Showing papers in "Harvard international review in 2007"

Credit for the Poor: Poverty as Distant History

Abstract: In our data-driven analysis of economic development and poverty, it is often difficult to remember that poverty was not created by the poor, but is rather a result of the socioeconomic system we have designed for the world. The poor are the victims of the very institutions that we have built and feel so proud of, and their continuous plight stems from our inability to think beyond the dominant theoretical frameworks of macroeconomics. Reliance on flawed concepts explains why the interactions between institutions and people have resulted in policies that produce poverty, rather than alleviate it, for so many human beings. The fault of poverty therefore lies with the top of society, with policymakers and academics. It does not reflect any lack of capability, desire, or effort on the part of the impoverished. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] In my mind, it is possible to envision a world without extreme poverty, where imaginations of poverty will be of the distant past. But in order to reach this goal--to reduce and ultimately eliminate poverty--we must go back to the drawing board. It is unthinkable that the concepts, institutions, and analytical frameworks that have created and perpetuated poverty will be able to end it. Instead, we must intelligently reconstruct the economic framework and redesign these institutions along principles that better serve the poor. In doing so, we can affirm their basic human right to dignity and work with them to serve their needs in a sustainable way. I became involved in the effort against poverty not as a policymaker or as a researcher, but as an individual concerned by the destitution around me. Grameen Bank, a personal project I started over 30 years ago, serves as a testament to the power of alternatives to the conventional banking techniques espoused by our current economic system. By setting a precedent for the efficacy of microcredit and the reliability of the poor, Grameen Bank has inspired many similar banks around the world engaged in eliminating poverty. Most important is that these banks are designed with the poor in mind. While conventional banks exclude the poor with impossible loan conditions, inaccessibility, and bureaucracy, Grameen and others have eliminated many of these difficulties. Sending bank officials to villages gives the poor convenient access to credit, while collateral-free loans make it possible for the poor to lift themselves out of poverty. Paperwork and forms have been simplified to accommodate the illiteracy of bank beneficiaries. Similarly, a new solution calls for removing the pressures of legal reprisal that plague borrowers by abolishing the legally-binding quality of loans, thereby removing potential doubts and fears about obtaining credit. In order to design systems that are more accessible to the poor, the institutions fighting poverty must understand the limitations faced by the poor and seek to work around them. We must create a new system that expands the horizons of our economic understanding to best serve these communities by redefining traditional notions of credit, reaffirming self-employment, and creating social businesses. The Shortcut of Self-Employment The most important step to ending poverty is the creation of employment and income opportunities for the poor. While insufficient infrastructure and often inefficient markets in the lesser-developed world make it difficult for populations to find jobs, the unemployed can still create their own work and a sustainable living wage for themselves. Orthodox economics recognizes wage-employment, but it has been deficient in commenting on self-employment. This omission is a grave mistake. Promoting self-employment is the quickest and easiest way to create jobs for the jobless and to help the poor break a recurring cycle of debt and deeper poverty. Credit is essential for the creation of instant self-employment, since it provides the investment that leads to small businesses and income for the impoverished. …

The Resource Curse Revised: Conflict and Coltan in the Congo

Abstract: "Going up that river was like traveling back to the earliest beginnings of the world, when vegetation rioted on the earth and the big trees were kings. An empty stream, a great silence, an impenetrable forest. There was no joy in the brilliance of the sunshine." [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, Norton and Company, 1963, 35. The Resource Curse and its Paradox The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), also known as "The Congo" and "Zaire," remains the "heart of darkness" depicted so scintillatingly by Conrad in his novella. A place of conflict, brutality, and exploitation, the Congo documented by Marlow, a Belgian traveler journeying up the Congo River in search of Kurtz, the infamous ivory station chief and Marlow's fellow colonist, is not that different from its present reality. The faces of DRC leaders may be different, the names of places may have changed, but the Congo's horror is unchanged. Ongoing armed conflict and strife between groups of varying nationalities, ethnicities, and ideologies overwhelm the lush land. Here, greed for political power and wealth fuels the exploitation of people, their resources, and their homeland. Lusting foreigners, rebels, and governments strip the land of its natural resources. It is widely acknowledged that greed exacerbates the negligence of an incompetent state and thereby leads to war. In the DRC, greed has precipitated a multinational war. Most recently, since 1998, the country has transformed into a battleground for what many observers have dubbed Africa's "First World War," a war that has cost over 3.8 million lives. Both precedent and theory lend reason for the ongoing conflict in the Congo. From the diamond mines of South and West Africa to the oilfields of Iraq and the timber-rich forests of the Amazon, millions of people in these resource-rich countries have seen their lives devastated by the mishandling of vast revenues from natural resources. This pattern has reaffirmed the well-established resource curse: resource-rich countries are less wealthy and less competently governed than those lacking in natural resources. The resource curse gives reason for the empirical correlation between resource-rich countries and reduced investment in human capital, increased domestic political corruption, and perilous reductions in economic diversification. The ultimate result of these outcomes is the stunted long-term economic growth of an ostensibly fortunate nation. Nowhere has the mismanagement of abundant resources manifested itself more visibly than in the DRC. DRC resources include copper, diamonds, cobalt, petroleum, gold, silver, zinc, and coltan. The exploitation of coltan, used in computer microchips, is relatively underexamined by the international community, yet it is highly demanded overseas. Greed for coltan haunts the DRC. Indeed, the country's complex, unstable history, the corruption and substandard performance of its leaders, the ethnic hostilities, and the international community's invasion of the DRC, compounded with its readily available natural wealth, have led to ongoing war. Today, this human disaster is regarded as the worst African emergency and the worst humanitarian calamity since World War II. Political stability no longer looks impossible in the DRC following a power-sharing Global and All-Inclusive Agreement in South Africa in December 2003, from which a transitional government was formed and the country's first presidential elections were held in July 2006. However, even though the war is officially over, dozens of rebel armies remain fighting in the east, vying for products sold largely to the international community. Even though this vast country, which spans an area the size of Western Europe, or 2.34 million square kilometers, is being patrolled by the world's largest UN peacekeeping force (some 17,000 UN representatives are dispersed across the country), the Western media has significantly underplayed the war and its aftermath. …

Righting Wrongs: Affirmative Action in South Africa

Abstract: South Africa has in recent years passed legislation instituting the world's most rigorous form of affirmative action. The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Bill strives for the "effective participation of black people in the economy" in order to achieve the "economic unity of the nation." Although the professed aims of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) are noble, the program has achieved little success in eradicating poverty, increasing employment, or fostering overall economic growth. Whether the new legislation is government-sponsored discrimination or rightful redress of apartheid injustice, remains a matter of controversy. What is clear is that the initiative is an inadequate approach to extending prosperity. The unfortunate result is the displacement of one elite in favor of another, as income disparity within the black population widens. BEE is based on redistribution according to race rather than wealth or income. Businesses are expected to fulfill rigorous race quotas in a quest for a "demographically representative" staff. Redistribution legislation has made it more difficult for skilled white workers to find employment domestically, resulting in an outflow of skill. Between 1994 and 2001, the percentage of enterprises that perceived the emigration of skilled manpower as "significant" rose from 2 percent to 33 percent. This disturbing skills shortage in many sectors of the economy is accompanied by slow economic growth rates that barely keep pace with population growth. Critics worldwide have addressed another pressing concern with BEE policies, namely the perpetuation of a small black elite by the current system without aiding the masses who are most in need. Although BEE professes to promote the "meaningful participation of black people in the economy," it actually fosters a political cronyism that benefits only an elite few. For instance, in 2003, 60 percent of empowerment deals amounting to 25.3 billion South African rand went to the companies of only two black businessmen. Accordingly, wealthy blacks are enriched at the expense of millions living in poverty. In the case of government employment, where racial preferences commonly outweigh skill-based qualifications, black employees certainly benefit, but the masses of poor black citizens who rely on basic government services such as health care and water face exorbitant costs. Thus, while racial preference allows black contractors to charge much higher prices without the risk of losing business, the burden of excessive cost results in fewer public services for those who need them most. …

An Opportunistic Ally: China's Increasing Involvement in Africa

Abstract: Chinese officials, think tank researchers, and representatives of state-owned companies frequently refer to a "win-win" outcome when discussing Chinese-African relations. Most of my interlocutors during visits to Beijing and Shanghai this year sincerely seemed to believe that China and Africa have had, and will continue to have, a mutually beneficial relationship. China and Africa have been trading partners for many centuries. The Chinese Communist Party formed close ties with African liberation movements in the late 1950s. However, its engagements with the continent over the past 10 years have greatly exceeded earlier contact. As the quantity and intensity of these relationships have increased, China has been subjected to the realities of dealing with Africa and has come under criticism for some of its government policies and business practices. So far, China has shown an unusual ability to react constructively and mitigate problems caused by its policies. Indeed, if China continues its deft foreign policy in Africa, popular discontent among Africans will likely remain manageable. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] China's Strategy in Africa In general China has sought to portray itself as the world's largest and most powerful developing country, while it describes Africa as the continent with the largest number of developing countries. It considers Chinese and African economies as highly complementary with strong prospects for cooperation. China's January 2006 African Policy statement proposed a decades-long comprehensive agenda that has been well received by African leaders. This statement emphasized non-interference in internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit and support, and, most critical to Beijing, an acceptance of the one-China principle. This principle assigned a premium to high-level exchanges in all spheres of activity. It called for a new international political and economic order that would safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries. China promised to facilitate the entrance of African products into the Chinese market, increase investment in Africa, and intensify agricultural cooperation. It began to encourage Chinese enterprises in order to help build infrastructure in African countries, something the West has been reluctant to do in recent years. And it promised to help Africa raise the level of tourism, reduce its debt, and increase economic assistance. The policy statement called for comprehensive cooperation in the fields of education, science and technology, culture, medicine and health, media, the environment, and disaster relief. It offered training assistance to African military personnel as well as support to internal defense building and African peacekeeping operations. Finally, the statement noted that China would promote cooperation with African judicial, law enforcement, and immigration departments while addressing non-traditional security threats such as terrorism. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), launched in 2000, is the vehicle through which China manages this relationship. The Third Ministerial Conference of FOCAC took place in Beijing in November 2006. All 48 African countries that have diplomatic relations with China sent senior delegations, most of them led by their respective heads of state. Only five countries--the Gambia, Malawi, Swaziland, Burkina Faso, and Sao Tome and Principe, all of which have formal relations with Taiwan--did not participate. The Beijing Action Plan resulting from the last FOCAC conference was ambitious in both its depth and breadth. Specific decisions included a Chinese pledge to increase from 190 to 440 the number of items from Africa's least developed countries that are permitted to enter China duty-free. China said it would establish a China-Africa Development Fund capitalized at US$5 billion to support investments in Africa by Chinese companies. It also promised to double the value of its 2006 development assistance program by 2009 and cancel some states' government interest-free loans that were due at the end of 2000. …

