Showing papers in "Foreign Affairs in 1976"

Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?

Abstract: W H E R E are America's formal or de facto energy policies leading us? Where might we choose to go instead? How can we find out? Addressing tbese questions can reveal deeper questions—and a few answers—that are easy to grasp, yet rich in insight and in international relevance. This paper will seek to explore such basic concepts in energy strategy by outlining and contrasting two energy paths tbat the United States might follow over tbe next 50 years—long enough for tbe full implications of cbange to start to emerge. Tbe first path resembles present federal policy and is essentially an extrapolation of tbe recent past. It relies on rapid expansion of centralized high technologies to increase supplies of energy, especially in the form of electricity. The second path combines a prompt and serious commitment to efficient use of energy, rapid development of renewable energy sources matcbed in scale and in energy quality to end-use needs, and special transitional fossil-fuel tecbnologies. This path, a wbole greater than tbe sum of its parts, diverges radically from incremental past practices to pursue long-term goals.

Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente

Abstract: EVEN though the translation of the Vladivostok Accord on stra tegic arms into a SALT II Treaty has not yet been resolved, I believe it is now timely to take stock of the strategic arms balance toward which the United States and the Soviet Union would be headed under the terms of such a treaty. To that end it is necessary to raise certain basic questions about the maintenance of strategic sta bility?in terms of minimizing both the possibility of nuclear war and the possibility that nuclear arms may be used by either side as a means of decisive pressure in key areas of the world. It appears to be the general belief that while such strategic stability may not be assured by the SALT agreements, it is not and will not be substantially endangered?that on the contrary it has been furthered by the SALT negotiations and agreements since 1969?and that in any event the best hope of stability lies in further pursuit of nego tiations with the aim of reducing the level of strategic weapons and delivery systems on both sides. Unfortunately?and to the profound regret of one who has participated both in the SALT negotiations and in a series of earlier U.S. decisions designed to stabilize the nu clear balance?I believe that each of these conclusions is today with out adequate foundation. On the contrary, there is every prospect that under the terms of the SALT agreements the Soviet Union will continue to pursue a nuclear superiority that is not merely quantitative but designed to produce a theoretical war-winning capability. Further, there is a major risk that, if such a condition were achieved, the Soviet Union would adjust its policies and actions in ways that would undermine the present d?tente situation, with results that could only resurrect the danger of nuclear confrontation or, alternatively, increase the prospect of Soviet expansion through other means of pressure. While this highly disturbing prospect does not mean that strategic

Europe and Africa: Decolonization or Dependency

Abstract: FIFTEEN years after most of Africa received its independence, Europe is still present and influential in the continent. The Euro pean presence has, however, shifted from overt and direct to more subtle forms. While military occupation and sovereign control over African territories have all but been eliminated, political in fluence, economic preponderance, and cultural conditioning remain. Britain and France, and with them the rest of the European Commu nity, maintain a relatively high level of aid and investment, trade dominance, and a sizable flow of teachers, businessmen, statesmen, tourists and technical assistants. Perhaps most symbolically signif icant of all, the long-nurtured dream of an institutionalized Eur African community was finally inaugurated on February 28, 1975, when the convention of trade and cooperation was signed at Lom? between the European Nine and the then-37 independent Black African states (plus nine islands and enclaves in the Caribbean and the Pacific). Thus, Eur-African relations are a matter of continuity and change, but judgments of them vary considerably, according to the impor tance given to one or the other of these two elements. To some, the successor of colonialism is neocolonialism and dependency; for others, what is taking place is gradual disengagement, and the multilateral ization of ties to the developed nations. The first look askance at the continuing presence, comparing it with an ideal of total mastery of one's destiny; to them the change seems trivial, or worse, insidious. The second emphasize actual changes, the moves toward indepen dence, and see them as part of a continuing process. The best perspec tive obviously is the one that can encompass and provide an explana tion for the largest number of facts. The dependency approach is now widely used in analyzing Third World developmental problems. According to this school of thought the attainment of political sovereignty masks the reality of continued dependence on world economic structures, and calculations of power and interest within this dependency relationship explain underdevel opment. Impatient with the slow progress of African states toward development and the real difficulty for new nations in narrowing the gap that separates them from the industrial states, dependency an alysts locate the source of the new nations' developmental problems

The North-South Dialogue: From Conflict to Compromise

Abstract: THE conflict between the poor developing nations living in the Southern Hemisphere and the rich industrial countries of the North has entered a new phase in recent months. At long last the countries of the world are coming seriously to grips with the growing material inequalities between a handful of affluent nations in North America, Western Europe and Japan (which account for less than 18 percent of the world population but more than 60 percent of world income), and the scores of poor countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America which constitute the bulk of humanity but enjoy very little of the earth's bounty. The North-South struggle, brewing for years, had its first climactic manifestation in the 1971-72 negotiations between the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the multinational oil com panies for a higher crude oil price. OPEC's success in its first real bargaining with the companies put the geo-economics of petroleum at the very center of world politics. The oil price adjustments of 1973-74, and the consequences of the Arab oil embargo, made the world realize?however reluctantly and painfully?that the inev itable had finally occurred. The blissful era of plentiful and ridic ulously cheap hydrocarbon fuels from the Middle East came to a fateful end.

