Showing papers in "Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs in 2000"

ASEAN and Non-Interference: A Principle Maintained

Abstract: ASEAN leaders have maintained their traditional respect for the principle of non-interference in the affairs of states, despite predictions to the contrary as human rights issues have come to the fore in Southeast Asia's politics. Calls for "constructive engagement" from within and outside ASEAN, in the light of grave human rights abuses in Cambodia and Myanmar, have ultimately gone unheeded by ASEAN leaders. This overt stance in favour of non-interference seems incongruous with a more subtle, historical approach of "actual interference" in each other's affairs. The two are reconciled thus: publicly A SEAN leaders adhere to the vaunted "ASEAN way" of non-interference while privately, behind-the-scenes, quiet diplomacy interference takes place to resolve issues causing tension between states. This practice contrasts sharply with that of Western countries, which favour intervention for humanitarian reasons. Introduction Since the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 its members have adhered strictly to a principle of non-interference in the affairs of states. Non-interference stems from the traditional notions in international relations of equality of the sovereignty of states (from diminutive Singapore to mammoth Indonesia) and the consequent right to exclusive sovereignty. The respect for non-interference in each other's affairs has been a cardinal principle, and characteristic of ASEAN concord since ASEAN's creation. In the post-Cold War era, however, the principle has come under strain. A practice contradictory in this respect appeared in connection with political turmoil in three Southeast Asian states, two prospective ASEAN members (Cambodia and Myanmar), and the other a founding member of ASEAN (Indonesia). This new practice begs two interrelated questions. Is the principle of sovereign equality of states disappearing? Or, is there a qualitative change in the concept of exclusive sov ereignty and the consequent non-interference? A hypothesis which is explored in this article is that there is a qualitative change in the concept of non-interference in the sovereign affairs of another state. The quality that distinguishes the concept from its traditional sense, strict adherence to non-interference, is the notion that a state will only be considered equal in its sovereignty if it ensures minimum standards of good governance for its citizens. In other words, treat your citizens well and we can do business. An examination of this hypothesis will lead us through, first, a brief discussion of the enshrinement of the concept of exclusive sovereignty as a fundamental principle governing inter-state relations; secondly, ASEAN members' practice of non-interference; and thirdly, the forces motivating qualitative change in the principle of sovereign equality of states. The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States and Good Governance The concept of sovereignty is an elusive one that is hard to define. As Louis Halle notes in his foreword to Robert Klein's Sovereign Equality Among States: The History of an Idea: [I]nternational relations are determined by the myths that, as surrogates for realities beyond our comprehension, dominate our minds. The myths may represent the realities more or less truly, more or less falsely, with corresponding consequences, for good or evil, when action is taken on the bases they provide. [1] One such myth is that of sovereignty. As Klein shows, throughout history, by a process of analogy with individual personality, the state has acquired a corporate personality. The concept of sovereignty has evolved from being a signifier of the authority of an individual ruler (king, emperor) to a signifier of the authority of the people. The Romans dealt with associations of human beings as real persons; groups of individuals acting together were said to have a single legal personality. Hobbes applied the concept of personality to the territorial state, for the most part identified with the ruler, which permitted pinning on these new political entities rights and duties towards each other. …

Insights from ASEAN's Foreign Policy Co-operation: The "ASEAN Way", a Real Spirit or a Phantom?

Abstract: Notwithstanding substantial criticism over the past two years, ASEAN is regarded as a paragon case of successful regional co-operation. This article seeks to contribute to the debate about the nature of ASEAN's co-operation. Have ASEAN members been guided by a sense of community in their foreign policy co-operation? The article examines the nexus between regional identity and foreign policy by gauging the regional states' norm compliance with regard to the "ASEAN way". It focuses on ASEAN decision-making in relation to diplomatic initiatives relevant to the grouping's security. The main emphasis is on the post-Cold War era, with a backdrop provided by specific events in the 1970s and 1980s. Introduction The achievements of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since its establishment in 1967 are certainly impressive. In a region previously beset by confrontation, no armed conflict has erupted between the ASEAN members, although bilateral tensions have surfaced on several occasions. In the international arena, ASEAN has managed to attain a high profile and the regional grouping has acted in concert in the economic as well as in the diplomatic spheres. This record renders he principal success of ASEAN indisputable. However, the question that arises is what has been the underlying basis of co-operation? Have he ASEAN countries co-operated because they conceived of the region as a community where states share one common identity, or has co-operation been motivated by functional considerations derived from the realization that one's bargaining power increases if the region speaks with one voice? This article sets out to answer that question, and by doing so, intends to contribute to the debate about the essential nature of state interaction in Southeast Asia. Recent critical assessments of ASEAN and its approach to cooperation within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have rekindled the debate between rationalist, particularly realist, and constructivist scholars about which factors determine state interactions in Southeast Asia and, by extension, in the wider Asia-Pacific region. [1] Constructivist scholars have posited the existence, or at least emergence, of a regional community among the ASEAN states. [2] This perspective is underpinned by the premise that ASEAN possesses a shared collective identity which exerts crucial influence on states' behaviour. These "identity-based" accounts of ASEAN co-operation have emphasized the importance of ASEAN norms. According to that view, shared norms represent "collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity", and hence define how an actor should behave. [3] Norm compliance then becomes an important indicator of the existence of a regional community with a distinct collective identity. To date, most discus sions of the notion of a Southeast Asian community have examined the dimension of intra-ASEAN relations. The question of what role ASEAN norms have played for decision-making and implementation with regard to ASEAN's external relations has largely been neglected. [4] This article seeks to fill that gap by probing whether the norms of the "ASEAN way" have had a significant impact on ASEAN co-operation in foreign policy. ASEAN leaders, as well as some scholars, have emphasized the importance of the so-called "ASEAN way" for the success of regional co-operation. [5] The "ASEAN way" entails behavioural norms encapsulated in a code-of-conduct and a set of procedural norms. [10] The former contains standard norms of international law: respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and non-use of force. More unique to ASEAN, and hence more relevant for an assessment of the identity--foreign policy nexus are procedural norms which prescribe decision-making procedures that ASEAN leaders are expected to follow. According to those prescriptions, ASEAN's decision-making process should observe the principles of musyawarah (consultation) and mufakat (consensus). …

The Financial Crisis of 1997--98 and the End of the Asian Developmental State

Abstract: Financial globalization in the 1990s effectively dismantled the Asian developmental state and forced East Asia to search for a new political economy model. The paradigm shift in world economic development from state-driven planning to market-driven management has taken place since the late 1980s in Northeast Asia, spreading to Southeast Asia in the 1990s. The access to global capital markets by Asian corporations, both parastatal and private, has effectively reduced their dependency on the state for financial resources. In fact, the Asian developmental state and financial globalization are incompatible and often in conflict. By externalizing financial forbearance, Asian corporations and the global market have forced the state to change. Thus, important political changes have taken place in Northeast Asia and are now also occurring in Southeast Asia. Financial Implosion The contention of this article is that financial globalization effectively dismantled the Asian developmental state in the 1990s and forced Asia to search for a new political economy model. The paradigm shift in world economic development from state-driven planning to market-driven management has taken place since the late 1980s in Northeast Asia, and by the mid-1990s a similar process had spread southwards to the ASEAN region. The Asian state was slow in restructuring its private sector economy to forestall the oncoming crisis. The state-driven development model spawned a set of paradigmatic practices, such as clientelism, cronyism, cartels and monopolies, official and unofficial favouritism shown to a select number of business firms, and state patronage to certain ethnic groups. [1] In the era of globalization, these practices often clash with the fast integrating world economy where money flows in and out at the whim and fancy of investors. [2] By the early 1990s, the politics of the developmental state began to produce cleavages. As the economy grew and advanced further, a more complex division of labour emerged. In Japan and Korea, the stock market and chaebol collapses of the late 1980s and early 1990s signalled the worn-out nature of the developmental state model. The nexus of "the state leads, the market follows" broke down. When the regional crisis occurred in 1997-98, the market -- corporations, banks, individual investors, and chaebol -- remained unable to quickly detach themselves from the domineering state to ward off the ensuing mayhem. In Japan, the financial sector loathed to embrace deep restructuring, and in Korea and the rest of Asia, no business elites thought that the state would not come to their assistance when in crisis. These lapses compounded the Asian crisis further. By the early 1990s, as the changing of the gear in the developmental process from the state-centric to the global capital market-dependent mode intensified, Northeast and Southeast Asia needed to revisit their political economy models, first arrived at in the 1960s and 1970s. What had changed was the advent of globalization, the emergence of new financial institutions and innovative investment practices, and an evergrowing number of countries willing to accept foreign money from anywhere. Consequently, the state sped up the liberalization and deregulation of the domestic markets, as the pressure to sustain high growth rates increased throughout the region, where the legitimacy of quasi-democratic regimes impinged on their "economic achievements", and the ability of regimes to remain in power depended on the allegiance of the people. [3] The Asian Developmental State Revisited Chalmers Johnson in the United States and Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil were among the earliest pioneers of the concept of the "developmental state". Since the concept of the Asian developmental state and how it has become outdated constitute the core of this article, it is necessary to define the concept in both historical and functional terms. …

Malaysia´s Tenth Elections: Status Quo, Reformasi or Islamization?

