Showing papers in "Comparative politics in 2010"

Federalized Party Systems and Subnational Party Competition: Theory and an Empirical Application to Argentina

Abstract: In 1949 V.O. Key wrote about the importance of state-level "one-party systems" in the southern United States for organizing local authoritarian rule in a nationally competitive party system.1 Key's study documented a phenomenon that continues to pose theoretical puzzles to contemporary scholarship on party systems: the simultaneous existence of competitive party politics and noncompetitive party politics in one national party system. In addition to documenting U.S. party system dynamics at the subnational level that were distinct from those at the national level, Key also uncovered important institutional interac tions between noncompetitive state party systems and the competitive national party system. These findings (and many others that followed about U.S. state party politics) pro vided significant possibilities for theory building about parties and party systems. How ever, this theoretical promise was stifled by two subsequent developments in political science. The first was the impermeability of boundaries between American and com parative politics, which relieved Americanist scholars of the burdens of generalization and comparative theory builders of the burden of paying close attention to U.S evidence. The second was the theoretical development of comparative literatures on party systems, whose most influential scholars overlooked or rejected the incorporation of subnational contexts into their theorizing about party systems. As a result, scholars of American politics developed an extensive empirical literature on state party politics while com parative theorizing about parties and party systems remained oblivious to the theoretical implications of this trend. Today there is new interest in how and why the quality of democracy varies across subnational territorial units of countries.2 Party system dynamics are a crucial piece of the puzzle. However, the comparative literature on parties and party systems offers few theoretical tools to scholars interested in this topic. This is because in that theoretical tradition party systems are conceived of and measured nationally. Their systemic prop erties are assessed at the national level, and the indicators used to measure those proper ties (usually votes for national offices or seats in national legislatures) are national. This practice has created a situation of conceptual and measurement incompleteness that hinders new discoveries in the study of party competition across jurisdictional bound aries of the nation-state. 21

Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion

Abstract: This article examines military defection (whether government soldiers, instead of fight ing for the regime, desert or fight for the opposition) during rebellions in Syria, Jordan, and Iran. It distinguishes between two strategies to maintain military loyalty in "prae torian" regimes?individual incentives (reward and punishment) and a policy of ethnic preference in the armed forces. These strategies produce very different outcomes for defection when a rebellion arises outside the military. An individual strategy is vulner able to a cascade of defection sweeping across the whole army when a rebellion breaks out. A group-based strategy, however, may generate out-group defection, but in-group defection is much less likely. This argument focuses on the availability of information about soldiers' preferences and about the likelihood that the regime will survive. A focus on information, in turn, highlights two different self-fulfilling prophecies. In an individualized incentive system, soldiers' true preferences are hidden. They will support the regime if they believe it will survive, and will defect if they do not; but the only way of making this judgment is based on others' behavior. Thus the belief that the regime will collapse provokes a cas cade of defection, bringing about the very collapse it predicts. In a group-based system, the belief that in-group members have a proregime preference and that out-groups are opposed to the regime helps generate precisely those preferences. Thus preferences can become public by matching public prejudice. The result is a durable cleavage between in-group and out-group, where out-group soldiers are likely to defect but in-group sol diers are likely to remain loyal. These self-fulfilling prophecies may help explain why observers sometimes over estimate the resilience of some regimes and underestimate the resilience of others.1 In essence, we have lacked a theory that takes into account the way political judgments change due to rebellion itself. Some regimes seem generally successful in quelling dis sent (for example, the Shah's Iran prior to 1978) whereas others seem prone to out group anger (for example, Jordan in the 1960s and Syria in the 1960s and 1970s), and observers believe that the former can stand up to rebellion more easily than the latter. However, in the latter cases, the visible antiregime preferences of out-groups imme diately suggest regime weakness but also solidify in-group loyalty, providing a bulwark for the regime against rebellion. In the former case, people's preferences are not visible, and the viability of a regime hinges upon the judgment that the regime will remain in power?a judgment that is vulnerable in the face of a rebellion. 333