Moderate Revivalists: Islamic Inroads in Sub-Saharan Africa

Abstract: There are approximately three hundred million African Muslims in the world, which comprises roughly one-third of the African continent's population. But despite this fairly large Muslim population and Islam's historical presence in Africa, African Islam has remained largely neglected in the study of Muslim politics. This neglect was to a large extent the result of an academic division of labor based on the assumption that Africa was only superficially Islamized. However, the truth is that many parts of Africa have been incorporated into the world of Islam for a long time. African Muslims have adhered to and practiced the main pillars of Islam--including the arduous pilgrimage to Mecca required of every Muslim--for more than a millennium. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] During the European colonial conquest of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, colonial troops faced fierce resistance from organized religious political Islamic movements, including the Tijaniyya in Senegal and Mali and the Libyan Sanusiyya in the Sahara and Niger. After the establishment of colonial domination and the creation of French, British, and Portuguese-controlled territories, the movement of Muslims across the Sahara was considerably restricted by colonial governments that wanted to prevent the rise of transnational Islamic solidarities. This isolation of African Muslims ended with the collapse of colonial rule after World War II, at which point they began to enjoy greater freedom of movement and agency. Political independence also ushered in an era of charismatic leaders, such as Sukarno in Indonesia, Nehru in India, Nasser in Egypt, and Nkrumah in Ghana, all of whom sought to promote solidarity within the "Southern" bloc by way of the Non-Aligned Movement and various other bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements. Within the framework of such cooperation between southern countries, predominantly Muslim states in the Middle East and Africa were encouraged to develop closer relations based on a common Islamic heritage. These connections between African Muslims and the rest of the Islamic world laid the foundation for the strong revival of Islam that occurred in the 1970s. This revival, although originating in the Middle East, gained momentum in Africa and led to a new wave of Islamist groups that sought to enact a series of social changes in the region. But contrary to general consensus in the West, these groups have no real aspirations for political power and do not adopt methods of Islamic extremism or jihadism. Indeed, such extremist ideologies and movements have had very little success in gaining influence in sub-Saharan Africa. Afro-Arab Relations After Independence The attainment of political independence in Asia and Africa led to a rebuilding of ties that had been restricted or severed during colonial rule. Several North African and Middle Eastern Arab countries were keen to promote Islamic education in sub-Saharan Africa. From the early 1960s onwards, Egypt and Morocco strengthened their ties with many West African states. The Moroccan presence in West Africa, it must be noted, goes back to the sixteenth century when Morocco conquered the Songhai Empire and made it a province of the Moroccan kingdom. Another source of Moroccan influence in West Africa has been the spread of the Morocco-based Tijaniyya Sufi order, which millions of Black Africans have embraced. King Hassan of Morocco developed personal friendships with many West African politicians and religious leaders. Grants were provided to thousands of African graduates of the local Islamic scholarly tradition to pursue higher education in Moroccan institutions. These close ties continue to be cultivated by the current ruler of Morocco, Muhammad VI. Next to Morocco, Egypt has done the most to strengthen relations with African nations in the postcolonial period. A nationalist, socialist, and towering figure of Thirdworldism, Egypt's former president Gamal Abdel Nasser, also believed in pan-Islamic solidarity. …

Precipitate Decline: The Advent of Multipolarity

Abstract: As recently as 2003, it was considered absurd to talk of the decline of the United States. Now, however, such a belief has become common currency among theorists, policymakers, and the media. What significantly raised the awareness of this concept was, of course, the fiasco of the United States' preemptive invasion of Iraq. What is not yet sufficiently appreciated is the precise nature of this decline and when it specifically began. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Most analysts contend that the United States was at its hegemonic apex in the post-1991 era when the world was marked by unipolarity, as contrasted with the bipolar structure that existed during the Cold War. But this notion has reality absolutely backwards. The United States was the sole hegemonic power from 1945 to approximately 1970. Its hegemony has been in decline ever since. The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major blow to US power in the world. And the invasion of Iraq in 2003 transformed the situation from one of slow decline into one of precipitous collapse. By 2007, the United States had lost its credibility not only as the economic and political leader of the world-system, but also as the dominant military power. Since I am aware that this is not the standard picture either in the media or in scholarly literature, let me spell this out in some detail. I shall divide this account into three periods: 1945-1970, 1970-2001, and 2001 to the present. They correspond to the period of US hegemony, that of slow US decline giving rise to a creeping multipolarity, and that of the precipitate decline and effective multipolarity of the era inaugurated by US President George W. Bush. Unquestioned Hegemony The United States had been a rising world power since the 1870s, when it entered into steady competition with Germany to claim the succession as hegemonic power to the declining Great Britain. One way to think about the world wars is that they were really a single 30 years' war in which the principal protagonists were the United States and Germany. From that standpoint, the unconditional surrender of Germany in 1945 marked the clear victory of the United States. That it required the military assistance of the USSR is no more significant than when Great Britain required the military assistance of Russia in 1815 to achieve a clear victory over France and assume its hegemonic position. This 30 years' war was quite destructive to infrastructure. In 1945, the United States was the sole major industrial power not to have suffered direct attacks on its physical equipment. In 1945, the United States was by far the most productive and efficient producer in the world-economy, to the point that it could out-compete all other countries even in their home markets. On this economic base, the United States established its unquestioned hegemony. It created the types of international structures that would best serve its needs, such as turning Western Europe and Japan into political satellites. While it did partially dismantle its armed forces, it had a nuclear monopoly and the air force with which to deliver these bombs anywhere in the world. At the same time, New York City became the cultural capital of the world, displacing Paris in almost every artistic and literary domain. Of course, the United States still faced a challenge from the Soviet Union, which had a very powerful military structure and a desire equal to that of the United States to impose its ideological preferences on other nations. On the other hand, given the massive destruction caused by World War II, the Soviet Union had no desire to engage in a military confrontation with the United States. So the two countries struck a deal, which was symbolically termed Yalta. The deal had three components. First, the world was divided into two blocs, whose boundaries were defined by the location of the respective armies in 1945: the Soviet Union controlled one-third of the world and the United States two-thirds. …

A Modernization Paradox: Saudi Arabia's Divided Society

Abstract: There is something profoundly paradoxical about the new Al Faisaliah shopping center in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. A sprawling, three-story compound complete with air-conditioning and wireless internet, the bustling shopping mall is chock full of US fast-food chains and swanky clothing shops boasting everything from bras to basketball shoes. And yet, these hallmarks of economic modernity and Western-style mass consumerism are strikingly juxtaposed with the rigidly imposed cultural mores that have changed only marginally since the days when Riyadh was little more than a collection of dirt streets and mud houses. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Indeed, government enforcement of social mores has set Saudi Arabia apart as one the world's strictest and most traditional societies. The women roam from shop to shop clothed in full black abayas--garments that cover the entire body in order to disguise a woman's form--and scan shelves of children's clothes from behind face-covering niqabs. In the neighboring restaurants, unmarried men and women are not allowed to interact, and couples who choose to eat out are segregated by portable partitions. Women wishing to shop in the center or dine in these restaurants must rely on their male relatives to drive them, and they are not allowed to vote for the council members that advise the government on the development and establishment of these modern institutions. The enforcement of these and other rules, which generally mandate the segregation of men and women in all public arenas, falls under the responsibility of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, a government agency whose "morals police" monitors public areas to ensure that the rules are upheld to the highest standards of Islamic decency. A Society of Paradoxes This tension between modernity and tradition in Saudi Arabia is perhaps most palpable with regard to these laws toward women, but it is a paradox that has also manifested itself in virtually every branch of Saudi society. As Saudi Arabia develops, it has witnessed an ever-increasing number of contradictions between its modern economic institutions and rigid political and social systems. In a country whose economy is considerably dependent on the presence of foreign laborers, not to mention the innumerable Western professionals that contribute to the oil sector, there is still no freedom to worship any religion but Islam. Despite being one of the newest official voting members of the WTO, Saudi Arabia has still never had a national election--making it one of the world's ten least democratic states, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit's 2007 Democracy Index. Part of a multi-decade effort to strengthen the private sector, the country now has the strongest stock market in the region, but the kingdom's would-be entrepreneurs are graduating from universities that are ranked among the lowest in the world. Barriers to foreign direct investment, which until recently had been insurmountably high, have been significantly lowered, and yet the state still refuses to grant tourist visas to Westerners, opening its borders only to Muslims that travel to Mecca on the Hajj. The reality today is that Saudi Arabia is being pulled in two different directions. What is significant about this struggle, however, is the degree to which modernization has failed to permeate Saudi society beyond the economic sphere. Indeed, conventional wisdom among Western governments and institutions holds that economic prosperity will inevitably set developing nations on a road away from backwards political systems and toward pluralism, democracy, and liberalism. The Western view holds that with the development of a thriving middle class comes internal pressure to reform, and when this pressure becomes strong enough, incumbent regimes have no choice but to bow to the wishes of their people and liberalize their socio-political structures. Such beliefs have been the basis of much Western activity abroad in the last 50 years, with great hope being placed in institutions like the IMF and World Bank to bring about economic stability and eventual democratization movements. …

A Security Dilemma: Ethnic Partitioning in Iraq

Abstract: Anyone following events in Iraq could be forgiven for thinking that we know relatively little about the dynamics of communal civil wars. In addition, anyone who remembers Bosnia and the rest of the "ugly nineties" has observed that the list of countries that have ripped themselves apart in communal civil wars seems to be growing. At the same time, resolving these conflicts is now seen as a deeply intractable problem. In almost every region we observe, communal civil wars are at or near the top of US policy agendas, most of all in Iraq, but also in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Darfur. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] In reality, however, we have learned quite a lot about civil wars. Before the conflict in Bosnia, the conventional wisdom was that multi-communal states that had been torn apart by war should be put back together by power-sharing between communities or electoral reform. It was reasoned that such initiatives would compel politicians to appeal to all communities, not just their own, as well as to third party aid for reconstruction. Unfortunately, these approaches have rarely worked well. Bosnia and subsequent conflicts demonstrate that communal settlement patterns matter a great deal. Earlier theories of communal conflict focused on factors such as the legitimacy of the state, histories of communal compromise and confrontation, and the intensity of communal grievances (whether real or exaggerated by ultranationalist mythmakers). By contrast, the conflict in Bosnia led the international community to develop a new theory centered on security dilemmas. Whenever centrally imposed order in any communally divided state collapses, as in the case of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, or when the United States destroyed Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, communities must rely on their own resources for self-defense. In effect, the communally divided state becomes and behaves like a pocket international system. The problem is that the material measures, and even the rhetorical measures, that communities use to mobilize for defense also pose offensive threats to other communities. The result is a security dilemma: a situation in which no community can provide for its own security without threatening the security of others. If and when this reaches the point that all sides are mobilized for war, or if large-scale violence has already commenced, it ceases to matter whether the original reasons for conflict were based on real material interests or were whipped up by political elites using populist rhetoric for their personal gain. Nor does it matter which side started the spiral into internal conflict; each group's mobilization now poses a real security threat to other groups. The Case of Bosnia: A Security Dilemma Of course, the nature and intensity of this mutual security dilemma can vary, depending in large part on communal settlement patterns. The more intermixed the settlement pattern of the hostile populations, the greater the offensive opportunities for each side--not only for organized forces but also for bandits and terrorists. Each group is likely to feel compelled to eliminate enclaves of the other community settled in its midst, lest these form fifth columns or become targets of "rescue offensives," as in the case of the Israeli offensive of 1948. In that mission, the Israeli government incorporated the isolated Jewish enclave of West Jerusalem into Israel by overrunning the Arab towns between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The worst dangers are posed by people who are settled in places that make them appear both vulnerable and threatening to the other side at the same time. People in this situation are the ones most likely to become victims of ethnic cleansing. The heaviest fighting and worst atrocities in Bosnia happened in places where Serb and Muslim populations were most heavily intermixed--in the Drina Valley in Eastern Bosnia and in the North Central "Posavina Corridor," where Muslims lived not only with Serbs but also astride the only possible route that could connect the two main Serb enclaves in Bosnia. …

