Showing papers in "Financial Accountability and Management in 1991"

Span of control, task interdependence and usefulness of mas information in not‐for‐profit government organizations

Abstract: This study examines the relationships between subunit supervisors' span of control, their perceived task interdependence, and their perceived usefulness of MAS (management accounting systems) information in not-for-profit government organizations. One hundred and forty-nine subunit supervisors/managers working in twenty-one public hospitals in New Zealand participated in the study. The study used structured questionnaires for data collection. The results suggest that supervisors' perceived task interdependence intervenes in the relationship between their span of control and their perceived usefulness of MA information for decision making. The types of MAS information considered were broad in scope, timely available, aggregated and integrated. A path analytic technique was applied to test the model used in the study.

Accountability and the poll tax: the impact on local authority budgets of the reform of local government finance in england

Abstract: In 1990 the United Kingdom government introduced major reforms to the system of local government finance in England. The most dramatic change was the replacement of domestic property taxation by a flat rate community charge, or poll tax. The government's principal argument for this reform was that it would enhance the accountability of local authorities to their electorates. This paper examines the nature of this accountability link, and develops measures of the extent to which the new arrangements have increased accountability. A model is presented which seeks to determine whether the changes in accountability have led to changes in the expenditure patterns of local authorities in the first year of the reforms. The results are negative, and this preliminary evidence therefore suggests that the accountability arguments for the reforms are spurious.

Why cost‐reimbursed not‐for‐profits use debt financing despite the absence of tax incentives

Abstract: This paper explains why cost-reimbursed not-for-profits (NFPs) have incentives to use debt financing when purchasing capital assets. When the purchase is internally financed (i.e., through retained earnings), NPV is negative and the NFP lacks incentives for efficient investment. But when financed through debt with reimbursed (‘passed through’) interest, earlier reimbursed depreciation recovery relative to delayed principal costs can lead to positive NPV and excessive reimbursement. This analysis may thus help explain an empirical regularity, namely that NFPs tend to be highly leveraged despite the absence of tax shields or the availability of internal funds. This regularity cannot be explained either by the ‘trade-off’ or by the ‘pecking order’ theories of capital structure.

Accounting for the Severn Bridge

Abstract: Although the Severn bridge has been financed as a vote-funded service, the Severn Bridge Tolls Act 1965 required the publication of commercial-style ‘White Paper accounts’. The existence of this consistent source makes it possible to review the financial history to date of the Severn bridge, an interesting example of a case of government deciding that a capital-intensive infrastructural facility should break-even over its life. Two principal factors explain the everaccumulating deficiencies on the bridge account: the failure of successive governments to maintain the bridge toll in real terms; and the exceptional capital repairs required during the 1980s because of design faults and greater than expected loads. There are implications for the design of reporting systems for civil-service executive agencies and for the privatized ‘concession’-style financing packages for transport infrastructure which the present Government has now adopted.

Equity flotation cost in public utility rate regulation

Abstract: Based upon Myers (1974) adjusted net present value model, this paper develops a financial valuation framework to account for flotation costs in the utility's rate determination process. The zero adjusted net present value criterion established in the paper is used as a basis in measuring the ‘fair’ returns to the utility. It is demonstrated that both the Arzac-Marcus (1981) and the conventional flotation cost adjustment formulas maintain the utility shareholders' wealth. However, the Arzac-Marcus formula fails to charge the utility customers properly across time while the conventional approach preserves the ‘fair’ pricing of the utility services to the customers.