Questioning the New Liberal Dilemma : Immigrants, Social Networks, and Institutional Fairness

Abstract: Questioning the New Liberal Dilemma : Immigrants, Social Networks, and Institutional Fairness

Civilian Praetorianism and Military Shirking During Constitutional Crises in Latin America

Abstract: Civilian Praetorianism and Military Shirking During Constitutional Crises in Latin America David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas Since the end of the Cold War, an elected civilian leader in Latin America is more likely to be displaced from office prior to the end of his constitutional term by mass mobiliza- tion than by a military coup. As Arturo Valenzuela has observed, thirteen of the fifteen nonconstitutional transfers of power in the region between 1990 and 2004 have been the result of civilian coups rather than military actions. 1 This phenomenon has occurred in Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador, while attempts in Peru and Venezuela have failed. Civilian coups are not confined only to Latin America; they have occurred in the Philippines, where “people power” displaced both dictators and elected presidents; in Ukraine with the “Orange” Revolution; and in Georgia with the “Rose” Revolution. In each case, a civilian elected leader was ejected from power by the mass action of civilian, rather than military, sectors of society. This article focuses on military responses (or the lack thereof) to mass protests against elected governments during moments of constitutional crisis in democratic states. These crises occur when opposition forces decide that merely changing gov- ernment policy is not enough; that what is required is a change in government itself. This may involve violent or nonviolent mechanisms, but the universe of cases ex- amined here is delimited by the opposition’s goals—changing governments outside the normal democratic processes established by the constitution rather than altering government policy. The cases draw on the Latin American experience with democra- tization both because the third wave of democracy struck the region earlier than most and because states in the region have had a long experience with military intervention in politics. At first glance what appears to have changed about contemporary politics in Latin America is the unusual lack of military intervention in moments of social contestation that might have produced a coup d’etat in previous eras. Samuel Huntington once argued that in praetorian societies, students riot, workers strike, and militaries coup. 2 The absence of military protagonism amidst social upheaval could certainly be viewed positively, as a confirmation of increasing civilian control over the armed forces in many new democracies. However, security forces play an important role in these civilian versus civilian contests. They make decisions about whether to support or withhold support from elected leaders. In nine of the thirteen cases examined from Latin America since 1990, militaries have refused presidential orders to intervene against civilian opposition forces during such crises and instead have remained quartered. 3 In a more

Electoral Systems, Party Systems, and Ideological Representation: An Analysis of Distortion in Western Democracies

Abstract: The effects of party system features and election rules on ideological representation can be seen in parliamentary elections in Western democracies over a fiftyyear period. “Distortion” is short-term representation failure—the distance between the median voter and the legislature or government immediately after the election. Electoral choice and left-right positions of parties (from the manifesto data) can be used to estimate median voter positions. The number of parties, party polarization, and the election rules all independently affect ideological distances. But party system polarization seems to be the predominate factor shaping distortion of governments’ relationship with the median voter. Examining the effects of party systems under different election rules helps clarify the causal connections between legislative and government levels. Democracy means government by the people. In modern nation-states policies are predominately made by elected representatives of the people, rather than by the people themselves. Political scientists have invested a great deal of effort in exploring the connections between the people and these representatives. One element that looms large in both theoretical and empirical studies is systematically generated correspondence between the preferences of the people and the commitments of their chosen representatives. Such correspondence is sometimes identified as the definition of democracy, as its best justification, or as essential to its overarching goal. We need not debate alternative definitions or explore the complexities of interests and preferences to accept that agreement between citizens and representatives is “one of the most important notions within the broad family of theories of representative democracy.” If elections systematically fail to generate close correspondence between the preferences of citizens and the stated positions of those they elect, what is here called “distortion,” the quality of the democratic process may be diminished. In comparative studies of representation, two general empirical approaches can be discerned. One of these assumes that what voters want is best summarized by their partisan vote; representation is measured by comparing the distribution of party votes with

Statist vs. Pro-Market: Explaining Leftist Governments' Economic Policies in Latin America