Terrorist Rivals: Beyond the State-Centric Model

Abstract: By any standard measure, the United States is currently the most powerful country in the history of the world. Its defense budget of US$440 billion in 2007 (US$560 billion if one includes the budgets for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) is greater than the combined military expenditure of the rest of the world. In 2003 the International Institute for Strategic Studies calculated that the US defense budget was greater than the combined budgets of the next 13 countries and more than double the combination of the remaining 158 countries. Potential challengers cannot even begin to rival this power. The European Union can compete with the United States in terms of population and GNP, but it does not have the will or the institutional ability to act in concert on foreign or security initiatives. Russia, which until relatively recently was considered the closest challenger, retains vast armies but lags dramatically in military spending and technological development. The United States even outspends China, the nation most often mentioned as a challenger, by about seven to one. China is a formidable economic powerhouse, but only spends 3.9 percent of its GDP on defense, whereas it would have to spend about 25 percent to begin to rival the United States. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Yet in spite of this extraordinary and quite unprecedented preeminence, the United States has been unable to impose its will on the impoverished state of Afghanistan, on the sectarian chaos that is Iraq, or even on an organization, Al Qaeda, which is led by a few men believed to be hiding in caves in remote parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. What does it say about traditional conceptions of the balance of power when the most powerful country on the planet cannot effectively apply its power to achieve its objectives? The inability of the United States to achieve its security objectives is not due to the fact that other countries have balanced or "bandwagoned" against it, as traditional conceptions of a balance of power mechanism would have claimed. On the contrary, most of our would-be rivals share the United States' desire to destroy Al Qaeda, have supported its efforts to rebuild Afghanistan, and have acquiesced, albeit reluctantly, to its operations in Iraq. Indeed the United States has failed to achieve its security objectives because it has failed to appreciate the nature of the adversaries it faces and because of its inability to transform its military might into an effective arsenal against these adversaries. Military Strength Misapplied On September 11, 2001, a small substate group inflicted greater casualties on US civilians than any enemy government had ever inflicted on the United States before. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor killed 2,403 servicemen and 68 civilians, and vastly more US citizens were killed by fellow countrymen in the course of the Civil War, but an attack from an enemy state of this scale was simply unprecedented. In the words of President George W. Bush, "September 11 changed our world." Vice President Dick Cheney was more specific, commenting on NBC News that "9/11 changed everything. It changed the way we think about threats to the United States. It changed our recognition of our vulnerabilities. It changed in terms of the kind of national security strategy we need to pursue, in terms of guaranteeing the safety and security of the American people." The US government nevertheless responded in an entirely traditional way: it declared war. However, rather than declaring war on an enemy state, it declared war first on the tactic of terrorism and later, and even less sensibly, on the emotion of terror. As a practical matter, however, it waged a conventional war--first against Afghanistan, whose government had harbored the terrorists who committed the attacks on New York and Washington, and later against Iraq, whose government had no connection to these same attacks. Its overwhelming military force brought down both governments in short order and with little cost in terms of US lives. …

Unipolar Stability: The Rules of Power Analysis

Abstract: The potential for the rise of a multipolar world order certainly seems far more plausible now than it did several years ago. In 2003, pundits considered the term "unipolar" to be too modest; only "empire" could capture the extraordinary position of power that the United States appeared to occupy. Indeed, in the eyes of the foreign policy commentariat, the United States has fallen from global empire to hapless Gulliver in a mere four years. When Charles Krauthammer--the columnist who originally coined the term "unipolar moment"--has announced the end of unipolarity, it is hardly a leap to suggest that multipolarity is nigh. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Perceptions of rapid polarity shifts of this sort are not unusual. In the early 1960s, only a decade after analysts had developed the notion of bipolarity, scholars were already proclaiming the return of multipolarity as postwar recoveries in Europe and Japan took off. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, they again announced the advent of multipolarity. The most influential scholarly book on international relations of the past generation, Kenneth N. Waltz's Theory of International Politics, was written in part to dispel these flighty views and show that bipolarity still endured. If one looks past the headlines to the deep material structure of the world, Waltz argued, one will see that bipolarity is still the order of the day. Yet in the early 1990s, Waltz himself proclaimed that the return of multipolarity was around the corner. Such perceived polarity shifts are usually accompanied by decline scares--concern that as other powers rise, the United States will lose its competitive edge in foreign relations. The current decline scare is the fourth since 1945--the first three occurred during the 1950s (Sputnik), the 1970s (Vietnam and stagflation), and the 1980s (the Soviet threat and Japan as a potential challenger). In all of these cases, real changes were occurring that suggested a redistribution of power. But in each case, analysts' responses to those changes seem to have been overblown. Multipolarity--an international system marked by three or more roughly equally matched major powers--did not return in the 1960s, 1970s, or early 1990s, and each decline scare ended with the United States' position of primacy arguably strengthened. It is impossible to know for sure whether or not the scare is for real this time--shifts in the distribution of power are notoriously hard to forecast. Barring geopolitical upheavals on the scale of Soviet collapse, the inter-state scales of power tend to change slowly. The trick is to determine when subtle quantitative shifts will lead to a major qualitative transformation of the basic structure of the international system. Fortunately, there are some simple rules of power analysis that can help prevent wild fluctuations in response to current events. Unfortunately, arguments for multipolarity's rapid return usually run afoul of them. Rule No. 1: Be Clear About Definitions of Power It is important to ask why opinion has gyrated so wildly from bullishness to bearishness in conversations on US power. It is not--as in some of the earlier cases--that perceptions of actual US capabilities or resources have changed. The United States is still widely recognized to be the most powerful state in a material sense since the modern international system took shape in the sixteenth century. I have conducted many of these measurements myself, and I can report that there has been no change in these "objective" indicators over the past three years sufficient enough to explain a shift in elite perspectives of US power. What have shifted are peoples' views of the real utility of these resources and capabilities. Current discussions of the limits of US power are really focused on the limited usefulness of large amounts of military and economic capabilities. Political scientists generally use the term "power" to refer to a relationship of influence. …

Writing the Rules: The Need for Standardized Regulation of Islamic Finance

Abstract: Islamic finance has been one of the fastest-growing areas of the global financial services industry over the last decade. This growth, estimated at 15 percent annually over the last three years, has been primarily driven by vast inflows of petrodollars, the search by Western banks for high-margin businesses, and widespread innovation in Islamic financial engineering. However, Islamic financial institutions have not achieved the same degree of success in creating regulatory environments conducive to greater innovation and development of Islamic capital markets. Standardized regulation is critical to the future growth of Islamic finance. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] The State of Islamic Finance Interest is at the foundation of conventional financial systems. Payments on interest compensate creditors for both the time value of money and default risk. However, interest is prohibited under Shari'ah, or Islamic law: the Qu'ran states, "And that which you give in gift, in order that it may increase from other people's property, has no increase with Allah." It also declares, "We have prepared for those among men who reject faith a grievous punishment." For a devout Muslim, all fixed income instruments from mortgages to interest rate swaps are clearly haram, or forbidden. Additionally, Shari'ah bans excessive gharar, or risk. This condition is more ambiguous than the prohibition of riba. For example, an exporter could use currency options to hedge foreign exchange risk, while a speculator could use the same options to make bets on exchange rates. In the former situation, options are used to decrease risk, while in the latter, options are used to increase risk. Even in this simple example, Shari'ah scholars could (and do) have differing opinions. Clearly, the absence of standardized regulation can lead to significant confusion among investors. Despite the bans on riba and gharar, Islamic banks have developed Shari'ah-compliant financial products from loans and insurance to equity funds and exotic derivatives. These financial products often take the form of profit-sharing agreements between a "debtor" and a "creditor." For example, in mudarabah, sometimes called participation financing, an entrepreneur asks a bank to provide capital; profits are shared between the entrepreneur and the bank according to an agreed ratio. Profit sharing continues until the "loan" has been repaid. On the other hand, in murabahah, a bank can purchase a good for a customer and sell that good to the customer at an above-market price that is equivalent to the market price plus the amount the bank would have earned from interest. The customer then pays the bank in installments, just as if he or she had taken a conventional loan. However, the bank cannot charge the customer extra money for late payments, so instead the bank has custody of the good until full payment has been received. Each financial product must be approved by Shari'ah advisory committees or consultants. Because it is nearly impossible for any product to be approved by every Shari'ah scholar in Islamic finance, banks traditionally focus on some target group or appeal to as many people as possible. Some Islamic scholars have remained opposed to Islamic finance, maintaining that the industry's techniques are simply legal fudges. They draw comparisons to contractum trinius, a method European bankers used during the Middle Ages to circumvent the prohibition of usury. A banker would invest the amount of money required by a borrower and then purchase insurance for the investment from the borrower. Finally, the lender would sell the borrower the right to any profit made on some percentage of the investment. The three contracts used in contractum trinius, investment, insurance, and sale of profit, were individually permitted; put together, they behaved like an interest-bearing loan. Growth Islamic finance is one of the most rapidly growing areas of international finance today. …