Abstract: Malaysian politics have been in upheaval since Dr Mahathir Mohamad sacked his deputy; Anwar Ibrahim, in September 1998. That made the 1999 elections one of the most keenly contested ever. For the first time, the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) faced a coalition of the major opposition parties, campaigning on a common reform platform. The result was a strong win for the BN (148 of 193 seats) but a great setback for UMNO, the dominant coalition member, which lost 22 seats. Non-Malay support for the BN generally held firm, while Malays -- reacting against the government's handling of the Anwar issue - shifted to the opposition. Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) and keADILan (led by Anwar's wife) were the main beneficiaries. PAS, benefiting from its identification with reformasi, emerged as the new parliamentary opposition leader, and heads state governments in Kelantan and Terengganu. Introduction Initial reports on Malaysia's 29 November 1999 elections carried mixed assessments. By some accounts, the results were an overwhelming endorsement of Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad and the ruling Barisan Nasional (National Front, or BN). The coalition, according to Associated Press "won a resounding victory[ldots]after a year of political and economic turmoil that threatened the Malaysian leader's reign". The Asian Wall Street Journal endorsed this view, arguing that despite concerns over Anwar Ibrahim, the electors "chose stability over concern for political freedoms". Thomas Fuller in the International Herald Tribune, however, declared that although the election was a convincing win for the government, it was also a "striking loss" for the politically dominant party of the Prime Minister, the United Malays National Organization (UMINO). Malaysian papers also reflected this divide. The New Straits Times declared that "the Barisan Nasional's resounding win in the 10th general election is undisputed proof of the people's overwhelming support for the coalition"; but The Star headed one of its articles "UMNO's Worst Fears Come True". [1] Another element in election assessments was the emphasis on gains made by the Parti Islam SeMalaysia. PAS, as it is known from its Jawi abbreviation, was nearly always described as "fundamentalist", and its gains were seen as a reflection of a problematic shift towards Islamization. "Islamists close on Mahathir" was the worried title of a Times article by David Watts. [2] These different perspectives mirror a broader debate over political change in Malaysia. Do events since the onset of the Asian economic crisis in mid-1997, particularly the protests associated with the sacking of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in September 1998, represent the beginnings of political change in Malaysia, or is it politics as usual? Despite the drama of events since Anwar's sacking, many in the foreign media have concluded that Dr Mahathir remains firmly in control, and nothing has really changed. Malaysia is the exception to the regional move towards reform, seen particularly in Indonesia and Thailand. A third perspective is that focusing on the respective sides represented by Dr Mahathir and Anwar misses the point. It ignores, in the words of writer Karim Raslan, "a far deeper and more important societal shift -- the increasing Islamisation of the country's majority Malay Muslim population". [3] Elections in Malaysia are not the open, uncertain contests leading to frequent changes of government found in other polities. Electorates are heavily weighted in favour of rural constituencies, benefiting particularly Malays (hence, traditionally, UMNO), and indigenous groups in Sabah and Sarawak. The advantages of incumbency, and almost total control over the media, give government parties an overwhelming advantage. As Harold Crouch has observed: "The Malaysian electoral system could not be described as fair. It was so heavily loaded in favor of the government that it was hard to imagine that the ruling coalition, as long as it remained united, could be defeated in an election. …

The Political Economy of Vietnam's Transformation Process

Abstract: Reforms started by Vietnam in 1986 are far from complete. As a result of a slowdown in economic growth, growing unemployment, and social unrest, Vietnam faces renewed challenges for further reform. With doi moi (renovation) there has been greater openness and mounting pressure for more open discussions within the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). The country faces two options: to continue with the same pace of change and risk falling economically behind neighbouring countries, or to undertake more radical economic reform and risk losing control. This article explores the economic decision-making process in Vietnam. It argues that gradualism in reform is due to internal strife, to a trial-and-error approach, and to the lack of capable human resources. Evidence suggests that prescription for economic reforms cannot be carried out effectively without modernizing the CPV's political decision-making process. Introduction Vietnam has been going through a transition from a command economy to a "socialist-based market economy" since 1986. The "renovation" (doi moi) policy began with a reform in the agricultural sector, where land was redistributed among rural households. Wide-ranging economic reforms have been introduced since then. As a result, the economy has achieved a steady growth of about 8 per cent per year since 1992. According to the 1997-98 Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS), the ratio of poor [1] has dropped from 58 per cent of the population in 1993 to 37 per cent in 1998. [2] Living standards have improved but the benefits have been distributed unevenly. Poverty remains largely a rural phenomenon. Since the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party (NCP) in mid-1991, Vietnam has moved to normalize relations with China, Japan, the United States, the ASEAN states, and other countries. Vietnam's development strategy has been tilted towards protected and capital-intensive industries dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Once seen as the next "tiger" in Asia, Vietnam seemed ready to boom in the late 1980s. However, growth stalled before an economic crisis hit the rest of East Asia in the second half of 1997 and, since 1996, Vietnam has experienced a decline in foreign direct investment (FDI), a fall in exports, a drop in economic growth, and came close to a mini-banking crisis in 1997 and 1998. [3] These events were to spark frantic calls by Vietnam specialists and international organizations for the government to speed up the pace of structural reform. As doi moi reforms have deepened, there has been a lack of consensus within the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) as to the speed, depth, and pace of further reforms. Heated debates came into the open for the first time during the Eighth National Congress of the Party. As a response, the Fourth Central Committee of the CPV plenum in December 1997 reaffirmed Vietnam's commitment "to accelerating comprehensive and uniform renovation", but would do so at its own pace. [4] The problems of reform of the early doi moi period in Vietnam are well known. [5] The country began from a low base and many economic reforms started from "below", while the political sector was left untouched. In recent years, slow growth has led to higher unemployment, taken a toll on government revenues, and resulted in deep cuts in the social sectors. An obvious question arises: why is Vietnam reluctant to pursue the rapid changes initiated in 1986? Internal strife has slowed the pace of change. Vietnam offers an interesting example of the dynamic process of reform and its economic consequences which could induce the process of change in the institutional and political sectors. This article tries to explore the economic decision-making process in recent years. It offers explanations to the politics of change, arguing that gradualism is due to internal opposition, lack of human resources, and a trial-and-error approach followed by the government. It attempts to show the need for political and institutiona l doi moi in the area of economic decisions. …

Indonesia's China Policy in the New Order and Beyond: Problems and Prospects

Abstract: This article examines Indonesia's perceptions and policies towards China during the New Order era (1965-99) and the prospects for bilateral relations in the post-New Order period. For the first two decades of President Soeharto's rule, Indonesian policy towards China was marked by hostility, and stemmed from the 1965 Gestapu Affair. Bilateral relations remained frosty until the mid-to-late 1980s when Soeharto initiated a gradual policy of rapprochement with China. This led to the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1990 and Indonesia's policy of engagement with China. Despite improved economic relations, a number of obstacles stood in the way of closer Sino-Indonesian relations in the 1990s. The new government of President Abdurrahman Wahid must tackle these obstacles if bilateral relations are to move forward in the twenty-first century.

Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid: Radical or Status Quo State? [1]

Abstract: When Abdurrahman Wahid first came to power in Indonesia there was some alarm over the direction of Indonesia's foreign policy. However, the reality is that Abdurrahman's foreign policy has been more orthodox than some of his earlier rhetoric might have indicated. Indonesia needs the developed world as a source of funding to revive its economy. In terms of foreign diplomacy, Indonesia has successfully gained reassurances from the international community of its territorial integrity. ASEAN also remains central to Jakarta's foreign policy outlook. The issue of East Tim or is still a crucial sticking point between Indonesia and a number of Western countries. The United States, in particular, is reluctant to push Indonesia too far as it is believed that the Abdurrahman presidency is the least desirable alternative in domestic and foreign policy terms. Introduction Since the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, the East Timor crisis of 1999, and the emergence of Abdurrahman Wahid (or Gus Dur) as Indonesian President, there has been much press and diplomatic corps speculation about the likely direction of Indonesia's foreign policy. In particular, there has been an expressed concern that Indonesia is turning away from the West, after the bitterness over East Timor, and seeking to forge a common front with some of the leading nations in Asia. This has become known in the popular media as Gus Dur's "Asia card" -- whatever this might mean. Since assuming office, President Abdurrahman Wahid has made a number of statements about the direction of Indonesia's foreign policy. With any leader -- and with Gus Dur in particular -- it might be imprudent to take all of these statements at face value. It is necessary to try to determine what is personality-driven -- that is to say what is driven by the person of the President -- and what is institutionally-driven. Although Soeharto's New Order is now part of history, it is important to examine some of the main themes of Indonesia's foreign policy in the not too distant past as this will shed some light on recent events. While it is true that Indonesia under President Abdurrahman may be looking to lessen its dependence on the West, what is seen as a break with Soeharto's supposed "pro-Western" stance tends to accentuate differences that may not exist in reality. Indicative of the literature that assumes that Soeharto was completely pro-Western, or even a Western lackey, is the fairly recent article by Noam Chomsky entitled, "Indonesia, the Master Card in Washington's Hand". [2] This kind of statement tends to obscure the fact that Indonesia is a decidedly non-aligned state with aspirations to Third World leadership. Links with the West, which had held economic and diplomatic value for Soeharto's New Order, were only part of the equation. Strengthening ties with other developing countries is not unique to the current In donesian administration. Therefore, Abdurrahman's activism in the Third World -- with regard to trying to forge greater links with China and India, or recent noises about a visit to Iraq -- must be seen in that light. Another scholar has remarked that: "Wahid's Indonesia is now seeking to play 'the Asia card' in its relations with the West. In other words, it's back to the days of Sukarno's Indonesia of the 1960s. Who said, the future doesn't resemble the past." [3] It is the contention of this article that President Abdurrahman Wahid's foreign policy is more continuous with that of the Soeharto administration than this sort of quotation would seem to suggest. Indonesia wishes to continue to play its part as a good international citizen, and it is too early to predict emerging radicalism in Indonesia's foreign policy. The core concerns remain, including a stable international order; the desire for an enhanced reputation; the need to have strong relations with the neighbouring ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) states; the need for support from the global community for its existing borders (notably with regard to Aceh and Papua); the need for funding from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the wider international community; and the need for trade and investment, principally from the developed world. …

Vietnam's Objective in the South China Sea: National or Regional Security?

Abstract: Vietnam's interests in the South China Sea may be divided into traditional national security interests, and interests linked to the broader category of human security. This article examines Vietnam's policy in the South China Sea and its use of the Law of the Sea. Vietnam has doggedly upheld its claim to the whole of the Paracel and Spratly areas (Hoang Sa and Truong Sa) and has spent considerable resources in modernizing its naval and air forces. However, there seems to be a move away from a narrow focus on national security to a more broad-based concern for human security. This is connected with a trend towards a greater regional, less nationalist approach, which may give Vietnam a key role in resolving the multiple disputes in the South China Sea. Introduction The disputes in the South China Sea form a permanent threat to Vietnam's national security, to its full integration with the rest of ASEAN, and to farther improvement of its relationship with China. [1] The disputes also threaten regional security and the interests of the populations around the South China Sea, who need to be protected against typhoons, floods, pollution, depletion of fish stocks, piracy, and war. The manner in which Hanoi handles the situation in the South China Sea may have a significant impact on the living conditions of the Vietnamese, and for their country's regional role. Vietnam's aims in the South China Sea may be divided into traditional national security concerns, and aims linked to the broader category of human and regional security. Under the first category are aims such as defending the long S-shaped coast against invasion, defending the sovereignty of the Paracels (Hoang Sa) and the Spratlys (Truong Sa), gaining exclusive control of resources on and under Vietnam's continental shelf, as well as living resources in the sea out to 200 nautical miles, collecting customs duties, and suppressing smuggling, piracy and other illegal activities within Vietnam's 12-nautical mile territorial waters. [2] As long as no formal agreements have been reached on the delimitation of maritime boundaries, attempts to pursue these aims tend to generate conflict between Vietnam and the other nations around the South China Sea. Under the second category are aims such as defending the population against typhoons, protecting mangrove swamps, securing fish stocks for future generations, halting the destruction of coral reefs, preventing pollution, facing the eventuality of major oil spills, building modern and secure ports, maintaining open communications securing regional peace, attracting serious oil companies to explore for oil and gas, and facilitating international trade and investments. These aims entail a need for regional and international co-operation. The means in pursuit of the traditional national security interests are not necessarily effective in achieving human and regional security. National security may be pursued by maintaining considerable military capabilities, entering into alliances with other powers, and conducting nationalistic propaganda domestically and internationally. These means are costly and can lead to a deterioration in relations with neighbouring states, thus endangering human security. In pursuing human security for its population, the Vietnamese Government is finding other means more useful, such as bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, international co-operation in resource management and environmental protection, and activities to further develop an internationally recognized legal regime, on the basis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS was signed in 1982 and entered into force in November 1994, one year after the sixtieth state had ratified it. This article will test the hypothesis that there is a gradual movement in Vietnamese policy away from a narrow focus on national security to a more broad-based concern for human security. …

The Politics of Privatization in the Malaysian Health Care System

Abstract: Despite a strong commitment, for both ideological and pragmatic reasons, to the privatization of state enterprises and services, and pronouncements that public health care services would be privatized, the Malaysian Government has introduced only a selective degree of privatization in the health sector. Haemodialysis, pharmaceutical distribution and hospital support services have been transferred to the private sector. Several privatized entities have links with the dominant party in the ruling coalition government. Moves to privatize public hospitals have politicized health care policy in Malaysia and generated opposition from interest groups and demands for greater public consultation in policy-making. Both political and practical factors have restrained the government from introducing wider privatization policies within the health sector. Introduction Health sector privatization encompasses the "high politics" of the very role of the state in providing health care to its citizens: the extent to which Malaysia's historical welfare model of public health care is to be replaced by one in which individuals and employers are responsible for health care costs and services provided by the private, rather than the public, sector. Any radical change in the role of the state as a provider of public health care poses problems of political legitimacy for a ruling coalition which has historically projected itself as delivering socio-economic benefits to the population and especially to its principal constituency, the rural Malays. Organized opposition to health sector privatization from medical, consumer and trade union interest groups and the inclusion of health care in the common manifesto of four major opposition political parties have demonstrated the growing politicization of health care policy, which had previously escaped the levels of political conflict which c haracterized such policy areas as education, culture and economics. Moreover, an investigation into how health sector privatization policy has been made tells us much about the political culture of Malaysia which, despite the country's rapid industrialization and socio-economic development, is still characterized by the reluctance of government decision-makers to consult with consumer interests and to open their decisions to a degree of public scrutiny. Finally, an exploration of the ways in which privatization has been carried out in the health sector reveals the close political linkages of many of the successful tendering consortia with the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the dominant party in Malaysia's ruling coalition government. It is important to explore some of the meanings of the term "privatization". In its general application, the Malaysian Ministry of Finance has defined privatization in very broad terms as "the transfer of the public sector activities and functions to the private sector". [1] More specifically, as Jomo has pointed out in his discussion of the wider Malaysian experience, the term "privatization" can be applied to a range of measures, including the actual sale of state enterprises, leasing out assets, joint public--private ventures, private financing of projects, ending public monopolies, and the contracting out to the private sector of services previously provided by the public sector. [2] The concept of privatization applied to the health system has attracted a number of definitions. Scarpaci conceptualizes it in terms of a shift away from the public sphere, defining it as "reduced levels of public provision, subsidy or regulation of either preventative or curative health services". [3] Muschell points out that "the encouragement of the financing and provision of health services by the private sector" can also be regarded as a form of privatization. [4] In the case of the Malaysian health care system, a number of elements of privatization can be identified in the actions and articulated policy intentions of the government. …

