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Showing papers in "Contemporary Political Theory in 2003"


Journal ArticleDOI

403 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Bruno Latour1
TL;DR: The authors explores the specificty of this regime and especially the strange link it has with the canonical definition of enunciation in linguistics and semiotics, and thus also the reasons why a 'transparent' or 'rational' political speech act destroys the very conditions of group formation.
Abstract: Political enunciation remains an enigma as long as it is considered from the standpoint of information transfer. It remains as unintelligible as religious talk. The paper explores the specificty of this regime and especially the strange link it has with the canonical definition of enunciation in linguistics and semiotics. The ‘political circle’ is reconstituted and thus also the reasons why a ‘transparent’ or ‘rational'political speech act destroys the very conditions of group formation.

133 citations




Journal ArticleDOI
John Horton1
TL;DR: In this article, a critical exploration of the liberal project of normatively justifying basic political principles is presented, focusing on John Rawls's use of the idea of public reason, and concluding that resorting to public reason will significantly constrain the scope of substantive political disagreement within a constitutional democracy.
Abstract: This article is a contribution to a critical exploration of the liberal project of normatively justifying basic political principles. The specific focus is John Rawls's use of the idea of public reason. After briefly discussing the evolution of Rawls's ideas from A Theory of Justice to his most recent writings, the key components of his conception of public reason are set out. Two principal lines of criticism are developed. The first is that the criteria of legitimacy Rawls establishes for a democratic procedure are unworkably demanding. The second is that there is no reason to think that resort to the idea of public reason will significantly constrain the scope of substantive political disagreement within a constitutional democracy. The article concludes with a few speculative reflections about the relevance of the limitations of Rawls's account of public reason for the project of liberal justification more generally.

86 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the political implications of silence and how it can be used to constitute self-and even communities, as opposed to simply being a lack of speech imposed upon the powerless.
Abstract: This article investigates the unfamiliar political implications of silence. Generally regarded as simply a lack of speech imposed upon the powerless, silence is thereby positioned as inimical to politics. In a normatively constituted lingual politics, silence's role can never be more than that of absence. The subsequent understanding that silence can operate as resistance to domination has opened original and ground-breaking treatments of its role in political practice. However, the argument here moves beyond this simple dualism, examining how silence does not merely reinforce or resist power, but can be used to constitute selves and even communities. That silence can operate in such diverse ways, as oppression, resistance, and/or community formation, leads to the recognition that its ultimate politics cannot be fixed and determined.

72 citations





Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors evaluate the recent work of three authors, who exemplify this strand of political thinking; William Connolly, Chantal Mouffe, and James Tully.
Abstract: In this paper, I delineate one tradition of contemporary political thought that has emerged within the more general climate of difference and diversity. This is ‘agonistic pluralism’. The paper evaluates the recent work of three authors, who exemplify this strand of political thinking; William Connolly, Chantal Mouffe, and James Tully. Over the past decade, each of these three has developed the notion of agonistic pluralism. The task here is to examine points of comparison between them. I compare the three authors' conceptions of politics and of the dimension of the political. I make the case that their work complements one another, they each endorse broad notions of the political; and they understand politics to be constitutive of social relations. Nevertheless, the forms of politics that they describe differ from one another. It is my contention that these forms of politics are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. However, I maintain that in order for their work to be understood in this way, the political (or constitutive) practices described by Connolly and Tully — struggles for self-making and for recognition respectively — must be re-figured as forms of sub-constitutional politics. These forms of politics will make up necessary elements of a viable pluralist society, but they are played out within multiple public spheres made possible by — what we might call — the quasi-republican political constitution elaborated by Mouffe.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that the very acceptance of ambiguity, often misrepresented as relativism, is a crucial precondition not only for the conceptualization of human agency, but also for its actual application in practice, and defend an anti-essentialist stance as the most viable chance for retaining an adequate understanding of how people situate themselves as agents and influence their socio-political environment.
Abstract: The conceptualization of human agency is one of the oldest and most debated challenges in political theory. This essay defends the continuous relevance of this endeavour against a proliferating theoretical pessimism. Instead of engaging the much rehearsed structure–agency debate, the author conceptualizes agency in relation to discourses. However, such an approach inevitably elicits suspicion. Is discourse not merely a faddish term, destined to wax and wane with fleeting intellectual trends of the postmodern and poststructural kind? Does the concept of discourse, as many fear, suck us into a nihilistic vortex and deprive us of the stable foundations that are necessary to ground our thoughts and actions? Not so, argues this essay, and defends an anti-essentialist stance as the most viable chance for retaining an adequate understanding of how people situate themselves as agents and influence their socio-political environment. The ensuing analysis, which focuses on everyday forms of resistance, demonstrates how the very acceptance of ambiguity, often misrepresented as relativism, is a crucial precondition not only for the conceptualization of human agency, but also for its actual application in practice.