Abstract: Beginning with the election of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in 1998, the rise to power of the left took Latin America by surprise. During the previous two decades, the region's economies had increasingly moved toward an open, market-oriented model of development and away from the statist, import-substitution-industrialization (ISI) model that had prevailed for decades. 1 Toward the end of the twentieth century, there were few if any challengers to the liberalizing trend. The devastating effects of the debt crisis of the early 1980s contributed to a generalized perception that ISI and state-interventionist policies advocated by the left had failed. The collapse of the Soviet Union—exposing the vices and inconsistencies of centrally planned economies—gave credence to this view and heralded the universalization of the market economy as the only feasible mode of organizing economic relations. The Washington Consensus permeated most policy and academic circles as the dominant paradigm. 2 Against these trends, the left's political revival seemed extremely unlikely. To make matters worse for the left, the market-oriented reforms adopted across the region severely undermined the left's main base of support—organized labor. 3 The exposure of previously protected domestic industries to foreign competition and the privatization of state-owned companies resulted in widespread layoffs particularly affecting highly unionized sectors. Stabilization policies that relied on wage restraints to enhance productivity and competitiveness eroded labor's negotiating power. Overcoming these obstacles was a challenging task for leftist parties in the region. In describing its general disarray in the early 1990s, Steve Ellner and Barry Carr characterized the left as \" more disoriented and lacking in credible options than ever before. \" 4 In this adverse context, a series of leftist electoral victories swept the region. 5 In light of this \" leftist tsunami, \" scholars have begun to study different aspects of the rise of the left. Some authors have focused on the political parties that brought leftist candidates to power. 6 Others have emphasized classification issues, highlighting the variety of leftist projects and the inadequacy of monolithic classifications of the left. 7 Others have grappled with the relationship between the rise of the left and democracy in Latin America. 8 Still others have sought 413

Authoritarian States and Voting From Abroad: North African Experiences

Abstract: While scholars have recently focused much attention on democracy promotion, far less interest has been directed to the extraterritorial expansion of voting rights. Absent from celebrations of ink-stained fingers in the 2005 Iraqi elections or from complaints about poor state organizational capabilities in Mexico's 2006 external voting have been serious analyses of the broader phenomenon?the increasing number of countries, many of them nondemocracies, which have accorded their expatriates the right to vote. Why do authoritarian regimes extend the franchise in this way? Are they driven by the same logic as democratic regimes, or are other factors at work? Exploring these issues contributes to a number of current theoretical debates. First, it is relevant to debates regarding elections and voting in democratic versus authoritarian regimes. Second, it addresses the trajectory of the evolution of citizenship, as increasing numbers of emigrants who had been excluded from formal political participation are offered the opportunity to rejoin the national community. Finally, a study of voting from abroad contributes to discussions regarding the evolving, multifaceted relationship be tween sending states and their diaspora communities. The question here is not the right to vote if one returns home?many states allow this as long as the national continues to be registered to vote. Instead, the issue is the extension of the right to cast a ballot from abroad. In some of the earliest examples, external voting was accorded to members of the military or other government em ployees overseas.1 Some countries still restrict such voting to these groups; however, increasingly the franchise has been expanded to include other citizens, especially labor migrants and refugees. As of May 2007, 115 countries and territories had legal provi sions for voting from abroad.2 (See Table 1.) Supporters of extending the franchise outside the national territory base their argu ment on the normative ground that the citizenship of emigrants entitles them to partici pate in elections. Opponents insist that while residency has generally not been sufficient for the right to political participation, it has long been regarded as a necessary condition. Those who are not directly subject to the implications of their vote should not have the right to participate in determining the composition of representative organs whose decisions are not binding on them.3 Elements related to the size and composition of the target population, as well as the means of conducting the elections, are directly relevant in attempting to understand why 81

The Color of Money: Privatization, Economic Dispersion, and the Post-Soviet “Revolutions”