Think Independent: Qatar's Education Reforms

Abstract: In 1995, Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani and his wife introduced an initiative to reform Qatar's higher education arts and sciences program by creating the Qatar Foundation. In stark contrast to other Arab nations, Qatar began a mission to embrace a world-class education, believing it to be a gateway to a stronger economic and political future. In subsequent years, Qatar's higher education reforms have inevitably trickled down to lower education, but, despite efforts over the past several years, Qatar's primary and secondary schools' policies and curriculums are still flawed. Newer reforms are just beginning to address problems such as schools' lack of independence in budget, hiring, and instructional decisions, with hopes of encouraging more Qatari students to pursue higher education. The results of this improved nationwide curriculum, Emir al-Thani believes, will not only bring Qatar a more advantageous role in the world economy, but will also make it a more influential force in combating extreme Islamic influence. Before the most recent reforms of 1995, Qatar's primary and secondary schools underwent vast changes to make Qatari students more internationally competitive. Despite drastic changes, however, these schools did not operate under ideal conditions. The Ministry of Education, which oversees all schools in Qatar, had to approve all important decisions concerning education and did not give primary and secondary schools the independence they wanted. Many schools did not have the power to hire and fire employees as they saw fit and operated under fixed, inadequate budgets. In addition, students learned from official textbooks, studying the same material as every other student despite having different interests and requiring different teaching methods. Because of these problems, students lost interest in pursuing higher education, and, as a consequence, they are failing to contribute to Qatar's economic and social prosperity and are becoming more susceptible to extremist influences. The most recent reforms in secondary and primary education seek to address this failure. In November 2002, Qatar established four branches of education. The primary branch, the Supreme Educational Council (SEC), established the underlying principles of autonomy, accountability, variety, and choice for new Independent Schools. It was not until 2004, however, after the implementation of the reforms in higher education, that the first of 12 Independent Schools was established. Unlike other schools, Independent Schools allow for teachers to make changes independent of higher authority as long as the changes fall under the general guidelines administered by the SEC. Independent Schools are thus funded by the SEC but have increased autonomy and are encouraged to make necessary changes to their curriculums. Schools now run their own budgets and have the option of hiring and firing staff as they please. Unlike in the past, parents can now choose the schools to which they send their children. …

Ethnic Civil Wars: Securing the Post-Conflict Peace

Abstract: Present discourse on ethnic conflict is grounded in common sense and advocacy that together form a received wisdom with which everybody is familiar. The task of analytic and quantitative research is to bring us beyond this received wisdom: to discover whether there are counterintuitive behavioral relationships that might be helpful for developing policy. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] The phrase "ethnic conflict" hovers between description and explanation. As a description of the large scale organized violence that besets many low-income countries, it is unexceptional. As an explanation, it is radically inadequate. Most societies are ethnically diverse. Where conditions are ripe for internal violence, conflicts are indeed likely to be organized along ethnic lines. During a conflict, ethnicity is often used as a propaganda tool. Indeed, whether or not ethnic divisions are a cause of conflict, they are quite likely to be a consequence of it. After such disputes, societies are often trapped in the ethnic organizations and categories that the conflict determined. As a literal objective, "ending ethnic conflict" cannot be taken seriously. Political conflict is endemic, and intra-ethnic affinity may form a cost-effective basis for political organization. Political contests between ethnic groups are therefore common in ethnically diverse democracies. What can, and indeed should, be ended is large scale, organized violence. This kind of violence generally takes three variants: communal violence, pogroms, and rebellion. Of these three, rebellion is by far the most deadly, since it results in full-scale civil war. Communal violence, in contrast, is generally the least deadly because it lacks large scale organization. The prevention of pogroms, in which a government systematically kills the members of some ethnic group, is straightforward in one sense: pogroms can be prevented by enforcing international norms. The difficulty in preventing pogroms thus comes down to a dispute over the limits on state sovereignty. The prevention of civil war, by contrast, requires a substantially different agenda. Civil war is, by definition, a conflict that involves at least one private, non-governmental actor. This is not, of course, to lay the blame for civil wars at the door of the rebels. Rather, every government attempts to maintain a monopoly over the organized violence within its borders. Where it loses this monopoly due to the emergence of a rebel group, a civil war is virtually inevitable. Reducing the global incidence of civil wars is indeed feasible. Pogroms and communal violence are different and equally important variants of ethnic conflict; however, my discussion here will not apply to them. To "end" ethnic civil war, there are three possible points of intervention. We can attempt to prevent such conflicts from starting, we can attempt to stop ongoing conflicts, and we can attempt to strengthen peace in situations where conflict has recently ended. Herein I discuss each scenario. I contend that the greatest payoffs would come from improving the record of maintaining post-conflict peace, due to the high level of post-conflict relapses into civil war. The Deep Prevention of Civil War Deep prevention is obviously the most desirable form of prevention. The normal, somewhat pious, discourse on the deep prevention of ethnic conflict invariably invokes the need to address its root causes. Obviously, when grievances are genuine they should be addressed, regardless of whether or not they are the root causes of violence. However, the argument that violence will inevitably occur unless such grievances are addressed seems both unnecessary as a basis for remedial action and potentially counterproductive, as it becomes subject to hijacking by advocacy groups with their own pet agendas. The root cause method of explanation is inextricably linked to the notion that the motivation behind rebellion is some objective grievance. …

Reinventing integration: Muslims in the west

Abstract: As the sixth year of the US-led war on terror rages on, it would appear that few constructs are more self-evident than the one dividing Islam and the West. Muslim minorities in the West are often scrutinized through this paradoxical prism. On which side of the divide do they fall? For pessimists, the signs do not look good. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] The results of several recent polls have set off alarm bells in a tense Europe, still shaken by the July 7, 2005 bombings in London. For example, the Pew poll found that given a choice of identifying as first Muslim or Christian or as first a citizen of their country, the majority of British, French, and German Muslims choose faith, while the majority of British, French, and German Christians choose country. Some have taken these results as witness to the danger of over-accommodating religious differences. They have advocated that European Muslims be persuaded or forced to forsake their Islamic identity for a Western one. However, new findings from a Gallup study of Muslims in London, Paris, and Berlin, and the general public in each corresponding country, challenge the very legitimacy of such a trade-off and offer another way to reconcile citizenship and creed. In many such instances, the divide between European Muslims and the general public is inexistent or not as large as originally seemed. In light of these results, people of all backgrounds should forsake popular assumptions and alarmist rhetoric for an evidence-based understanding of European Muslims, consequently creating a new narrative for their societies. This fresh perspective indicates that national and religious identities are not mutually exclusive, but mutually enriching, and that integration is not defined by citizen conformity, but by citizen cooperation. Islam, Identity, and Integration One of the most pervasive assumptions in discourse on European Muslim integration is that Muslim religiosity threatens Europe. Those who believe in the irreconcilability of Western and Muslim identity generally argue that Muslim piety, expressed in religious symbols and moral conservatism, contrasts against the backdrop of an increasingly secular and sexually liberal Europe: a recipe for increasingly insular Muslim communities and profound alienation from European national identity. These isolated communities, the argument continues, represent illiberal islands corrupting Western society's liberal values; they are "cesspools" for radicalization. Integration, or conformity with majority culture, is therefore seen as vital defense against citizens with dual loyalties. However, a new study paints a very different picture. While Muslims in three European capitals are indeed highly religious, this piety does not lead to sympathy for terrorism, desires to isolate, or lack of national loyalty. Not surprisingly, the study found that Muslims in London, Berlin, and Paris are much more likely than the general public in their corresponding countries to say religion is an important part of their daily lives, and to identify strongly with their faith. Predictably, the Muslims surveyed are also much more likely to express traditional moral values. In comparison to the public at large, Muslims overwhelmingly see homosexual acts, sex before marriage, and abortion as "morally wrong." However, religious and national identities are not mutually exclusive. Not only do urban Muslims identify strongly with their religion, but they are at least as likely as the general public to identify strongly with their countries of residence. As a British Muslim MP recently commented, "My nationality is first British and my religion is first Muslim." Also defying conventional wisdom, high levels of Muslim religiosity and corresponding conservative moral outlooks did not translate into a sense of threat from the "sinful West" and into a desire to isolate. Instead, urban Muslims were slightly less likely to feel people with different religious practices than their own were a threat to their way of life, and slightly more likely than the general public to say they would prefer living in a mixed neighborhood. …

A New Approach: Engaging the Muslim World through Public Diplomacy

Abstract: One does not have to be a pollster or a political scientist to recognize that the current public impression of the United States in the Muslim world is dismal and unlikely to improve substantially without a drastic change in the political climate of the Middle East. The United States' image suffers from ongoing violence in Iraq, allegations of torture in Guantanamo Bay, US backing of autocratic rulers in the Middle East, and support for perceived Israeli offenses in the Holy Land, as well as the decades-old perception of the United States as a corrupt imperialist power. Recent surveys, moreover, demonstrate that positive Muslim opinion of the United States has plummeted since 9/11, and particularly since the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The decline in image, however, is only partially due to US policies in the Middle East. An essential component of all foreign policy strategies is public diplomacy--the manner in which governments communicate to citizens in other societies. The United States can cultivate a more positive impression abroad by courting foreign publics through media, educational, and cultural venues. Unfortunately, such a plan is only now beginning to materialize. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] The United States developed a public relations strategy for the Cold War in an attempt to counter negative impressions of the West during that monumental ideological struggle. Yet five years after 9/11, the government has yet to develop a comprehensive plan for diplomacy in the Muslim world. Now the Bush administration, in an attempt to make up for lost time, is moving to aggressively overhaul a defunct public relations and communication bureaucracy and reinvigorate a once-dynamic public diplomacy machine. The change is vital to US foreign policy in the Middle East as an often-overlooked facet of the US campaign for democracy in the Muslim world. Its effectiveness will depend, however, upon the nature and commitment of the diplomacy effort. Can the Bush administration tread the delicate line between sincere promotion of ideals and blatant propaganda? The United States must attempt, within a comprehensive public diplomacy framework, to reframe or reshape its policies toward greater compatibility with its foreign audience. An eager US marketing campaign coupled with contradictory foreign policy would further alienate Muslims from goodwill toward the United States and more severely hinder collaboration between the two cultures. An Obsolete Legacy The current quandary over the state of public diplomacy, and correspondingly, US image marketing, derives in part from the communication vacuum created after the fall of the Soviet Union. Throughout the Cold War, the United States operated a robust network of communication and propaganda campaigns, all attempting to displace Communist-implanted anti-Americanism and install a pro-Western worldview. The United States Information Agency (USIA) functioned as the nexus of this operation, funding US cultural centers and libraries across the world, awarding Fulbright scholarships for study abroad, broadcasting the Voice of America and Radio Freedom Europe, and creating hundreds of propaganda films. Indeed, the term public diplomacy is largely associated with the USIA--and also with the term "propaganda." However controversial, the USIA was an effective organization for its time. But as the Soviet Union collapsed and the need for such a concerted pro-US communication effort dissipated, funding for USIA programs quickly disappeared as well. The money squeeze led to the closure of libraries, the reduction of cultural exchange programs, and an end to numerous US foreign broadcasting initiatives. In 1999, conservative pressure forced the Clinton administration to dismantle the USIA entirely, cut staffing by nearly 40 percent, and shunt its various agencies into poorly organized bureaucratic structures within the State Department and other organs. …