ASEAN's Relations with Major External Powers

Abstract: The international relations of Southeast Asia has traditionally been determined by external powers. During the Cold War until the conclusion of the Second Indochina War in 1975, the United States had overwhelming influence on the ASEAN states. Between 1975 and 1989, ASEAN achieved greater accommodation with China to address Thai security concerns. Since 1989, ASEAN has been relatively free of external power entanglements. Preliminary evidence from the past indicates a generally favourable appraisal of the United States and Japan and a more cautious attitude towards China. ASEAN's new latitude in managing its own affairs is complicated by its membership expansion and internal disagreements. However, ASEAN's manifest desire is that the major external powers will provide a favourable regional environment for peace and development. Introduction External powers have traditionally determined the contours and context of international relations in Southeast Asia. The earliest influences, until the sixteenth century, derived from China and India. However, beginning from the sixteenth century and especially after the eighteenth century, European colonial powers began to actively extend their empires into Southeast Asia. The only country that retained its sovereign status in the region was Thailand. [1] European influence on Southeast Asian international relations evaporated rapidly after World War II and the Japanese Occupation of the region from 1942 to 1945. The pressures of domestic independence movements, military engagements, and the crystallization of states as the primary political units in world affairs led to the breakup of colonial empires. The process began with the Philippines in 1946 as part of the first wave of decolonization and ended with the Geneva Accords of 1954 which partitioned Vietnam into two halves. [2] The second wave brought independence to the Malay Archipelago -- the Federation of Malaya in 1957, which was expanded to the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965, and Brunei was the last state to become independent in 1984. The process of decolonization dovetailed with the onset of the Cold War. Accordingly, Southeast Asia operated as a sub-system of broader global structural arrangements for most of the period from the 1960s to the 1980s. [3] Given the overwhelming influence of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China during this period, the region's destiny was understandably intertwined with and determined by these and, to some extent, other extra-regional powers. In this regard, both Southeast Asia as a region and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an organization have been relatively free of overwhelming external influences for only the last decade. This article examines the relationship between ASEAN and three major extra-regional powers -- China, Japan, and the United States. Two caveats are necessary at the outset. The first of these is that whereas Southeast Asia is a region comprising ten sovereign states, ASEAN is only an organization in which all ten states have collective membership. In this regard, the region is, to all intents and purposes, much larger, both philosophically and in terms of its major attributes, than ASEAN. Accordingly, the two units should not be used interchangeably. In this regard, ASEAN is but one of many international fora available to regional countries to create and utilize opportunities, ensure greater collaboration and calibration of policies, achieve and enhance familiarity and accommodation, and serve as a vehicle for extra-regional representations. The second caveat pertains to the treatment of ASEAN as a unitary corporate entity. It should be noted that insofar as collaboration and co-ordination is concerned, there are often significant differences or disagreements between the policy positions of individual member countries. Collective pronouncements are therefore often premised on the lowest common denominator principle, given ASEAN's consensual decision-making model. …

ASEM: Looking Back, Looking Forward

Abstract: The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is a forum and a process involving the fifteen EU member states and the Commission, and ten East Asian countries. It is a product of the emergence of East Asia as an economic powerhouse in the 1990s, and the commercial embrace of Asia by many European countries. However, with the advent of the Asian economic crisis, the economic motivations underlying ASEM could not but be questioned. ASEM has seemingly survived the worst of the Asian economic crisis. But what lies ahead? Can ASEM continue without a fundamental reassessment of its basic rationale? This article is an attempt to chronicle the genesis and development of ASEM, and examine the challenges that lie ahead. Introduction ASEM is the acronym for the Asia-Europe Meeting, a co-operative framework established in March 1996 between Europeans as represented by the fifteen European Union (EU) member states plus the European Commission, and Asians as represented by ten East and Southeast Asian states comprising China, Japan, South Korea, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. ASEM was to be a symbol of Asia's and Europe's rediscovery of each other after a long period of relative neglect. It was first conceived to be the bridge between Asians and Europeans. The declared aim of ASEM was to reinforce the weak link in the triangle of relations between East Asia, North America, and Western Europe. These three regions were then depicted as the growth engines driving the world economy. While transatlantic and transpacific ties were well-established, strong ties between Europe and Asia were missing. To fill this gap, the idea of an Asia-Europe Meeting was initiated by Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in October 1994. There were many reasons behind the alacrity with which the idea of ASEM was taken up. Among them were the development of East Asia into an economic powerhouse, the formation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum, the fears of a fortress Europe, and mutual interest in maintaining an open and multilateral trading system and countering American unilateralism. It was further argued that a balanced relationship among these regions would promote and ensure greater stability and prosperity in the world. The inaugural Summit Meeting of ASEM in Bangkok in March 1996 got off to a good start. The range of initiatives and activities that followed engendered an ongoing process involving summit meetings, ministerial and senior officials meetings, and also expert meetings in various functional areas of co-operation. All these are now collectively referred to as the ASEM process. The plethora of activities in the wake of the Bangkok Summit reflected the initial enthusiasm and optimism of the parties involved. However, scepticism with regard to the long-term sustainability of the process, and criticisms about ASEM being more form than substance, have also been commonplace. Below is an attempt to re-examine the underlying rationale of ASEM and explain its genesis and development thus far. It has been four years since the first Asia-Europe Summit was launched in Bangkok. What has been ASEM's achievements and what are the challenges that lie ahead in view of the various changes now taking place in Europe and Asia? An Idea Whose Time Has Come? Was ASEM a product of the post-Cold War world? Hans Maull and Akihito Tanaka believe that the realities of the changing power structure in the post-Cold War environment provide the backdrop for ASEM. More specifically, they offer the following reasons behind the genesis of ASEM: * The growing complexity of power relations in a post-Cold War world where military power has lost its old dominance, and economic power and other forms of "soft power" have grown in importance. * The rise of new actors such as China, leading to a general diffusion and dissipation of power in world politics. …

Civil Society and Regional Security: Tensions and Potentials in Post-Crisis Southeast Asia

Abstract: This article delineates the areas where there might be same consonance between the dynamics underlying the present interest in Southeast Asia in the nation of civil society and those linked to the current reassessment of the discourse and practice of security in the region. The areas where tensions can be expected between these two sets of dynamics are also considered. An attempt is then made to establish the policy parameters which, under such circumstances, should guide the regional debate on these issues. The central argument advanced in this context is that it is now possible to create in Southeast Asia mechanisms allowing for a degree of synergy between the development of civil society and that of regional security which will be beneficial to both of these processes. Introduction Civil society has traditionally been conceived of by its proponents as a site of resistance against two forces: that of the state and that of the market. [1] In societies where the state apparatus and the nature of economic development are seen as creating forces of social inequality and exclusion, the exponents of civil society have argued that it can help constitute a space where critiques of these forces can be formulated and alternative trajectories of political and economic development propounded. This explains the wide appeal of the concept in current debates on the different scenarios for the reconstruction and development of Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis. If the current period is to mark a reassessment of the prevalent models of economic and political development in the region, the argument goes, then civil society represents an ideal standpoint from which to ensure that the reconstruction of regional and domestic politico-economic frameworks gives pride of place to more participatory and egalitarian processes and institutions. The rising demand for more participatory and egalitarian models of governance is also very much at the heart of the ongoing reconceptualization of domestic and regional security, as required by the recent upheavals in the region. [2] Security in Southeast Asia has been framed conventionally and quite exclusively in terms of the strength and sustainability of state-building and economic development, which have been at the top of the agenda of the countries in the region. The multi-level crisis which unfolded in mid-1997, however, appears to have ushered in a broader understanding of the different underlying factors which come into play in these processes and must, therefore, be considered part of the security equation. The importance, for example, of widening the space for public participation in development planning and implementation is now better recognized as one of these factors, which the crisis revealed as a necessary precondition to further economic and political growth. There are also dissimilarities, however, between the inner logic pursued by the proponents of civil society and that animating current debates on the reformulation of security in Southeast Asia. For its supporters, civil society is both a process and a goal: it is through the development of civil society that political and economic frameworks in the region can be made more democratic, and it is the presence of a strong and effervescent civil society which will, in the end, be proof of the success of that enterprise. The process of security reformulation, however, has, first of all, involved a much more disparate set of actors. Concepts of security are, of course, being debated within official channels, and these channels also bring into play a series of more informal networks which involve, for instance, academics, linked tacitly or more overtly to official circles. In turn, this structure, whereby Track One (official) and Track Two (unofficial) actors interact on issues of security, offers points of contact with civil society actors (dubbed Track Three in this milieu). …

