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JournalISSN: 0017-8322

Hastings Law Journal 

University of California, Hastings College of the Law
About: Hastings Law Journal is an academic journal. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Supreme court & Statute. It has an ISSN identifier of 0017-8322. Over the lifetime, 1264 publications have been published receiving 8544 citations. The journal is also known as: The Hastings law journal.


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Journal Article
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the game theoretic approach underlying the Prisoner's Dilemma, which has traditionally served as the theoretical basis for the race-to-the-bottom rationale, leads to the opposite result: inefficient allocations, suboptimal environmental standards, and reduced overall welfare.
Abstract: Of the numerous theoretical rationales used to justify federal environmental regulation, perhaps the most broadly compelling is the argument that without such regulation, states would engage in a welfare-reducing \"race-to-the-bottom\" in environmental standard-setting. Recently, in the wake of a widely cited article by Professor Richard Revesz, scholars are questioning the very existence of a race-to-the-bottom in environmental standard-setting. Swimming against the tide of prior scholarship, these revisionist critics contend that the effects of state competition upon state environmental standard-setting are welfare-enhancing, rather than welfare-reducing. The theoretical basis for their arguments is neoclassical economics, according to which each state's individual rational pursuit of its own best interest, when set in the context of an ideally competitive playing field, leads to socially optimal allocations between environmental amenities and material goods. In contrast, under the game theoretic approach underlying the Prisoner's Dilemma, which has traditionally served as the theoretical basis for the race-to-the-bottom rationale, the very same behavior assumed in the revisionist' neoclassical model - rational pursuit by individual states of their own best interest - leads to the opposite result: inefficient allocations, suboptimal environmental standards, and reduced overall welfare. This article argues that (1) the preponderance of the evidence available at this time supports game theoretic approaches for understanding interstate conflicts over simple neoclassical frameworks; and (2) even if a neoclassical framework is used, evidence suggests that the interstate market for industrial development and environmental benefits is substantially distorted. Indeed, this article argues that the neoclassical model, when combined with empirical realities, tends to undermine the claim that interstate competition leads to efficiency, indicating instead that such competition in the real world is presumptively detrimental to social welfare. Thus, there is little reason to believe that state environmental standards established in the absence of a federal framework will be optimal.

134 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: The Sherman Act (1890) prohibits conspiracies to create monopolies and anticompetitive conduct, and the Clayton Act (1914) regulates mergers (Hylton) as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Antitrust law consists primarily of three federal laws: The Sherman Act (1890) prohibits conspiracies to create monopolies and anticompetitive conduct. The Clayton Act (1914) regulates mergers (Hylton). The Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) created the Federal Trade Commission and regulates advertising and other interstate competition (DOJ). Cases related to these laws are either decided using the “reasonable rule” which requires the plaintiff prove that defendants’ actions created an “unreasonable” restriction of competition in the market; or by the per se rule which infers the conduct and intent of the defendant based on their actions’ result (Hovenkamp).

130 citations

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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Journal in previous years
YearPapers
20212
202010
201914
201812
201720
201621