Targeted Sanctions: Motivating Policy Change

Abstract: Economic sanctions are the international relations tool of choice in this day and age. The range of states that have become targets of sanctions is growing month by month, as is the list of organizations applying this foreign policy instrument. Such sanctioners are no longer limited to sovereign nations and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations; today even "small-time" players like state and municipal governments have discovered that economic sanctions provide them with a wonderful opportunity to assert their positions on international issues. And likewise, the sanctionees are no longer just the transgressor nations of yesteryear--now even trade partners are rebuked through the use of secondary sanctions. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] This rush to sanction has generated a great deal of criticism in both academic circles and among multinational firms, who often bear the burden of the taxation inherent to sanctions. Indeed, it is a reasonable generalization to characterize international economic sanctions as overused, ineffective, and unfair. The fact that sanctions are overused is demonstrated by the large number of sanctions currently in force. They are ineffective, as shown by the number of obvious failures in sanctions policy. They are unfair, not only because of the burden they place on firms that would otherwise freely engage in international commerce, but also because of the heavy suffering they often impose on innocent civilians in target countries. Nevertheless, this characterization of sanctions is a generalization. In order to understand more fully what should be used, what is effective, and what is fair, a better understanding of what sanctions actually do is necessary. The most important issue to resolve before one can judge the success of sanctions, generally or specifically, is exactly what is expected of a given sanction in the first place. The critical failure of current sanctions' policymaking and policy analysis is that there is almost never a clear understanding of what the objectives are or how the implementation will lead to success. Grasping these two failures leads us to consider alternatives to comprehensive sanctions. We believe that among those alternatives, narrowly targeted sanctions, and sometimes even non-economic sanctions, are often more likely to be effective in achieving an intended policy goal than an indiscriminate embargo on all trade and investment flows to a target country. Understanding Sanctions by Their Political Objective International economic sanctions are government policies, and as such they can be analyzed according to the general principles of public choice economics. According to economist Gary Becker, behind the enactment of any policy there are those with a certain set of interests pressing for the policy (policy demanders) against some resistance to the policy (policy suppliers) that must be overcome for successful implementation. In the case of sanctions, the pressure might come from interest groups with certain foreign policy goals or from players with more pecuniary objectives. In this analysis, however, we put aside pecuniary interests and focus on the foreign policy goals of sanctions. The objectives of these interest groups might be as disparate as taking the moral high ground in response to a target's reprehensible action, punishing the target for its offense, or attempting to pressure the target to change its policies. Across these objectives, however, the types of sanctions that are appropriate might vary widely in scope and range. Sanctions that take the moral high ground are those that are designed to please interests on the sender's side rather than to have any real impact on the target. The sender adopts the position that, rather than sitting by and acquiescing to the objectionable policy of the target, it would prefer to take a moral stand, ideally at very low domestic cost. An example is Canada's banning of South African Airways' landing rights during the apartheid era--even though South African Airways flights had never landed in Canada prior to the sanction in the first place. …

The Politics of a Health Crisis: Why AIDS Is Not Threatening African Governance

Abstract: Africa's HIV/AIDS epidemic has engendered many nasty surprises. In the 15 years after the continent's first AIDS cases were reported on the shores of Lake Victoria in the early 1980s, the virus spread further and faster than any epidemiologist predicted. Early predictions stated that it was impossible for more than 10 percent of the adult population to become infected; this ceiling, however, was soon broken as infection rates reached 20 percent, 30 percent, and even 40 percent in some populations, at which point the lifetime chance of a teenager contracting and dying from the disease became almost a complete certainty. Life expectancy crashed in a manner unprecedented for a peacetime population, with some southern African populations seeing expected longevity plunge from about 60 years to fewer than 40. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Scholars of historical calamities observe that one disaster often portends a second calamity. Economists have projected that the loss of national income due to AIDS could send some economies into a tailspin--described as "Adam Smith in reverse" by Malcolm McPherson of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. Management specialists expected that loss of skilled workers would result in essential services such as schools and clinics, not to mention army and police forces, grinding to a standstill. Drawing upon studies of how the rural poor survive famines, I coined the term "new variant famine" in 2002 to describe the vicious interaction between drought and AIDS which was unfolding in southern Africa at that time. I argued that households hit by the disease would be unable to cope with the extra demands of a food crisis and would be plunged into indefinite destitution. Political scientists feared for Africa's stability. How could democracy function when, as one Kenyan nurse protested, "All the voters will be dead?" Some of these fears are indeed materializing. Others still loom. But some have been proven unfounded or at least exaggerated. Foremost among the dire predictions that have not come true is the expectation that the epidemic would cause a governance crisis, leaving conflict, repression, and anarchy in its wake. Africa has these ills aplenty, but AIDS has not been indicated in their etiology. Marginalization of AIDS in African Opinion Since 1999, the University of Cape Town has conducted public opinion surveys in a growing number of African countries. These "Afrobarometer" surveys are a rich source of data on what ordinary citizens think. They have revealed a simple but surprising fact about public opinion: namely that AIDS is never at the top of the list of issues of concern for a population. That position is occupied by unemployment, poverty, famine, and crime, depending on the country in question. Although "health" occasionally comes in at number two, AIDS very rarely breaks into the top three, or even top five issues, though in some countries, notably South Africa, it has been climbing the ladder of concern. AIDS occupies a commensurately marginal place in African political life. No African government has been overthrown because of its AIDS policies. No election has been decided on this issue. In fact, in South Africa, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) was reelected with an increased majority in 2004 despite President Thabo Mbeki's notorious denial that HIV causes AIDS. True, South Africa has seen street protests over access to treatment, but the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), which organizes them, has no counterparts elsewhere in the continent. Furthermore, its agenda is reform and not revolution. Surprising as it may seem to AIDS activists from elsewhere, many TAC leaders remain loyal ANC members. Their dispute with Mbeki is not the insurrectionary fervor of the ANC toppling apartheid, but rather one wing of the new political establishment struggling to bring its errant colleagues back in line. Why is it that a disease which will kill one in six adult Africans and more than half of adults in the continent's southernmost six countries is not the subject of overwhelming political passion? …

A Responsibility to Protect: The Defining Challenge for the Global Community

Abstract: We live in an age that is dependent on a strong sense of global community. Despite this fact, many of our current problems trace back to how weak that unifying sense truly is. This theme is most tragic when it appears in the form of genocide, ethnic cleansings, and other manifestations of the deadly politics of identity. For all the vows that there would "never again" be another genocide, reality has too many times proven otherwise. Yet again, millions of people have been killed, maimed, raped, displaced, and otherwise victimized, while the international community--including the United States, the United Nations, and the European Union--continues to do too little, too late. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] If we cannot turn the "never again" pledge from rhetoric to reality, how can we genuinely claim to be a global community? Time and again we have witnessed man's inhumanity at its basest, most venal, and most outrageous. But where is the outrage? It has not been coming from recent US administrations--not from George H.W. Bush over Bosnia, not from Bill Clinton over Rwanda, and not from George W. Bush over Darfur. It has not been coming from the United Nations, in which countless resolutions about being "seized with the matter" are approved and then become "seized up" when it comes to meaningful action. And outrage has certainly not been coming from the many countries that buy into invocations of state sovereignty with little regard for supposedly shared values and commitments, which are codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide Convention. There is no doubt that breaking the vicious political cycle of identity is difficult. But it is possible. Bosnia and Rwanda were rife with missed opportunities--so, too, was Darfur. Breaking the cycle is necessary for tangible reasons, since these conflicts feed other conflicts, including terrorism. It is also necessary for less tangible, but deeply penetrating reasons. We must understand that our actions determine whether the legacy we leave to future generations is one of despair or one of hope. Key Questions in the Policy Debate Looking across key cases, we can identify five core questions that frame policy debates on genocide prevention and related humanitarian intervention. First, what are the driving forces behind ethnic conflict and genocide? Then, given existing tensions, when should military force be used? Why is such intervention justified, if ever, and who should decide when intervention should happen? Finally, what constitutes effective intervention? Driving Forces? Many policymakers take the "primordialist" view of these conflicts and view them as the inevitable outcomes of fixed, inherited, and deeply antagonistic group identities. In this understanding, the end of the Cold War stripped away the constraining effects of the overlay of bipolar geopolitics. The implication is that historical hatreds, including those that Robert Kaplan has called the "Balkan ghosts," are restored to their "natural" states of conflict. But while history shapes these conflicts, it does not determine them nearly to the extent that such theories suggest. A number of studies have shown that ethnic identities are much less fixed over time; as a result, the frequency and intensity of ethnic conflict vary more than primordialist theory claims. This point is made, albeit with some amount of hyperbole, in a statement by a Bosnian Muslim schoolteacher: "We never, until the war, thought of ourselves as Muslims. We were Yugoslavs. But when we began to be murdered because we are Muslims, things changed. The definition of who we are today has been determined by our killing." Such killing was not a predetermined playing out of history. Instead, it was an intentional manipulation of history by Slobodan Milosevic to turn grievances and prejudices into hatred and murder. This was also the case in Rwanda and elsewhere. …

Africa in Transition: Facing the Challenges of Globalization

Abstract: On March 6, 1957 Ghana became the first sub-Saharan country to achieve independence from European colonial rule. Over the next 23 years, most of the other sub-Saharan colonies followed suit. Expectations on the continent and around the world were high, as leaders hoped that sub-Saharan African states would "take off" both politically and economically to become viable, independent actors in the world community. However, most independent African states struggled almost immediately under the weight of protracted political and economic crises. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Africa's "first wave" of democratization quickly morphed into a wave of autocracy as African militaries seized power in the mid-1960s, and multiparty systems gave way to authoritarian, one-party regimes. Economic stagnation had set in by the early 1980s, and African states became increasingly dependent on international development assistance, thereby incurring enormous debts. Then, after the end of the Cold War, Western powers began to make their aid to Africa conditional on the pursuit of good governance and democratization. In the early 1990s, Africa entered a "second wave" of democratization as autocratic regimes gave way to new, more democratic constitutions and multiparty systems. Given Africa's crisis-prone transition from colonialism to independence and the many challenges its states have faced, it seems reasonable to ask what Africa has achieved in the 50 years since the start of the independence movement. Have African states moved from the margins of the international community to the center? Do they now have a stronger voice in the discourse on democracy and globalization, or are they as marginal as they were at the time of independence? Africa undoubtedly faces many challenges today, and it must continue to struggle not to lose ground in this age of globalization. Certainly Africa is not yet in a position to completely overcome these challenges--at least in the short run. However, if Africa's leaders want to move the continent forward and create a new position within the global community, they must make a concerted effort to begin addressing these challenges now. The Legacy of Colonialism Even though the period of colonial rule was a relatively brief one in Africa, the European powers profoundly reordered African political space, modes of economic production, and social hierarchies and cleavages. The modality of colonial rule varied from one colonial power to the next, but the end result was always domination, exploitation, and organized repression. Despite this, World War II coincided with the emergence of African demands for political independence. With the onset of the independence era, colonial regimes in Africa were replaced by independent, African-led regimes that were more or less carbon copies of their colonizers' political systems. At a fundamental level, the post-colonial African state looked like a top-heavy administrative state. African leaders hoped that this model would lead to self-sustained economic development--a hope that unfortunately was never realized. European powers relinquished political control on their former African possessions, but not their economic interests and influence. The formal trappings of colonialism were replaced by a situation of neo-colonialism, in which Africa remained heavily dependent on foreign private investment and bilateral and multilateral development assistance. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund set the development agenda for Africa starting in the 1960s, rather than allowing African countries to decide individually or collectively how to develop their own economies and societies. Bilateral donors such as Britain and France benefited from their relationships with former colonies and Africa's continued dependence on European monetary assistance and capital investment. For example, the former colonial powers, as well as the rest of the Western world, encouraged the export of primary products from Africa so they could be processed in European factories. …