Abstract: What accounts for the “colored revolutions” of the former Soviet Union? Analysis of postcommunist political economies reveals that states that underwent reform saw the emergence of a new capitalist class whose interests sometimes put them at odds with the regime. Following fraudulent elections, business elites played an active role in financing mobilization and signaling mass discontent, which undermined regime support and hastened regime change. Countries that did not privatize failed to develop an independent capitalist class and therefore faced smaller and weaker oppositions. This argument is demonstrated by analyzing mass protests that toppled regimes in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, and by the negative cases of Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. It has implications for the study of hybrid regimes, social movements, and postcommunist political development. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, policymakers in several successor states implemented a set of reforms—privatization, liberalization, and stabilization—intended to bring about a market economy and liberal democracy. Their aim was to transfer state assets broadly into the hands of society, creating stakeholders who would defend their newfound wealth, demand property rights, and support the consolidation of a democratic system. Needless to say, it did not always work out as planned. Instead of creating a postcommunist middle class, reforms across the former Soviet Union have weakened the state, impoverished the majority of citizens, and produced a small, kleptocratic elite that uses political connections to serve its interests. There is some disagreement as to how permanent this configuration is, but there is a near consensus among scholars that the economic reform project failed to achieve its major goals. Economic reforms, though disappointing, have also had an unexpected and important political impact. Privatization helped to create a class of capitalists that has sometimes found itself at odds with venal and covetous state officials and irresponsible stewards of the economy. When these new stakeholders have perceived that a change in the status quo would benefit them, they have formed tactical alliances with opposition activists and parties to help unseat the ruling elite. In particular, this materially

Enacting Constitutionalism. The Origins of Independent Judicial Institutions in Latin America

Abstract: Modern constitutionalism, inaugurated in the eighteenth century by the American (1787-1789) and French (1789-1791) constitution-making processes, assigned to codi fied constitutions a very specific function?to prescribe an institutional framework that would establish guarantees against the arbitrary use of power. However, already in 1800, Napoleon's constitution prescribed a personalistic rule that concentrated great power in his hands and formally made him emperor through its revision in 1804.1 When and why can we expect constitution-making processes to produce an institutional frame work that formally serves constitutionalism? To answer this question, a simple and general typology is presented that captures both the legal/political character of constitution-making processes and their dynamic nature. Unilateral constitution-making processes, where a cohesive and organized politi cal group controls the agencies required to amend or create the constitution, are differ entiated from multilateral processes, where at least two different political groups control those agencies. These two types of constitution-making processes are fruitful indepen dent variables that have considerable advantages over other commonly used variables. The hypothesis of this article is that multilateral constitution-making processes tend to establish institutional frameworks consistent with constitutionalism. Taking these types of constitution-making processes as independent variables, and the Latin Ameri can region as the empirical arena, the hypothesis is tested by focusing on some of the most important institutional mechanisms to prevent arbitrariness?independent judicial institutions. The Latin American region makes for a good laboratory for assessing dif ferent explanations for the creation of independent judicial institutions. The countries examined share a common legal heritage, political culture, civil legal system, and presidential regime, but at the same time retain important variations in judicial insti tutions as well as in other political and economic conditions. Based on an original database covering eighteen countries from 1945 to 2005, the analysis shows that au tonomous judicial councils, strong constitutional adjudication organs, and autonomous prosecutorial institutions are more likely to be created by multilateral constitution making processes.

The Party's Over: Citizen Conceptions of Democracy and Political Dissatisfaction in Mexico

