhat-Holzman. Scott is part of a growing body of revisionist Islamic scholars who are revisiting what had become the unquestioned history of Islam. We have all been told that Europe descended into a Dark Age upon the fall of Rome to the Germanic "barbarian" invaders in the 5th century, and that it was rescued from this darkness by the energetic arrival of a new religion, Islam, which saved and transmitted the "lost" classical culture. There has never been an explanation for why Europe was dark for five centuries after its collapse, not to revive until the 10th century, if Islam's Golden Age (supposedly the 8th- 10th centuries) was so glowing. What was that Golden Age really like that it could not influence events and culture just across the Mediterranean? An early 20th century scholar, the Belgian Henri Pirenne, was the first to dispute this theory. He claimed that contrary to the notion that Europe's Dark Age was caused by the barbarians, he said that Europe quickly recovered from these invasions and that the invaders themselves wanted nothing more than to become "Roman" themselves. These invaders pledged fealty to the Emperor in Byzantium, used gold coins with the emperor's profile on them, and engaged in a flurry of church and palace building by the 6th and early 7th centuries. What really brought this civilization to a screeching halt was the new barbarian invasion, Islam. Scott is a supporter of Pirenne, whose work was much criticized by scholars of the prior theory. His "revisiting," however, is built on a foundation of archeology, much of it within the past century since the death of Pirenne. Rather than just accepting the conventional wisdom, Scott takes note of actual "facts on the ground" that archeology provides. He says that archeology finds great activity in Europe in the 6th and early 7th century (cities enlarging, gold coinage, grand urban architecture, and indications of healthy trade). But from mid-7th century until mid- 10th century, not only is Europe much reduced (dark), but so is the Muslim world. Both seem to have recovered by 1095, with the start of the first Crusade. Scott makes an important distinction between the backwardness of northern and western Europe during the 6th and 7th centuries, particularly in Italy, and the status of Byzantium and the Byzantine Empire's satellites in North Africa and Spain. Classical civilization continued in Byzantium and its subject states, and even the population crash that accompanied the decline of Rome in the West reversed as Byzantium became Christian. The two groups with substantial birthrates were the Christians and the Jews, neither of which engaged in the Roman practice of widespread infanticide and abortion. So what was it that Islam did that created the catastrophe of a real Dark Age for not only the former Roman Empire, but even for the Byzantine, as well as the flourishing areas conquered by the Muslims, which also went into sharp decline for several centuries. How did that happen? What was different about Arab barbarians as opposed to Germanic barbarians? A barbarian, by definition, is usually an illiterate warrior, directed by tribal chiefs or warlords, whose main purpose is to take from others what they can. War, plunder, and rapine are their modes, primarily out of need (and often out of desperation). However, in repeated historic examples, when barbarians invade and conquer civilized (rich, agricultural, and urbanized) lands, it scarcely takes one generation for the barbarians to adopt the culture of the conquered. Throughout history, invaders of China always became Chinese - and this was true even for the Mongols, who began their invasions full of scorn for the weak civilized. …

Dravidian Language and Culture

Abstract: Sjoberg, Andree, Dravidian Language and Culture: Dravidian University, Kuppam 2009 When we discuss contemporary Dravidian peoples we are generally referring to over 200 million people, from diverse groups across the India sub-continent area, who speak languages belonging to the Dravidian language family and who very often are characterized by darker skin color than that of first language Hindi speakers. The term Dravidian comes from the Sanskrit term Dravidian, meaning "Tamil." Therefore, what is often depicted as "Dravidian" reflects a variety of customs popularly seen as "South Indian", though the presence of Dravidian speakers extends into central India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The origin of the Dra vidians has been a subject of much controversy. And a great deal of that has been focused on the relative extent to which the Dravidians have been a major primary creator of the larger Hindu civilization of the Indian sub-continent or the recipients of outside enrichments to which they have added the residuals of their more ancient ways. A fundamental premise of this book-a collection of diverse essays by Prof. Andree Sjoberg, a long-time active member of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, is that there is a significant under-appreciation of the contribution of Dravidians to present day more generalized Indian Hindu culture; further, key elements of Hindu culture are often excessively attributed to the Aryan groups who entered India, pushing back the more ancient Dravidian populations in the process. But while Sjoberg makes a strong case that the preponderance of evidence seems to attest to the major formative role of Dravidian speakers in the molding of Hindu civilization, many of the specifics remain imprecise, as she herself clearly notes. For example, she notes that the linguistic and biological evidence often seems contradictory, because many of the specifics of linguistics point to an origin in Central Asia and Asia Minor for Dravidian groups while other biological and cultural aspects seem more oriented to the southeast and even a Proto-Australoid or Australoid past. This publication by Pravadea University provides an excellent exposure to how Dr. Sjoberg' s own thoughts and research are important contributions to the resolution of many of those contradictions. Pravadea University's publishing of Sjoberg's work, Dravidian Language Culture, represents a type of activity frequently produced by specific institutions and organizations of a highly localized nature and whose subject matter is often perceived to be esoteric or highly specialized in contrast to the interests and presentations of reigning majority concerns, conceptions and dynamics. In India, of course, the concept of "minority" must be understood as only relative, given the size of minority populations and the richness of local cultures. Yet those outside the obvious intended audience for such works who do take up the challenge of navigating through the concentrated localized content are often rewarded with profound insight - like sweet grapes picked through the labor of arduous workers who select from rarer and more mature vines than those used for more general mass distribution. Such is the case with Sjoberg's book. Sjoberg uses what she identifies as the process of "elimination" to support her thesis that Dravidian culture has profoundly influenced what is characterized as presentday Hindu Indian civilization. However, because the evidence is so very scattered and varied, she makes the case that such a large presence of evidence, even if imprecise, justifies attribution of cause specifically because there is far less evidence to support a contrary position. In short, in cases where there is a lack of solid evidence, accepting the preponderance of evidence is the acceptable default criterion. From a religious perspective, she notes how the core concept of Shakti (power or energy), so central to Hinduism, is clearly pre-Aryan and mainly Dravidian. …