A New Climate Treaty: US Leadership after Kyoto

Abstract: For years, despite a steady accumulation of science showing the clear and present dangers of global climate change, efforts toward an effective international response have been at a virtual standstill. The principal reason is that the United States has refused to play. But with Washington now seemingly on a course to enact mandatory limits on US greenhouse gas emissions, it is plausible to begin envisioning a multilateral solution to this quintessentially global challenge. It is, in other words, time to contemplate a new climate change treaty. The urgency of the task is irrefutable. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's latest assessment concluded with 90 percent confidence that human activity is warming the planet and warned of irreversible and potentially catastrophic consequences if emissions continue unabated. Politically as well, the next few years represent a critical window for action. The emission limits assumed by most industrialized countries under the Kyoto Protocol expire in 2012. What momentum the treaty has achieved and the multibillion-dollar carbon market it has spawned may well be lost unless a new agreement can be forged. Any new treaty will be environmentally effective and politically feasible only to the degree that it successfully engages and binds all of the world's major economies. Coming to terms with cost and equity while also bridging the gap between developed and developing is an extraordinary diplomatic challenge. Meeting it will require fresh thinking and approaches, a genuine readiness to compromise and a collective political will that, while perhaps emerging, is by no means assured. What is needed above all right now is US leadership, for no country bears greater responsibility for climate change, nor has greater capacity to catalyze a global response. Responsibility is measured most directly in terms of emissions, and it should surprise no one that history's greatest economic power is also the world's largest greenhouse gas emitter. By the same token, the tremendous enterprise, prosperity, and technological prowess that have contributed so heavily to the atmospheric burden uniquely qualify the United States to lead a low-carbon transition. Indeed, no nation has done more to advance scientific understanding of the causes and consequences of global warming. But thus far, the US contribution to the global effort largely ends there. For the first time, however, US politics are beginning to favor real climate action. Even before the recent Democratic takeover of Congress, momentum was building for mandatory measures to reduce US emissions. As on many other environmental issues, individual states are leading the way, with California once again at the forefront. Business leaders, sensing that carbon constraints are inevitable and fearing a patchwork of state rules, are increasingly calling for a uniform national approach. Ten major companies, including General Electric, DuPont, and Alcoa, recently joined with four nonprofits in the US Climate Action Partnership to push for mandatory emission limits. Several bipartisan bills now before Congress would mandate emission cuts of 60 to 80 percent by 2050. With the enactment of mandatory US measures probably occurring no later than 2010, the global politics of climate change will be thoroughly transformed. Having resolved what it will do at home, the United States will know far better what it can commit to abroad. To avoid losing competitive advantage to countries without emission controls, the United States will have a strong incentive to rejoin and strengthen the global climate effort. For the struggling multilateral process, the United States' re-entry cannot come soon enough. After President Bush's outright rejection of Kyoto, other countries rallied around the treaty and brought it into force. But without the United States and Australia, the protocol encompasses only about one third of global emissions. …

Lone Migrants: China's Growing Underclass

Abstract: In the 1980s, China's population of rural-to-urban migrants numbered around 2 million; today, the estimated number of internal migrants ranges from 150 to 200 million people--over one-tenth of China's 13 billion population--and growing These rough estimates are only expected to rise, with some analysts predicting that the total number of such migrants will reach 300 million by the year 2015 Driven by the privatization of farming, increased urbanization, and rapid industrialization in China's cities, millions of people each year decide to leave their increasingly substandard livelihoods in the Chinese countryside to find work in the cities, mainly in factories or on construction projects These migrants make up 40 percent of the urban labor force; however, due to China's strict regulation of social benefits that legally ties residents to one area of the country, the vast majority of these migrants are unregistered and therefore unable to claim either government benefits or protection from employer exploitation Living alongside their urban counterparts, China's migrant workers face second-class treatment from employers and native city-dwellers alike, an attitude only reinforced by government restrictions on migration As the need for more urban workers rises, government regulation of internal migration needs to adjust accordingly in order to fully support the workers who form the silent backbone of China's economic and internal development In the 1950s, the Chinese government implemented the hukou household registration system in an effort to regulate and allocate government-subsidized public services The system determines government benefits by a citizen's place of residence; when the program was implemented, urban residents received social welfare benefits such as pensions, health care, and subsidized housing, while rural residents received land The previous communist, government-controlled economy has given way to capitalism, resulting in agricultural privatization and urban industrialization Consequently, the existing hukou system proved to be too rigid to accommodate the new system Furthermore, the government benefits offered to rural residents tied them to their increasingly meager portions of land, providing peasants with much more limited options than their urban counterparts Migration from the countryside to the city was only a logical consequence of the new economic climate; however, the hukou system continued to require rural residents to apply for a difficult-to-obtain change of residence in order to live in the cities and receive government benefits Because millions of Chinese migrants are living undocumented in the cities, they receive none of the benefits that registered city-dwellers are allocated by the Chinese government All types of social benefits and insurance, including many pension programs, subsidized housing, and free health care, most importantly, are not available to city dwellers without hukou status Pensions, for example, if offered, cannot be transferred if a migrant moves to another city or returns home Education also comes at an often-prohibitive premium for children of unregistered migrants, who, unlike their urban-registered counterparts, must pay a fee to attend urban schools Furthermore, since hukou status is inherited, these migrant children will face the same barriers as their parents if they attempt to obtain urban hukou status Workplace discrimination is also a problem Employers are not accountable for their treatment of unregistered migrants, and workplace conditions are predictably substandard …

China's Rise: An Unlikely Pillar of US Hegemony

Abstract: The rise of China is perhaps one of the most discussed topics in current scholarship on international politics. In many ways, it is actually an over-analyzed concept. Within Chinese political dialogue, China's return to eminence is often bandied about as a goal of national development and is expressed frequently in the speeches of Chinese leaders and documents such as CCP National Congress Reports and Government Work Reports. In addition, foreigners often worry that China's rapid economic development will present a threat to the stability of the current world order. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Because of this, other countries, especially a United States increasingly anxious about losing its preeminence, are often even more outspoken than Chinese pundits in proclaiming the imminent rise of a Chinese pole on the global power-map. According to the 2006 report of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 61 percent of US citizens believe that within the next 20 years, Chinese GDP will surpass US GDP. Yet interestingly, only 30 percent of Chinese citizens hold this view. The "China threat theory" has proliferated across the globe, while Chinese people remain bewildered as to why their country is suddenly the cause for so much international concern. Thus while Chinese citizens may revel in the glories of China's rise, from the 2008 Olympics to Shanghai's nosebleed skyscrapers, they are also seeing its side effects. Externally, they confront an increasingly hostile international community that has become critical of everything from China's development strategies to its political policies. Domestically, they confront the usual bedbugs of globalization and rapid development: rapidly increasing housing prices, traffic, pollution, and problems with product safety. Not least are the social consequences of development: people are working harder and longer, and there is a frenetic pace to urban life in China that has only arisen in the past few years. Thus, Chinese citizens have complex attitudes toward development and the rise of China. Domestically, the benefits of development are bittersweet, and criticism from the international community has led to a good deal of domestic discomfort with China's apparent rise. Rethinking the Implications of China's Rise There are two common views regarding Chinese development: first, that it will result in the revitalization of the Chinese nation, and second, that it is a consequence of globalization. The former is often called nationalism by Western alarmists, and has been called so since the imperial powers applied this moniker to China following the Opium War of the 1840s. The latter holds that China correctly implemented liberalization and reform policies and embraced globalization and market liberalization. One could say that Chinese development is a result of successful US policies to bring China into the world market. Regardless of whether the main catalyst was Franklin D. Roosevelt's construction of an international order based on a police force of "the Big Four" or Nixon's conception of an order based on a balance between the five great powers, the fact is that today the United States is China's principal trading partner and investor, and more importantly, Chinese reform and liberalization was conducted in an international system supported by US hegemony. Objectively, then, the United States is aiding Chinese development and helping China achieve a new position of significant power. But how should we measure this power? Economically, GDP is not useful as a measure of overall Chinese economic strength. This is not only because Chinese per capita GDP is ranked 110th in the world, but also because there is little Chinese investment abroad and a great deal of foreign investment in China. Thus, in comparison with other developed countries, there is a large amount of "hidden wealth" in China that skews the GDP calculation. China's foreign currency reserves are huge because foreign investment in China must be made in RMB. …