Abstract: Mexicans are disenchanted with democracy?or at least with democracy in their country. A decade after the watershed 2000 presidential contest, they are already deeply distrustful of democratic institutions and actors, politicians, parties, and parliament. The contrast with the heady optimism of the 1990s could not be greater. Former President Ernesto Zedillo described the 1997 midterm elections, when the opposition wrested Congress from the long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), as a "democratic fiesta." The phrase aptly characterizes the citizen effervescence of the entire decade. Now, the party's over. This rapid, deep disillusionment is especially puzzling because one would expect the euphoria following the culmination of Mexico's transition to electoral democracy in 2000 to have been greater and more enduring than it has been. Decades of struggle for free and fair elections might have made citizens more forbearing of the shortcomings of the new government brought to power by these elections. Typically, democratic regimes' legitimacy affords them a "reservoir of good will" that enables governments to withstand "performance deficits." This reservoir, in theory, keeps citizens from gen eralizing their dissatisfaction with democratic governments to democracy as an ideal.1 Democracies are insulated from frustration with economic downturns by their legiti macy of origin and ability to modify economic policy without changing regimes.2 Yet a mere nine years or less sufficed in Mexico for satisfaction with democracy to fall dra matically from its peak in 1997. Why are Mexicans so dissatisfied with their democracy? The combination of a citizen conceptualization of democracy that emphasizes social equity?a "substantive" view of democracy?with poor government performance in just that respect is partly responsible. That is, even after accounting for other factors that bear on evaluations of democracy, how Mexicans define democracy exercises an important, independent effect on how satisfied they are with it. Specifically, citizens who view democracy as either political rights ("liberal" democrats) or elections ("electoral" democrats) are more satisfied than substantive democrats. The causal relationship between conceptualizations of democracy and satisfaction with it is both undertheorized and underexplored empirically. Exploring definitions of democracy in three Latin American countries, Roderic Ai Camp has established that Mexicans tend to view democracy in socioeconomic terms, but he does not relate this 41

The Politics of Institutional Change: Transformative and Self-Preserving Change in the Vocational Education and Training System in Switzerland

Abstract: On the basis of an in-depth study of the Swiss Vocational Education and Training (VET) system?an extreme case among collectivist regimes?the employers' constellation and the elites of the public education administration affect patterns of institutional change. If large firms are the dominant actors and collaborate with elites in the public education administration, institutional change follows a transformative pat tern. If small and medium firms are in a strong position and have the power to influence public elites according to their interests, self-preserving institutional change results. With reference to causal mechanism of institutional change in VET systems, developments in the international political economy and Europe are important intervening factors in pat terns of institutional change. In comparative political economy, institutional change in collectivist skill-provision sys tems has received increasing attention.1 One finding is that collectivist training regimes exhibit a high degree of stability and that radical (transformative) change is probable but less likely.2 Collectivist systems are vocational education and training regimes which show three peculiarities: employers and their associations are strongly involved in the administration and financing of training; the systems provide portable, certified occupa tional skills; and, historically, employers' interest in skills may lead to training regimes which evolve as "dual" schemes. Dual schemes combine school-based learning with company-based training. Collectivist skill systems have developed in Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Switzerland, but scholars focus mainly on the German case as the proto type of collectivist skill systems. An in-depth study of the Swiss training system, namely, its structural peculiarities as well as its recent patterns of change, offers fresh and in triguing insights for the analysis of institutional change in collectivist skill systems. Until the mid-1990s, the Swiss history of training reforms was a story of failed reforms and gradualistic policy, best described by the Helveticism "Der Berg hat eine Maus geboren" (The mountain has given birth to a mouse).3 However, since the mid 1990s several reforms have changed the Swiss training system in a self-preserving as

The Politics of Immigration: Dictatorship, Development, and Defense

Abstract: Contemporary immigration policy choices are puzzling. Although people prefer living in a democracy, there is large-scale migration into rich dictatorships. We live in an age of globalization, but most countries regulate and restrict immigration. It is widely ac cepted that free trade is beneficial and states have formed international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), in order to remove barriers to trade. But no equivalent of the WTO exists in the realm of immigration, and international law does not recognize the right to enter another country. Furthermore, immigration policies are more restrictive now than in prior historical periods. Despite the importance and puzzling nature of immigration outcomes, key aspects of immigration policymaking are understudied. The literature has overstated the extent to which international and domestic norms and supposed economic and/or demographic necessities constrain immigration policymaking. Within international political economy, migration is studied much less than trade. Until recently, international security scholars have tended not to examine the links between security and migration. Comparative politics scholars usually examine the immigration policies of western democracies while largely ignoring immigration policymaking under dictatorship. The conventional wisdom is that democracies adopt liberal immigration policies and that immigrants, especially since the 9/11 attacks, are regarded as potential security liabilities. But the opposite should be expected?that dictatorship and large-scale security threats, along with economic development, increase immigration. This theoretical proposition explains both contemporary cross-national variation in and the macrohistorical patterns of im migration policymaking. The statistical findings presented in this article are original because large-n, cross-national testing has been rare in the immigration literature.