The Emergence of an Independent East Timor: National and Regional Challenges

Abstract: For a generation, the East Timorese independence struggle was ignored by Southeast Asian nations and by Australia. However, Indonesia's annexation never gained full international recognition, and with the failure to win the allegiance of the majority of the population and in the context of national political uncertainty; the crisis in the territory led to United Nations (U.N.) intervention. However, the U.N. mandate will be difficult to execute, given the material and political problems in the territory Indonesia's record has already generated unprecedented domestic and international scrutiny of the role of the military. The contribution of Australian diplomacy and military power to the resolution of the East Timor issue has brought into question longstanding Australian regional policies. In the case of ASEAN, which had previously supported Indonesia on the issue, the East Timorese independence movement has also raised difficulties for the grouping. Introduction Developments over the past year in East Timor have constituted a watershed for Southeast Asia, comparable in importance to the resolution in 1992 of the Cambodian conflict. Southeast Asia now has a new nation, one whose historical experience marks it out as diverging somewhat from the prevailing regional consensus. The size and scale of the United Nations-sponsored multinational INTERFET (International Force for East Timor) operation introduced into the territory- in September 1999 as well as the manner of its introduction also set new precedents. The UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) authority that succeeded it ensured that the United Nations will have a direct role in the region for some time to come. The consequences for individual nations have also been significant. On the one hand, the Australian Government has considerably reinterpreted a longstanding policy of regional "engagement" which may yet portend a different future response to the problems of Southeast Asia and beyond, and will certainly entail a new approach to such issues as military force configuration and expenditure as well as to diplomacy. On the other hand, the integrity of Indonesia has been challenged. These events have encouraged separatist trends in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and elsewhere, and they have already led to re-evaluations at home and abroad of the Indonesian military and its political role and aspirations. This article reviews the background to the East Timor issue, considers the interventions of 1999 in the territory, and seeks to identify the sources of Indonesian and Australian policy, paying particular attention to the new challenges posed for policy-makers by the East Timorese independence struggle. It then concludes with a consideration of the impact of these events on ASEAN and on regional dynamics. The Failure of Indonesian Policy East Timor was formally incorporated into Indonesia as the nation's twenty-seventh province on 17 July 1976, after the invasion of the territory by elements of the Indonesian military on 7 December 1975, and intervention in the politics of the emerging nation from October 1974, On 27 September 1999, the Indonesian commander in Dili, Major General Kiki Syahnakri formally transferred authority for security in the territory to the INTERFET command, and the final elements of his force departed on 27 October. Between these dates Jakarta expended, given East Timor's insignificant size and population, prodigious amounts of blood and treasure in pursuit of a policy of integration. Yet this policy was evidently a failure. The reasons for this failure are a matter of considerable debate. They may be sought in the assumptions fundamental to Indonesia's conduct. They may also be attributed to particular dynamics within East Timor in the last decade, a time in which external pressures have played an important role. As to the former, it is clear that in the first few years Indonesian military policy was incoherent, producing widespread alienation of the population and many fatalities while being incapable of finally extinguishing the guerilla resistance of FALINTIL (Forcas Armadas de Libertacao de Timor-Leste Independente), the military arm of FRETILIN (Frente Revolutionaria de Timor-Leste Independente). …

China and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Abstract: This article surveys China's policy towards the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contests the view that China has now completed the transition from a challenger to an upholder of the global non-proliferation regime. It argues that "the learning curve hypothesis" and the "bureaucratic politics and profit motives" arguments provide only a partial explanation of China's shifting but ambiguous and contradictory policy towards non-proliferation. China has cleverly played "the proliferation card" by exploiting loopholes in the nonproliferation regime and contradictions in major power relationships so as to serve its national security interests. The article examines the factors that have led Beijing to disregard the non-proliferation regime in the past and might make it continue to do so in the future. It also analyses the changing Asian security environment and its impact on China's nonproliferation commitments in the future. Introduction The global nuclear non-proliferation (NNP) regime is an outgrowth of the steps taken during the second half of the twentieth century to halt the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. The NNP regime consists of several components. These are the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), founded in 1957; the 1953 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) banning the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, outer space, or under water; the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was extended indefinitely in 1995; the London-based Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), formed in 1974, which requires IAEA safeguards on all of its participants' nuclear exports; the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) aimed at halting the proliferation of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems; the 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement (a successor to the Cold War era's COCOM) covering conventional weapons and dual-use exports; and the Zangger Committee which covers nuclear-related exports. T he 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has yet to come into force, further constrains all states from conducting nuclear tests. In addition, the nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs) in Latin America, the South Pacific, and Africa have further strengthened the regime. In 1995, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) proposed the establishment of a NWFZ in Southeast Asia, and in 1997 the five Central Asian states issued the Tashkent statement proposing a NWFZ for Central Asia. The overall record of the NNP regime has been a mixture of success and failure. On the positive side, the five decades of international efforts at curbing the spread of nuclear weapons have created a political and normative climate in which no state can easily declare its nuclear intentions. The unsuitability of nuclear weapons to most military situations also renders them useless. Moreover, a number of nuclearcapable states -- notably Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and the former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan -- have in recent years agreed to abandon the strive for, or dismantle their nuclear weapons capabilities. In this sense, the regime has been fairly successful. On the negative side, the campaign for nuclear disarmament appears to be failing just when success seemed at hand. Since the mid1980s, the regime has been undermined by the emergence of new suppliers of nuclear technology and delivery systems, as well as by an increase in the number of threshold or new nuclear weapons states (NWSs).. Apart from the five declared NWSs (the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China), and two new self-declared NWSs (India and Pakistan), several other nations (Israel, Japan, North Korea, and Iran) are widely believed to have made significant progress towards acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. The changes in the international system and the global nuclear balance of power since the end of the Cold War have thrown up new challenges and opportunities for the NNP regime. …

The Strategic Significance of the Mekong

Abstract: Despite its size, the Mekong River has not played a unifying role as have other great rivers such as the Nile in Egypt or the Yangtze in China. Flowing by or through six countries (China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam), the Mekong is nevertheless vital to Southeast Asia's ecology. However, efforts to make it a route for commercial navigation have been largely unsuccessful. Perhaps best known for the wars fought in its delta in the post-World War II period, the Mekong is now a focus for concern on the part of downstream countries as China embarks on a major dam-building programme in Yunnan Province. Will these dams have damaging effects on the river's vital role as a source offish and carrier of silt that aids horticulture and agriculture?

Cambodia´s International Rehabilitation, 1977–2000

Abstract: This article offers a historical analysis of Cambodia's recent three-year crisis of international legitimacy, provoked by the brief civil war in July 1997, and finally settled between November 1998 and mid-2000. Overwhelming international condemnation of Hun Sen's government after the July 1997 fighting seriously delayed national reconciliation and a return to stable government. However, the origins of Cambodia's complex 1997 crisis go back to UNTAC and before. This article argues that from 1993 onwards and especially during the 1997-98 crisis, Cambodia's national sovereignty came under serious challenge from increasingly powerful ideas about international peace enforcement and the imposition of international norms of behaviour on small or weak states. Cambodia fought off such pressures: it found a new domestic political equilibrium, and in so doing succeeded in reclaiming its sovereignty and international legitimacy. Introduction For some sixteen months, from the outbreak of military conflict in Cambodia's capital, Phnom Penh, between the two coalition parties sharing government (the CPP and Funcinpec) on 5 July 1997 until a new coalition government was formed in November 1998, Cambodia's international legitimacy was suspended. Cambodia's leading politician, Prime Minister Hun Sen of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), was comprehensively and routinely condemned in the world's press. [1] The credentials of the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC)) to occupy its United Nations seat were rejected by the latter in August 1997 (even though these credentials were co-signed by Hun Sen and his then co-Prime Minister, Funcinpec's Ung Huot, and endorsed by King Sihanouk). Cambodia was not able to resume its seat in the United Nations until December 1998, following the formation of a new CPP-Funcinpec coalition government. Cambodia's bid for ASEAN membership, which had been within a few days of taking effect in July 1997, was suspended by ASEAN, pending normalization of Cambodia's political crisis. Ironically, Myanmar, led by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) regime was admitted into ASEAN in 1997 along with Vietnam and Laos, while a disgraced Cambodia had to wait another year-and-a-half, until early 1999. [2] The restoration of the U.N. seat and the acceptance into ASEAN were the key markers in rebuilding Cambodia's international legitimacy. A third key marker -- annual aid consultations with major donors, which provide about half of Cambodia's annual government budgetary revenue -- also resumed in April 1999, after a 22-month gap. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank resumed their normal programme relationships with Cambodia in early 1999. Since then, there has been a progressive and now virtually complete restoration of Cambodia's international standing. The legitimacy of Cambodia's government is still being contested, but by a shrinking band of opponents (and not by any government). One outstanding issue still in contention until recently -- agreement on procedures for the United Nations and the RGC to jointly conduct Khmer Rouge trials -- continued to sour Cambodia's international image throughout 1999 and the first half of 2000; but finally, with the help of constructive mediation by the United States, it now seems to be on the point of implementation. [3] The past three years have been a hard road for the RGC. The immediate and blanket condemnation by virtually the entire international community of the July 1997 conflict as a Hun Sen-led coup precipitated a three-year political crisis that carried serious costs for all Cambodians. [4] The first cost was in the quality of governance. Much of the RGC's political energy and leadership focus, from the fighting in July 1997 till the settlement with the United Nations in July 2000 on the issue of the Khmer Rouge trials, needed to be directed to the search for political solutions and to the defence of Cambodia's national sovereignty and international standing under hostile international pressure. …