Market-sharing approach to the world nuclear sales problem

Abstract: The recent decisions by West Germany and France to sell nuclear fuel facilities to Brazil and Pakistan, respectively, mark the first sharp divergence by major industrial nations from long-established U.S. nonproliferation policy. Thus far, the U.S. has been ineffective in seeking to persuade Germany and France not to proceed with them. This indicates a serious weakness in the execution of American nonproliferation policy, which if left uncorrected, could result in the rapid spread of nuclear weapons material and capability around the world. It is clear that complex problems are raised by the concept of market-sharing. A principal advocate, Dr. Lawrence Scheinman from ERDA, says that traditional arguments against market-sharing do not qualify as reasons against the concept. He does identify three basic arguments against market-sharing, which the author discusses in this article, namely: (1) reactor market-sharing is contrary to U.S. anti-cartel policy and in violation of antitrust laws; (2) other nuclear supplier countries would reject a market-sharing arrangement; and (3) the recipient countries of the Third World would view it as a nuclear cartel and refuse to do business with it. The author advocates that at the very least, the U.S. should enter the next round of supplier negotiations preparedmore » to propose multinational arrangements for closing the commercial nuclear fuel cycle and for making all weapons-grade material generated by the fuel cycle unavailable to any nation on a sovereign basis. The U.S. should also make clear that it would view with the gravest concern the continuation of the present export policies of West Germany and France. (MCW)« less

The International Nuclear Industry Today: The End of the American Monopoly

Abstract: The rapid spread of nuclear reactors, uranium enrichment facilities, and reprocessing plants outside of the nuclear weapons club--to countries such as Brazil, South Korea, and the Union of South Africa--has caused concern resulting in a suggestion that the technology transfer be banned until more acceptable safeguards are adopted Several reasons why this approach to the proliferation problem is unlikely to be successful are discussed First, the US no longer possesses a monopoly over reactor technologies or fuel cycle processes In fact, in the area of reprocessing and breeder reactor development the US lags behind other industrialized countries Second, the nature of the nuclear industries in most of these countries makes it highly unlikely that they would go along with such an embargo; rather, they would be likely to exploit the opportunity for additional nuclear sales to the fullest Third, such a policy would run the risk of wrecking the existing NPT which guarantees countries nondiscriminatory access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes These facts have led some in the domestic nuclear power establishment to conclude that the current realities of the international nuclear energy industry not only rule out the possibility of an effective unilateral US embargo policy but mandatemore » the cessation of nuclear trade The author presents his views against this argument He says that trade in nuclear facilities can be effectively regulated through cooperative agreements and international institutional arrangements Recent agreements to regulate such trade, signed by six key countries, is a step in the right direction (MCW)« less

Jamaica, or the Non-Reform of the International Monetary System

Abstract: (>(, A LL is well that ends," Treasury Secretary William Simon said jokingly at X3^ the cocktail party that followed the conclusion of the recent Jamaica Con ference It would indeed be hard to give in a few syllables a more discerning judg ment about the long drawn-out international monetary negotiations of the past four to five years, since the suspension of the convertibility of the dollar into gold in August 1971, and the resulting collapse of the system of par values or fixed exchange rates which had existed since 1944 The original purpose of the negotiations had been to bring about a full-fledged, comprehensive reform of the international monetary system But this attempt was given up in January 1974 after, but as we shall see not mainly because of, the quad rupling of the price of oil In its stead some "interim arrangements" were to be im plemented It took another two years of negotiations to reach final agreement at Jamaica on these interim arrangements, even though they consist mainly, though not exclusively, of the legalization of the international monetary practices which had evolved in the meantime The Secretary's joke thus well expressed the feelings of most of those present under the mango trees In what follows, I propose to deal in turn with ( 1 ) the tensions that developed within the Bretton Woods system and why it was allowed to break down; (2) the reform effort that ensued and why it failed; (3) the Jamaica agreement and its significance; (4) where we should go from here, and how*