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a post-peer-review, pre-copyright version of an article published in Contemporary Political Theory 2(1) 2003: 77-87 is presented.
Abstract: This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyright version of an article published in Contemporary Political Theory 2(1) 2003: 77-87. The definitive version is available at: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cpt/journal/v2/n1/abs/9300071a.htm


Journal ArticleDOI
Jason Glynos1
TL;DR: The authors argue that a central virtue of Laclau and Mouffe's hegemonic approach to democracy is that it clearly emphasizes the ethos of democracy, not simply the institutions of democracy.
Abstract: In this paper I explore some connections between two anti-essentialist approaches to democratic theory — Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's hegemonic approach and Slavoj Zizek's psychoanalytic approach. I argue that a central virtue of Laclau and Mouffe's hegemonic approach to democracy is that it clearly emphasizes the ethos of democracy, not simply the institutions of democracy. This shift transforms democracy, now conceived as radical democratic ethos, into a site of further research about how to make our understanding of its conditions more theoretically nuanced. In the main bulk of the paper, I explore how Slavoj Zizek's notion of an authentic political act seeks to develop this understanding.



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Forgiveness cannot properly be conceived as cancelling the need for repentance, atonement, and punishment as discussed by the authors, and only punishment that expresses repentance and atonement brings about true reconciliation between the wrongdoer and the rest of the community.
Abstract: Amnesty in the context of national reconciliation involves waiving or cancelling the punishment of convicted or suspected criminals in the name of peace. We can distinguish three positions: (1) amnesty is wrong because it is unjust; (2) amnesty is unjust, but necessary; and (3) amnesty is just because it expresses forgiveness. The third position sounds promising. However, it assumes that when we forgive, we can justifiably waive or cancel the need for punishment. I argue that only punishment that expresses repentance and atonement brings about true reconciliation between the wrongdoer and the rest of the community. If we forgive in the absence of repentance and atonement, we restore our (civic or personal) relationship with the wrongdoer, but in doing so ignore the way the wrongdoing conditions the relationship. An adequate, properly reconciled relationship can only be forged on the basis of some agreement on fundamental values, and that requires a change of heart from the wrongdoer. Forgiveness cannot properly be conceived as cancelling the need for repentance, atonement and punishment.




Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The double inscription of the political is a familiar trope among progressive thinkers, whose discussions have focused primarily on the ontological presuppositions of political at the expense of a theoretical reflection on politics as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The discussion about the double inscription of the political is a familiar trope among progressive thinkers, whose discussions have focused primarily on the ontological presuppositions of the political at the expense of a theoretical reflection on politics. This article shifts the emphasis to the latter. It develops an image of thought of our political actuality that moves beyond the commonplace observation that politics exceeds electoral representation. Its underlying assumption is that modernity is characterized by a continual process of political territorialization and re-territorialization whereby the political frontier has experienced a series of displacements along a migratory arc that goes from the sovereign state to liberal party democracies. However, it does not stop there, for as politics colonizes new domains and carves up novel places of enunciation, the cartography we inherited from democratic liberalism experiences a Copernican de-centring that throws us into a scenario best described as an archipelago of political domains. This announces the becoming-other of politics, the post-liberal setting of our political actuality.




Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932; English translation, 1935) as discussed by the authors provides a context for understanding what the book has to contribute to the recent flowering of interest in liberal nationalism.
Abstract: Beyond borrowing the terms ‘open’ and ‘closed’ societies, political theorists have not had much time for Henri Bergson's book The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932; English translation, 1935). However, the recent flowering of interest in liberal nationalism provides a context for understanding what the book has to contribute. For it takes up the relationship between the nation-state and ‘special ties’ on the one hand and ‘cosmopolitan’ obligations on the other. From a political point of view, it should be read as a critique of the too-easy assimilation of cosmopolitan claims by republican ideology, and as a warning that the state cannot be seen as only contingently exclusive. Although both nationalists and cosmopolitans will find things to welcome in Bergson's book, its most original contribution may be its claim that nationalists cannot consistently resist the demands of cosmopolitan morality, for the nation-state already draws upon its for its legitimation.


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors deal with cultural theory in the version of Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, using Durkheim's dimensions, "social integration" and "regulation of the actions of individuals".
Abstract: This article deals with cultural theory in the version of Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky. Cultural theory is important for research in the area of political and policy science because this theory has the pretension of pinning down endogenous preference formation. Using Durkheim's dimensions, ‘social integration’ and ‘regulation of the actions of individuals’, cultural theory distinguishes five ways of life or cultures, namely individualism, hierarchy, egalitarianism, fatalism and autonomy. The statement that there are only five ways of life is, however, the result of a selective interpretation of the dimension, ‘regulation of the actions of individuals’. A broad perspective on this dimension — including the ‘horizontal’ aspects of human relations — will lead to the conclusion that there is a sixth culture existent that has been neglected by current cultural theory. This sixth culture is essentially ‘mutualism-driven’. In this mutualist way of life, people hold highly specialized positions and are closely associated. The production of goods and services within this culture is based on cooperation and mutual adjustment. Power is widely spread, but not because equal rights and duties are considered a good thing. Knowledge and skills are primary in mutualist settings, and power follows knowledge and skills.