U.S. Security Policy in Asia: Implications for China-U.S. Relations

Abstract: As the two major players in the Asia-Pacific region, China and the United States are increasingly in disagreement over security concepts and practices. In an era when Washington is trying to build a Pax Americana, Beijing feels strongly that its security interests in Asia are being challenged. The prospect of security relations between China and the United States will shape the political-security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific in the twenty-first century While both sides will continue to pursue their security interests in Asia as they see appropriate, each has to adapt itself to the changing political, economic, and security landscape in the region and learn how to live with the other. This approach requires both countries to adjust their respective security policies as the region's geopolitical dynamics evolve. Introduction In the post-Cold War era, Sino--U.S. relations have been troubled constantly by three major factors: human rights, trade, and security. With the de-linking of China's human rights record from most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment in 1994 and the closing of the Beijing--Washington marathon talks on China's World Trade Organization (WTO) membership in 1999, human rights and economics seem to be subsiding as major sources of tension on the bilateral agenda, while security issues emerging in the mid-1990s appear to be the most important factor affecting the evolution of bilateral relations in the first decade of the twenty-first century. This article starts with an exploration of some U.S. misperceptions regarding China's policy objectives in the Asia-Pacific and certain important conceptual differences on security practice between Beijing and Washington. Next, it discusses how China perceives the United States' impact on its security interests. Finally, some policy recommendations will be made on how China and the United States might manage their problems. The basic argument is that, because of differences in their world-views, historical experiences, and capabilities, China and the United States have quite different security thinking, which has led to the two countries pursuing different security practices. Chinese and U.S. security interests in Asia both converge and diverge, and as the United States acts to take on China as a latent adversary, the divergence will become even more conspicuous. While both sides will continue to pursue their security interests in Asia as they see fit, each has to adapt to the changing regional political, ec onomic, and security landscape and learn to live with the other. This requires both sides to adjust their respective security policies accordingly. Misperceptions and Conceptual Differences One popular perception in the United States about China's long-term policy objectives in Asia is that Beijing aspires to be the regional hegemon and to restore a Sino-centric order in this part of the world. This observation is wrong. First, Beijing believes in the trend of multipolarization rather than unipolarization at both the global and regional levels, and predicts that, with continued economic development and growing intra-regional political consultation in Asia, countries' influence on regional affairs will become more diversified and more evenly distributed. Secondly, even though China expects some relative increase in its own influence in Asia, it understands that, because of the limits of its hard power and particularly its soft power, it will not achieve a position comparable to its role in the ancient past or to America's role in the region today. Another misperception is that, in the long run, China will endeavour to drive the United States out of East Asia. Again, this is an incorrect assumption. From Beijing's perspective, the United States is an Asia-Pacific power, although not an Asian power, and its political, economic and security interests in the region are deep-rooted, as are its commitments to regional stability and prosperity. …

U.S.-Indonesian Relations during the Economic Crisis: Where Has Indonesia's Bargaining Power Gone?

Abstract: The U.S.--Indonesian diplomatic "bargaining setting" has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The changes in the structure of global power explain why, during the Asian economic crisis, the United States was able to wield considerable influence in support of its political objectives vis-a-vis Indonesia. It will be argued in this article that the hegemonic structure of Cold War international relations protected Indonesia's authoritarian elite from the global pressure towards democracy, and that the end of the Cold War explains why Indonesia became very exposed to this pressure during the regional economic crisis. While recognizing some of the positive aspects in the loss of bargaining power of Indonesia's authoritarian elite, the article also sees problems related to it and offers suggestions on how democratic Indonesia might avoid external pressures. Introduction After the meltdown of its economy and the rescue operation launched by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in December 1997, Indonesia has frequently been referred to as the Republic of the IMF, or as a victim of U.S. colonialism. In order to get help for its desperate economy, Indonesia's leaders have had to compromise many of their values and interests to the demands of the country's creditors. In 1998, Indoensian President Soeharto had to step down partly as a consequences of external pressure: he resigned only hours after U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had urged him to perform a "historical act of statemanship for the democratization of Indonesia". In Soeharto's words, "[a] foreign power made me quit". [1] In 1999, Indonesia had to accept that East Timor would secede to United Nations (UN) control in preparation for full independence. East Timor was considered by Indonesia to be an integral part of its territory. During the 1970s, only twenty years earlier, Indonesia had successfully negotiated an increase in its military aid from the United States by releasing some of its left-wing political prisoners, thus signalling to the leader of the anti-communist world that Jakarta's support could not be taken for granted. In the same manner, under Soekarno, an economically weakened Indonesia had bargained for political concessions from the United States and, accordingly, received U.S. aid. [2] What is it that has made Indonesia and many other developing countries so vulnerable to external influence? Why did democracy gain ascendancy after failing for so many decades? Even if one does not accept the idea of a new colonialist period, it seems clear that the present period makes developing countries easier to penetrate than they were only two decades ago. Or even if one does not accept Francis Fukuyama's prediction of the final global victory of liberal democracy, one must accept that in recent years authoritarian regimes have found themselves increasingly isolated, externally and internally. In this article, the ability of Western democracies to impose their ideals on developing countries is explained unconventionally. Instead of saying that this is merely a part of the process of globalization, it will be shown that, in the case of Indonesia, the phase of the cyclical hegemonic development played a major role in making Soeharto and Habibie yield to the democratizing pressure of the United States. In this alternative argument, states and political power -- and not merely new agents of globalized world politics, such as banks, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and regional organizations -- still have a role to play in world politics. It will be argued that the collapse of the Cold War hegemonic order made it easier for the United States to devote itself to ideological objectives: it no longer needed to "waltz" with dictators to legitimize and manage its leading role. The collapse of the Cold War also meant the disappearance of the challenge to U.S. leadership. This disappearance made it impo ssible for Indonesia to use the "Soviet/PRC Card" of resorting to the hostile camp if the terms of co-operation with the West did not please, or was conducive to, it. …

The Australia-Japan Partnership in the Asia-Pacific: From Economic Diplomacy to Security Co-Operation?

Abstract: Australia and Japan have been acclaimed as taking joint initiatives in establishing regional economic institutions such as the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council and the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum. This article seeks to establish why both countries have been able to forge a partnership in an Asia-Pacific economic community. The article identifies three elements of the partnership in institution-building: shared interests in building institutions of regional economic cooperation; power complementarity between the two countries compensating for their respective diplomatic shortcomings; and a corps of influential policy personnel working for regional economic co-operation. The article then looks at the partnership moving towards defence and security co-operation. Introduction Australia--Japan relations have developed to the extent that they have evolved into a partnership in the Asia-Pacific region based on shared interests and common identity, as Prime Minister John Howard declared during his visit to Japan in September 1996. Significant achievements of the partnership have been the joint initiatives in creating regional economic institutions, such as the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC) in 1980 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum in 1989. Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser said of such endeavours by the two countries: "APEC[ldots]is a creation of a great deal of painstaking effort and diplomacy over about 20 years. The move for such an organization has been driven by politicians in Japan and Australia, by the business community in both countries and also by linkages between universities." [1] After resolving 'bilateral trade disputes over beef and sugar in the 1970s, Japan and Australia worked together in organizing the Pacific Community Seminar at the Australian National University (ANU) in Canberra in September 1980, an event which is now regarded as the first PECC meeting. This was the earliest example of the success of the Australia--Japan partnership in contributing to the Asia-Pacific region at the governmental level. Yuichiro Nagatomi, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira's chief policy assistant, attributed the success of the seminar partly to three strong and long-established ties among Australian and Japanese leaders: Ohira and Foreign Minister Saburo Okita, Okita and seminar chairman John Crawford, and Crawford and Prime Minister Fraser. [2] The origins of the PECC can be traced to Ohira's Pacific Basin Co-operation Concept, and the idea of setting up a nongovernmental seminar stemmed from an agreement between Fraser and Ohira in Canberra, in January 1980. The Australian and Japanese sides p roceeded with frequent consultations and co-ordination at both governmental and academic levels, culminating in the ANU's successful organization of the seminar. Both countries were also co-operatively engaged in developing the APEC initiative which Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke announced in Seoul in January 1989. The actual creation and the circumstances of the announcement of the initiative were at the instigation of Hawke and his advisers in the Prime Minister's office, but the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) came to play a major role in developing and promoting the idea after the Hawke announcement. Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) had floated a proposal for economic ministers' regional meetings in mid-1988 and the DFAT expressed strong interest in the idea, which urged co-ordination between the two countries. A MITI delegation visited the regional countries to sound-out reactions for its proposal and Hawke's initiative in March 1989, which laid the "groundwork" for the Hawke proposal's relatively easy acceptance when an Australian delegation later visited the regional countries in April--May 1989. Although MITI's p roposal was eventually subsumed into the Hawke initiative, MITI took the position that the establishment of APEC amounted to success of its own proposal. …