Politics without Insurance: Democratic Competition and Judicial Reform in Brazil

Abstract: Brazil's constituent assembly of 1987-1988 delegated wide-ranging powers of review to the country's Supreme Court. The new constitution, drafted after two decades of mili tary rule, also broadened access to the judiciary by allowing political parties and other interests to challenge the constitutionality of legislative outputs. As in other recently constitutionalized countries, these institutional changes triggered the judicialization of Brazilian politics, narrowly defined as the process by which conflicts over policy are transferred to the judiciary.1 Yet, despite increased judicial influence over the policy making process, Brazilian presidents have pursued institutional changes further ex panding the Court's power. What is the causal explanation for this reform process? Why do officeholders willingly expand the authority of an institution capable of limiting their actions?

Taxation and Credible Commitment: Left, Right, and Partisan Turnover

Abstract: Building on the fiscal contract literature, this paper argues that taxation is partly a game of credible commitment. Using data for 18 OECD countries, it shows that partisan turnover systematically affects the long-run equilibrium mix of taxes and services. When partisan turnover is low, more right-wing influence permanently increases corporate tax revenue and the corporate share of pre-tax income; more left-wing influence, by contrast, permanently increases consumption tax revenue and social spending. When turnover is high, even powerful partisans do not increase taxes that disproportionately affect their supporters. When partisans tax their own supporters, they raise more revenue, even when we account for some plausible benefits. Our theoretical conjectures are consistent with the pattern of partisan behavior within countries, not just between them.

Social Capital: Summing up the Debate on a Conceptual Tool of Comparative Politics and Public Policy

Abstract: Social capital, defined as a combination of generalized trust and access to social networks, has become a key concept in the social sciences in recent decades because it correlates with normatively desirable qualitative features of liberal democracy, such as functioning demo cratic institutions, increased levels of civicness and citizens' participation in social and/or public life, and, most importantly, with increased levels of performance in several public policy areas, such as education, health, development, and public policy at large. The rele vance of social capital to good governance and almost all areas of public policy draws on its capacity for resolving dilemmas of collective action, such as the provision of various public goods, and avoiding a situation Bo Rothstein describes as "social trap."1 There is strong evidence that social capital contributes not only to public policy achievements but to improving the performance of democratic institutions and democracy at large. The already huge and expanding literature and research on social capital over the last fifteen years has been dominated by a fundamental and crucial theoretical dichotomy. On the one hand, the cultural/historical approach views social capital as an independent variable embedded in and generated by culturally and historically determined networks of civic en gagement (that is, associations, civil society organizations) that affect public policy outcomes. On the other hand, the institutionalist approach conceptualizes social capital as an intervening variable crucially influenced by formal institutional structures of the polity, such as the wel fare state, in conjunction with other variables, such as equality and homogeneity, and affect ing in turn the quality of governance and public policy outcomes at large. The former approach is characterized by the logic of path dependence and therefore attributes much of the origins of social capital to history. Conversely, the latter approach takes into account the role of important humanly constructed devices, such as institutions and equality. This article considers this theoretical dichotomy, as well as the determinant and outcome variables of social capital, through a review and assessment of recent scholarly contributions to the debate.

Understanding Media Socialization in Democratizing Countries: Mobilization and Malaise in Central and Eastern Europe

Abstract: In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), although many scholars assumed that liberaliza-tion of mass media would naturally if unsteadily play a normatively positive role indemocratization, recent evaluations have suggested that the media have instead pursueda “race to the bottom,” creating something less positive.

