Showing papers in "Humana.Mente in 2010"

Time Really Passes

Abstract: It is common to dismiss the passage of time as illusory since its passage has not been captured within modern physical theories. I argue that this is a mistake. Other than the awkward fact that it does not appear in our physics, there is no indication that the passage of time is an illusion.

From Timeless Physical Theory to Timelessness

Abstract: This paper addresses the extent to which both Julian Barbour's Machian formulation of general relativity and his interpretation of canonical quantum gravity can be called timeless. We differentiate two types of timelessness in Barbour's (1994a, 1994b and 1999c). We argue that Barbour's metaphysical contention that ours is a timeless world is crucially lacking an account of the essential features of time-an account of what features our world would need to have if it were to count as being one in which there is time. We attempt to provide such an account through considerations of both the representation of time in physical theory and in orthodox metaphysical analyses. We subsequently argue that Barbour's claim of timelessness is dubious with respect to his Machian formulation of general relativity but warranted with respect to his interpretation of canonical quantum gravity. We conclude by discussing the extent to which we should be concerned by the implications of Barbour's view.

Metaphysical language, ordinary and Peter van Inwagen's Material Beings

Abstract: Material Beings is an immensely important work in contemporary metaphysics,even though hardly any metaphysicians accept its central conclusion. (Manyworks of contemporary metaphysics are like this: metaphysicians are adisputatious lot). There is a lot of value in Material Beings about themetaphysics of parts and wholes, material addressing the metaphysics ofexistence over time, puzzles about existence of people over time, and asurprising defence, in the final two chapters of the book, of abandoningclassical logic in metaphysics in favour of a three valued logic. In thiscommentary, however, I will focus on what I take to be the main conclusion ofthe book, what van Inwagen says to sugar the pill of this conclusion, and a newproblem that arises for van Inwagen’s theory which is very similar to the sort ofproblem he is at such pains to solve. Finally, I suggest that reflection on thisnew problem raises an epistemic challenge to van Inwagen’s position.

Physics and Metaphysics: Interaction or Autonomy?

Abstract: In this paper it is argued that if physics is to become a coherent metaphysics of nature, it needs an interpretation, namely (i) a clear formulation of its ontological/metaphysical claims and (ii) and a precise understanding of how such claims are related to the world of our experience, which is the most important reservoir of traditional, merely aprioristic metaphysical speculations. Such speculations − especially if conducted in full autonomy from physics, or imposed upon it “from the outside” − risk to turn analytic metaphysics into a “rigorous” but fully sterile intellectual game.

Not Particles, Not Quite Fields: An Ontology for Quantum Field Theory

Abstract: There are significant problems involved in determining the ontology of quantum field theory (QFT). An ontology involving particles seems to be ruled out due to the problem of defining localized position operators, issues involving interactions in QFT, and, perhaps, the appearance of unitarily inequivalent representations. While this might imply that fields are the most natural ontology for QFT, the wavefunctional interpretation of QFT has significant drawbacks. A modified field ontology is examined where determinables are assigned to open bounded regions of spacetime instead of spacetime points.

String Theory: Physics or Metaphysics?

Abstract: I will give arguments for why the enormous progress made during the last century on understanding elementary particles and their fundamental interactions suggests strings as the truly elementary constituents of Nature. I will then address the issue of whether the string paradigm can in principle be falsified or whether it should be considered as mere metaphysics.

Physics and Metaphysics

Abstract: It is notoriously difficult to define Metaphysics1, its content, its method, its language, its scope. Thus I will not even try an attempt here. I will rest content to point out some widely held characterizations. A long and highly influential tradition maintains that Metaphysics is the study of being qua being. It is concerned with what there is, what kind of things are the things that there are, what properties do they have, how they are related. In this sense Metaphysics deals with the more general features of reality, the most fundamental categories of being. Call this tradition General Metaphysics.