The Reform of the Indonesian Armed Forces

Abstract: Indonesia's armed forces have played a dominant role in domestic politics from 1957 under their so-called "dual function". While the armed forces consolidated in the early Soeharto period, a significant faction later came to challenge his authority, contributing to his resignation from the presidency. This marked the beginning of the armed forces' reform movement, and its transition away from the political arena. Despite its reform orientation, under the Habibie presidency the armed forces were a stronger (and united) political actor. This carried over into the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid. However, as a consequence of the reform movement within the armed forces and with the assistance of Abdurrahman, the armed forces have splintered into several factions. This factionalism has given greater strength to the reform movement within the armed forces, and may contribute to the strengthening of democracy in Indonesia. Introduction When Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dun "suspended" Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, General Wiranto, on 14 February 2000, he marked what was seen by many as a new direction in the political role of Indonesia's military. By extension, this act also signified a critical juncture in Indonesian politics. For two weeks Wiranto had refused Abdurrahman Wahid's request to resign over being implicated in the bloody carnage surrounding East Timor's vote for independence and, briefly, Gus Dur appeared to accede. But the President did an abrupt about-face and relieved Wiranto of his Cabinet position. This action followed weeks of open speculation about a possible military coup against Gus Dur, and, although many ambiguities remained, it appeared that Gus Dur had triumphed over Wiranto. [1] While Wiranto was in the Cabinet, he was effectively equal to the most powerful person in Indonesia. Despite having been removed from his position as armed forces chief in October 1999, Wiranto still retained a strong grip over the Tentara National Indonesia (TNI, or the Indonesian National Military), [2] which had its own firm grip over Indonesian political society. The TNT had played a pivotal role in Indonesian politics, in particular through its so-called dwi fungsi (dual function) of engagement in civil and military affairs. [3] However, as Indonesia moves through its transition towards democratization, the role of the TNI as a political participant has been identified as a major impediment to that process. Yet, throughout the post-Soeharto period, at a time of continuing unprecedented political change, the TNI had also been reinventing itself. This process had begun before the fall of Soeharto and had deep roots in divisions within the armed forces, particularly between what was known as the "professional" as opposed to "financial" officers. [4] It was a later manifestation of this division that finally undermined Soeharto's presidency and led, via the economic collapse it precipitated, [5] to his resignation. The question remained, however, whether or not the changes that were taking place in the TNI marked a broad shift in commitment to its previous politically active policy. Most of the signs were that the TNI had partly shifted its style, but was only slowly shifting its substance. After a period of relative unity, the TNI had again fractured and there were competing visions for its future, with a more genuinely reformist movement aimed at political disengagement gaining ground. The TNI in Decline? It was suggested, after the fall of Soeharto as President in May 1998, that the TNI then called ABRI, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, or the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) [6] enjoyed little public support and, without the support of Soeharto, was seriously weakened as a political institution. In particular, many commentators claimed that ABRI had come into public disrepute and that this had weakened its standing as a state institution. …

ASEAN as a "Neighbourhood Watch Group"

Abstract: The Secretary-General of A SEAN, Rodolfo Severino, had said that the organization "has to be measured against the purposes that it has set for itself and the limitation that it has imposed upon itself". This article argues that A SEAN'S core purpose is that of an intergovernmental neighbourhood watch group, its primary function being that of ensuring regional political and economic stability. The neighbourhood watch group (NWG) idea borrows from the police-community crime prevention concept. When applied to ASEAN, this idea draws attention to its members' self-interest and mutual stake in regional stability. With the end of the Cold War, ASEAN embarked on expansion and consolidation, and seemed to have co-opted the newer members into this idea. Since 1997, however, ASEAN's fundamental purpose has been severely tested and it remains to be seen if the grouping can meet the challenge. Introduction Imagine a genie appearing suddenly before a gathering of ASEAN foreign ministers, with the grant of one wish. The assembled wise men -- well aware than ASEAN's image has been tarnished since 1997 -- are allowed to confer among themselves for five minutes. The argument of this article, in revisiting ASEAN's purpose, is that the appointed spokesman will approach the waiting genie and profess that the consensus is a wish for "regional political stabilization" [1] rather than "regional security", for which corporate agreement may be more difficult to establish. In making such a request, the ministers would be acutely aware of Southeast Asia's conflictual history since 1945, of the region's geopolitics and links to external powers, and of recent events such as the Asian economic crisis and the turmoil in postSoeharto Indonesia which inform the region's interdependence. In short, ASEAN should be best viewed as a "neighbourhood watch group" in which bilateral diplomacy -- not always smooth -- is critical to "regiona l political stabilization", and corporate initiatives are both limited and yet hold promise for the grouping if it seeks to become more vibrant. Cold War ASEAN A "neighbourhood watch group" is an apt way to describe ASEAN. The neighbourhood watch group (NWG) idea borrows from the municipal crime prevention concept in which the residents of a locality claim an active role in assisting the police to eliminate crime from their neighbourhood, in looking out for each other, and in improving safety in their neighbourhood. The appeal of an NWG derives from the assumption that residents of a neighbourhood "know best their own specific problems, strengths, resources and needs. They know best the people that live in the neighbourhood... Neighbourhoods are made up of people who have the power to protect each other's safety". [2] Of course, applied to ASEAN in the intergovernmental sense, the residents and police are the same state actors. Embedded in this idea is self-interest reinforcing a mutual stake in regional stability. It embodies several ideas associated with the grouping's emphasis on regional political stabilization, that is, the mutuallyagreed premium placed on poli tical stability embodied in central power and regardless of each state's political processes. These ideas include: good neighbourliness, a hallmark of which is the prerequisite of "getting to know each other"; non-interference and respect for sovereignty; territorial integrity; national and regional resilience; and consensus and consultation. Strongly suggestive of these ideas are the notions that trouble-makers could come from within the neighbourhood or from elsewhere, and that member households would cultivate goodwill towards each other. Given each member state's domestic concerns with religious, ethnic and other sectarian fault lines, none is expected to be his "brother's keeper". In the event that quarrels break out between affected households, these are no business of other households, although discreet mediation is not precluded. …

Tokyo's Dynamic Diplomacy: Japan and the Subcontinent's Nuclear Tests

Abstract: Among Japan's recent international initiatives, its responses to India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests have been largely overlooked. Major Japanese diplomatic initiatives in the wake of these tests included promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and taking a leadership role in resolving the India-Pakistan dispute. Japan's energetic responses were driven by domestic considerations of public opinion, coalition politics, and bureaucratic interests. Externally, Japan was motivated by a desire to highlight its contributions to international peace and security, solidify its claims to a permanent United Nations Security Council seat, and exhibit its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, as well as by the relative paucity of concrete interest in India and Pakistan. However, Japan achieved few of its objectives. A repeat of such episodes may well influence Japan's future efforts to be more active in international affairs. Introduction. Japan's foreign and defence policies are beginning to exhibit signs of rising activism. An unprecedented parliamentary debate on Japan's constitution, an announcement by the foreign ministry that it is considering participation in multilateral anti-piracy patrols in the Strait of Malacca, the dispatch of delegations around the world to promote the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's recent suggestion that Japan's soldiers might be able to carry weapons on peace-keeping operation (PKO) missions are just some examples of the trend towards a more engaged international posture by Japan. Japan's neighbours and others have been watching Tokyo's emerging "normalization" closely, seeking clues to Japan's future international behaviour and ambitions. One little noticed example of Japan's recent initiatives in international affairs was its responses to India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests conducted in May 1998. Japan's energetic responses to the nuclear blasts provide fresh insights into its broader international behaviour and ambitions. Although the subcontinent itself is marginal to Japan's economic, political, and security concerns, the nuclear tests raised fundamental questions about Japan's foreign policy, including the balance between economic and political diplomacy, the application of its official development assistance (ODA) charter, the role of public opinion, as well as domestic and bureaucratic politics in making foreign policy, Japan's relations with the great powers of the Permanent Five (P-5) and Group of Eight (G-8), the relative importance of specific security factors in shaping foreign policy, and Japan's relations with the United States. What emerges from a consideration of this episode in Japan's contemporary foreign relations is quite telling. Motivated mainly by the desire to demonstrate responsible political rather than economic leadership, burnish its claims to a permanent United Nations Security Council seat, and exert initiative on nuclear matters, Japan launched strong but largely overlooked efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as well as to help resolve the India-Pakistan dispute. Not only did Tokyo fail on these scores, but the international community and the major powers were indifferent, Delhi and Islamabad uncompromising, and the Japanese public unmoved. Tokyo's dynamic diplomacy fell flat. Whether a repeat of similar episodes and outcomes in other contexts will push Japan towards a sullen isolationism, assertive unilateralism, or what the Japanese commentator Yoichi Funabashi, writing in Foreign Affairs, called a "reluctant realism", [1] remains to be seen. "Political Animals" "South Asians are political animals, while Japan is an economic animal", the late Prime Minister of Pakistan Zulfikar Al Bhutto supposedly once said. The world is accustomed to Japan's economic diplomacy. It is hence surprising that political initiatives in the wake of India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests have eclipsed Japan's economic actions. …