Constitutional Design: Promoting Multi-Ethnic Democracy

Abstract: The crafting of democracy in a fragile and divided state, often ripped apart by internal conflict or buffeted by international and regional storms, is one of the most difficult and important tasks that international politicians face. The ever-deteriorating conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have been driven in large part by mistakes of institutional design in the immediate post-conflict period. Implementing a well-crafted constitution tailored to the peculiarities of a divided nation state is not the solution to ethnic conflict. However, there has never been an enduring peace settlement in which a well-designed, multi-ethnic government was not central. Designing a suitable democracy is a necessary, if not sufficient, prerequisite for stability in a divided society. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] A democracy is an interconnected web of political institutions chosen by and beholden to the voters who fall under its laws and regulations. But that web must be tethered to the distinct cultural, historical, and social threads that bind a state together. A post-conflict constitution needs to reflect traditional ways of making decisions, dominant power centers in villages and cities, and the scope of ethnic divisions--in both their intensity and root causes. A constitution stipulates the ground rules of the democratic game. Thus I shall use the terms "constitutional design" and "democratic design" interchangeably, although a constitution necessarily speaks to issues beyond the scope and derivation of institutions of governance. A good constitution is a pillar of interethnic harmony, but it is only one pillar. Even when constitutional designers are successful, the new state can be thrown back into violence and chaos by regional conflict or meddling neighbors. But when it comes to building stability and managing ethnic conflict, well-crafted political structures are the best way of dealing with communal conflicts existing within nation states. A credible and well-developed constitution assuages minority fears and feelings of alienation. In a divided society there are two elements of building ethnic stability. First, each significant ethnic group must feel included and acknowledged in the running of the state. Second, weaker groups and individuals must be protected. It is quite possible for a state to include a minority group in government while not protecting the rights of that group. Alternatively, a state can protect but not acknowledge the minority voice when making decisions of governance. A state can have one without the other, but true ethnic accommodation requires both. Protection is ultimately legal, yet inclusion is a crucial characteristic of good--and workable--politics. Thus I will focus here on the constitutional elements which can manifest inclusion. Democratic Design in Afghanistan and Iraq With such burgeoning instability in both Afghanistan and Iraq, one might pose the question: How central is domestic constitutional design to the future of Afghanistan and Iraq? It certainly could be argued that defeating the insurgencies, eliminating corruption, and rebuilding each country's socioeconomic infrastructure are more pressing problems than imperfect elections and legislative maneuvers. But in fact, the emergence of workable democratic political structures has been central to both states' survival since the US-led occupations, and without attention to institutional design, democratic slippage may doom both countries to increasing fragmentation and violence. A vacuum of legitimate political power, if allowed, will set the stage for insurgency and instability. The situation in Afghanistan remains a highly complex mosaic of age-old ethnic enmities, power plays, and struggles over religion, nationhood, and wealth. These tensions permeate the state's political discourse and particularly come to a head in debates over how democracy in Afghanistan should be crafted, who will receive power, how leaders will be chosen, and how their power, once bequeathed, will be restrained. …

The Good Neighbor: Why China Cooperates

Abstract: For much of Communist China's existence, ideology and revolution were cornerstones of the country's domestic and foreign policies. While aid and support was given to radical groups in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, wars were fought against India in 1962 and against the Soviet Union in 1969 because of trivial land disputes. The People's Republic of China (PRC) thus gained the reputation of an unstable and chaotic neighbor. The unpredictability of pre-1976 Chinese foreign policy was epitomized by the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1960s and rapprochement with the "great capitalist devil," the United States, in the early 1970s. However, in 1976, the death of the PRC's first leader, Mao Zedong, led to the ascension of Deng Xiaoping, a visionary who aimed to lead China on a path of pragmatism and economic growth in which foreign policy became less confrontational. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] The ascension of Deng Xiaoping in 1979-1980 meant that Chinese foreign and domestic policy was no longer dictated by political ideology but instead by practicality. Deng's "Four Modernizations," emphasized the growth of agriculture, industry, military might, and science over previous concerns regarding perpetual revolution and class struggle. This about-face meant that stability and economic growth would become the top priorities for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as the CCP could no longer rely on revolutionary ideology to legitimize government rule. More importantly, this pragmatic attitude led to economic liberalization and opened the Chinese economy to the global marketplace, permanently linking the fate of the CCP to its foreign policy. As the Chinese economy rapidly expanded, it became more dependent on international trade and began to prioritize stable diplomatic relations in order to ensure economic growth. The importance of maintaining healthy and constructive relationships with other nations, especially the United States and China's neighbors, ensured that China has often had to adopt an accommodating and non-assertive stance on many international issues. For example, in a 2005 article published in International Security on China's compromises and territorial disputes, political scientist Taylor Fravel found that China "has offered substantial compromises in most of these settlements, usually receiving less than 50 percent of the contested land." Furthermore, China has tried hard to convince both its neighbors and the world that it is intent on rising peacefully by joining and encouraging multilateral organizations and also by working with the United States on issues such as terrorism and trade. However, China's recent military modernization, as exemplified by the anti-satellite missile testing in January 2007, has led many observers to claim that China will become more assertive and aggressive in its foreign policy in the near future, especially with regard to Taiwan, Japan, and the United States. With a restless population that is often riled up by nationalistic propaganda, it is possible that the CCP will turn toward aggressive means in order to ensure survival. But even as it seems that China will begin to assert itself further in international arenas, it is easy to forget that the legitimacy and ultimate survival of the CCP rests on economic growth that is highly dependent on trade, foreign investments, and access to natural resources and foreign technology. As a result of these strong economic incentives, Chinese foreign policy will largely remain pragmatic and diplomatic. Regional Multilateralism: Means to an End With the Chinese economy growing at breakneck speed, the larger Asian economy has become intertwined with Chinese development. Raw materials and capital flow into China, and cheap manufactured goods from China propel the service sectors of the other Asian economies. In Northeast Asia, China recently became both Japan's and South Korea's primary trading partner, with commerce likely to pick up with the passage of a looming trade agreement between the Chinese and the South Koreans. …

The Oil Weapon: Can It Be Used Today?

Abstract: In 1973 the Arab oil-exporting countries stunned the world by announcing that they were cutting oil production and placing an oil embargo on the United States and the Netherlands. Now, 35 years later, fears about the security of oil supplies are provoking concern that Iran or a similarly hostile country might have recourse to some form of the oil weapon again. However, upon examination of the historical precedent--the use of the oil weapon in 1973 and 1974--it becomes clear that the oil weapon is a blunt instrument that cannot be applied in a focused manner for any sustained period. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] The Oil Weapon of 1973-1974 On October 16, 1973, an OPEC committee consisting of the oil ministers of the six Gulf member countries (United Arab Emirates, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) announced that they would unilaterally increase the posted price of Arabian Light, the marker crude, from US$3.011 per barrel to US$5.119--an increase of 70 percent. This price decision was the first phase of what became known in the developed world as the "oil price shock." The next day, the five Arab members of the OPEC committee were joined in Kuwait by the oil ministers of Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, and Syria. Although the meeting included all the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), it was not convened as an OAPEC Council of Ministers, but rather as a Conference of Arab Oil Ministers. Indeed, the purpose of the meeting was political rather than economic, and fell outside the OAPEC remit. The ministers were trying to agree on how to use the oil weapon to persuade the United States to reconsider its "blind and unlimited support for Israel" and to force the evacuation of occupied territories. The October, Yom Kippur, or Ramadan War (which, like the English Channel, has different names depending on which side of the divide one stands) had begun on October 6, 1973. But Arab frustrations with the Israeli refusal to evacuate occupied territories and implement a number of UN resolutions had been deepening even before the war. These frustrations had been aggravated on a number of occasions by perceptions that the United States was perpetually standing behind Israel in total indifference to the Arab plight. The idea that an oil weapon might be used to shake US indifference was introduced in 1971 and 1972, and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia went so far as to issue a warning in a meeting held with top executives of the Aramco parent companies (Exxon, Socal, Texaco, and Mobil) in Geneva on May 23, 1973. The message was that the United States might "lose everything" unless it changed its policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. The possibility of a cutback in oil production was mentioned again in subsequent press interviews. The meeting of the ten Arab oil ministers in Kuwait on October 17 produced, with remarkable speed, a resolution detailing the steps to be taken. Nine countries signed the resolution. Iraq was the only one to decline, as it strongly preferred the nationalization of oil concessions to the use of the oil weapon. At this meeting, it was determined that the oil weapon would be deployed as follows: the nine signatory countries would reduce their oil production forthwith by at least 5 percent from the actual September 1973 levels, "with a similar reduction to be applied each successive month, computed on the basis of the previous month's production." Care would also be taken to ensure that friendly states would not be affected by the reduction. The production cuts would continue until Israel evacuated the occupied territories and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people were restored. The decision on the production cut was then modified on November 4. Production cuts were raised to 25 percent below the September level, to be implemented in November. This was to be followed by a further 5 percent reduction in December. …

Exploiting Ethnicity: Political Elites and Domestic Conflict

Abstract: Self-serving, perceptive elites tend to exploit ethnic conflict for their own personal benefit. In times of political and social upheaval, when insecurity prevails, ethnic leaders take advantage of uncertainty to consolidate their power and provide benefits to their groups. Two conditions exacerbate this process: democratization and diaspora support. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Ted Gurr of the University of Maryland challenges the prevailing notion that conflict emerges when states collapse into anarchy. He has argued that the so-called "Third Wave" of democratization, which swept through Africa and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, led to ethnic upheavals because institutional change created the opportunities for groups to more openly pursue their objectives. However, I would argue that violent conflict involves a crisis of legitimacy in which both state and society become arenas for open conflict and reform-minded leaders lose ground to ethnic nationalists through the electoral process. In Yugoslavia, for example, the careful balance of power between Croats, Serbs, and Bosnians was torn asunder by self-serving bases of power controlled by ethnic elites. The situation then spiraled into conflict between the Serbs, who dominated Yugoslavia's weak political institutions, and the Croats and Bosnians, who moved to counteract the Serbs by attempting to wrest control and territory from the center of the country. Thus, an important condition for the escalation of ethnic conflict is the relentless pursuit of ethnic goals under conditions of democratization, combined with the failure of reform-minded political leadership to anticipate and resolve disputes before they devolve into violence. Such leaders often lack the necessary skills and resources to resolve disputes peacefully. Ethnic leaders take advantage of this by exploiting group differences for short-term political gains and encouraging radicalized politics and violent conflict. Fueling Ethnic Violence Aside from democratization, there are other significant factors that fuel ethnic conflict. Perhaps the most significant of these is financial support from diaspora communities. The transformation of the political arena into a series of narrow bands of ethnic sensibility results in a situation in which ethnic leaders face a basic tradeoff in strategy. On the one hand, they must establish a power base that is broad and inclusive enough to fend off potential reform-minded challengers. On the other hand, in order to maintain support from extremists factions, leaders must demonstrate their unwillingness to compromise on fundamental security issues. They generally reconcile these two strategies by lobbying for support from diaspora groups. More often than not, these groups hold the most extreme positions on questions of ethnic survival, yet their strength does not threaten a leader's power base. Diaspora finance is thus a fundamental component to the success of ethnic elites. Surprisingly, diaspora remittances far outweigh Official Development Assistance. The World Bank estimated that in 2005, remittances reached an all-time annual high of over US$230 billion. Another World Bank study indicated that post-settlement ethnic conflicts have a higher probability of reverting to war when a large proportion of the diaspora lives in the United States. The financial support of diaspora groups, many of whom still cling to their ethnic prejudices, was found to be vital in supporting armed groups and precipitating this reversion to war. To be sure, not all remittances are directed toward fueling ethnic fires abroad. But the basic problem with fungible resources like financial flows is that, in the absence of complete information about who should be supported, funds are often distributed indiscriminately. Framed in this context, ethnic conflict brings benefits to ethnic leaders. For example, conflict plays an important role in ensuring group cohesion. …