Party System Institutionalization and Government Spending

Abstract: Despite myriad explanations for government spending levels, few studies have included considerations of party system institutionalization. This is surprising since the level of party system institutionalization should significantly affect policymak ing. Weakly institutionalized systems, that are characterized by loose ties with societal groups, higher volatility levels, and poorly developed internal organizations, should result in lower public goods but higher parochial goods spending. In contrast, more institutionalized systems should result in more public goods spending as these systems try to appeal to broader swaths of the population. Time-series cross-sectional analyses, with three different spending measures as dependent variables, show that institutional ized party systems significantly influence spending patterns. At the outset of his seminal work, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave, Scott Mainwaring notes that in third wave democracies it is necessary to consider the degree of institutionalization of the party system, since "weakly institutionalized party systems function very differently from highly institutionalized systems, with important implica tions for democracy."1 He suggests that institutionalized parties should result in lower electoral volatility levels, entrenched ties between parties and voters, higher levels of legitimacy for parties, and established internal party organizations.2 Although scholars have sought to measure and refine these requisite components of institutionalized party systems, the effects Mainwaring speaks of have yet to be fully explored. The policy im plications of institutionalized systems have only recently been considered.3 Indeed, much work remains in order to adequately understand the myriad effects of stable party systems. One of the most fundamental and essential government policies is the distribution of government expenditures. This is, after all, the essential building block of gover nance, since fiscal policies affect other realms of policymaking. As Hans-Dieter Klingemann and his coauthors succinctly say, "Money is not all there is to policy, but there is precious little policy without it."4 Previous studies have provided explana tions that rely on political, institutional, or structural factors to explain government ex penditures. However, at least two limitations emerge from many of these works. First, many studies of government spending refrain from cross-national analysis, often focus ing instead only on developed states. As Mainwaring points out, this is a concern because 229 This content downloaded from 207.46.13.51 on Mon, 20 Jun 2016 06:00:51 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Comparative Politics January 2010 theories derived from or based on such states may not hold the same theoretical weight when applied to developing states. Second, although some studies consider various as pects of party systems, few explore the relationship between government spending and party system institutionalization (PSI). Studies that include party system variables typi cally involve some form of counting the number of parties,5 the number of parties holding seats in the ruling coalition,6 or the parties' relative seat share. For instance, Bumba Mukherjee concludes that the number of effective parties influences levels of subsidies and transfers.7 Refuting Mukherjee's legislative universalism theory, Kathleen Bawn and Frances Rosenbluth suggest that the number of coalition parties better determines spend ing levels.8 Additional research is necessary to understand the effects of party system stability. The connection between party stability and government spending is intriguing, since weakly institutionalized systems should behave differently than more stable ones and, thus, should differently influence how states allocate expenditures. This article offers three contributions to the extant literature. First, it provides an initial attempt to explore the importance of PSI vis-?-vis government spending levels and types. If the relationship between these variables holds, spending levels, as well as spending types, should vary based on the level of PSI. Specifically, institutionalized systems, when controlling for institutional, ideological, and structural factors, should result in higher public goods and overall spending. In contrast, weakly institutionalized systems should rely less on expensive public goods?thereby resulting in lower overall spending levels?and should favor parochial spending that benefits smaller segments of the population?thereby resulting in lower overall spending. Previous studies have seldom considered the effect of PSI on policymaking, though some have explored the concept theoretically and offered refinements in measuring its components.9 Another strand of work has considered what factors catalyze or promote PSI.10 More recently, scholars have assessed the relationship between PSI and democ racy.11 Still, there is a dearth of research on the relationship between PSI and policy making. Charles Hankla considers how party system strength affects trade openness, but this is one of the few exceptions.12 Second, this article addresses the paucity of scholarship on PSI in developing democ racies. Previous studies have considered relatively small samples of states when exploring the causes or effects of PSI.13 In particular, the research has only recently begun to include postcommunist states. As illustrated in Table 1, this is a serious concern since average Table 1 Volatility and Party Replacement Levels by Region Volatility Party Replacement Africa 9.97% 6.45% Asia 13.91% 15.23% Latin America 17.55% 18.22% OECD 11.78% ;.57% Postcommunist 28.61% 39.51%