Chinese New Villages of the Malayan Emergency, A Generation Later A Case Study

Abstract: Between 1950 and 1952 the British Military Administration of Malaya undertook the relocation of some half a million rural Chinese into some five hundred fenced and curfewed "new villages" as part of its counter-offensive against the communist insurgency. Almost one in four of the Chinese of Malaya, and one in ten of the entire population, were involved in resettlement. Though the new villages received some notoriety in the war literature of the "Emergency" and were the focus of more serious studies in the 1960s, they have not been singled out for much scholarly attention in recent years.1 Nonetheless, an understanding of the new villages today has both historical and contemporary value. The origins of these villages set them apart from natural communities; some of their successes and problems a generation later may prove instructive to planners cur rently developing resettlement programmes of other sorts. Moreover, since there is a widely held notion in the public mind in Malaysia that new villages are communities of a particular sort, there is value in examining the nature of their particularity, if indeed such exists. In its survey of income and poverty levels set forth in the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980), the Malaysian Government chose to treat "new villagers" as an economic category, comparing them directly with such groups as "padi farmers" and "fishermen". Most of the new villages, however, display considerable economic heterogeneity, which grows out of the process of relocation itself and has been further exacerbated by the complex interaction of natural demographic and economic forces. The common wisdom holds that the new villages, and other semi-rural communities like them, are dying slow social and economic deaths, as their youth leave to seek work in the cities. But for many of these departing workers the separation from family and home community may prove to be only temporary; many are involved in a pattern of circulating wage labour in which workers drawn off into the national economy remit earnings and move with varying regularity 126

New Zealand and Asia-Pacific Security: New Rationales for Engagement?

Abstract: Throughout the 1990s, New Zealand maintained a commitment to Asia-Pacific security as one of the three pillars of a broadly based defence policy. However, Wellington tended to define its regional security goals in very general terms, making few obvious steps towards the formal publication of a regional security strategy. This article provides an explanation for this somewhat indirect approach to regional security. It also explores New Zealand's future role in Asia-Pacific regional security against the backdrop of two important developments in the latter half of 1999. The first of these was New Zealand's extensive commitment to the multinational force in East Timor -- the largest overseas deployment by the New Zealand Defence Force since the Korean War. The second was the election of a centre-left Labour-Alliance government committed to a thorough review of New Zealand's defence priorities. Introduction The proposition that regional security matters to New Zealand is unlikely to raise many voices of domestic protest. But one does not have to be a post-modernist to recognize that perceptions of the region, and of security within it, depend on the eye of the beholder. It stands to reason that when New Zealand approaches security in the Asia-Pacific it does so from a perspective which reflects its own particular place in the world. This view is further filtered according to the way the government of the day defines the region and the security problems it is most keen to address. This article begins with an examination of New Zealand's consistent approach to regional security during the 1990s under a series of governments led by the centre-right National Party. A comparison with Australia's more direct regional security strategy is used to illustrate the generality of New Zealand's approach. The latter is then explained with reference to six key factors, ranging from New Zealand's relative distance from major security events in the Asia-Pacific to Wellington's desire to keep its options open. The final sections of the article deal with the potential change to this security policy status quo stemming from two key developments. The first of these is New Zealand's role in the international community's response to the post-referendum violence in East Timor. As Chair of the September 1999 Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) summit held in Auckland, New Zealand presided over the consideration by regional leaders of the escalating East Timor crisis on the increasingly wide sidelines of this important annual forum. [1] New Zealand then made substantial military contributions to the Australian-led International Force East Timor (INTERFET) and its replacement, the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET). Under INTERFET, New Zealand's commitment reached a high point of 830 troops and over 1,100 personnel in total from all three New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) services. [2] While New Zealand's contribution to East Timor has since been scaled back to 660 troops under UNTAET, [3] this is still a substantial undertaking for New Zealand, especially as it involves rotating battalion groups under a projected eighteen-month commitment until March 2001. [4] The second major development was the November 1999 election of a centre-left coalition government comprising the Labour and Alliance Parties, which is also backed by the support of the Green Party in the House of Representatives. Prime Minister Helen Clark's new government has included in its heavy workload a commitment to revamp New Zealand's defence posture. [5] This promised overhaul will undoubtedly have implications for Wellington's future approach to regional security. New Zealand and Australia on Regional Security: A Brief Comparison The most obvious benchmark for assessing New Zealand's regional security role is the approach taken by. its nearest neighbour, Australia. This is to be expected not least because of Canberra's senior role in Wellington's most important defence partnership. …

Vietnam : northernizing the south or southernizing the north?

Abstract: On both sides of the political spectrum it was a commonly held view, after the com munist victory in April 1975, that the next phase of development in southern Viet nam would see a process of "northernization" ? a remoulding of southern society after the pattern already existing in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) north of the seventeenth parallel. The logic of the position held by those of the political right, that the erst while Republic of Vietnam had been a legitimate, independent nation-state, was that the change of regime was a "conquest" of the south by the north. As a corol lary, the period following this "conquest" was expected to be one in which the vic torious north would attempt to impose its political, social and economic system upon an essentially unwilling south. Even among those who took the opposite view of the nature of the Vietnam War, the common presumption in the aftermath of "liberation" was that the southern half of the country would embark upon a process of political, social and economic transformation to bring it into line with the system developing in the north since 1954. Though allowing for some inevitable (but not fundamental) differences between the two regions, the leadership of the DRV seems to have shared this view. In the initial stages, the policies adopted towards the south mirrored those followed in the north twenty years earlier. Transformation-was seen as proceeding in stages, the initial one being a period of recovery from the ravages of war. At this stage only the assets of foreign companies, comprador capitalists and other "enemies of the people" were nationalized. Once the economy was on a more normal footing (though one cannot claim that all the long-term consequences of war have been overcome even now), a process of socialization was set in motion. As in the north where it was regarded as basically completed in three years (1958-60), this was expected to be achieved by the end of the 1976-80 Five-Year Plan.1 It involved the creation of state and joint state-private industries in the modern sector, collectivization of agriculture and handicraft industries and the attempt to bring domestic circulation of goods under state control. During the transformation stage, class struggle was expected to con tinue, but there is no indication that the leadership regarded this process as especially problematical. Possibly the experience of China in the early 1950s in

The U.S. Military Facilities in the Philippines

Abstract: Every U.S. military operation in the Western Pacific has made some use of the mili tary bases in the Philippines. For example, the American military contingents sent out in 1900 to enforce Washington's "open-door" policy in China were staged through the Philippines. Seventy-five years later, the bases played a key role in the rapid military response to the Cambodian capture of the American ship, the Mayaquez. The strategic location of the islands was recognized by the Commander of the American colonial forces in the Philippines, General Arthur MacArthur.1 More than half a century later, a similar appreciation was given to the Congress by the retiring Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. forces in the Pacific (CINCPAC), Admiral Long, when he said:

The Role of Singapore in ASEAN

Abstract: The idea for this paper became more and more plausible when I spent a brief period of time in each of the five countries in the Associa tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the summer of 1980. As a member of a group of ten American academics, I was sent to the ASEAN area to exchange views, debate the issues, defend or condemn U.S. policy, and learn about the five countries individually and about ASEAN as an organization. One of the major themes was the concept of "consensus in ASEAN", another the "ASEAN spirit of co-opera tion". These are necessary devices enabling all five countries to reconcile different national interests, patterns of development, and styles. In all five countries, Singapore was mentioned as the one mem ber that was not likely to be in complete agreement on most major issues.

The Soviet Union in Southeast Asia: National Perspectives from the Region*

Abstract: It is often tempting to describe Soviet-Southeast Asian relations as if a single view exists. Equally prevalent is the belief that the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries are unanimous in opposing Soviet "expansionism" in the region. While this statement may be true in general terms, differences in nuances and, at times, genuine clashes of interest drastically alter this basic scenario. This paper aims to analyse the ASEAN member states' perspectives on Soviet involve ment in the region, especially in terms of how they perceive the "Soviet threat''. As for the views of the Indochinese states, especially Vietnam, and Burma, it is only possible to make educated guesses because relatively little is known about the goals and perceptions of their leaders. But whenever the term Southeast Asia appears in the paper, it refers to all regional countries except when specific reference is made.