Effective Sanctions: Incentives and UN-US Dynamics

Abstract: As a means for responding to a wide array of national security concerns and violations of international norms, economic sanctions have occupied an increasingly prominent place in the tool kit of US policymakers. Ever since the United States championed UN Security Council Resolution 661 to expel Iraq from Kuwait in August 1990, it has imposed sanctions to restore democratically elected governments, protect human rights, extradite international fugitives, and end inter-state and civil wars. Especially after the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has employed more specialized smart sanctions, both on its own and in conjunction with the UN Security Council, to combat what many claim to be the most serious contemporary threat to US and global security--the spread of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Although practitioners and politicians continue to resort to sanctions to punish wrongdoers, critical assessments of sanctions continue to be quite mixed. Some lament the limited success rate of sanctions, which most analysts consider to be 33 percent or lower. Others worry that Congressional trade and aid restrictions combine with UN-mandated sanctions to create a sanctions "epidemic" in US foreign and economic policy. And yet, sanctions techniques have become increasingly effective. This trend can be attributed to a number of mutually reinforcing realities. First, policymakers from the United States and the international community now recognize those factors in sanctions formulation and implementation that lead to success. Second, the development of sharpened sanctions techniques--so-called "smart sanctions"--has replaced comprehensive trade sanctions. These provide states and international organizations with greater versatility of coercive economic measures while limiting the unanticipated humanitarian damage that sanctions can bring. Third, the success of sanctions necessitates astute consideration and management of the complex, symbiotic relationship that has emerged between the United States and the UN Security Council. This demands a coordinated strategy that balances sanctions and incentives as complementary tools designed to pressure and encourage delinquent states into changing their behavior. Designing Successful Sanctions The dozens of sanctions cases implemented since 1990 resulted in an impression of the international community as having a good idea of how to guarantee the success of a given sanction. Four considerations are particularly instructive for designing effective policies. First, in this age of globalization, unilateral sanctions seldom succeed--multilateral support and cooperation are essential to the success of sanctions. In fact, when international (United Nations), regional (such as the European Union), and national authorities coordinate their actions to effectively monitor and enforce sanctions, target compliance increases significantly. Second, sanctions as a means of punishment and isolation rarely succeed. Indeed, sanctions form only half of the mix of mechanisms needed to alter the behavior of stubborn targets. Positive inducements--the proverbial carrots of international economic and political relations--are a necessary complement to the sticks of a sanctions strategy. This is especially true in complex cases such as the control of weapons proliferation. Third, sanctions succeed when they are a component of a larger foreign or international policy with multiple tools that collectively serve a specified end. When sanctions are the policy or are maintained for so long that they, de facto, become the policy, then they are no longer effective. This was the trap that the United States and United Nations fell into with sanctions against Iraq during the 1990s. Finally, the structure of sanctions must be clear and credible. …

Power and Interdependence: Uncertainties of Greek-Turkish Rapprochement

Abstract: Relations between the Greeks and the Turks often seem to be characterized by antagonism, suspicion, and historical enmity. The two neighboring states have frequently been at odds over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus, and the two peoples share a mutual distrust as a result of a bitter history and competing interests. Yet Greece and Turkey have also experienced periods of interaction and cooperation, which have derived from geographic proximity and a growing sense of interdependence. Following intense post-cold war competition, Greece and Turkey have adopted a policy of rapprochement that began in 1999. They have signed numerous bilateral agreements and are building economic and cultural links. In addition, the prospect of Turkey's accession to the European Union, however distant and uncertain, provides some hope for more cooperation in the future between these two historical enemies. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Although security concerns are still a source of tension between Greece and Turkey, growing ties between the business, civil society, and cultural sectors of the two countries are beginning to ease competition. At the same time, the impact of the European Union is increasingly felt in the business climate, and the relationship between the two states is becoming ever more entangled with the future of Turkey as a part of Europe. The decision of both countries to Europeanize their bilateral differences could have two conflicting outcomes. On one hand, it might facilitate the process of rapprochement in the spirit of European integration, and on the other, it could complicate and deteriorate the process under the shadow of European introversion and enlargement fatigue. Thus, it is important to analyze the Greek-Turkish relationship in light of the latest bilateral developments and the European Union's engagement with the region. Emerging Cooperation Amid Unsolved Issues For most of the 20th century, relations between Greece and Turkey were defined by the politics of hard power, with national security interests dominating the agenda of their respective foreign policies. Since the early 1970s, the most divisive matters concerned the delimitation of continental shelf and territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, the control of airspace, and the militarization of the Greek islands. The episode over the Aegean islets of Imia/Kardak in 1996 brought the two countries to the verge of war. In effect, parts of the Aegean Sea and its airspace have developed into contested borders with no imminent possibility for agreement. Even the means of solving the dispute differ from one country to the other. Greece recognizes only the dispute over the continental shelf and claims that the disagreement should be resolved at the International Court of Justice, in accordance with existing international law. Turkey looks at all bilateral matters as a package and favors bilateral negotiations and bargaining. One major bilateral concern has to do with what Greece assumes to be a violation of its airspace by Turkish air fighters. Turkey rejects the ten-mile airspace claimed by Greece, arguing that Greece is only entitled to a six-mile airspace. Therefore it sends its aircraft as close as six miles from the Greek coast. This practice often results in aircraft incidents between the two states, which have become somewhat of a routine. To keep its military at the state of alertness necessary to catch up with the militarily superior Turkey, Greece spends between 4.5 and 5 percent of its GDP on military expenditures--the highest such percentage in Europe. Bilateral relations become even more complex with the inclusion of the Cyprus dispute, which has been affecting Greek-Turkish relations with unabated intensity since the 1950s. The list of non-settled bilateral issues also includes problems which are remnants of the Ottoman past. Against the background of unsolved political and historical strife, a positive climate of cooperation in the business, trade, cultural, and civil society sectors has been developing since 1999. …

Molding the Middle Class: Kenya's Path to Greater Economic Growth

Abstract: An announcement by Kenya's Central Bank indicating that the country had experienced 5.8 percent economic growth in 2006 was dismissed by the media and the government opposition as political propaganda. Under former President Daniel Arap Moi's government in the late 1990s, Kenya's economic growth fluctuated from negative values to highs of 2.3 percent. In spite of an upturn in economic growth, however, other indicators were not as promising. The number of people unable to afford 2,250 calories per day hit a staggering 14.4 million out of a population of 32 million. This represented an increase in poverty levels from 47 to 53 percent in rural areas and 29 to 49 percent in urban areas. Despite these signs of increased poverty levels, Kenyans have sent a strong signal to the government that they would like to control and take over state-owned corporations. This was manifested in the overwhelming response received when Kenya Generating Electricity Company offered shares to the public; shares were over-subscribed by 233 percent. Scan Group, a privately owned company that floated shares to the public, was also over-subscribed by 521 percent. The Nairobi Stock Exchange has witnessed a beehive of activity in recent months, with many ordinary Kenyans moving to invest in shares. The Kenyan middle class constitutes the majority of the people investing in ordinary shares in the Nairobi Stock Market. The middle class population, coupled with remittances from Kenyans in diaspora that constitute an estimated US$700 million, has played a crucial role in the growth of the economy. Another key factor has been the entry of China and India as major players in the global economy. It is estimated that Africa as a whole has witnessed a five percent increase in economic activity due to China and India's quests for raw materials in Africa. However, ending dependence of economic growth on the export of raw materials poses one of the continent's greatest challenges. Africans have no reason to settle for economies that are driven by raw-material export after three centuries of being in contact with wealthier civilizations. Continuing this type of relationship with developed countries will limit the ability of local entrepreneurs to diversify their local industrial bases and offer products in the global market. Kenyans wanting to own shares in businesses run by the government is a sure indicator that if given a chance, Africans would be eager to invest in value-added industries. Kenyan government policymakers ought to give their citizens the opportunity to stem the tide of raw-material exports to emerging and developed economies by creating an environment that rewards business initiatives. Instead of engaging in agricultural, mining, and service-oriented industries, African governments should facilitate their citizens' ownership of such industries. They could do so by offering shares in already existing enterprises and opening their markets to new competitors. Addressing Poverty In order to fight poverty, Africans must not wait for others to generate wealth for them. Each aspect of government failure in service delivery has the potential to turn into a business opportunity. For instance, in areas that receive sufficient rainfall, individuals can invest as little as US$300 to protect springs and ensure for the clean provision of water. Clean water will not only keep populations from incurring the expenses caused by water-borne diseases, but will also provide jobs for rural people in water services. A similar approach can be used in the fight against diseases such as malaria. Individuals need US$800 to purchase pumps for indoor spraying, certified chemical sachets, protective gear, and spray against mosquitoes. After this expenditure, individuals would earn an estimated US$5 per sprayed house. Tackling poverty effectively requires transforming the 70 percent subsistence-farmer population into a society with a substantial middle and upper class. …

India's Way: Crafting Special Economic Zones

Abstract: In June 2005, the Indian government passed an act intended to significantly increase exports by legalizing the creation of numerous Special Economic Zones (SEZs). These zones are designed to increase economic growth and lure foreign investment with incentives such as tax exemptions and industrial business parks. SEZs have existed in Asia for many years now, and their success in China prompted India to introduce the same policy in 2000. As India embarks on its own SEZ program, it should study China's policies and success, but it must be wary of a wholesale importation of China's methods. India must acknowledge and take into account the vast differences between the two countries when crafting its own policies. India has already experienced significant economic growth and is projected to become the world's third major economic power within the next two decades. Despite this prosperity, however, a full 10 percent of India's population is unemployed. India's government seeks to reduce that figure through the implementation of SEZs by compensating farmers for lost land and creating jobs through the private companies that will be moving into the zones. India first introduced the idea of its SEZs in 2000 and initiated the logistical program last year. Its success is now evident; the current 15 SEZs maintain US$780 million in investment and have created over 100,000 jobs. Despite these achievements, however, India's growth and development are overshadowed by China's phenomenal success with its own SEZs, which have become hugely prosperous since their creation in 1980. Shenzhen, the biggest and first of China's six zones, annually exports more than the total export volume of India and has developed from a small fishing village into one of the world's most rapidly growing cities. Its economy grew at an average annual rate of 16.3 percent from 2001 to 2005. While Shenzhen is the most successful, all six Chinese SEZs have prospered due to certain shared characteristics such as prime locations along China's coastline, very large sizes, and government-driven initiatives. It is the success of these Chinese zones that provided the initial enthusiasm for similar enclaves in India. China's relative success gives reason for India to study its counterpart's policies, and in certain circumstances, adopt similar efforts. For example, unlike China, India offers a blanket tax exemption to companies for the first five years of production. …